Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. SCVSS87869. Brian Saunders, Judge.
Law Offices of Michael R. Young, Michael R. Young; Law Offices of Michael J. La Cilento, Michael J. La Cilento; and Robert J. Spitz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Michael O. Harvey for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
King, J.
Betty Oshiro transferred more than $600,000 to defendant All Nations Mission Church (ANMC). Defendant Peter Nam is the founder and pastor of ANMC. Oshiro claimed that she transferred the money in exchange for certain representations and promises by defendants, including a promise to care for her for the rest of her life. She lived for awhile in a mobile home on mountain property owned by ANMC. Eventually, the relationship between Oshiro and defendants deteriorated and defendants obtained a restraining order against Oshiro based upon threats made by her. Oshiro sued ANMC, Nam, and other affiliated individuals, alleging causes of action for fraud, breach of contract, rescission, elder neglect and abuse, and conversion. The case was tried by the court, which found for the defendants on all counts.
On appeal, Oshiro contends that the court erred by: (1) finding that the money and property that Oshiro transferred to defendants was a gift; (2) finding that there was not a fiduciary relationship between Nam and Oshiro; (3) failing to apply the correct legal standard in determining whether financial elder abuse existed; and (4) failing to consider certain expert testimony concerning Oshiro’s mental capacity. We affirm.
There was conflicting evidence at trial on essential factual issues. Our summary of the facts in this part is presented in a light favorable to the prevailing parties (the defendants), and we resolve all conflicts in the evidence and draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the judgment. (See, e.g., Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137-1138; Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925.)
Oshiro operated a successful beauty salon in New York City for 40 years until 1992, saving more than $1 million. That year, at age 64, she retired and moved to Hawaii. There, she purchased a condominium for $240,000 and lived there with her mother. She never married and had no children. In May 1995, Oshiro’s mother died. Thereafter, she lived alone.
Oshiro had always considered becoming a missionary. She testified that after her mother died, God told her to go to California to worship and open a mission. She contacted an organization that produces religious television programs and asked for a recommendation of a place in California where she could become a missionary. She was referred to ANMC in San Bernardino.
Nam founded ANMC in 1978. Initially located in Huntington Beach, ANMC purchased 130 acres in San Bernardino County for $360,000 in July 1986. The property is referred to as “Prayer Mountain.” It is located in a rural area, four miles off Interstate 15. ANMC has trained missionaries who have gone on to other countries. According to Nam, the training of a missionary takes one or two years.
Oshiro called Nam and asked to come to Prayer Mountain to pray. Nam told her she could come for a 40-day “fast and pray[er] session.” Oshiro asked about the expense, and Nam told her that she could “offer to the church as she wished.”
In June 1998, Oshiro travelled to Prayer Mountain for a 40-day stay. While there, she lived in a small mobile home, cooking her own food. She was there, she testified, just to pray, which she did “night and day.” She saw Nam about once each week and did not talk often with him. Nam’s wife drove her to the grocery store. According to Oshiro, the Nams made her feel welcome and comfortable, and treated her “like a queen.” After this 40-day stay, she gave Nam $1,000. At this time, she trusted Nam “with [her] life.”
Oshiro also testified that the 40-day stay “was not a good experience. It was [a] bad experience.”
In September 1998, Oshiro returned to Prayer Mountain for a 20-day visit. Oshiro made a check payable to Nam in the amount of $20,000 or $30,000, which she described as a “[d]onation to the church.”
Oshiro testified that she did not remember going to Prayer Mountain for the second 20-day visit.
At the end of the 20-day visit, Oshiro invited Nam to visit her in Hawaii and offered him a $50,000 donation. Nam accepted the invitation and, in October 1998, he, his wife, and a daughter went to Oshiro’s home in Hawaii for approximately one week. Oshiro paid for their airfare.
On the morning of the second day of the Nams’ visit, Oshiro told Nam that God told her to donate all her money to ANMC and that she wanted to obey God’s words immediately. She called her investment manager, Mark Suiso, to assist with the transaction. Suiso came to Oshiro’s house. Oshiro directed Suiso to transfer her money to ANMC. Suiso told Oshiro that if she donated the money, she could not get it back. He suggested that she think about this more deeply before doing so. Oshiro raised her voice and told him that she was “giving the money to God.” Suiso said that he would do as Oshiro instructed. He prepared the documents to effect the transfer and Oshiro signed them. At least one of these documents referred to the transfer as a “gift to church.” The three of them then went to a bank office to have the documents notarized.
In May 1999, Oshiro sold her house for $135,000. She also sold her car. All together, Oshiro transferred approximately $616,000 to defendants. Nam used the money, together with other “offerings,” to pay off a mortgage on the property, to fund the construction of improvements, and for the purchase of two mobile homes placed on the property.
Oshiro moved to Prayer Mountain in May 1999. She lived in one of the new mobile homes; the other mobile home was used by Nam’s family. ANMC paid $500 per month for Oshiro’s food. Nam planned for her to become a missionary and to be dispatched to Japan, supported by ANMC. Her missionary training consisted primarily of reading the Bible and praying.
Sometime in 2000, Oshiro met John Morales. Morales lived in a trailer on land adjacent to Prayer Mountain. He testified that he did not have a good relationship with Nam and considered him a liar. Morales is the registrant of a church called “House of Prayer for All the Faithful.” He and Oshiro would meet to pray at his trailer and at her mobile home on Prayer Mountain.
Oshiro testified that Morales is a pastor. When Morales was asked if he is a “pastor,” Morales replied that he is not an ordained minister, but that he has “had an experience with the Lord.”
According to Nam, Oshiro’s missionary training “fell through” after Morales appeared. He testified that Oshiro “totally changed” and was no longer “teachable.” She stopped attending Bible studies and stopped talking with Nam.
Oshiro said that she was afraid of Nam, and believed that Nam wanted to kill her. On two occasions, Oshiro threatened to kill Nam’s wife because, Oshiro said, God told her to. Nam had received complaints that Oshiro was disturbing others who had come to Prayer Mountain to pray.
Nam viewed Morales’s presence on the property to be trespassing; so he changed the code that allowed the driveway entry gates to open.
On August 19, 2000, Oshiro called police claiming that she was being held captive by Nam. Sheriff’s Deputy Rick Medley responded and met with Oshiro. Medley observed that there were no locks on the gate to the property and it did not appear that Oshiro was being restrained or locked in. Even with the driveway gates closed, a person could still leave the property on foot. Oshiro admitted to Medley that no one was holding her there against her will. She talked with him about the money she had donated to ANMC and how she wanted to be more involved in the ministry and activities of the church so that she could present the Japanese point of view. According to Medley, Oshiro wanted to be involved in the sermons, but Nam would not let her.
Two days later, Morales drove Oshiro to the police station, where she was interviewed by Detective Gary Somerville. Oshiro told Somerville that God told her on different occasions to give money to the church, and that she had done so. She said that Nam had changed the code on the gates and was keeping her locked in her house.
Somerville subsequently met with Oshiro at Prayer Mountain. He observed that her mobile home could only be locked from the inside. Oshiro admitted to him that she could leave if she wanted, and Somerville found no evidence otherwise. Oshiro told Somerville that God told her to go to ANMC to protect the Japanese interests in the church, and that the Korean property belonged to the Japanese. While they talked, Misuzu Nakai, a Japanese missionary with ANMC, approached and asked the detective if he needed any additional information. Oshiro yelled at Nakai to go away and accused her of standing up for the Koreans against the Japanese.
Somerville also spoke with Nam. He told Nam that Oshiro should leave the property because she is a danger to others. Nam was planning to take a trip out of the state and was concerned for his wife’s safety. He was also concerned about Morales trespassing on the property. Somerville told Nam that he could obtain a restraining order. Nam then obtained a restraining order against Oshiro and Morales.
During a court-ordered mediation session related to the restraining order proceedings, Oshiro admitted that she had threatened to kill Mrs. Nam and said she had to do so because it was God’s orders. Morales and Oshiro agreed that Oshiro would move off of Prayer Mountain with Morales’s assistance.
Oshiro left Prayer Mountain and, with Morales’s help, moved into an apartment in San Bernardino. Nam testified that he felt obligated to find housing for Oshiro, but did not because Morales was taking care of her. Morales was made custodian of her social security income and now takes care of her. Oshiro testified that Morales has “helped [her] to find God.” Eventually, Oshiro moved in with Morales.
Morales assisted Oshiro in locating an attorney and filing this action. He promised Oshiro that if the court awarded her the Prayer Mountain property, he would help start her mission; and if she should die, he would carry on her vision.
At trial, Oshiro testified that the money she transferred to ANMC and Nam was not a gift; rather, she understood that in exchange for her money (1) she would own an interest in the Prayer Mountain property, (2) she and Nam would open a mission together, and (3) Nam would take care of her for the rest of her life. The mission, she believed, would be at Prayer Mountain. The promises were “verbal.” Oshiro understood that if Nam did not fulfill these promises, she would get the church’s land; she and Morales could then move onto Prayer Mountain and open a mission. This understanding, however, was not based on anything that someone told her, but rather on what she hoped or thought would occur.
The documents reflecting the transfer of money, Oshiro stated, are “fakes” and forgeries. She testified that she told Suiso that the money was a loan, and denied that Suiso warned her about being unable to get the money back. She denied that God told her to donate money to ANMC. According to her, Nam “pushed” her and “made” her sell her house against her will.
She testified that after her move to Prayer Mountain, Nam made her do “hard work,” refused to take her to a doctor to treat her dental problems, and did not provide her with missionary training.
Robert Miller, a psychologist, testified for Oshiro. Miller diagnosed Oshiro as having a form of dementia and a dependent personality disorder. Her dependency, he explained, made her susceptible to being taken advantage of by others. She is also incapable of handling her finances and very trusting of people who held religious views similar to her own. If she had a large sum of money, he would expect her to give it away to someone that she trusted. According to Miller, Nam occupied such a position of trust for Oshiro. Finally, he opined that a “normal person” could have discerned Oshiro’s dependency trait and taken advantage of her financially in 1998 or 1999.
Additional facts will be discussed below where pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal.
II. PROCEDURAL FACTS
In the operative complaint, Oshiro alleges five causes of action: (1) fraudulent misrepresentations; (2) breach of contract; (3) rescission of oral contract; (4) elder neglect and elder financial abuse under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657; and (5) conversion. The claims are based, in essence, upon allegations that Oshiro transferred her money to defendants in exchange for, and in reliance upon, certain promises and representations made by defendants. These alleged promises and representations are that defendants would: (1) transfer title to Prayer Mountain to her; (2) pay Oshiro’s moving expenses; (3) provide Oshiro with room and board for as long as she lived; (4) provide her with the opportunity to work as a missionary for as long as she was able and willing to do so; (5) care for her physical needs as long as she is alive; (6) provide her with medical and dental care; and (7) buy her a new car. In support of her elder abuse claim, Oshiro additionally alleged that defendants failed to exercise due care to insure that she had adequate food and dental care.
Following a bench trial, the court issued a statement of decision and found for the defendants on all causes of action. The court found, based upon “overwhelming evidence[,] that the transfers from Oshiro were unencumbered donations.” The court explained that there was no evidence of an “inducement provided by the Defendant that was relied upon by the Plaintiff,” or of an agreement, with the possible exception of a representation or promise to provide Oshiro with missionary training and a mobile home to live in on Prayer Mountain. To the extent representations or promises regarding these matters were made, the court found, Oshiro failed to prove that Nam did not fulfill any obligations he had.
The court’s findings were based, in part, upon the court’s evaluation of Oshiro’s credibility. It stated: “In evaluating Ms. Oshiro’s testimony, the Court finds her an unreliable historian as to the events which took place in 1998 and 1999 regarding the circumstances resulting in the transfer of funds from Ms. Oshiro to [ANMC] and Nam. This lack of reliability is even greater as to events after 1998. Ms. Oshiro was confused, contradictory and hostile when testifying.”
III. ANALYSIS
A. Court’s Finding That the Money Transferred Was a Gift
Oshiro contends that the trial court erred in finding that the transfer of her money to defendants was a gift. She argues that the money was given in exchange for promises, and in reliance upon representations, that Nam made to Oshiro. Although Oshiro describes the issue as one of “legal error” concerning the court’s “application of contract law and gifts,” her argument is directed at the court’s factual findings regarding the nature of the transfer of her money. The question presented by this argument is whether there is substantial evidence to support such findings. Accordingly, our task is to determine whether, based upon our review of the entire record, there is “evidence ‘of ponderable legal significance, . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value’” that will support the challenged findings. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873, italics omitted.) We hold that there is.
Our first task is to identify and interpret the court’s findings relative to Oshiro’s argument. There is language in the statement of decision that indicates that the court found that the money transferred to defendants was a gift, and other language indicates that the court found that there was an agreement to provide Oshiro with missionary training and a mobile home to live in at Prayer Mountain. Oshiro points to the statements regarding an agreement to argue that the court incorrectly applied gift law when it should have applied contract law. As we explain below, the different statements do not reflect a misapplication of the law concerning gifts as Oshiro contends, but merely the court’s analysis of alternative factual scenarios.
With respect to the fraud claim, the court stated that “there was not sufficient evidence that Ms. Oshiro had any agreement with Nam or [ANMC] for any of the matters outlined in [Oshiro’s] claim with the exception of missionary training.” This suggests that the court found that there was “sufficient evidence” of an agreement to provide missionary training. However, even if such an agreement existed, the court concluded that Oshiro failed to establish that defendants failed to provide missionary training.
Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court stated: “[T]he only substantiated agreement [Oshiro] had dealt with was missionary training. There is no evidence to support an oral contract existed as to any other issues. However, there is overwhelming evidence that the transfers from Oshiro were unencumbered donations.” Relative to the rescission claim, the court stated that it “found that no oral contract existed between Oshiro and [defendants] except as to missionary training and possibly the purchase of the mobile home.” The court referred the parties to its prior discussion regarding missionary training. As for the mobile home, defendants performed by providing Oshiro with a mobile home until she left Prayer Mountain.
In addressing the elder abuse claims, the court stated at one point that the “funds Oshiro transferred were intended as a gift to the church,” and later that “an agreement existed between Oshiro, Nam and [ANMC] for missionary training and nothing else . . . .”
Finally, with respect to the conversion claim, the court “concluded that assets transferred by Oshiro to Nam/[ANMC] are characterized as gifts or donations. They were made without any specific expectation by Oshiro or promise by Nam/[ANMC]. [¶] A possible exception exists only as to missionary training.”
Viewing the court’s statement of decision as a whole and allowing the various statements to aid our interpretation of each of them, we construe the statement of decision as making the following findings with respect to the nature of the transferred money: (1) there is no reliable or substantial evidence of an agreement to provide Oshiro with any of the matters identified in her complaint with the possible exceptions of missionary training and a mobile home to live in while on Prayer Mountain; (2) although there was some evidence to support a promise for missionary training and a mobile home, such evidence was ultimately unpersuasive in light of overwhelming evidence that the funds were a gift; and (3) if there was an agreement to provide missionary training and a mobile home, defendants performed their obligations under such agreement. So construed, the language in the statement of decision indicating that there was an agreement is not inconsistent with the finding that the funds were a gift; rather, the gift and agreement findings are presented as alternatives, both of which support judgment in favor of defendants.
Therefore, the initial issue for review is whether there is substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that the funds were a gift. If there is no substantial evidence to support this finding, we will consider whether there is substantial evidence to support the court’s alternative finding that any promises made by defendants were performed.
“A gift is a transfer of personal property, made voluntarily, and without consideration.” (Civ. Code, § 1146.) “Three things are necessary for a valid gift: (1) There must be an intent, on the part of a donor having capacity to contract, to make an unconditional gift. [Citation.] (2) There must be an actual or symbolical delivery, such as to relinquish all control by the donor. [Citation.] (3) The donee must signify acceptance, except where it may be presumed. [Citations.]” (13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Personal Property, § 124, p. 140.) Only the intent element is in issue here.
Nam testified that during his visit to Hawaii, Oshiro announced that she had been directed by God to donate all her money to ANMC and that she would do so. Despite Suiso informing her that she would not be able to get donated money returned to her and that she should think about it further, Oshiro insisted that she was “giving the money to God.” At least one document Oshiro signed to effect the transfer described it as a “gift to church.” Even after the relationship between Oshiro and Nam had soured, Oshiro told Medley and Somerville that the fund transfers were “donations.” Such evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that Oshiro intended the transfer of her funds to defendants to be a gift.
Oshiro relies primarily upon her own testimony, which contradicts Nam’s testimony and other evidence supporting the judgment. According to her, the documents are fakes and forgeries, and the money was either a loan to be repaid if Nam did not fulfill certain promises, money to fund a mission on Prayer Mountain to be operated jointly by Oshiro and Nam, or purchase money for an interest in Prayer Mountain. Such evidence has no bearing on our review: “We have no power on appeal to weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” (Navarro v. Perron (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 797, 803.) Under our standard of review, “‘we look only to the evidence supporting the prevailing party. [Citation.] We discard evidence unfavorable to the prevailing party as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. [Citation.]’” (Felgenhauer v. Soni (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 445, 449.)
Oshiro also argues that “[i]t is simply absurd [to assert] that this money was a gift.” She would not have given all her money away, she insists, without an agreement that she be taken care of. This, however, is an argument properly presented to the trial court. Because there is substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that the funds were transferred with a donative intent, we will not comment upon the reasonableness of the gift.
Because there is substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that the money Oshiro transferred to defendants was a gift, we need not consider the court’s alternative conclusions regarding a possible agreement to provide Oshiro with missionary training and a mobile home to live in. Nevertheless, to the extent that such an agreement could be found, there is substantial evidence to support the court’s findings on this issue. Nam testified that ANMC had previously trained and supported missionaries abroad. The training consists primarily of studying the Bible and praying, and takes one or two years. Nam further testified that he planned to dispatch Oshiro to Japan when her training was completed. During the period of her training, Oshiro lived in the mobile home defendants allegedly promised to her. This continued up until the time that Oshiro met Morales—approximately 15 months after her arrival at Prayer Mountain. Thereafter, according to Nam, Oshiro stopped attending church services and became unteachable. Oshiro was required to leave the property only after she threatened to kill Nam’s wife. Based upon such evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude that any obligations defendants had to provide Oshiro with missionary training and a mobile home to live in had been fulfilled or excused.
B. The Court’s Application of Law Concerning Fiduciary Relationship
Oshiro contends that the court committed “legal error” in failing to find that a fiduciary relationship existed between Oshiro and Nam. Because a fiduciary relationship existed, she argues, the burden of proof on this issue shifted to defendants. She relies heavily upon the case of Estate of Miller (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 141 (Miller).
We note that Oshiro did not expressly allege a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Nevertheless, in its statement of decision, the court addressed the theory that Nam owed a fiduciary, or “special,” duty to Oshiro.
In Miller, Lillie Miller’s heirs at law challenged the validity of a gift made by Miller shortly before her death to her spiritual advisor, William Farwell. Prior to the challenged acts, Miller was hospitalized and “in the last stages of cancer, [and] drugged with opiates for several weeks.” (Miller, supra, 16 Cal.App.2d at p. 150.) Eleven hours before her death, she executed documents purporting to transfer certain property to Farwell contrary to her expressed wishes. (Id. at p. 147.) The court stated the applicable rules relied upon by Oshiro: “Where a confidential relationship exists between the parties, coupled with activity on the part of the grantee in preparation of the grant, the presumption of undue influence arises and the burden of proof shifts to the donee to show that no undue influence is used. [Citation.] Confidential relations are presumed to exist between priest and parishioner, principal and agent, counsel and client, and in each of said relations the party in whom the confidence is reposed must stand in his dealings with the other party unimpeached of the slightest abuse of the confidence reposed, and if he derives or claims any advantage from the relation the law places upon him the burden of showing that the transaction out of which the advantage arose was fair and just and fully understood and consented to by the party confiding in him.” (Id. at p. 152.)
Here, the trial court discussed the Miller case at some length in its statement of decision and restated the burden-shifting rule of that case. Although the court did not expressly state whether a fiduciary relationship existed between Oshiro and Nam, it impliedly found such a relationship: “Nam was a pastor and did gain an advantage since the gifts Oshiro made to [ANMC] did directly and indirectly benefit him.” The court then analyzed the evidence as if Miller’s burden-shifting rule applied: “If the burden is shifted to Nam and [ANMC], the analysis of the evidence would support that the gifts from Oshiro clear the hurdles presented by the Miller case.” There is, the court found, “no reliable evidence to support that at the time the transfers took place they were unfair, unjust[,] and not fully understood by Oshiro.” Thus, contrary to Oshiro’s argument, the court did not fail to find that a fiduciary relationship existed. Indeed, the court found that the gift was fair, just, and understood by Oshiro regardless of which party had the burden of proof. Oshiro’s argument is without merit.
C. Financial Abuse of an Elder
Oshiro argues that the court failed to apply the proper standard in determining whether defendants committed financial abuse of an elder under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Act). (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.) The Act “does not create a cause of action as such, but provides for attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages under certain conditions.” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 529.) Specifically, when a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is liable for “financial abuse,” the court shall award the plaintiff attorney fees and costs; additionally, when a plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that defendants have been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice, certain limits on the award of damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages are lifted. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.5, subds. (a) & (b).) The Act was created “to protect a particularly vulnerable portion of the population from gross mistreatment in the form of abuse and custodial neglect.” (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 33.)
“Financial abuse,” as defined by the Act, occurs when a person or entity “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult to a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court here found that there was no “factual foundation to show that Oshiro was defrauded,” and Oshiro does not contend that this finding was error.
Regarding the “wrongful use” prong of the statute, a “person or entity shall be deemed to have taken, secreted, appropriated, or retained property for a wrongful use if, among other things, the person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates or retains possession of property in bad faith.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (b).) Such bad faith exists when “the person or entity knew or should have known that the elder or dependent adult had the right to have the property transferred or made readily available to the elder or dependent adult . . . .” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) This definition “focuses on property that belongs to the victim but may be in the hands of a third party.” (Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the Solution a Problem? (2003) 34 McGeorge L.Rev. 267, 274.) Finally, a person or entity should have known of such a right “if, on the basis of the information received by the person or entity or the person or entity’s authorized third party, or both, it is obvious to a reasonable person that the elder or dependent adult has [that] right . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (b)(2).)
As explained above, there is substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that the money transferred to defendants was a voluntary gift made without inducement by Nam. As such, the money was not “taken, secreted, appropriated, or retained” in bad faith or otherwise for a wrongful use. On appeal, Oshiro argues that “the facts at trial showed that OSHIRO expected that her money would be available to her to pay for her medical expenses and her living costs after she moved to California.” She is, however, merely arguing the facts that support her position and ignoring the contrary evidence presented primarily through Nam’s testimony. Again, we must accept for purposes of review only the evidence supporting the defendants, as they are the prevailing parties, and discard evidence unfavorable to them “‘as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. [Citation.]’” (Felgenhauer v. Soni, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 449.) Viewing the evidence under this standard, the gift was complete when the funds were delivered and accepted by defendants; at that point, Oshiro no longer had the right to have the property transferred or made readily available to her.
D. The Court’s Consideration of the Testimony of Robert Miller, Oshiro’s Expert
Oshiro contends that the court abused its discretion by “failing to consider” her expert witness’s testimony about her mental state at the time she transferred her funds to defendants. She does not, as we understand her argument, challenge any evidentiary ruling by the court; rather, Oshiro appears to argue that the court was required to consider (and apparently accept) her expert’s testimony in the absence of evidence from an opposing expert. Generally, however, a trier of fact may reject uncontroverted expert testimony. (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 632.) Oshiro offers no citation to authority or meaningful argument that would place Miller’s testimony within an exception to this rule.
One such exception occurs in professional negligence cases when an expert’s testimony concerning the standard of care is uncontroverted. (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) This exception does not apply here.
Moreover, the court did consider Miller’s testimony. In its statement of decision, the court addressed the evidence regarding Oshiro’s mental state, including Miller’s testimony, at some length. The court concluded its discussion on the subject with the following: “[Miller] agreed that all diagnoses are ‘iffy’ [citation]. It is on this diagnosis, that the Court is to conclude that Oshiro was, in 1998 and 1999, at the time she gave up her assets, of unsound mind, incapable of understanding the nature of the transfers. However, during the 1998 - 1999 time period, Oshiro had, apparently, managed her own financial affairs, provided for her needs, arranged flights to and from California, transferred funds, listed and sold her home and sold her car. Later, during her stay at Prayer Mountain, Oshiro contacted a friend, arranged for her to fly to California and provided for the friend at Prayer Mountain. Nam thought this was in 1999 or 2000. [Citation.] These facts support the position that Oshiro was aware and capable of handling her own financial affairs.” The court’s rejection of Miller’s conclusions, therefore, was not arbitrary. Any obligation the court had to consider his testimony was fulfilled.
IV. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur:Ramirez, P.J., Gaut, J.