Ott v. Johnson

33 Citing cases

  1. Briles v. Wurtsbaugh

    530 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 1 times

    Secondly, it must be recalled that it is our duty to give effect to the plain and manifest meaning of the language used by the legislature. Ott v. Johnson (1974), 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622. `It is only when the language of the statute is ambiguous that the courts should search for legislative intent.'

  2. Gerrish v. Applegate

    526 N.E.2d 993 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)

    Secondly, it must be recalled that it is our duty to give effect to the plain and manifest meaning of the language used by the legislature. Ott v. Johnson (1974), 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622. `It is only when the language of the statute is ambiguous that the courts should search for legislative intent.'

  3. Bodine v. Hiler

    463 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 6 times

    Secondly, it must be recalled that it is our duty to give effect to the plain and manifest meaning of the language used by the legislature. Ott v. Johnson (1974), 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622. "It is only when the language of the statute is ambiguous that the courts should search for legislative intent."

  4. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. McShane

    170 Ind. App. 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 31 times
    In Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. McShane (1976), 170 Ind. App. 586, 354 N.E.2d 259, trans. denied, the court held that a court may not attempt to control an agency's valid execution of its discretionary powers or to substitute its judgment for that of the agency's in matters within the realm of the agency's delegated authority.

    There also exists Indiana precedent that for a private claimant to maintain an action for violation of a general public right or for protection of a public interest, he must show some [3] special individual injury other than that sustained by the public in general. See Greene, Mayor v. Holmes (1929), 201 Ind. 123, 129, 166 N.E. 281; Ott v. Johnson (1974), Ind. App., 307 N.E.2d 523, 527, reversed on other grounds, (1974), 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622, 624. Applying these rules to these plaintiffs, none of them had the requisite standing to sue.

  5. Underwood v. Waddell, (S.D.Ind. 1990)

    743 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D. Ind. 1990)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that a sheriff had the authority to terminate a chief deputy even though a statute only expressly gave the sheriff the power to hire a chief deputy because "the general rule throughout this country is that the power to hire necessarily and implicitly carries with it the power to fire, No authority to the contrary has been located"

    As a result, though not specifically addressed by the parties, the Court must look to the tools of statutory construction to determine what import the statute shall be given. Ott v. Johnson, 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1974) (if statute is ambiguous, courts can search for legislative intent); Daugherty v. State, 466 N.E.2d 46, 52 (Ind.App. 1984) (same); Siddell v. Review Bd of Indiana Emp. Sec. Division, 428 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind.App. 1981) (same). After considering the matter and invoking the relevant canons of construction, this Court determines that the county sheriffs do, in fact, have the power to hire and fire their chief deputies at will.

  6. In re Whyte

    164 B.R. 976 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993)   Cited 2 times

             Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court may not substitute language which it feels that the legislative body may have intended. Ott v. Johnson, 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1974). It is not within the province of the court to expand or contract the meaning of a statute by reading into it language which arguably will correct any supposed omissions or defects.

  7. Sloan v. State

    947 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 2011)   Cited 68 times
    Finding no double jeopardy violation because although the act occurred together, there was independent and distinct evidence of both penetration of vagina and fondling of breast

    Thus, this Court will not delve into legislative intent unnecessarily if no ambiguity exists. See Ott v. Johnson, 262 Ind. 548, 552, 319 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1974). The language of Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) is free of ambiguity.

  8. State v. Downey

    476 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1985)   Cited 69 times
    In Downey the court found that the particular language at issue ("may endanger" in a child neglect statute) did not "indicate a critical legislative choice or represent the resolution of important issues within the social problem involved."

    The word "may" means in some degree likely to. Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The word "may" expresses ability, possibility, or contingency. Ott v. Johnson (1974), 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622. Therefore, the statute must be read to proscribe placements which to some degree are likely to bring a dependent into a situation in which he is exposed to harm.

  9. Seymour Nat. Bank v. State

    422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. 1981)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that "[i]n cases of ambiguity, we may resort to subsequent amendments in order to glean the Legislature's intent"

    And, in cases where a statute is clear and unambiguous, we have no choice but to hold it to its plain meaning. E.g., Lindley v. State (1978) 268 Ind. 83, 373 N.E.2d 886; Ott v. Johnson (1974) 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622; Cheney v. State ex rel. Risk (1905) 165 Ind. 121, 74 N.E. 892. Moreover, even if we were to accept Plaintiffs' contention, we perceive the Legislature's amendment of Ind. Code § 34-4-16.5-3(7) as having a clarifying effect on the statute insofar as all acts of enforcement save false arrest and imprisonment now render the State immune.

  10. Steup v. Ind. Hous. Fin. Auth

    273 Ind. 72 (Ind. 1980)   Cited 31 times
    Finding law providing tax exemption for Indiana Housing Finance Authority constitutional because the Authority was not a private corporation, but a state instrumentality operating for a legitimate public purpose

    Appellants cannot attack a negative decision on the ground that there was a lack of evidence to sustain the judgment. Ott v. Johnson, (1974) 262 Ind. 548, 319 N.E.2d 622. The evidence which appellants claim mandates conclusions of law contrary to the trial court's findings is of no moment given our determination that the benefits derived by private individuals are incidental to the furtherance of a legitimate public purpose.