Ott v. Johnson

3 Citing cases

  1. Underwood v. Waddell, (S.D.Ind. 1990)

    743 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D. Ind. 1990)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that a sheriff had the authority to terminate a chief deputy even though a statute only expressly gave the sheriff the power to hire a chief deputy because "the general rule throughout this country is that the power to hire necessarily and implicitly carries with it the power to fire, No authority to the contrary has been located"

    As a result, though not specifically addressed by the parties, the Court must look to the tools of statutory construction to determine what import the statute shall be given. Ott v. Johnson, 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1974) (if statute is ambiguous, courts can search for legislative intent); Daugherty v. State, 466 N.E.2d 46, 52 (Ind.App. 1984) (same); Siddell v. Review Bd of Indiana Emp. Sec. Division, 428 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind.App. 1981) (same). After considering the matter and invoking the relevant canons of construction, this Court determines that the county sheriffs do, in fact, have the power to hire and fire their chief deputies at will.

  2. Steup v. Ind. Hous. Fin. Auth

    273 Ind. 72 (Ind. 1980)   Cited 31 times
    Finding law providing tax exemption for Indiana Housing Finance Authority constitutional because the Authority was not a private corporation, but a state instrumentality operating for a legitimate public purpose

    Appellants cannot attack a negative decision on the ground that there was a lack of evidence to sustain the judgment. Ott v. Johnson, (1974) 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622. The evidence which appellants claim mandates conclusions of law contrary to the trial court's findings is of no moment given our determination that the benefits derived by private individuals are incidental to the furtherance of a legitimate public purpose.

  3. Romack v. State

    446 N.E.2d 1346 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that only weight of "pure" substance could be used for enhancement

    It is well-established that where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts may not substitute language they feel the legislature intended. See Whitacre v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 1202; Ott v. Johnson, (1974) 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622; Smiley v. State Department of Revenue, (1981) Ind. App., 416 N.E.2d 855. The only compounds and mixtures contemplated by the statutory definition are narcotic ones; to ignore statutory rules of construction and conclude otherwise would allow the courts to apply the penalty enhancement unconstitutionally.