Opinion
G062360
10-10-2023
In re A.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. S.A., Defendant and Appellant. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputies County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. No appearance for the Minor.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 21DP1466, Vibhav Mittal, Judge. Affirmed in part, conditionally reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputies County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
OPINION
DELANEY, J.
Appellant S.A., the mother of the dependent child (the minor) and a dependent minor herself, appeals from an order made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 which terminated her parental rights and freed the minor for adoption. Mother requested, and the court denied, a contested hearing on the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). She contends the trial court erred in concluding her offer of proof regarding the exception was insufficient to warrant a contested hearing. She also claims the order must be reversed because the due process rights of the minor's alleged father were violated as a result of the Orange County Social Service Agency's (SSA) failure to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and notify him of the section 366.26 hearing. We find no error in the court's denial of a contested hearing, but we conclude SSA's efforts to locate and notice the alleged father were constitutionally deficient in light of case specific facts known to SSA. We conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights as to both parents to allow SSA to exercise reasonable diligence to locate and properly notice the alleged father. If the alleged father does not appear within a reasonable period thereafter, the juvenile court shall reinstate the termination order as to both parents.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS
Pursuant to a protective custody warrant, SSA removed the minor from mother's custody when the minor was one day old. The warrant application described mother as "a chronic runaway" who "has a history of drug abuse including methamphetamine, cocaine, and Percocet." "[M]other admitted to using cocaine, LSD, marijuana and alcohol during her first trimester, before having knowledge that she was pregnant." The application also indicated mother was previously diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, major depressive disorder, and polysubstance abuse, received limited prenatal care, and was previously unwilling to engage in clinical and substance abuse treatment.
In speaking with social workers after the minor's birth, mother stated "Johnny Aguirre" was the minor's father, but he was not listed on the birth certificate. She conveyed he lived in Bakersfield, she was no longer in a relationship with him, and she did not want the minor to have contact with him because "he gets 'locked up' all the time and is 'doing drugs.'" Although mother denied having contact information for him and did not know his date of birth, she said she communicated with him via social media and visited him in Bakersfield a few weeks before the minor was born.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court detained the minor and released him to mother's custody subject to a variety of protective orders. The following were among the protective orders to which mother agreed: "[m]other shall reside at [her placement] while the child is in her care[;]" "[m]other shall take the child to all medical appointments[;]" "[m]other shall submit to drug testing and . . . shall not be under the influence of drugs or alcohol[;]" "[m]other shall engage in all referrals by the SSA[;]" and mother shall complete therapy, substance abuse treatment, and parenting classes without any unexcused absences.
When the topic of the alleged father came up at the hearing, mother denied knowing a "Johnny Aguirre," said the minor's father's first name was "Alec," and denied knowing his last name or date of birth. Mother's counsel conveyed mother might have contact information for his sister and the ability to contact him through social media. The court ordered her to provide such information to SSA, but mother never followed through.
Roughly three weeks later, without notifying SSA, mother left her living placement with the minor. SSA obtained a protective custody warrant for the minor, but mother and the minor's whereabouts remained unknown. One week later, police officers from a Los Angeles County based police agency returned mother and the minor to mother's placement. Based on these events, the juvenile court ordered the minor detained in SSA's custody, with visitation by mother, pending further proceedings.
A subsequent jurisdiction and disposition report, and an addendum thereto, detailed mother's history, SSA's and others' concerns about the safety of the minor if returned to mother's care, services offered and mother's visitation with the minor. Among other things, the concerns stemmed from mother's substance abuse, unresolved mental health issues, placement disruptions, and frequent disappearances without notice or communication. With respect to services, the documents indicated mother expressed a willingness to continue with parenting education and therapy, but she was noncommittal concerning substance abuse treatment services. On multiple occasions she said she would not participate in the latter type of services; on one occasion she stated she would participate in such services, "'but not for a long time.'" As for visitation, although mother was allowed a minimum of ten hours per week of supervised visitation, her attendance was not consistent. She sometimes visited with the minor as scheduled, but other times she failed to show up, declined to attend or cut the visit short.
The report and a related declaration of due diligence discussed the alleged father's identity and whereabouts. When asked by SSA for contact information or a last name, mother again stated his first name was "Alec" and denied knowing his last name or having contact information for him. And in a later text message responding to a social worker's request for "any information" about him, mother replied, "'I'm telling you guys I do not have contact with him or anything so, I have no idea how to get a hold of him or anything either[.] No one has heard from him[.]'"
The juvenile court held a jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Based on declarations from SSA, the court found SSA exercised due diligence in attempting to locate and provide notice to the alleged father, Alec Unknown. Mother stipulated to the factual basis for the dependency petition outlined in SSA's reports. The court sustained the petition, removed the minor from mother's custody pursuant to section 360, subdivision (d), and granted mother reunification services and visitation of a minimum of ten hours per week.
Following the hearing, SSA placed minor in a foster home. Over the course of the next six months, mother's residential placement and visitation with the minor was erratic, and her use of services was nonexistent. Regarding mother's living situation, the place where she was previously housed declined to continue to house her because of her runaway behavior. Mother received a new placement, but she also ran away from that placement shortly thereafter and her location remained unknown for roughly four months. Throughout this time, SSA provided mother with information concerning services, but mother generally did not respond and SSA could not confirm whether she participated in any services. As for visitation, notwithstanding visit opportunities scheduled for three to four times per week for a few hours at a time, mother initially visited the minor only occasionally and for short durations. During her fourmonth disappearance, she requested the minor's caregiver send her pictures of the minor, but she made no contact with the minor.
At a six-month review hearing, the juvenile court adopted SSA's recommendation to terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 (permanency planning) hearing concerning termination of parental rights. It ordered "SSA to provide [a section] 366.26 level search referral for [the minor's] parent(s) immediately."
Prior to the permanency planning hearing, SSA filed declarations of due diligence explaining their attempts to locate the minor's alleged father, using the names Johnny Aguirre and Alec Unknown. Mother told SSA "'the baby daddy disappeared' and that she did not know how to contact him or anyone." When asked on two different occasions to clarify the name of the minor's father and provide information about him, mother responded: "I told you he disappeared that is all I have to say[;]" and "[Y]ou all stupid. You should know this by now." SSA's search efforts involving certain federal, state and Orange County related databases did not reveal any leads. The court subsequently found SSA "exercised due diligence in its efforts to locate and notice [the alleged father,]" and it ordered SSA to give notice by publication. SSA published notice in an Orange County newspaper.
On the day of the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court first heard a section 388 petition filed by mother, in which she listed "Johnny Aguirre" as the minor's father. She requested the court reinstate family reunification services, noting she was ready to take responsibility because she was in a stable placement and finally had the support she needed. The court denied the petition.
With respect to permanency planning, SSA recommended termination of parental rights and adoption. Mother requested a contested hearing based on the potential applicability of the beneficial parental relationship exception (see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). The court asked her counsel for an offer of proof, and mother's counsel responded as follows: "So the mother doesn't agree with the recommendation of the agency. She would like to testify and tell the Court what the issues were with the visitation, and she does believe that -- well, she's asking the Court to let her testify and have the Court listen to her testimony. That's my offer of proof. She has a factual dispute."
In response to a clarification question from the court, mother's counsel said mother would explain there were issues setting up visits with the minor. She later elaborated: "[S]he was in placement because she's a minor, and the placement didn't allow her to have a phone. So there were things that were out of her control, so she couldn't set up the visit. [¶] She did indicate that she called the social worker a couple weeks ago, and the worker never set up a visit with her. So when she did have access to a phone, she still was unable to get visits with her child. [¶] As I said earlier, she's asserting that there is a bond. The first few months of [the minor's] life he was with his mother, he was placed with her. The mother does think there is a bond, even though there was a period of time that [the minor] was not with her."
The juvenile court denied mother's request, concluding the offer of proof was insufficient to warrant a contested hearing. As for visitation, the court "look[ed] at the life of the case" and noted the record was clear mother did not engage in regular and consistent visitation with the minor. It understood mother's proposed testimony would not appear to contest that, but instead would focus on supposed recent issues with visitation. The court identified two additional components of the beneficial parental relationship exception, and stated, the offer of proof notwithstanding, it did not appear mother could meet her burden as to either component.
After the parties argued the underlying matter, the court found by clear and convincing evidence the minor was likely to be adopted and mother and the alleged father received proper notice. It further concluded mother did not meet her burden of establishing applicability of the beneficial parental relationship exception. The court terminated parental rights and ordered the minor be placed for adoption.
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother raises two issues on appeal. First, she asserts the juvenile court erred in denying her a contested hearing concerning the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights notwithstanding her offer of proof. Second, she argues there is insufficient evidence to support the court's conclusion that SSA used due diligence to locate and notify the alleged father of the section 366.26 hearing. We disagree with the first contention, but find error with respect to SSA's search for, and noticing of, the alleged father.
I. Offer of Proof and Contested Hearing
"After it has been adjudicated that a child is a dependent of the juvenile court, the exclusive procedure for establishing the permanent plan for the child is the selection and implementation hearing as provided under section 366.26." (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 992 (A.G.).) Such a hearing takes place only "'after the juvenile court finds that the parents are unfit and the child cannot be returned to them.'" (In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 611 (Grace P.).) "[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is 'specifically . . . to select and implement a permanent plan for the child.' [Citation.] To guide the court in selecting the most suitable permanent arrangement, the statute lists plans in order of preference and provides a detailed procedure for choosing among them. [Citation.] According to that procedure, the court must first determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the child is likely to be adopted. [Citation.] If so, and if the court finds that there has been a previous determination that reunification services be terminated, then the court shall terminate parental rights to allow for adoption." (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) Because the critical decisions that the minor cannot be returned home and that reunification efforts should not be further pursued are made at a prior stage in dependency proceedings, "'"the decision to terminate parental rights will be relatively automatic if the minor is going to be adopted.'"" (A.G., supra, at pp. 992-993.)
A parent may avoid termination of parental rights by proving the applicability of any one of six statutorily specified circumstances in which termination is considered detrimental to the child. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631.) If a parent meets its burden, "the court should decline to terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan. [Citation.] . . . '[T]he statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.'" (Caden C., supra, at pp. 630-631.)
The exception raised in this case by mother is the beneficial parental relationship exception. "This exception applies where the parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and termination of that relationship would impose a detriment on the child." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625.)
Mother does not challenge the validity of the juvenile court's determination she did not meet her burden with respect to the exception. Rather, mother claims the court should have allowed her the opportunity to provide additional evidence concerning the exception. Specifically, she argues her offer of proof was sufficient to warrant a contested hearing. We review the court's denial of a contested hearing for an abuse of discretion. (A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003; Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 611.)
When faced with a parent's assertion of an exception to termination of parental rights at a section 366.26 hearing, a juvenile court may require an offer of proof before deciding whether to allow a contested hearing. (A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 998; Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 612; In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122 (Tamika T.); see also In re Thomas R. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 726, 732, [precluding parents from testing sufficiency of SSA's evidence is fundamentally different than requiring them to describe evidence they will offer to prove matter on which they bear burden].) "A proper offer of proof gives the trial court an opportunity to determine if, in fact, there really is a contested issue of fact." (Tamika T., supra, at p. 1124). For it to be sufficient, it "must be specific, setting forth the actual evidence to be produced, not merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued." (Ibid.)
Here, mother's counsel initially stated there was a factual dispute and mother would testify "what the issues were with visitation." This, by itself, was insufficient because it simply provided a subject matter. (See Tamika T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124 [offer of proof may not merely identify issue to be addressed]; People v. Carlin (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 322, 334 [offer of proof may not be "general or vague"].) It failed to specify the nature of the supposed visitation issues or offer evidence with respect thereto. With such a vague offer of proof, the court would not be able to assess whether there in fact was a relevant factual dispute.
Mother's counsel provided further information shortly thereafter, stating mother would explain she had difficulty setting up visits because her residential placement would not allow her to have a phone and a visit was not set up when she called the social worker. But even with these details, the court did not err in concluding the offer of proof was insufficient.
The required showing under the beneficial parental relationship exception is that visitation and contact with the child has been regular. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) It is a qualitative, not quantitative, measure which just concerns "whether 'parents visit consistently,' taking into account 'the extent permitted by court orders.'" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; see also Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 613.)
Mother's offer did not demonstrate a dispute on this issue. According to mother's counsel, the social worker's failure to set up a visit occurred "a couple weeks ago." And although she did not specify the timing of the phone issues, the court expressed it understood "there were some issues recently" and mother's counsel did not dispute that understanding. The record otherwise shows the issues raised by mother did not pervade the entire duration of the dependency proceedings. SSA's reports, the facts of which mother did not challenge, indicate mother ran away from her placements multiple times, at least one of which lasted roughly four months, and during those times mother occasionally contacted the minor's caregiver by text message but did not have any visits with the minor. Thus, even assuming the truth of the matters suggested by mother's offer, there was no dispute mother's visitation with the minor was limited and sporadic, based on decisions within her control, during the many months the minor was out of her care. The juvenile court correctly focused on the "life of the case," and it did not err in concluding the offer of proof on this point was insufficient. (See A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 995 ["'"Sporadic visitation is insufficient'""]; In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 [upholding denial of contested hearing because offer of proof was insufficient to show dispute concerning visitation where it only raised potential visitation issue during unspecified prior time period, not entire duration of case].)
Because the record does not demonstrate mother was wrongfully denied visitation or prevented from visiting the minor such that she would never have been able to establish consistent visitation under the beneficial parental relationship exception, we do not reach her argument that termination of parental rights under such circumstances would violate due process.
Moving beyond the visitation aspect of the beneficial parental relationship exception, mother argues she made a sufficient offer of proof on the second aspect of the exception-whether mother's relationship with the minor was such that the minor would benefit from continuing it (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632). We disagree. Mother's counsel simply stated the minor was placed with mother for the first few months of his life and mother believed she had a bond with the minor "even though there was a period of time that [the minor] was not with her." The offer of proof was not specific and did not set forth the evidence that would be produced. (See Tamika T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124.) Nothing was offered, for example, about mother's interactions with the minor or the minor's actions during time spent with mother. (See e.g., A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1013-1014 [concluding parent's detailed offer of proof concerning parental bond was partially sufficient even though certain other details were left out]; Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 613 [among details in "undisputedly sufficient" offer of proof was information concerning positive quality of parent's visitation, how parent engaged with children during visits, and how children viewed parent as parental figure].)
Mother next argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by misstating the law concerning the third aspect of the exception, namely whether termination of mother's relationship with the minor would be detrimental to the minor. She notes the juvenile court denied the contested hearing, in part, because it concluded her offer of proof was inadequate as to the third aspect even though caselaw specifies the parent has no obligation to provide evidence concerning this aspect.
Even assuming, arguendo, the juvenile court erred in considering whether mother made a sufficient offer of proof concerning detriment to warrant a contested hearing, reversal would not be warranted because the error would not be prejudicial. (See A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015 [in dependency context, reversal generally only warranted if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to appealing party but for the error].) As previously explained, the juvenile court correctly concluded mother's offer of proof regarding visitation and the parent child relationship was insufficient. Thus, irrespective of the court's action as to the detriment component, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's request for a contested hearing.
II. Due Process and Notice
Mother's second argument asserts the constitutional rights of the minor's alleged father. She contends SSA violated due process by failing to use reasonable diligence to locate the alleged father and provide him with notice of the section 366.26 hearing. As further detailed below, the unique circumstances of the case lead us to consider the issue even though mother did not raise it in the juvenile court and the right being asserted is not her own. And on the merits, we agree due process was violated.
"The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that '[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....' [Citation.] Except in emergent circumstances, this provision guarantees reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the state may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest. [Citations.] Because parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children, the due process clause requires child welfare agencies to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and notify them of dependency proceedings." (In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 572 (J.R.).)
"'Reasonable diligence "denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and an inquiry conducted in good faith." [Citation.] It includes searching not only "standard avenues available to help locate a missing parent," but '"specific ones most likely, under the unique facts known to the [Agency], to yield [a parent's] address.'"'" (In re Mia M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792, 807-808 (Mia M.), citing In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 712 (Daniel F.).) "This is no idle command." (J.R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 572.) "Put differently, '[s]ocial services agencies, invested with a public trust and acting as temporary custodians of dependent minors, are bound by law to make every reasonable effort in attempting to inform parents of all hearings. They must leave no stone unturned.'" (Id. at p. 588.)
In addition to the use of reasonable diligence in locating an absent parent, due process requires "'notice that is reasonably calculated to advise [the parent] an action is pending and afford them an opportunity to defend.' [Citation.] . . . '"Only with adequate advisement can one choose to appear or not, to prepare or not, and to defend, or not."'" (Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 807.)
SSA contends mother lacks standing to raise the issue of notice as to father and has forfeited the issue by failing to raise the argument below. Although those principles sometimes preclude an issue from being raised on appeal in the dependency context, the unique circumstances of this case and the precise notice issue raised by mother counsel against their application here.
J.R. is instructive. There, the father appealed from an order terminating parental rights and argued social services violated mother's due process rights by failing to provide her with adequate notice of the dependency proceedings. (J.R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 573.) The mother, who never appeared before the juvenile court, was not party to the appeal. (Id. at p. 585.) The appellate court concluded the father had standing to raise the notice issue because his interests and the mother's interests intertwined. (Id. at pp. 581-582.) That is, a meritorious due process claim would require reversal of the termination of parental rights as to both parents. (Id. at p. 581.) The court also explained granting the father standing furthered two critical interests: (1) it allowed the court to review an alleged constitutional error that would otherwise not be reviewed and would most likely go uncorrected (id. at p. 583); and (2) it protected the best interests of the child by ensuring the juvenile court had the most complete picture of the available relevant facts before it disposed of the dependency petition. (Id. at pp. 583-584.) For similar reasons, and because the issue raised was a pure question of law, the court exercised its discretion to reach the merits of the issue despite the father's failure to object or otherwise raise the issue in the lower court proceedings. (Id. at p. 587.)
We agree with the reasoning in J.R. on these points, and the facts in this case lead us to the same conclusion.
Turning to mother's substantive argument, the record reveals deficiencies in SSA's efforts to locate the alleged father. Mother initially identified the father with a full name. Although she denied knowing his date of birth and having any contact information for him, she told SSA he was 16 years old, he lived in Bakersfield, "he gets 'locked up' all the time," "she communicates with him via social media," and she notified him the minor was born. Mother also told SSA that when she ran away from her residential placement a few weeks before the minor was born, she went "to visit her biological mother and the father of the baby in Bakersfield, CA."
There is no indication in the record that SSA took any steps to explore social media or resources related to the Bakersfield area (Kern County) to locate the alleged father. For example, there is no evidence SSA asked mother about which social media platform she used to communicate with the alleged father, independently searched any social media using the limited information provided by mother, or inquired with Bakersfield or Kern County related government agencies to obtain identifying and/or contact information for the alleged father. Instead, it appears SSA's search was limited to certain federal and state databases, as well as Orange County related records.
We understand mother complicated the situation by later claiming not to know the person she originally named, providing a new first name with no last name, stating he was two years older than her rather than the same age, and consistently thereafter denying having contact information for the alleged father or means of getting in touch with him. She also failed to provide additional information after the court ordered her to provide SSA with the alleged father's social media information and a telephone number she purportedly had for the alleged father's sister. These actions and inactions likely made SSA's job more difficult, but they did not discharge its obligation to use reasonable diligence to locate the alleged father using the information they had. This includes systematically investigating the specific avenues most likely, under the unique case-specific facts known to SSA, to yield his full identity, address, or other contact information. (Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 807-808.) The record does not demonstrate it fulfilled that obligation. (See, e.g., In re Jayden G. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 301, 309-310 [concluding agency violated father's due process rights by limiting searches to generalized databases despite having more localized and specific information]; J.R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 589-590 [finding lack of due diligence when agency failed to explore social media avenue raised by caregiver and reviewed federal and state records despite having information mother lived in El Salvador]; Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 809 [finding due process violation because agency only ran searches on "standard California and federal databases" and a telephone directory clearance database, despite having been told father lived in Oklahoma]; Daniel F., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 713 [finding due process violation because agency's efforts were limited to California and Alameda County records databases even though it was told father lived in Mexico]; In re D.R. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 583, 591 [finding due process violation because agency failed to explore potential social media source and limited search to United States government databases despite knowing father was deported to Mexico].)
Similarly, the notice SSA provided by publication was not reasonably calculated to advise the alleged father of the section 366.26 hearing. The only location information obtained by SSA during the life of the case came from mother who said the alleged father lived in Bakersfield and she visited him there not long before the minor was born. Yet SSA published notice in an Orange County newspaper. We recognize publication in a qualified Bakersfield or Kern County based circular ultimately might be no more successful in getting the alleged father to appear in this case. But due process does not hinge on a likelihood of success in that respect. Rather, due process in the notice context requires consideration and use of case-by-case unique facts known to SSA to determine the proper means for advising a parent of upcoming proceedings. (See J.R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 590-591 [publication in Los Angeles newspaper not reasonably calculated to advise mother of proceedings when agency had information mother lived in El Salvador or Guatemala].)
The due process deficiencies we have identified, collectively and separately, require us to conditionally reverse in its entirety the order terminating parental rights. (Jayden G., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 312 [conditionally reversing parental rights termination order based on notice related due process violation and Indian Child Welfare Act error]; J.R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 593-595 [conditionally reversing parental rights termination order based on notice related due process violation].) Conditional reversal does not give mother a new bite at the apple regarding termination of parental rights. Instead, it gives the alleged father the opportunity to appear in the proceedings to assert and change his parental status. (See Jayden G., supra, at p. 309 ["'Due process for an alleged father requires only that he be given notice and an opportunity to appear and assert a position and attempt to change his paternity status'"].) If he does not do so within a reasonable period after SSA complies with its due process obligations, the juvenile court should reinstate its order terminating parental rights as to mother and father. (J.R., supra, at p. 594.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. On remand, the juvenile court shall order SSA to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and provide the minor's alleged father with proper notice. If the alleged father fails to appear in the proceedings within a reasonable period of time after SSA discharges this obligation, then the juvenile court shall reinstate its order terminating parental rights as to mother and the alleged father.
WE CONCUR: GOETHALS, ACTING P. J. SANCHEZ, J.