Reading the word "delivering" to require personal service would also render ineffective language in Rule 4. Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2012) (approving of use of certified mail to deliver subpoenas). Rule 4(e)(2) provides that one permissible method to serve an individual with a summons is by "delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally."

Discovery rulings are generally not "final" orders and, being interlocutory in nature, cannot be appealed as of right. The plaintiffs assert, however, that an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena is appealable under the "collateral order doctrine" where the order is directed against a non-party who would not have a means of appealing the order at the conclusion of the underlying litigation. In their supplemental brief, the plaintiffs describe the doctrine as an exception to the general rule against interlocutory appeals (Supplement at 1), but the Seventh Circuit explained in Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2012), that it is not. Rather, the doctrine subsumes a narrow set of orders that are immediately final because they "are conclusive, ... resolve important questions completely separate from the merits, and ... would render such important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action."

Denials of motions to dismiss rarely fit into those categories, but the government argues here that the denial of its motion to dismiss under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) was a "collateral order," not a final judgment but by a "practical construction" of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 still a "final decision" within its terms. See Ott v. City of Milwaukee , 682 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). We see no need to create a new category of appealable collateral orders.

on, 902 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................................ 1 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 908 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................... 11, 13, 14, 16 Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292 (D.Md. 1992) .................................................................................................. 13, 18 Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009) ....................................................................................................................... 2, 8 Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Larose, No. 18-4258, 2019 WL 259431 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2019) ............................................................... 1 Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................... 18, 19 Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................................................ 2 Reeder v. Madigan, 780 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2015) .......................................................................................................... 13 Rodriguez v. Pataki, 280 F. Supp. 2d 89 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ............................................................................................. 18 Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992) ........................................................................................................................... 3 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) ................................................................................................................. passim Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exchange Ass'n of Ill., Inc., 729 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1984) ........................................................................................................ 15 United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F

Neither Cates, nor Branch, nor Carr has been overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by a Supreme Court decision. AEA buttresses its argument by citing the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552, 553–55 (7th Cir.2012), which applied Mohawk and held that nonparty state agencies cannot immediately appeal a discovery order and instead must appeal from a contempt citation. We are obviously bound to follow our own precedent instead of Seventh Circuit case law.

Although the Supreme Court has refused to include discovery orders within the class of “collateral orders,” which are appealable though interlocutory, see, e.g., Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103, 130 S.Ct. 599, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009), it has made clear that mandamus provides a “safety valve” enabling appellate review of such an order in the exceptional case. Id. at 111, 130 S.Ct. 599; see Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552, 554–55 (7th Cir.2012). This is one of those rare “safety valve” cases for mandamus because of the risk of international complications arising from a U.S. judge's having ordered foreigners to be brought to the United States to be deposed, when there is no legal authority for such an order; because alternative sanctions are readily available; and because the particular sanction punishes innocents—the inventors whom the order requires Boehringer to fly to the United States to be deposed, rather than their being deposed in nearby Amsterdam as the parties had agreed.

“Collateral-order review is based on a practical construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1291; it is not an exception to the final-judgment rule.” Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making the collateral-order determination, we “do not engage in an ‘individualized jurisdictional inquiry.’ ” Mohawk Indus., 130 S.Ct. at 605 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)).

Defendant argues, in its Memorandum of Law in support of the Motion, that “[c]ertified mail is a valid means of effectuating service pursuant to R. 45(b)(1) as an agent of the postal service qualifies as a ‘person at least 18 years of age and not a party.'” (Doc. No. 21 at ECF p. 27 (quoting Ott v. Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2011)).

See, e.g., High Tech Nat'l, LLC v. Stead, Misc. No. 19-181, 2020 WL 3605286, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2020); Yelland v. Abington Heights Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-cv-2080, 2017 WL 4122465, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept 18, 2017); Jorden v. Glass, No. 09-1715, 2010 WL 3023347, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. July 23, 2010); N.J. Building Laborers Statewide Benefit Funds & Trs. Thereof v. Torchio Brothers, Inc., No. 08-552, 2009 WL 368364, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2009). Most of the cases following that minority rule involve service attempted by certified mail, see, e.g., Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2012), or other unusual circumstances not present here. See, e.g., Castillo v. Shippensburg Urban Developers, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-2236, 2021 WL 12313250, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2021) (allowing service by certified mail in a case in which there was evidence that the subpoenaed party had previously intentionally avoided service and had not responded to the government's motion to permit alternative service, despite a court directive to do so).

Seventh Circuit has held that personal service is not necessary for proper service under Rule 45 because certified mail through the United State Postal Service (USPS) is a “sensible option” that can help save costs in litigation. See Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 2012). When a party uses delivery options other than USPS certified mail or personal service