Third, there is no need to offer the Bureau an opportunity to correct any errors in its proceedings because the Bureau has consistently defended the policy in courtrooms across the country. Fourth, the Bureau concedes that if Program Statement 5162.04 is invalid, Petitioner Boucher would have been eligible for early release as of July 1999 at the earliest, six months ago. While there is no entitlement to early release, see Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 653 (6th Cir. 1998), the potential for immediate release counsels timely consideration by this Court. Under these circumstances, the interests of the agency are less persuasive than they would otherwise be. Other federal courts have excused exhaustion under similar circumstances:

The Court need not address this question, as the result is the same even affording the BOP's Program Statement "some deference" under Reno. One of the earliest Sixth Circuit decisions discussing the BOP's identification of "crimes of violence" came in Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1998). In Orr, the BOP refused to consider a prisoner for early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) because he had been convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

We hold that the B.O.P.'s July 1995 Program Statement was not sufficient authority to exclude felons in possession from consideration for early release, and King is therefore entitled to relief. We find Orr v. Hawk 156 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1998) persuasive. In that case, a federal prisoner was convicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon in violation of § 922(g), among other convictions.

Thus, even where a prisoner successfully completes the program, the Bureau retains the discretion to deny early release. See McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1999); Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 652-54 (6th Cir. 1998). Hayes's expulsion or removal from the program did not deprive him of either procedural or substantive due process.

Moreover, "[n]othing in the statute requires the BOP to grant early release to any eligible prisoner." Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 653 (6th Cir. 1998). The BOP has the authority, but not the duty, to reduce a prisoner's term of imprisonment.

Moreover, "[n]othing in the statute requires the BOP to grant early release to any eligible prisoner." Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 653 (6th Cir. 1998). The Bureau has the authority, but not the duty, to reduce a prisoner's term of imprisonment.

Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995). The Bureau "has substantial discretion in its decisionmaking," Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 653 (6th Cir. 1998), and "broad discretion to grant or deny the one-year reduction" in sentence under § 3621, Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 984 (9th Cir. 1997). The Bureau has the authority, but not the duty, to reduce a prisoner's term of imprisonment for successful completion of drug treatment.

Petitioner's due process claim fails because neither the Constitution, nor § 3621(e)(2)(B), nor the BOP's regulation, created a liberty interest in early release. Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 1998); Piccolo v. Lansing, 939 F. Supp. 319, 321 (D.N.J. 1996). The BOP has substantial discretion in denying early release.

Sesler v. Pitzer, 110 F.3d 569, 571-572 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 877, 118 S.Ct. 197, 139 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997); Davis v. Crabtree, 109 F.3d 566, 569-570 (9th Cir. 1997).Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 653 (6th Cir. 1998) (some citations omitted). The BOP has drafted a program statement, which further interprets the statute.

In response to several federal court decisions rejecting the BOP's categorization of felon in possession as a crime of violence, the BOP has revised § 550.58 such that felon in possession is no longer defined as a crime of violence. See, e.g., Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1997), modified, 172 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. 1999); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1998); Davis v. Crabtree, 109 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 1997). According to the Program Statement, "Section 7 lists offenses that are not categorized as crimes of violence, but would nevertheless preclude an inmate's receiving certain Bureau program benefits at the Director's discretion."