Opinion
G045252
09-30-2011
In re RONNIE R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONNIE R., Defendant and Appellant.
Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen, Senior Deputy County Counsel, and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. J428396)
OPINION
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Dennis Keough, Judge. Affirmed.
Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen, Senior Deputy County Counsel, and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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19-year-old Ronnie R., a college student living with his long-term foster family, appeals an order terminating his dependency case. Ronnie argues his best interests would be served by maintaining his status as a nonminor dependent. We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Ronnie's dependency.
FACTS
Ronnie, born in June 1992, became a dependent child of the court in 2000. In March 2001, Ronnie and his brother were placed together in the same confidential foster home in which Ronnie still resides. The court granted de facto parent status to Ronnie's foster mother in March 2007. Ronnie earned his high school diploma in June 2010.
In May 2011, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) asked the court to terminate Ronnie's dependency case. SSA provided Ronnie with "all his exit information."
Ronnie was working part-time at a restaurant and attending college. Along with his enrollment in college and employment, Ronnie's social worker cited Ronnie's supportive caregivers as reasons to terminate the dependency. Ronnie did "not put himself in [a] situation where he's going to hurt himself or get involved with negative situations . . . ." According to Ronnie's assigned social worker, if the court terminated the dependency Ronnie would still remain eligible for counseling services, Medi-Cal, and independent living services. Moreover, SSA would still reimburse Ronnie for dental procedures as required by the court in a prior order. Ronnie received free tuition at college due to a Board of Governors waiver, but he was obligated to pay for books and health care fees.
Ronnie wanted to keep the dependency case open: "I feel a lot safer having it open. I mean with the case closed, I do believe that there is no obligation for the social services to actually be paying for my braces because then they don't have anything to do with my case anymore. . . . And I'm afraid that if it closes they are not going to . . . pay[] my parents or me or the doctor . . . because . . . the money is coming out of my mom's bank account." "[T]hat money should be paid, $6,005, about a year ago, and it still hasn't been paid . . . ." Ronnie had "some troubles" at school due to a more rigorous environment than high school. Ronnie attended counseling once a week and took medication for attention deficit disorder. Ronnie could not survive on his earnings if he did not continue to live with his foster mother. But Ronnie thought he could still live with his foster parents even if the dependency case ended. Ronnie could not think of any assistance he would need from SSA other than payment of the dental bill.
Ronnie's foster mother also testified. She claimed Ronnie was struggling with his college education, noting he had been a special education student throughout his life and was now on academic probation at his college. She received $659 per month from SSA for Ronnie's care. She claimed an SSA employee indicated in a phone conversation that Ronnie's dental bills may not be reimbursed. Ronnie's foster mother made it clear Ronnie would stay with her family no matter what the court decided.
The court terminated the dependency, finding case law directed it to do so under the circumstances presented. But the court also granted a stay of its order pending appeal.
DISCUSSION
Ronnie contends the court erred by granting SSA's request to terminate dependency jurisdiction. We review the court's order for an abuse of discretion. (In re Tamika C. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1168 (Tamika); In re Holly H. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1338 (Holly).)
"While the juvenile court may not acquire jurisdiction over a person who is 18 years of age or older, once it has obtained jurisdiction of a minor it may retain jurisdiction until the dependent child turns 21." (Holly, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 303, subd. (a).) "'The burden of proof on the issue of termination rests with the party seeking to terminate jurisdiction . . . .' [Citations.] 'In determining whether to terminate jurisdiction over a child in long-term foster care, the issue to be addressed is the best interest of the child.'" (Tamika, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160.) Section 391, subdivision (a), imposes requirements on the "county welfare department" seeking to terminate dependency jurisdiction. But regardless of whether the "county welfare department" has met its obligations, the court has discretion to continue dependency jurisdiction. (§ 391, subd. (a)(3) ["This section shall not be construed to limit the discretion of the juvenile court to continue jurisdiction for other reasons"]; Holly, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333.)
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Section 391, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: "At any hearing to terminate jurisdiction over a dependent child who has reached the age of majority, the county welfare department shall do all of the following: [¶] (1) Ensure that the child is present in court . . . . [¶] (2) Submit a report verifying that the following information, documents, and services have been provided to the child: [¶] (A) Written information concerning the child's dependency case . . . . [¶] (B) [Certain official records, such as social security card, birth certificate, proof of citizenship] [¶] (C) Assistance in completing an application for Medi-Cal or assistance in obtaining other health insurance; referral to transitional housing, if available, as assistance in securing other housing; and assistance in obtaining employment or other financial support. [¶] (D) Assistance in applying for admission to college or to a vocational training program or other educational institution and in obtaining financial aid, where appropriate. [¶] (E) Assistance in maintaining relationships with individuals who are important to a child who has been in out-of-home placement . . . . [¶] (3) The court may continue jurisdiction if it finds that the county welfare department has not met the requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) and that termination of jurisdiction would be harmful to the best interests of the child. If the court determines that continued jurisdiction is warranted pursuant to this section, the continuation shall only be ordered for that period of time necessary for the county welfare department to meet the requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a). This section shall not be construed to limit the discretion of the juvenile court to continue jurisdiction for other reasons. The court may terminate jurisdiction if the county welfare department has offered the required services, and the child either has refused the services or, after reasonable efforts by the county welfare department, cannot be located." (Italics added.)
A court may not, however, continue dependency jurisdiction merely to assist in the financing of a dependent's college education. (In re Robert L. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 789, 797 (Robert) ["We are aware of no legislative mandate that the dependency system is to be utilized to subsidize higher education"].) In Robert, two dependents were placed with their grandparents, who received $700 per month in foster care benefits. (Id. at p. 791.) Years later, both dependents continued to live with their grandparents while they attended college. (Id. at pp. 791-792.) The trial court denied a motion by the county agency to terminate dependency jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 792-793.) The appellate court reversed. "[E]xercise of jurisdiction must be based upon existing and reasonably foreseeable future harm to the welfare of the child. [Citation.] Similar factors should come into play in determining whether jurisdiction should extend beyond the age of majority." (Id. at p. 794.) Because the evidence indicated dependents had a safe, supportive home and were not in danger of being "abused, neglected, or exploited[,]" the reason for the dependency case had ended. (Id. at pp. 794-795; see § 300.2 [purpose of dependency laws is to protect against abuse, neglect, and exploitation].) Thus, the "best interest" standard is tethered to the policy of preventing harm against the dependents, and cannot be stretched to justify financial enrichment in the absence of such potential harm.
"Although decided prior to the enactment of section 391, the [Robert] opinion articulates the standard to be applied in deciding whether to terminate the jurisdiction of the juvenile court after a dependent child turns 18." (Holly, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332.) "Section 391 does not change the standard set forth in [Robert], that the 'exercise of jurisdiction must be based upon existing and reasonably foreseeable future harm to the welfare of the child.'" (Id. at p. 1333.)
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Conversely, in determining whether to terminate jurisdiction, a court may not ignore a young adult's best interest (properly defined) in deference to the financial straits of the local child welfare agency. (Tamika, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.) The 18-year-old dependent in Tamika had not yet finished high school, and would not do so before turning 19. (Id. at pp. 1159-1160.) The agency sought to avoid the financial responsibility of maintaining the dependent. (Id. at pp. 1156, 1159; see Holly, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330 [referencing then-existing lack of federal funding for foster care after age 18].) The trial court terminated the dependency, citing the lack of "'extenuating circumstances'" to justify maintaining jurisdiction. (Tamika, at p. 1160.) The appellate court reversed: (1) the trial court applied a legally incorrect burden of proof by requiring extenuating circumstances to continue the dependency rather than considering the best interests of the dependent; (2) the department failed to meet all of its obligations under section 391; and (3) the court prioritized the agency's funding issues rather than the best interests of the dependent. (Tamika, at pp. 1161-1168.)
Our review of the entire record leads us to conclude the court did not abuse its discretion. First, SSA met its statutory obligations to Ronnie. Second, it was reasonable to find Ronnie's best interests did not require continued dependency jurisdiction. Undoubtedly, Ronnie and his foster family would benefit from continued dependency jurisdiction, in that foster care payments currently being made to his foster parents assist the family unit in making ends meet. But as made clear by Robert, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 789, courts should not continue a dependency case merely to provide financial breathing room for a young adult pursuing a college degree. The court was entitled to deem speculative Ronnie's attempts to show cognizable harm (i.e., maybe SSA would not meet its existing obligation to pay dental bills, maybe Ronnie's emotional health would be harmed by the removal of his legal status as a dependent).
Ronnie also points to portions of the Welfare and Institutions Code that have not yet taken effect, claiming statutory amendments in 2010 have changed the law with regard to continuing dependency jurisdiction over young adults like himself. (See §§ 303, subd. (b) ["On and after January 1, 2012"], 303, subd. (c), 391, subd. (c).) We decline Ronnie's invitation to countermand the clear language of the statutory text by applying laws not yet in effect. (See People v. McCaskey (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 411, 416 ["when the Legislature gives both an operative date and an effective date, the operative date is the date upon which the directives of the statute may be actually implemented"].)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating dependency proceedings is affirmed.
IKOLA, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. FYBEL, J.