Opinion
Argued October 22, 1937 —
Decided January 26, 1938.
1. In construing the constitutional provision that every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title, the language of the title should be reasonably and liberally interpreted, and should not be technically or critically construed, nor should it be held insufficient unless the question is free from doubt.
2. Chapter 114 of the laws of 1934, entitled "An act concerning officers and employes and members of police and fire departments of counties and municipalities of this state," consists of four sections, the first three of which deal with the reinstatement of employes dismissed from employment as firemen or policemen entirely for reasons of economy, and obviously refer to members of those departments affected subsequent to the passage of the act, while the fourth section extends the benefits of the act to those in such departments who were removed or demoted before the act was passed. Held, that the title sufficiently indicates the legislative intent, and that it was not necessary to particularly refer in the title to the appointment of members of such municipal departments who had been discharged prior to the enactment and those who might be discharged afterwards.
On appeal from judgments of the Supreme Court entered on postea signed by Circuit Court Judge Ackerson, who filed the following opinion:
"Three informations in the nature of writs of quo warranto were filed by the relators, pursuant to section 1 of the Quo Warranto act (3 Comp. Stat., p. 4210), to test the right of the defendant Joseph J. Braddock to occupy the office of policeman in the police department of the township of North Bergen, in the county of Hudson, and of the defendants Oliver Chasmar, Jr., and Walter Lender, to occupy the offices of firemen in the fire department of said township. These three cases were duly consolidated and are submitted for decision by the court, without a jury, upon the pleadings and an agreed state of facts.
"The right of the defendants to occupy their respective offices depends upon the applicability and constitutionality of chapter 114, Pamph. L. 1934, p. 310, and particularly section 4 thereof. This act is the later of two statutes passed for the evident purpose of creating a preference in the matter of new appointments to or promotions in such departments in favor of persons previously dismissed or demoted for reasons of economy only.
"The first of these acts is chapter 148, Pamph. L. 1933, p. 299, which is entitled `An act concerning policemen and firemen of municipalities of this State,' and merely provides that `from and after the first day of January, 1933,' when any fireman or policeman is removed from the department in which he is employed for reasons of economy, he shall be placed on a special list and given preference thereafter in the event of new appointments.
"Evidently realizing that the scope and effect of this act was too limited, the legislature in the following year passed chapter 114, Pamph. L. 1934, p. 310, the title of which was enlarged to read as follows:
"`An act concerning officers and employes and members of police and fire departments of counties and municipalities of this State.'
"The first three sections of this later act are purely prospective and deal with the creation of a special list of those thereafter removed or demoted from offices or positions in such departments and requiring new appointments or promotions to be made from such list where possible.
"Section 4 of this act, on the other hand, extends the preferential benefits of the act to those in such departments who were removed or demoted before the act was adopted, and provides, inter alia, as follows:
"`In the event that any officer, employe or member of any such department has been heretofore demoted or removed solely on the ground of economy and for no other reason, in the case of new appointments to such departments the persons heretofore demoted or removed on the ground of economy shall first be reappointed to such department and to the rank from which he was removed if such rank is retained in such department.'
"The stipulated facts disclose that on December 30th, 1930, certain additional members were added to the police and fire departments of the township of North Bergen among them some of the relators herein. On June 3d 1931, the positions so created were abolished and the officers occupying them dismissed on the ground of economy and for no other reason as was held in Spears v. Board of Commissioners of North Bergen, 10 N.J. Mis. R. 962. On June 5th, 1936, the director of the department of public safety appointed the defendant Joseph J. Braddock as a patrolman of the police department of said municipality to fill a vacancy created by death. On the same day the defendant Oliver Chasmar, Jr., was similarly appointed to the fire department to fill a vacancy created by promotion, and on June 11th, 1937, the defendant Walter Lender was likewise appointed as a fireman to fill a vacancy created by death. None of said defendants had, previously to his appointment as aforesaid, been a member of the department to which he was appointed and had not held a position therein which was abolished for reasons of economy. It is conceded in the stipulated facts that at least two of the relators, whose positions as firemen were abolished as aforesaid, and at least one whose position as a policeman was also abolished, have always been and are at present qualified for re-appointment, and ready, able and willing to accept thereof.
"In this situation the fundamental question presented for solution is whether the defendants were lawfully appointed to their respective positions in June, 1936, while there were former occupants of such positions, who had been dismissed therefrom on June 3d 1931, for reasons of economy only, and who were and are qualified for reappointment, and ready, able and willing to serve?
"The correct answer to this question depends upon whether section 4 of Pamph. L. 1934, p. 331, heretofore quoted in full, was intended to apply to those who had been dismissed from or demoted in such departments before the legislation in question was adopted, and if so, whether, as to such persons, the 1934 act is unconstitutional as contravening article IV, section 7, paragraph 4 of our state constitution which provides that `to avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title."
"Section 4 of the 1934 act was patently intended to extend the preferential features of the act to those who had been removed from or demoted in such departments before its adoption, otherwise it is totally unnecessary and superfluous in the statute, as the first three sections thereof govern dismissals for reasons of economy taking place after its adoption and it would be pointless to add the fourth section to cover the same ground. The important words `heretofore demoted or removed,' occurring twice in this section refer to time before the passage of the act without any limitation whatsoever in its extent. Where, as here, an act is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the rule is fundamental that there is no room for judicial construction, since the language is presumed to evince the legislative intent. Rudderow v. West Jersey Ferry Co., 31 N.J.L. 512, 515; Douglas v. Freeholders, c., 38 Id. 214; State v. Brewster, 42 Id. 125; Heston v. Atlantic City, 93 Id. 317; In re City of Passaic, 94 Id. 384, 386.
"Since the body of the 1934 act is broad enough in its plain application to include in the classification for preferential appointment all persons removed from or demoted in such departments for reasons of economy at any time before the passage thereof, it remains to consider whether this feature of the act is unconstitutional as constituting an object not expressed in its title.
"As already noted, this title reads: `An act concerning officers and employes and members of police and fire departments,' c. The defendants contend that by its wording this title necessarily excludes, as the object of its operation, those who had formerly been officers, employes or members of such departments, but who were not such at the time of the passage of the act in question. They do not claim that this title is too general and comprehensive to render it effectual, but that it is too restrictive to include the persons contemplated by section 4 of the act, who had been dismissed from the departments in question prior to the adoption of the act, and that it is in this respect misleading and contrary to the aforesaid constitutional mandate.
"In considering this question certain well established rules of construction must be kept in mind. It is settled that in determining the sufficiency of the title of a statute under such a constitutional mandate, its language should be reasonably and liberally interpreted, and should not be technically or critically construed, nor should it be held insufficient unless the question is free from doubt. The rule is settled that a statute will not be judicially declared inoperative and unenforceable on this ground unless it is plainly in contravention of the constitutional mandate. Boorum v. Connelly, 66 N.J.L. 197; State, ex rel. Richards v. Hammer, 42 Id. 435; In re Public Utility Board, 83 Id. 303; Sauter v. Shoenthal, 83 Id. 499; Public Service Electric, c., Co. v. Camden, 118 Id. 245, 248; 59 C.J. 809, § 390. In this regard, statutory titles are to be liberally treated, so as to validate the law to which they appertain, if such course be reasonably practicable. In such connection hypercriticism is utterly out of place, the only requirement being that the title of the statute shall express its object in a general way so as to be intelligible to the ordinary reader. In re Haynes, 54 N.J.L. 6, 24; Public Service Electric, c., Co. v. Camden, supra.
"The title is a label not an index. Its function is to give notice of the effect of the legislation to one conversant with the existing state of the law, and its validity is not to be determined by nice distinctions of etymology or definitions of words, but by the facts of the case and the history of the legislation. All matters which are germane to and naturally connected with, the subject announced by the title of an act and not excluded thereby are covered by it and may validly be included in the statute, and in determining whether or not a provision is germane to the title a reasonable meaning should be given to the words and context of the provision. A title is not to be held bad merely because a better one might have been provided. Moore v. Burdett, 62 Id. 163; Sauter v. Shoenthal, supra; Ringer v. Paterson, 98 Id. 455; Public Service Electric, c., Co. v. Camden, supra; 59 C.J. 812.
"If the `heading' or general subject of a statute is fairly expressed in the title, the constitutional requirement is met. Public Service Electric, c., Co. v. Camden, supra. Where the subject of legislation is single, and is of a general character, all matters reasonably connected therewith, and appropriate to the achievement of the legislative object, may be embraced therein without infringing the constitutional interdict; and, by the same token, matters cognate to that object are not required to be expressly mentioned in the title. The title comprehends, within the signification of this constitutional provision, all matters embodied in the statute germane to the subject of the title, and not excluded thereby. Boorum v. Connelly, supra; Ringer v. Paterson, supra; Public Service Electric, c., Co. v. Camden, supra.
"Applying these well founded general rules of construction to the title in question, there can be no doubt that it meets the constitutional requirement here invoked.
"The general object of the act sub judice is to create a preferential group from which the personnel of police and fire departments are to be recruited in the first instance, and this group is made up of those who heretofore have been and those who hereafter may be removed from or demoted in the specified departments for reasons of economy. The makeup of the classification from which appointments to such departments are drawn, is merely incidental to the fundamental and underlying subject which is the protection and recruiting of the personnel of such departments, and is, therefore, germane to that subject as expressed in the title sub judice.
"This conclusion is obvious if we merely substitute the words `the personnel' in place of the words `officers and employes and members' in the title of this act. It would then read: `An act concerning the personnel of police and fire departments,' c. No one could logically contend that a provision in the body of an act so entitled setting up former service as a qualification for preferential consideration for future employment in such departments would run counter to the constitutional inhibition. If the present act were so entitled, how could section 4 thereof, as it now stands, be placed in any different category? If this is so, then the use of the words `officers and employes and members' instead of the words `the personnel' can make no difference, because it is such persons who make up the personnel of these departments.
"Furthermore the word `concerning' as used in this title, is sufficiently broad to be applicable to past, present or future `officers and employes and members' of the specified departments.
"Certainly an ordinary reader wishing to know whether there existed any preferential rights to appointments to positions in police and fire departments would not be misled by the title in question for he would naturally look for a title dealing with the personnel of such departments.
"The defendants rely upon the case of Davison v. Patten, 94 N.J.L. 338, to sustain their contention. But in that case an attempt was made by chapter 125, Pamph. L. 1919, to amend the so-called `Veterans act' of 1897, which applied in its title and body to `honorably discharged Union soldiers,' i.e., veterans of the civil war, by extending its scope to include honorably discharged soldiers, sailors and marines who had served in any other war, without properly amending the title to include such additional object. Naturally this amendment was unconstitutional. In the instant case, however, there is no attempt to amend any other statute, and the subject of the fourth section is germane to its title. The case of Heddon v. Hand, 90 N.J. Eq. 583, also cited by the defendants, is subject to the same infirmity.
"Since section 4 of chapter 114, Pamph. L. 1934, p. 310, applies to the office occupied by the defendant in each of the above entitled causes, I, therefore, find that the defendant Joseph J. Braddock has usurped, intruded into and unlawfully holds and exercises the office of policeman in the police department of the township of North Bergen in the county of Hudson; that the defendants Oliver Chasmar, Jr., and Walter Lender, have usurped, intruded into and unlawfully hold and exercise the offices of firemen, respectively, in the fire department of said township.
"A postea may be submitted in accordance with the aforesaid findings."
For the appellants, Nicholas S. Schloeder.
For the respondents, William Rubin.
The judgments are affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion of Judge Ackerson.
For affirmance — THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, PARKER, LLOYD, CASE, BODINE, DONGES, HEHER, PERSKIE, DEAR, WELLS, WOLFSKEIL, RAFFERTY, JJ. 13.
For reversal — None.