But review by the Panel and this court is limited to orders that require “any party to pay a penalty or benefits or den[y] a claimant any benefit or penalty.” Id. “The term ‘final order’ has ‘traditionally been interpreted as including only those orders that grant or deny benefits or penalties.’ ” Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 181 P.3d 1199, 1200 (Colo.App.2008) (quoting Ortiz v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110, 1111 (Colo.App.2003)). ¶ 12 “Where an order neither awards nor denies benefits, it is merely interlocutory and is ‘not ripe for appellate review.’ ”
But review by the Panel and this court is limited to orders that require “any party to pay a penalty or benefits or den[y] a claimant any benefit or penalty.” Id. “The term ‘final order’ has ‘traditionally been interpreted as including only those orders that grant or deny benefits or penalties.’” Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 181 P.3d 1199, 1200 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting Ortiz v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110, 1111 (Colo. App. 2003)). ¶12 “Where an order neither awards nor denies benefits, it is merely interlocutory and is ‘not ripe for appellate review.
Thus, to be final and appealable, an ALJ's order "must grant or deny benefits or penalties." Flint Energy Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office , 194 P.3d 448, 449-50 (Colo. App. 2008) ; accord Ortiz v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office , 81 P.3d 1110, 1111 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 9 Because the Panel affirmed the ALJ's decision denying claimant's request for TPD and TTD benefits, that portion of the ALJ's order is final and appealable.
CF I Steel Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 731 P.2d 144, 146 (Colo.App. 1986). To be final, an order must grant or deny benefits or penalties. Ortiz v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110, 1111 (Colo.App. 2003) (final order has "traditionally been interpreted as including only those orders that grant or deny benefits or penalties.") Where an order neither awards nor denies benefits, it is merely interlocutory and is "not ripe for appellate review." U.S. Fid. Guar., Inc. v. Kourlis, 868 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Colo.App. 1994).
" The term "final order" has "traditionally been interpreted as including only those orders that grant or deny benefits or penalties." Ortiz v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110, 1111 (Colo.App. 2003). In Ortiz, the ALJ entered an order concluding that a claimant's DIME was void.
Consequently, an order must satisfy the finality criteria set forth in that statute or we lack jurisdiction. See Ortiz v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110, 1111 (Colo. App. 2003) (final order grants or denies benefits or penalties). Here, contrary to Pinnacol's argument, we conclude that ALJ Cain's order is final and reviewable.
Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Nelson, supra. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review orders or portions of orders which are not final and reviewable within the meaning of § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. Cf. Ortiz v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110 (Colo. App. 2003). We do not reach the respondents' remaining arguments.
Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review orders or portions of orders which are not final and reviewable within the meaning of § 8-43-301(2). Cf. Ortiz v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110 (Colo. App. 2003). Moreover, when construing a statute, the statutory scheme must be read as a whole "to give a consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts."
Orders which do not meet one of these criteria are interlocutory and not subject to immediate review. Ortiz v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110 (Colo. App. 2003); Natkin Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1989). Generally, orders are not final if they do not fully dispose of the issue presented including the amount of benefits to be paid. Bestway Concrete v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 984 P.2d 680 (Colo. App. 1999); United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 988 P.2d 1146 (Colo. App. 1999).
In our opinion, ALJ Broniak's order was not interlocutory because it denied all benefits connected with the neck and shoulder claims. See Ortiz v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1110, 1111 (Colo.App. 2003) (final order has "traditionally been interpreted as including only those orders that grant or deny benefits or penalties."). III.