Opinion
13 CAF 19-02064
03-19-2021
In the MATTER OF DAGAN B. Ontario County Department of Social Services, Petitioner-Respondent; v. Calla B., Respondent-Appellant. (Appeal No. 3.)
DAVISON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, CANANDAIGUA (MARK C. DAVISON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. HOLLY A. ADAMS, COUNTY ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. SUSAN E. GRAY, CANANDAIGUA, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD.
DAVISON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, CANANDAIGUA (MARK C. DAVISON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
HOLLY A. ADAMS, COUNTY ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
SUSAN E. GRAY, CANANDAIGUA, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, TROUTMAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In appeal Nos. 1 and 2, respondent mother appeals from orders entered in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10 that continued placement of the subject child with petitioner until the completion of the next permanency hearing. The mother has not raised any contentions with respect to those orders, and we therefore dismiss those appeals as abandoned (see generally Golf Glen Plaza Niles, Il. L.P. v. Amcoid USA, LLC , 160 A.D.3d 1375, 1376, 76 N.Y.S.3d 307 [4th Dept. 2018] ). In any event, those appeals have also been rendered moot by subsequently entered permanency orders (see Matter of Anthony L. [Lisa P.] , 144 A.D.3d 1690, 1691, 41 N.Y.S.3d 641 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 914, 2017 WL 581722 [2017] ), and by the order in appeal No. 3, which, inter alia, terminated the mother's parental rights with respect to the subject child (see Matter of Jaxsin L. [Heather L.] , 124 A.D.3d 1398, 1399, 2 N.Y.S.3d 307 [4th Dept. 2015] ).
In appeal No. 3, the mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated her parental rights with respect to the subject child on the ground of permanent neglect. The mother contends that petitioner failed to establish that it had exercised diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen her parental relationship with the child, as required by Social Services Law § 384-b (7) (a). We reject that contention. "Diligent efforts include reasonable attempts at providing counseling, scheduling regular visitation with the child, providing services to the parent[ ] to overcome problems that prevent the discharge of the child into [his or her] care, and informing the parent[ ] of the[ ] child's progress" ( Matter of Jessica Lynn W. , 244 A.D.2d 900, 900-901, 665 N.Y.S.2d 205 [4th Dept. 1997] ; see § 384-b [7] [f] ; Matter of Star Leslie W. , 63 N.Y.2d 136, 142, 481 N.Y.S.2d 26, 470 N.E.2d 824 [1984] ). The record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner made "affirmative, repeated, and meaningful efforts" to assist the mother ( Matter of Sheila G. , 61 N.Y.2d 368, 385, 474 N.Y.S.2d 421, 462 N.E.2d 1139 [1984] ), including making referrals for evaluation and therapy, providing transportation services, and coordinating supervised visitation. Nonetheless, petitioner's efforts were fruitless because the mother was utterly uncooperative in that she, among other things, refused to provide her residential address for the purpose of a home inspection or sign a release so that petitioner could talk to the mother's purported psychologist, despite Family Court confirming that the mother understood that her failure to do either was preventing petitioner from returning the child to her care (see id. ; Matter of Markus R. , 273 A.D.2d 919, 920, 708 N.Y.S.2d 792 [4th Dept. 2000] ). Further, the mother's disruptive behaviors during supervised visitation inhibited petitioner's ability to find willing visitation supervisors despite petitioner's continued attempts to do so. Thus, the court did not err in granting petitioner's request to suspend visitation because, contrary to the mother's contention, it was not a lack of diligent efforts by petitioner that prevented visitation from being able to safely occur (see generally Matter of June D.S. , 288 A.D.2d 904, 905, 732 N.Y.S.2d 324 [4th Dept. 2001] ). "[G]iven the circumstances, [petitioner] provided what services it could" ( Matter of Christian C.-B. [Christopher V.B.] , 148 A.D.3d 1775, 1776, 50 N.Y.S.3d 766 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 917, 2017 WL 3877620 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Contrary to the mother's further contention, the court did not err in determining that she permanently neglected the child because she failed to plan for the child's future, i.e., she failed "to take such steps as may be necessary to provide an adequate, stable home and parental care for the child" ( Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [c] ; see Matter of Janette G. [Julie G.] , 181 A.D.3d 1308, 1309, 119 N.Y.S.3d 796 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 907, 2020 WL 3422455 [2020] ). Finally, we conclude that there is a sound and substantial basis in the record for the court's determination to terminate the mother's parental rights (see Matter of Caidence M. [Francis W.M.] , 162 A.D.3d 1539, 1541, 78 N.Y.S.3d 558 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 905, 2018 WL 4924781 [2018] ).