It has been consistently held in Indiana that judicial construction of a statute is permissible only where the statute is ambiguous and of doubtful meaning. Bowen v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, (1977) [173] Ind. App. [166] 362 N.E.2d 1178; Ott v. Johnson, (1974) 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622; 26 I.L.E., Statutes, ยง 101. If the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial interpretation is inappropriate and the courts will adopt the meaning clearly expressed. Bowen, supra; Town of Merrillville v. Lincoln Utilities, Inc., (1976) [171] Ind. App. [224] 355 N.E.2d 851. If however, a statute is ambiguous and its meaning is not clear from the words used, judicial construction is proper.
However, it is not for this court to weigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court was not contrary to law in that there was evidence from which reasonable men could have concluded that Frankfort did not exercise due care for his own safety when he walked from in front of the parked Indiana Bell service truck into the path of the oncoming vehicle being driven by Owens. Pokraka v. Lummus Co. (1952), 230 Ind. 523, 104 N.E.2d 669; Ott v. Johnson (1974), Ind. App., 307 N.E.2d 523. ISSUE THREE:
Zeppenfeld v. Franklin Motor Service Co., supra; Kissel v. Lewis, supra. See: Ott v. Johnson (1974), 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622, 624. "The essence of a private nuisance is the fact that one party is using his property to the detriment of the use and enjoyment of the property of another."