Opinion
7:24-cv-3714-JDA-BM
07-09-2024
Dorian Osment, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Andrew Christopher Lyons, Sheriff Steve Mueller, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRISTOW MARCHANT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, the undersigned concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard form seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the Cherokee County Detention Center. Id. at 2, 4. He contends that he brings this action for unlawful arrest because Defendant “Lyons locked [him] up under false assumption” without conducting a proper investigation. Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends the incident occurred on February 29, 2024, when he was arrested for grand larceny even though he “was nowhere around that area to commit this crime.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lyons did not complete an investigation and took a false statement. Id. at 6. As to Defendant Mueller, Plaintiff contends he “is not aware and should be more interactive so the misconduct and false arrest could be stopped.” Id. at 7. For his injuries, Plaintiff contends that these events caused his sister to have a panic attack and caused Plaintiff to suffer marital stress and instability. Id. at 8. For his relief, Plaintiff wants to press charges against the officers for false arrest and he seeks damages in the amount of $300,000 for mental anguish, loss of time, loss of his job, and loss of time with his children. Id.
Plaintiff has attached to his Complaint a copy of the arrest warrant and an incident report completed by Defendant Lyons dated February 29, 2024. ECF No. 1-1. The incident report contains the following narrative:
On February 29, 2024, I, Deputy Lyons was dispatched to [a residence] in reference to a use of vehicle with out owners request report.
I spoke to my complainant, Sandra Osment, who stated her grandson, Dorian Osment, took her and her husband's, Harold Osment, truck with out their permission while they were in Gaffney running errands.
According to Sandra they allowed Dorian to come to the house for breakfast. Sandra stated Dorian lives in a tent in the winds down the street and does not live with them. Harold and Sandra had to go to town to run errands and then a doctors appointment. Sandra stated they left at approximately 1100 hrs and did not return until 1230 hrs. Prior to leaving they told [D]orian he can sit outside and use their WiFi.
When the couple returned they noticed Harold's Truck a 2006 Nissan Frontier was no longer on their property.
Sandra states that Dorian has stolen a lot from them in the past and assumed it was him, so Sandra was requested by Harold to contact Law Enforcement to report the truck stolen. Sandra stated that Dorian has a suspended license and he was supposed to go to
Spartanburg court for habitual traffic offender today but failed to do so.
Sandra stated after she got off the phone with dispatch Dorian returned to the residence. Dorian stated to [S]andra and Harold he just went to the store. Dorian has never had a key issued to him and apparently made a spare key to use the vehicle when he wants to. Sandra stated that [H]arold has two keys one that was in his picket and one locked in a safe. Sandra stated the one in the safe was still secured and the key Dorian used today they took from him.
Sandra states that they are tired of being taken advantage of by Dorian he is constantly stealing from them to buy drugs and she is under the impression he never went to the store he went to a dealers house.
Sandra stated that she does wish to press charges due to this incident.ECF No. 1-1 at 3. The arrest warrant, which was sworn by Defendant Lyons and signed and issued by Cherokee County Magistrate Judge Robert Howell, contains the following statement of probable cause:
That on February 29, 2024, in the county of Cherokee, one Dorian Scott Osment did commit the crime of Larceny/Grand Larceny, value $10,000 or more in that he did take without permission a 2006 Nissan Frontier belonging to victims, Harold and Sandra Osment. Incident occurred at 1697 Burnt Gin Road located in Gaffney SC. Warrant is based on investigation by the Cherokee County Sheriff's Office and case # 2400807.Id. at 1.
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Cherokee County Court of General Sessions with grand larceny, value $10,000 or more, at case number 2024A1110100184. See Cherokee County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/cherokee/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited July 9, 2024) (search by case number listed above); see also Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Complaint filed in this case is subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
Plaintiff asserts a claim for “unlawful arrest.” ECF No. 1 at 4. Section 1983 actions premised on false arrest are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”). The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
Although Plaintiff appears to style his claim as one for false arrest, his claim is properly construed as one for malicious prosecution. See Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 257 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A claim for false arrest alleges that a warrantless arrest lacked probable cause; a claim for malicious prosecution alleges that an arrest made pursuant to a warrant lacked probable cause.” (emphases added)); Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[A] claim for false arrest may be considered only when no arrest warrant has been obtained.”); see also Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022) (“[A] Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution [is] sometimes referred to as a claim for unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process.”); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) (explaining the plaintiff's claim was for false arrest because officers detained him “without legal process” and “did not have a warrant for his arrest”).
“To state a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant seized him pursuant to legal process (e.g., a warrant) not supported by probable cause and (2) the criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor.” Brunson v. Timmons, No. 4:22-cv-00882-RBH, 2022 WL 2155311, at *2 (D.S.C. June 15, 2022). Here, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim is subject to dismissal because he has not alleged that the state criminal proceedings against him have terminated in his favor. Id. Indeed, the Complaint notes that Plaintiff remains incarcerated on the charges of which he complains and the public record shows that the charges remain pending against him.
Additionally, the record before the Court does not establish that Plaintiff was seized pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause. As noted, Plaintiff has attached to his Complaint a copy of the arrest warrant and documents in support of that warrant. Those documents show that Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant, and “a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that, when arresting official makes the arrest with a facially valid warrant, it is not false arrest); Harrison v. Sumter Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 2:07-cv-3555-PMDG, 2008 WL 553181, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2008) (same). Nothing in Plaintiff's Complaint shows that Defendants made material false statements or omissions deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth such that Defendants would not be shielded by the arrest warrant. Accordingly, the Complaint does not show that Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause on the charges pending against him.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a cognizable constitutional claim, and this action is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Therefore, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A without service of process and without leave to amend.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).