Opinion
C097239
08-17-2023
CHIZOMA ONYEMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SCV0045837
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
Chizoma Onyems sued his home loan servicer and several others for, among other things, allegedly locking him out of his home and misrepresenting the balance on his home loan. He now appeals the trial court's judgment rejecting his claims. We affirm, finding most of his arguments either unintelligible or forfeited for failure to provide any reasoned argument.
BACKGROUND
Onyems obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to purchase a home in Auburn. Years later, after he allegedly fell behind on his loan payments, the trustee on the deed of trust recorded a notice of default and election to sell the home. The trustee later recorded a notice of sale for the property, but it rescinded the notice a few weeks later after Onyems submitted a payment of over $27,000.
Onyems afterward sued his home loan servicer (Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.) and the trustee on the deed of trust (Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, in trust for Registered Holders of Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-3, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-3) (together, respondents). Among other things, Onyems alleged respondents "illegally extorted money from [him] through a foreclos[u]re sale of his prop[e]rty."
Respondents demurred to Onyems's complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the complaint was uncertain, explaining that the allegations in the complaint were unintelligible and ambiguous. The court added, among other things, that it "appears" the applicable statute of limitations would bar many of Onyems's claims. The court granted Onyems leave to amend his complaint.
Onyems afterward filed an amended complaint and named four additional defendants: JP Morgan Chase, N.A., Chase Home Finance LLC, and JP Morgan Chase &Co. (together, Chase) and National Default Servicing Corporation (NDSC). Onyems alleged defendants failed to account for payments he had made on his loan, misrepresented the principal balance on the loan, and improperly added charges and fees to the balance. He also, among other things, alleged that a Select Portfolio Servicing employee named Stephen C. came to his home and demanded payment for amounts past due, that he and his family left their home while the employee was still at their property, and that when they returned home shortly after, they found a chain and padlock on their door. Onyems further alleged the employee removed the chain and padlock a few weeks later.
Respondents, Chase, and NDSC each demurred to Onyem's amended complaint. The trial court sustained Chase's and NDSC's demurrers without leave to amend. It also largely sustained respondents' demurrer, finding all but two causes of action against respondents to be time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations.
Respondents later moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication on Onyems's two remaining causes of action. They argued these causes of action failed as a matter of law because Stephen C.-the alleged Select Portfolio Servicing employee who came to Onyems's home-was not an employee of Select Portfolio Servicing and, even if he were, Select Portfolio Servicing would not be vicariously liable for his conduct.
The trial court granted respondents' motion. It found respondents met their burden to show that Stephen C. had never worked for them or acted at their direction, and it further found Onyems presented no evidence to show otherwise.
Onyems filed a notice of appeal the day after the trial court granted respondents' motion. The trial court later entered judgment in respondents' favor.
DISCUSSION
Before turning to Onyems's arguments, we start with respondents' request that we dismiss his appeal. Respondents reason we should dismiss the appeal because Onyems filed his notice of appeal after the trial court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment but before the court entered judgment. We deny their request. Under the California Rules of Court, a "reviewing court may treat a notice of appeal filed after the superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed immediately after entry of judgment." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2).) We do so here.
Turning to Onyems's arguments, he appears to assert at least 10 distinct arguments, none of which we find persuasive.
Onyems first contends "the trial court erred in the imposition of Rule 3.1306(c)." (Capitalization omitted; for ease of reading, we will generally omit capitalization when quoting Onyems's briefs.) Without any citation to the record, he states the trial court acted inappropriately because its "argument of compliance of Rule [3.1306 (c) is informational and a misdirection should not have been imposed to grant summary judgment when the defendant's motion papers were not complete, is abuse of discretion because the ruling by the presiding judge on motion order protection hearing denied the defendants' motion, verbatim cited 3.1306 (a) (b) and (c) inclusive; demanded compliance irrespective of the defendants' extensive argument against the order had already been argued at hearing denied." Onyems adds that respondents "obstructed justice hired a fake counsel," "colluded with purported representative counsel," and "deceived the trial court to modify as truth even though is a false modification . . . while the culprit stayed out of the country." And he asserts the trial court failed to disclose certain evidence (though it is unclear what), the court's decision "was in conflict with the jurisprudence of the judge in the imposition of order," and "changing the statu[t]e code to favor opposition who knew the order had been reviewed and hearing granted, evidence not disclosed; denied its existence prejudiced appellant."
We find Onyems's arguments unintelligible. As best we can tell, "Rule 3.1306(c)" is California Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(c), which describes the procedure for requesting judicial notice. But we fail to understand why Onyems believes the trial court violated this provision. Nor do we understand why Onyems believes respondents had "fake counsel," "colluded with purported representative counsel," and "deceived the trial court." Because Onyems has failed to present any reasoned argument on how "the trial court erred in the imposition of Rule 3.1306(c)," we treat his argument as forfeited. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 ["When an appellant . . . asserts [a point] but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived"].)
Second, under the heading "California law allows defendants to challenge non party deposition," Onyems argues respondents violated a protective order and this violation "goes against the judge's decision exceeds the bounds of reason and results in a miscarriage of justice is plain error." But Onyems's argument that respondents violated a protective order is unrelated to his argument heading that defendants can challenge nonparty depositions. Onyems needed to raise his distinct argument concerning the alleged violation of the protective order "under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point," as required under California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B). Because he failed to do so, we find he forfeited this argument. (Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830, fn. 4 (Opdyk).) In any event, Onyems's argument follows from a misreading of the cited protective order. In his view, the trial court issued a protective order compelling the deposition of Stephen C. But the cited order did no such thing. The order concerned respondents' motion to stay discovery after Onyems filed one document titled "Request for Evidence Hearing Rule 3.1306" and another titled "Request for Attorney Confidential Information Rule 1.5." The court denied the motion, saying it saw "no good cause for a protective order as [Onyems's] filings on their face do not constitute valid discovery requests under the Discovery Act." The court said nothing about Stephen C.
Third, under the heading "the trial court adopted the local rules," Onyems claims respondents obtained summary judgment based on "a well known false fact" and, in failing to comply with the protective order, suppressed evidence. But he never describes the referenced false fact and, again, relies on a misreading of the protective order. He also, as with his prior argument, raises his argument under a heading that concerns a different topic. We find he forfeited his argument as a result. (Opdyk, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1830, fn. 4.)
Fourth, Onyems suggests the trial court violated his due process rights when, at oral argument, it "enquire[d] on the protective order evidence already in court file." But Onyems never describes the trial court's inquiry, nor explains how the court violated his due process rights when it asked about the protective order. We consequently find his argument forfeited. (Badie v. Bank of America, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.)
Fifth, Onyems claims respondents "obtained judgment in an undue influence of coercion." He then characterizes respondents as "dominant" and himself as a "senior citizen . . . with a frail mind and body." But Onyems cites no facts showing respondents exercised undue influence over anyone. We thus reject his conclusory argument. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [courts may" 'disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt' "].)
Sixth, under the heading "Evidence Code 452 referred to any court recorded of this state," Onyems states that "the trial court admitted appellant complied with the evidential code 452 is the protective order in courts records did not disclose" and that "the question raised is why would the trial court looking for 'one or more evidence' it sort to favor appellant found the protective order which is one also the activities of the defendants withholding the evidence which is two and statutory required to obey the order of the judge has not been complied with is three." To the extent we can understand Onyems's argument, we understand his point to be that respondents withheld evidence and disobeyed a court order. But Onyems offers no rational argument for how these allegations have any relationship to Evidence Code section 452-a statute dealing with judicial notice. Nor has Onyems offered any evidence to support his allegations. We thus reject his unsupported and unclear claim.
Seventh, Onyems claims the trial court violated Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h). That provision states: "If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just...." Although Onyems claims this provision is applicable here, he never shows that to be true. He simply states, without explanation or citation, that "all moving papers were not complete and were instantly objected to as improper discretion by trial court" and that respondents' motion should have been denied "because the protective order violation, concealment and misrepresentation." We find the unsupported argument forfeited. (Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1406 [courts "may disregard any claims when no reference [to the record] is furnished"].)
Eighth, Onyems suggests his children are entitled to a pre-adjudication protective order under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 213.5, subdivision (b). But that provision-which applies "[a]fter a petition has been filed . . . to declare a child a ward of the juvenile court . . ." (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 213.5, subd. (b))-is inapplicable here. No petition has been filed in this case to declare Onyems's children wards of the juvenile court.
Ninth, Onyems claims the "trial court should have exercised power of its discretion when a party is in contempt of a valid order." We reject the argument, as Onyems has not shown any respondent to have been in contempt of a court order.
Tenth, Onyems argues the trial court and respondents violated his constitutional rights. He reasons that the trial court should have appointed him counsel, appearing to rely on the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He adds that respondents violated the Sixth Amendment by withholding evidence, violated his right to counsel by engaging in discovery misconduct that made litigation expensive, and violated "the Fifth Amendment and the article I, section 7 of the California Constitution by facilitating illegal in-house disinformation tactic to 'green lighting' coerce the trial court that Mr. Stephen [C.] was not the wrongdoer who infringed those rights." We reject his arguments. The Sixth Amendment applies in criminal prosecutions, not civil cases. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) And although parts of the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution apply in civil cases, Onyems never shows, as he alleges, that respondents facilitated an "illegal in-house disinformation tactic." Nor has he shown that respondents engaged in any discovery misconduct, let alone misconduct that could violate an opposing party's right to counsel.
Eleventh, in his reply brief, Onyems contends the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions against him. He also claims the trial court wrongly filed a demurrer on NDSC's behalf and, in support, cites respondents' proof of service for a notice of taking deposition. But because Onyems raises these arguments for the first time in his reply brief, and without good cause, we find them forfeited. (Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8.)
Finally, to the extent Onyems makes additional arguments in his "statement of the case," we disregard those arguments. Onyems, for example, asserts the "trial court judgment order newly signed dated 01/31/2023 and as modified is illegal because the new order contradicted original order appealed retained appellate jurisdiction as on 11/14/2022 (appellate court in fact added additional 8 days 11/22/2022 grace period) which is more than 60 days is prejudicial to appellant, is abuse of discretionary power and jurisdiction of appeal court." Onyems further, without explanation, asserts the "trial court has affirmative constitutional duty in the due process clause of 14th constitutional amendment to disclose all evidence favored the defendants before trial but not disclosed prejudiced appellants constitutional rights, is illegal required reversal." Because Onyems raises these points in his statement of the case only, and fails to assert them under a separate heading or subheading summarizing his points, we find these arguments forfeited. (Opdyk, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1830, fn. 4.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
We concur: ROBIE, Acting P. J. MAURO, J.