Opinion
Case No.: 5:20-CV-743-LCB
2020-12-04
Wendell Dwayne O'NEAL, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants.
Wendell Dwayne O'Neal, Harvest, AL, pro se. J. Mark Hart, Joseph L. Cowan, II, Hand Arendall Harrison Sale LLC, M. Keith Gann, Huie Fernambucq & Stewart LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Allstate Indemnity Insurance Company Inc. Davis L. Middlemas, Ruth Elisabeth Bailey, Morris Bart & Associates LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Morris Bart LLC. Brad A. Chynoweth, Jeremy Stone Weber, Office of the Attorney General State of Alabama, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant Claude E. Hundley, III. M. Keith Gann, Huie Fernambucq & Stewart LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Keith Gann. Albert J. Trousdale, II, Trousdale Ryan PC, Florence, AL, for Defendant Albert Trousdale. Caleb Winslow Ballew, Martinson & Beason PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants Jeff Knight, William Plyant. Edward E. Blair, City of Huntsville Office of the City Attorney, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants Trey Riley, Eddie Blair, Charles A. Fann, The City of Huntsville. Davis L. Middlemas, Morris Bart & Associates LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants Bailey, Davis L. Middlemas.
Wendell Dwayne O'Neal, Harvest, AL, pro se.
J. Mark Hart, Joseph L. Cowan, II, Hand Arendall Harrison Sale LLC, M. Keith Gann, Huie Fernambucq & Stewart LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Allstate Indemnity Insurance Company Inc.
Davis L. Middlemas, Ruth Elisabeth Bailey, Morris Bart & Associates LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Morris Bart LLC.
Brad A. Chynoweth, Jeremy Stone Weber, Office of the Attorney General State of Alabama, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant Claude E. Hundley, III.
M. Keith Gann, Huie Fernambucq & Stewart LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Keith Gann.
Albert J. Trousdale, II, Trousdale Ryan PC, Florence, AL, for Defendant Albert Trousdale.
Caleb Winslow Ballew, Martinson & Beason PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants Jeff Knight, William Plyant.
Edward E. Blair, City of Huntsville Office of the City Attorney, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants Trey Riley, Eddie Blair, Charles A. Fann, The City of Huntsville.
Davis L. Middlemas, Morris Bart & Associates LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants Bailey, Davis L. Middlemas.
ORDER
LILES C. BURKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Over the past two decades, Wendell Dwayne O'Neal has sued persons, partnerships, and corporations. He has sued cities, states, and the federal government; federal agencies, federal officers, and federal employees. He's sued community colleges, technical universities, and boards of education; high schools, teachers, and school administrators; sheriffs' deputies, police officers, and 911 dispatchers. He's sued insurance agencies and claims adjustors; hotels and property managers; banks, credit unions, and collection agencies; fitness centers, phone companies, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. He's also sued law firms, defense attorneys, and student lawyers; city, state, and federal prosecutors; judicial clerks, court administrators, and judges throughout the nation. All told, he's sued over 400 parties. His 100-plus filings comprise civil actions, appeals, and petitions taken in the state courts of Alabama, Arizona, Minnesota, and Nevada; the District Courts of Alabama, Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia; the Bankruptcy Court of Arizona; the United States Tax Court; the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits; and the Supreme Court of the United States. Together this tidal wave of proceedings has spawned thousands upon thousands of pages of pleadings, motions, briefs, and orders. All but two have been without merit.
The tally of parties named as defendants at the district-court level alone runs to 440. The vast majority of these parties have been named but once.
In aggregating these cases, the Court consulted PACER, Westlaw, Lexis, and AlaCourt. Based on his filing patterns, however, O'Neal has likely filed suit in many other states. Also omitted are O'Neal's criminal actions, and, with the sole exception of a habeas petition that he filed with the Supreme Court, the many (often duplicative) civil actions that he's brought for post-conviction relief. The Court's estimates are thus conservative.
This case is no exception. Unhappy with the outcome of a recent settlement agreement, O'Neal now sues the parties involved in the earlier case for federal review of the state-court action, naming as defendants the presiding judge and attorneys of record. But because this case presents no "substantial" federal question, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide his claims, and the case must be dismissed.
O'Neal's Second Amended Complaint comprises 427 pages of allegations, claims, citations, footnotes, and exhibits. Though only 65 pages of the prodigious filing constitute the amended complaint itself, the Court considers copies of "written instrument[s]" attached to a pleading—that is, its full contents—as "part of the pleading for all purposes." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
On October 22, 2018, O'Neal was riding in a car with his mother, Maple McCray, when a drunk driver in a Honda Accord struck them from behind. (Doc. 37 at 10; Doc. 37–5 at 29; Doc. 37–11 at 42). Though the driver, a woman named Geronda Gendron, was carrying no insurance of her own (Doc. 37–5 at 29), the Honda she was driving was covered under a policy issued by Allstate to another woman, Kimberly Broadnax. (Doc. 37–8 at 13). As a permissive driver of the Honda, Gendron qualified as an insured under Broadnax's Allstate policy. Id. The Honda was thus insured against bodily injury up to $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. (Doc. 37–11 at 39).
The vehicle in which O'Neal and his mother were riding was also insured. (Doc. 37–2). McCray had subscribed to a policy with Metropolitan Property & Casualty Co. (MetLife) that provided up to $50,000 of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) with a cap of $100,000. (Doc. 37 at 8; 37–2 at 1–2).
Two weeks after the accident, O'Neal sued Gendron, Farmers Insurance Co., MidCentury Insurance Co., and a Farmers's claims adjuster named Leah Goslee for their roles in an alleged conspiracy that he claimed had "constructively denied [his] financial recovery from motor vehicle accident injuries through negligence, misrepresentation and fraud." O'Neal v. Farmers Ins. Co. , 5:18-CV-1831-LCB (N.D. Ala. April 18, 2019). Much like here, O'Neal's thrice-amended pleadings complained of a far-reaching conspiracy to deny him what he claimed to be full entitlements under his mother's UIM policy; and there too (though the parties were different) he reckoned the existence of a widespread misinformation campaign and a misbegotten insurance policy fabricated to deny him additional recovery. Id. And though his pleadings purported to invoke the Court's federal-question jurisdiction by reference to a host of federal statutes, the Court held that these invocations were entirely spurious: having stated no federal cause of action, O'Neal's claims sounded, if anywhere, in state tort law. Id. When it became clear in a fourth request to amend the pleadings that O'Neal had omitted essential, diversity-destroying parties, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
In so holding, the Court was careful to note that it was by no means concluding that O'Neal had properly stated a claim for relief under Alabama law. To the contrary, the Court opined that the claims, far from being well-pleaded, were scarcely intelligible.
With the dismissal of the federal-court lawsuit, O'Neal filed two actions in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Alabama: O'Neal v. Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Co. , CV-2019-40 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. Apr. 14, 2020), and O'Neal v. Metlife Auto & Home Ins. Agency Inc. , CV-2019-47 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. July 26, 2019). Metlife was dismissed without prejudice. Allstate , in contrast, precipitated a settlement agreement, with O'Neal and Allstate settling for a policy-limits payout of $25,000. In consideration for the insurance money, O'Neal released Allstate, Broadnax, and Gendron from all claims arising out of the accident and signed a pro tanto stipulation of dismissal with Gendron and Broadnax. (Doc. 50–1; Doc. 52–1 at 3–4). Upon the filing of the stipulation and on motion by Allstate, Judge Claude E. Hundley, III dismissed with prejudice all claims against Gendron, Broadnax, and Allstate. (Docs. 50–1, 50–2, and 50–3).
The $25,000 was split into two checks, both sent to O'Neal. The first, cut for $21,997.14, was issued solely to "Wendell O'Neal"; the other, which covered the $3,002.86 balance, was issued to "Huntsville Hospital and Wendell O'Neal." The background facts are somewhat fuzzy, but from the pleadings it appears that after the car accident O'Neal was admitted to Huntsville Hospital. (Doc. 37 at 24). The stay, which was paid for by Medicaid, cost $3,002.86 in emergency-room expenses. Id. ; (Doc. 37–11 at 11.) O'Neal was sent a notice by a firm called Avectus that the Health Care Authority of the City of Huntsville had claimed a hospital lien for his treatment, and the lien would apply against the settlement proceeds for any injury-related recovery. (Doc. 37–5 at 10–12). That Allstate recognized the lien and cut a check from his proceeds to service it appears partly to have motivated this lawsuit: in the Second Amended Complaint, O'Neal contends that by naming him on the second check, Allstate "involved [him] in insurance fraud against Huntsville hospital physicians." (Doc. 37 at 61).
Once Allstate had finalized the settlement, MetLife, following the procedure set forth in Lambert v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. , 576 So. 2d 160 (Ala. 1991), consented to the settlement agreement and waived subrogation. (Doc. 37–9 at 31). After further investigation, MetLife paid O'Neal the full $50,000 available under his mother's UIM policy. (See Doc. 37 at 34).
DISCUSSION
In this proceeding, O'Neal has sued the parties, attorneys and the presiding judge from the state-court action, alleging that the defendants conspired to deny him full recovery under his mother's UIM policy. (Doc. 37 at 8, 25, 40, and 55). According to O'Neal, Allstate "enjoined" the other defendants to "manufacture" a phony policy, then "concealed" that the policy was "void" in order to deny him full recovery under the MetLife policy and certain so-called "crime victim's benefits." O'Neal contends that the defendants violated his due-process and equal-protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, (Doc. 37 at 8, 25, and 40), and "engaged in deceit, misrepresentation, and fraud" (Doc. 37 at 55). To redress his alleged injuries, he seeks $1,000,000 in punitive damages; an award of $25,000 to "repay" the Allstate settlement; another award of $90,000 to cover the costs of the "2020 Chevrolet Camaro and 2020 BMW 301 drive" that he bought under the "mistaken belief" that he'd be able to press his claims after the settlement; and several declaratory rulings.
Conspiratorial contentions of this kind typify O'Neal's pleadings. In reviewing one of O'Neal's motions to file suit without prepayment of fees in another case with a similarly incredible narrative, a judge of the Western District of Wisconsin observed that O'Neal's allegations "have a paranoid quality that makes them difficult to accept as true." O'Neal v. Unknown Oakland Circuit Judge , No. 06-C-35-C, 2006 WL 644851, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 13, 2006).
Specifically, O'Neal asks the Court to find that Allstate's policy was "void ab initio," that he has standing to sue Allstate concerning Alabama HMS's efforts to recover Medicaid benefits, and that Huntsville police were required by Alabama law to arrest Gendron for a DUI and charge her for driving without insurance. (Doc. 37 at 59–64).
I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
It is a dictum oft-invoked that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Before reaching the merits of a dispute, federal courts "have an independent obligation" to ensure that they have jurisdiction over its subject matter. Jacobson v. Fla. Sec'y of State , 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2020). A court may raise the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte "at any stage in the litigation," Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 506, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), and, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Federal courts are conferred subject-matter jurisdiction only over those cases within the scope of the judicial power set forth in Article III of the Constitution and "entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress." PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc. , 844 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton , 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994) ). Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332 contain "[t]he basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction." Arbaugh , 546 U.S. at 513, 126 S.Ct. 1235. Section 1331 confers federal courts with jurisdiction over cases that present a "federal-question," cases over which the court may preside if the plaintiff "pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States." Id. (citing Bell v. Hood , 327 U.S. 678, 681–85, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ). Section 1332 confers the courts with subject-matter jurisdiction over "diversity-of-citizenship" cases, those in which the plaintiff "presents a claim between parties of diverse citizenship that exceeds the required jurisdictional amount" of $75,000. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) ). A case "arises under" federal law within the meaning of § 1331 "if federal law creates the cause of action, or if a substantial disputed issue of federal law is a necessary element of a state law claim." Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co. , 139 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust , 463 U.S. 1, 9–10, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) ). Section 1331 has been interpreted "narrowly"; the Supreme Court has imposed "three restrictions on the phrase ‘arising under.’ " 13D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3562 (3d ed. 2019). Among these is the requirement that "the implicated federal issue must be substantial. " Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc. , 381 F.3d 1285, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Hagans v. Lavine , 415 U.S. 528, 537, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit," Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport , 193 U.S. 561, 579 [24 S.Ct. 553, 48 L.Ed. 795] (1904) ; "wholly insubstantial," Bailey v. Patterson , 369 U.S. 31, 33 [82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512] (1962) ; "obviously frivolous," Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore , 216 U.S. 285, 288 [30 S.Ct. 326, 54 L.Ed. 482] (1910) ; "plainly unsubstantial," Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin , 289 U.S. 103, 105 [53 S.Ct. 549, 77 L.Ed. 1062] (1933) ; or "no longer open to discussion," McGilvra v. Ross , 215 U.S. 70, 80 [30 S.Ct. 27, 54 L.Ed. 95] (1909).
Hagans v. Lavine , 415 U.S. 528, 536–37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). Thus, a claim that purports to arise under the Constitution or a federal statute may be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if it "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction" or is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders , 138 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted).
A case may be heard under a federal court's diversity jurisdiction "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To cross § 1332's jurisdictional threshold, a "plaintiff must allege that the plaintiff and defendants are citizens of different states and that the amount in controversy exceeds" the jurisdictional minimum set forth in § 1332(a). Massey v. Congress Life Ins. Co. , 116 F.3d 1414, 1418 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997).
It is "presumed that a cause lies outside" of the court's limited jurisdiction, and "the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen , 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673 (first citing Turner v. Bank of North America , 4 U.S. 8, 4 Dall. 8, 1 L.Ed. 718 (1799) ; and then citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. , 298 U.S. 178, 182–83, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936) ). The party alleging the basis for the court's subject-matter jurisdiction must "include ‘a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends.’ " Taylor , 30 F.3d at 1367 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ).
A. O'Neal's pleadings raise no "substantial" federal question.
Like a staged bout in the theater of professional wrestling, O'Neal's pleadings shimmer with but a veneer of legitimacy. Although the complaint is peppered with citations to federal legal authorities, it is clear from the factual allegations and the supplemental documentation submitted with the complaint that, taken as a whole, the pleadings present no substantial question of federal law. The Second Amended Complaint contains two sections—"Federal Questions for the Complaint to Proceed" and "Subject-Matter Jurisdiction for Second Complaint to Proceed"—that purport to identify the basis for the Court's jurisdiction. (Doc. 37 at 3–7). At the beginning of the first of the two, O'Neal alleges that
Other sections of O'Neal's Second Amended Complaint purport to expand on this jurisdictional basis (see e.g. , Doc 37 at 8–9), but nowhere does he show how the citations relate to the facts or the relief requested.
Allstate employee's agreement to manufacture a liability policy after Huntsville police reported Gendron operated her vehicle without insurance presents a valid question whether third parties enjoined to deny Plaintiff's civil rights to due process and equal protection under the color of Alabama criminal, insurance and motor vehicle laws against full financial recovery from MVA injuries before federal and state courts.
Id. at 3. A footnote following this paragraph does most of the would-be jurisdictional heavy-lifting:
Fn. 1. USCA Am 14, 5, 1; U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2; Title 42 USC § 1985(3) ; Title 42 USC § 1983 ; Title 28 U.S. Code § 1331 - Federal question; Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l U.S.A., 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) ; Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 [130 S.Ct. 2743, 177 L.Ed.2d 461] (2010) ; Cox v. Mills, 465 Fed. Appx. 885, 888 (11th Cir. 2012), citing Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1123 [1223] ([11th Cir.] 2003) ; Luian [Lujan ] v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 [112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351] (1992) ; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345, 349, 95 S. Ct. 449, 452-53, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) ; Howton v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 448 [(Ala. 1987)]. (Independent tortious acts after MVA). (Supreme Court of Alabama Filed: March 13th, 1987). (Precedential Status: Precedential).
(Doc. 37 at 3 n.3) (emphasis in original). In this and a dozen or so other similarly ponderous footnotes throughout sections II and III, O'Neal claims that subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by the Fourth Amendment; the Fifth Amendment; the First Amendment; Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3). (Doc 37 at 3–8).
To support his allegations, O'Neal here and elsewhere cites not only to genuinely authoritative sources of law—state and federal statutes, Articles and Amendments of the Constitution, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court—but also to completely spurious filings that carry little or no legal weight. Among the sources he cites most frequently are briefs and undecided motions that he's submitted in other cases. Also popular are orders entered in cases that he's initiated, orders that often stand for propositions other than what he's cited them for. On the very first page of the Second Amended Complaint, for instance, O'Neal cites this Court's dismissal order in the first post-accident lawsuit, O'Neal v. Farmers Ins. Co. , 18-CV-1831-LCB (N.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2019), for the proposition that Allstate "enjoined" the other defendants "to effectuate settlement of MVA claims against Kimberly Broadnax and Geronda Gendron contrary to Plaintiff's civil rights for due process and equal protection under the color of Alabama insurance, motor vehicle, and criminal codes before federal and state courts." (Doc. 37 at 1). Regardless of what O'Neal meant here by "enjoined"—the pleadings use legal jargon somewhat freely—the Court found no such thing. What the Court found in Farmers is that O'Neal had conceded that the proper (non-diverse) defendants—Allstate, Broadnax, and Gendron—had not been named in the action, and dismissal under Rule 41 was therefore appropriate.
After careful review of all 421 pages of the Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds that the allegations of federal-question jurisdiction "clearly appear[ ] to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction" and are "wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. , 138 F.3d at 1352 (quotations omitted). Although O'Neal purports to bring this case under the Court's federal-question jurisdiction, none of the factual allegations set forth in the pleadings implicate a "substantial" federal question. Dunlap , 381 F.3d at 1291–92. Sixty-five pages of factual allegations can be distilled into but a few short propositions: Broadnax's Allstate policy was "void," O'Neal was entitled under his mother's Metlife policy to additional uninsured motorist benefits, and the defendants, through "deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation," concealed that they'd "manufactured" the "void" Allstate policy to deny him further recovery under his mother's policy. Were these facts well-pleaded, they would sound squarely in state contract, insurance, and tort law.
Nor can the Court exercise diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Like O'Neal, most of the defendants are residents of Alabama. Because the parties are non-diverse and the claims present no federal question, the Court must dismiss the case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Even if O'Neal had been able to clear these jurisdictional hurdles, his complaint would still suffer from three fatal defects. First, it is a "paradigmatic shotgun pleading," violating Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b). See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office , 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Second, taking the well-pleaded facts as true, the complaint offers only "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]," Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ), and " ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’ " id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ), allegations insufficient to state a claim for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). And third, even if he had plausibly stated a claim that could have defeated a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 9(b) would require that the details setting forth the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud be stated with far greater particularity than they have been here alleged. See Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp. , 605 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) ("[A] plaintiff must allege: "(1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place, and person responsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner in which these statements misled the Plaintiffs; and (4) what the defendants gained by the alleged fraud.")
SANCTIONS
But dismissal of the case is not deterrent enough: O'Neal, a seasoned and prolific filer of abusive lawsuits, must be sanctioned for bringing yet another meritless action, one of dozens that he's brought in legal fora across the country. This case is but one of twenty that he has filed in the Northern District of Alabama, a home-district concentration that belies the national scope of his litigious zeal. Not only does this figure exclude the thirty-nine cases that O'Neal has filed in other federal district courts across the country, it also excludes the nine cases that he's filed in the trial courts of Alabama; a handful of appellate proceedings he's initiated in other state courts; twenty-nine appeals taken in the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits; and two petitions to the United States Supreme Court. All but two of these cases, it appears, have been without merit. Some not only meritless but incredible. In many others, O'Neal simply seeks to relitigate imagined disputes that have already been dismissed in another forum. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Smith , 5:14-cv-1365-MHH (N.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 2014) (dismissing as frivolous a lawsuit against a Madison County Circuit Judge and several local attorneys and noting that two of O'Neal's recent cases had been dismissed on nearly identical facts). Just as often, he moves in the same proceeding for reconsideration of issues already decided by the district court or an appellate panel. See, e.g., O'Neal v. United States , No. 5:19-CV-90-LCB (N.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2019) (denying motion for amended judgment and noting that because the case was closed the Court would consider no further motions); see also O'Neal v. United States , No. 17-15164, 2017 WL 3222931, at *1 (9th Cir. 2017) (denying post-dismissal motions to "take judicial notice of recent judicial rulings" and "recall the mandate," noting that "[n]o further filings will be entertained in this closed case").
See O'Neal v. United States , No. 5:18-CV-1358-LCB, 2019 WL 4459066, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 18, 2019), vacated and remanded , 825 Fed. App'x 695 (11th Cir. 2020) ; O'Neal v. United States , No. 5:19-CV-458-AKK, 2019 WL 2297523, at *1 (N.D. Ala. May 30, 2019) ; O'Neal v. Farmers Ins. Co. , No. 5:18-CV-1831-LCB (N.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2019); O'Neal v. Deilman , No. 5:19-CV-259-LCB (N.D. Ala. Apr. 2, 2019); O'Neal v. United States of America, Inc. , No. 5:19-CV-90-LCB, 2019 WL 330140 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2019) ; O'Neal v. Berryhill , No. 5:18-CV-479-TMP, 2019 WL 220241, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2019) ; O'Neal v. Smith , No. 5:13-CV-02312-MHH, 2015 WL 2194585, at *1 (N.D. Ala. May 11, 2015) ; O'Neal v. Redstone Federal Credit Union , No. 5:14-CV-1296-CLS (N.D. Ala. July 9, 2014); O'Neal v. Smith , No. 5:14-CV-1365-MHH (N.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 2014); O'Neal v. Alabama , No. 2:14-CV-183-MHH (N.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2014); O'Neal v. Auto Club Inter Ins. Inc. , No. 5:13-CV-329-IPJ (N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2013); O'Neal v. Berryhill , No. 2:05-CV-2127-VEH (N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2012); O'Neal v. Michigan Acad. of Ct. Reporting , No. 5:09-CV-1925-SLB (N.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2010); O'Neal v. Remus , No. 5:09-CV-2038-IPJ (N.D. Ala. Oct. 30, 2009); O'Neal v. Minnesota , No. 5:09-CV-1882-CLS (N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2009); O'Neal v. United States , No. 5:09-CV-1802-IPJ (N.D. Ala. Sept. 16, 2009); O'Neal v. Sprint Nextel Corp. , No. 5:06-CV-4691-IPJ (N.D. Ala. Nov. 11, 2006); O'Neal v. Vang , No. 5:05-CV-2092-CLS-HGD (N.D. Ala. Oct. 17, 2005); O'Neal v. Michigan , No. 5:05-CV-2091-IPJ-RRA (N.D. Ala. Oct. 12, 2005).
Outside of the Northern District of Alabama, O'Neal has brought suit in the district courts of Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Nevada, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia; the Bankruptcy Court of Arizona; and the United States Tax Court: O'Neal v. United States , No. CV-16-3888-PHX-GMS, 2017 WL 168046, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2017), appeal dismissed , No. 17-15164, 2017 WL 3222931, at *1 (9th Cir. 2017) ; O'Neal v. Titlemax of Alabama Inc. , 2:16-cv-632-DJH (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2016), appeal dismissed , No. 16-15600 (9th Cir. 2017); O'Neal v. Adams , No. 2:14-cv-2360-DJH (D. Ariz. Oct. 26, 2015); O'Neal v. Adams , No. CV-15-00565-PHX-DJH, 2015 WL 13333309, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2015), aff'd , 670 Fed. App'x 456 (9th Cir. 2016), and aff'd , 670 Fed. App'x 456 (9th Cir. 2016) ; O'Neal v. Snow , 2:14-cv-2673-DLR (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2014), appeal dismissed , No. 14-17516 (9th Cir. 2015); O'Neal v. Univ. of Phoenix , 2:14-cv-2207-GMS (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2014), appeal dismissed , No. 14-17113 (9th Cir. 2014); O'Neal v. Deilman , 2:14-cv-1080-SRB (D. Ariz. Sep. 19, 2014); O'Neal v. Auto Club Inter-Insurance Inc. , 2:13-cv-523-SRB (D. Ariz. July 15, 2013); O'Neal v. Atkins , 2:10-cv-2351-SMM (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2011); O'Neal v. Remus , No. 09-14661, 2010 WL 1463009, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2010) ; O'Neal v. Quails , 2:96-cv-71489-BAF (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 1997); O'Neal v. City of New Brighton , Civil No. 12-2549 DWF/JJG, 2013 WL 1173933, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2013) ; O'Neal v. LDC Collection Sys. , No. CIV. 10-2517 JRT/JJK, 2011 WL 1193200, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2011), aff'd , No. 12-1482 (8th Cir. 2012); O'Neal v. Fang Sic Vang , 0:05-cv-2464-DSD-SRN (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2005), aff'd , No. 12-1477 (8th Cir. 2012); O'Neal v. Minnesota , No. CIV.09-2746(RHK/SRN), 2009 WL 4782504, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2009) ; O'Neal v. Cook , No. CIV. 07-2803ADM/JSM, 2009 WL 762207, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 19, 2009), aff'd , 355 Fed. App'x 978 (8th Cir. 2009) ; O'Neal v. City of St. Paul , No. CIV 07-3947ADM/JSM, 2009 WL 762207, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 19, 2009), aff'd , 355 Fed. App'x 978 (8th Cir. 2009) ; O'Neal v. City of St. Paul , No. CIV 07-4230ADM/JSM, 2009 WL 762207, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 19, 2009), aff'd , 355 Fed. App'x 978 (8th Cir. 2009) ; O'Neal v. Moore , No. CIV.06-2336-ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 4417327, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2008), aff'd , 355 Fed. App'x 975 (8th Cir. 2009) ; O'Neal v. Hennepin Cnty. , No. CIV. 08-377 JNE/JJG, 2008 WL 1783017, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 2008) ; O'Neal v. Atwal , 0:06-cv-1677-PJS-JJG (D. Minn. July 19, 2006); O'Neal v. Unknown U.S. Government Entity , 0:05-cv-1943-DWF-AJB (D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2005); O'Neal v. Unknown 911 Dispatcher , 0:05-cv-1897-JMR-FLN (D. Minn. Oct. 24, 2005); O'Neal v. Unknown 911 Dispatcher , 0:05-cv-1865-RHK-JSM (D. Minn. Sep. 1, 2005); O'Neal v. Albertson , No. 2:17-cv-3025-JAD-DJA, 2020 WL 5423987, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 10, 2020), appeal docketed Sept. 30, 2020; O'Neal v. Zurich Ins. Co. , 2:18-cv-1677-RFB-BNW (D. Nev. filed August 31, 2018); O'Neal v. Denise , No. 2:17-cv-02387-KJD-NJK, 2018 WL 1092334, at *1 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2018) ; O'Neal v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , No. 2:16-cv-2313-JCM-CWH, 2017 WL 4638226, at *1 (D. Nev. Oct. 13, 2017), aff'd , 735 Fed. App'x 352 (9th Cir. 2018) ; O'Neal v. LDC Collect Systems , 3:10-cv-2377-MLC-LHG (D.N.J. June 22, 2010); O'Neal v. Coleman , No. 06-C-243-C, 2006 WL 1706426, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 16, 2006) ; O'Neal v. Porchlight, Inc. , No. 06-C-242-C, 2006 WL 1515622, at *1 (W.D. Wis. May 30, 2006) ; O'Neal v. Atwal , No. 05-C-739-C, 2006 WL 3371752, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2006) ; O'Neal v. K.A. , No. 06-C-40-C, 2006 WL 6091449, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2006) ; O'Neal v. Unknown Oakland Circuit Judge , No. 06-C-35-C, 2006 WL 644851, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 13, 2006) ; O'Neal v. Mallon , 1:11-cv-330-RLW (D.D.C. May 8, 2013); O'Neal v. U.S. Justice Dep't. , 1:11-cv-776-RLW (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2012); O'Neal v. Stafford Loans , 2:15-ap-62-EPB (Bankr. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2016); In re: O'Neal , 2:14-bk-18636-EPB (Bankr. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2016); O'Neal v. Allstate Ins. Inc. , 2:15-ap-127-EPB (Bankr. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2015); O'Neal v. Gold's Gym , 2:15-ap-193-EPB (Bankr. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2015); O'Neal v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue , 005991-10 (T.C. 2010).
See O'Neal v. Allstate Northbrook Indem. Co. , CV-2019-000040 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. Apr. 17, 2020); O'Neal v. Metlife Auto & Home Ins. Agency Inc. , CV-2019-000047 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. July 26, 2019); O'Neal v. Alabama, Dep't of Revenue , CV-2016-000417 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cnty. Oct. 24, 2016); O'Neal v. Auto Club Inter-Ins. Exch. , CV-2013-000074 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty Nov. 14, 2013); O'Neal v. Riviera Fitness Ctr. of Hsv, Inc. , CV-2007-001091 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. June 17, 2008); O'Neal v. Riviera Fitness Ctr. , CV-2007-000047 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. Feb. 29, 2008); O'Neal v. Amko Inc. , CV-2006-002224 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. Jan. 30 2008); O'Neal v. Amko Inc. , CV-2008-000066 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. Jan. 25, 2008); and O'Neal v. H B Shin & Amko Inc. , SM-2006-005660 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. Dec. 22, 2006).
See O'Neal v. Corp. Serv. Co. , No. 1 CA-CV 19-0118, 2020 WL 428655, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2020) ; O'Neal v. Deilman , No. 1 CA-CV 15-0306, 2016 WL 4089143, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016) ; O'Neal v. Rd. Runner Rentals, Inc. , No. 72948, 2018 WL 3913679, at *1 (Nev. App. July 27, 2018), appeal dismissed , 393 P.3d 663 (Nev. 2017) ; O'Neal v. Albertson , No. 74607, 2018 WL 1417845, at *1 (Nev. App. Mar. 6, 2018) ; In re O'Neal , A061564 (Minn. 2006); O'Neal v. Pierce , 20006CV000427 (Dane. Cty. Cir. Ct. June 29, 2006); O'Neal v. Pierce , 20006CV000416 (Dane. Cty. Cir. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006).
See O'Neal v. K.A. Super U.S.A. , No. 06-2309 (7th Cir. 2006); O'Neal v. Y.P.O. Vang , No. 12-1477 (8th Cir. 2012); O'Neal v. Moore , No. 12-01478 (8th Cir. 2012); O'Neal v. Cook , No, 12-1479 (8th Cir. 2012); O'Neal v. City of St. Paul , No. 12-1480 (8th Cir. 2012) ; O'Neal v. City of St. Paul , No. 12-1481 (8th Cir. 2012); O'Neal v. LDC Collection System , 12-1482 (8th Cir. 2012); O'Neal v. Moore , 355 Fed. App'x 975 (8th Cir. 2009) ; In re O'Neal , No. 09-01772 (8th Cir. 2009); O'Neal v. Cook , 355 Fed. App'x 978 (8th Cir. 2009) ; O'Neal v. City of St. Paul , 355 Fed. App'x 978 (8th Cir. 2009) ; O'Neal v. City of St. Paul , 355 Fed. App'x 978 (8th Cir. 2009) ; O'Neal v. TitleMax of Alabama, Inc. , No. 15-1374 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2017); O'Neal v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. , No. 15-1152 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); O'Neal v. Albertson , No. 20-16892 (9th Cir. appeal docketed September 30, 2020); O'Neal v. Univ. of Phoenix , No. 14-17113 (9th Cir. 2014); O'Neal v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 735 Fed. App'x 352 (9th Cir. 2018) ; O'Neal v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. , No. 18-15591 (9th Cir. 2018); O'Neal v. Denise , No. 18-15113 (9th Cir. 2018); O'Neal v. Titlemax of Alabama Inc. , No. 16-16933 (9th Cir. 2017); O'Neal v. Univ. of Phoenix , Inc., No. 16-16766 (9th Cir. 2017); O'Neal v. Titlemax of Alabama Inc. , No. 16-15600 (9th Cir. 2017); O'Neal v. United States , No. 17-15164, 2017 WL 3222931, at *1 (9th Cir. 2017) ; O'Neal v. USA , No. 17-15007 (9th Cir. 2017); O'Neal v. Adams , 670 Fed. App'x 456 (9th Cir. 2016) ; O'Neal v. USDC-AZP , No. 16-71133 (9th Cir. 2016); O'Neal v. Snow , No. 14-17516 (9th Cir. 2015); O'Neal v. Univ. of Phoenix , Inc., No. 14-17507, (9th Cir. 2015); and O'Neal v. United States , 825 Fed. App'x 695 (11th Cir. 2020).
See In re O'Neal , 556 U.S. 1267, 129 S.Ct. 2759, 174 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) ; and O'Neal v. Minnesota , 555 U.S. 1001, 129 S.Ct. 502, 172 L.Ed.2d 369 (2008).
In canvassing O'Neal's filing history, the Court found only two cases in which O'Neal has obtained any of the relief that he sought in filing suit. In the first, O'Neal successfully petitioned the Court for review of an adverse decision by the Commissioner of Social Security. O'Neal v. Berryhill , No. 2:05-CV-2127-VEH, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2012). In lieu of a responsive pleading, the Commissioner, unable to locate O'Neal's file, moved to remand the case for the Administrative Law Judge to reconstruct the administrative record. Id. , ECF No. 6. The motion was granted, id. , ECF No. 7, and, on remand, the ALJ issued a "fully favorable decision," finding that O'Neal had been disabled since September 1999. In 2012, the decision was affirmed. Id. , ECF No. 12. Note, however, that in 2018, O'Neal inundated the Court with a spate of motions, memoranda, and supplemental exhibits under FRCP 60(b) seeking relief from the judgment. O'Neal v. Berryhill , No. 2:05-CV-2127-VEH, ECF No. 13 at 2 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2012); see also id. , ECF Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19. The allegation was that the Commissioner had "suppressed first favorable disability decision and misrepresented first filed application for SSA benefits to conceal covert FBI activity contrary to equal protection under color of regulations providing for backpay." Id. , ECF No. 13 at 2. The flurry of filings appears to have been motivated by a reevaluation conducted in the normal course of business of O'Neal's disability status, a review that concluded that O'Neal, as of March 2018, was no longer disabled. See O'Neal v. Berryhill , No. 5:18-CV-0479-TMP, ECF No. 47 at 8, 2019 WL 220241 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2019). The motions were denied as untimely, and the case remained closed. O'Neal v. Berryhill , No. 2:05-CV-2127-VEH, ECF No. 20.
In a second case, filed in bankruptcy along with a related adversary proceeding, O'Neal sought to discharge his student-loan debt. In re: O'Neal , 2:14-bk-18636 (Bankr. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2016); O'Neal v. Stafford Loans , 2:15-ap-62-EPB (Bankr. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2016). The case was dismissed as moot—a win for O'Neal—when the defendants stipulated that, because of his disability, O'Neal's debt should be discharged. See O'Neal v. Stafford Loans , ECF No. 63. After he had won, however, and the judge had admonished him that discharge of his indebtedness would leave the bankruptcy court without jurisdiction to decide any remaining claims, see id. ECF No. 66–1, O'Neal continued to flood the docket with frivolous motions. See id. ECF Nos. 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, and 72.
Consider, for example, his allegations in O'Neal v. United States of America , 5:09-cv-1802-IPJ (N. D Ala. Sept. 16, 2009), a case in which O'Neal sued the United States, Michigan, Minnesota, the City of Detroit, a Court Reporting Academy, and a community college for violations of his civil rights. There he alleged that a court-reporting school had falsified his high-school grades and attendance records by transposing his first and middle names; that he was under surveillance by the Justice Department, who, along with the FBI, were making "clandestine assaults" against him; that because of these FBI assaults, he had been imprisoned, defaulting thereby on his student loans; and that the conspiracy was motivated in part by the fact the DOJ had designated the Melanic Islamic Palace of the Rising Sun—a group he had joined while incarcerated—as a security threat. O'Neal v. United States of America , 5:09-CV-1802-IPJ (N. D Ala. Sept. 16, 2009).
In open cases, O'Neal has developed another tactic of abuse. When parties stake out positions contrary to his, O'Neal will often file a Rule 11(c)(2) "safe-harbor" warning and then move for sanctions against them. Here, for instance, O'Neal moved for sanctions against the Morris Bart Law Firm (Doc. 47), Allstate, the Huie Law Firm, and Attorney Keith Gann (Docs. 49 and 53) simply for denying his allegations. These motions spawned filing upon filing, imposing needless costs on the defendants and the Court alike.
O'Neal has thus, over the past two decades, developed a steady pattern of costly, abusive, and vexatious filing behavior. In just the past two years, four of his cases have been dismissed by this Court alone. Noting the pattern and the apparent baselessness of this lawsuit, the Court ordered O'Neal to appear in open court to show cause why his case should not be dismissed and he not sanctioned. (Doc. 78). At the hearing, the Court made the following findings:
O'Neal v. United States of America, Inc. , 5:18-CV-01358-LCB, (N.D. Ala. July 18, 2019), vacated, O'Neal v. United States , 825 F. App'x 695 (11th Cir. 2020) ; O'Neal v. Farmers Ins. Co. , 18-cv-1831-LCB (N.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2019) (dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); O'Neal v. Deilman , 5:19-cv-259-LCB (N.D. Ala. Apr. 2, 2019) (dismissing the case for failure to prosecute); and O'Neal v. United States of America, Inc. , 5:19-cv-90-LCB (N.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2019) (dismissing the case for failure to state a claim). Note that in the first case the Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgment not because of any meritorious arguments advanced by O'Neal, but because it found that the controversy had become moot before the Court granted summary judgment for the defendant. See O'Neal v. United States , 825 F. App'x 695 (11th Cir. 2020).
In the order setting the hearing, O'Neal was allowed to respond to the show-cause order with one ten-page brief. The order received short-shrift. O'Neal filed: (1) a response with twenty-one pages of briefing and exhibits (Doc. 81); (2) a motion eight pages of briefing and exhibits that sought leave to file supplemental briefs and exhibits (Doc. 85); and (3) a further fifty pages of supplemental briefs and exhibits in support of his first response (Doc. 86).
1. The complaint is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of success and cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing law. The claims are without merit, the case frivolous.
2. The case has been brought for an improper purpose. The successive suits brought on the same facts, the meritless claims, and the motions for sanctions serve only to harass the defendants and their attorneys.
3. Although O'Neal appears pro se, he is familiar enough with the law not to be accorded the same leeway typically accorded to unrepresented parties. He knows, for instance, that he cannot sue judges in their official capacities.
4. O'Neal has filed at least twenty lawsuits in the Northern District of Alabama, including several before this Court, and has been involved in at least forty-seven cases in the District Courts of Alabama, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Nevada, and the District of Columbia.
5. O'Neal has also been a party to at least twenty-seven appeals in the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal.
6. O'Neal has demonstrated a years-long pattern of filing frivolous lawsuits throughout the country, imposing enormous costs on defendants, attorneys, and judicial systems throughout the country.
7. For the foregoing reasons, O'Neal is a vexatious litigant.
8. O'Neal will be deterred from continuously filing frivolous lawsuits only
In a more exhaustive search conducted since the show-cause hearing, the Court found more actions, appeals, and petitions brought by O'Neal in courts across the country, including some in courts not mentioned in the findings made at the hearing.
See note 20, supra.
with the imposition of both monetary and non-monetary sanctions.
On the basis of these findings, the Court concluded that, by filing this lawsuit and moving for sanctions without an objective basis in law, O'Neal had violated Rule 11, and, moreover, that under both Rule 11 and the Court's inherent powers, sanctions were appropriate.
At the close of the hearing, O'Neal was put on notice that he may also be subjected to an anti-filing injunction—a prohibition against bringing new lawsuits without a court's pre-filing approval—and was given two weeks (and fifteen pages) to show cause why he should not be thus enjoined. O'Neal in response filed forty-two-pages of briefing and exhibits (Doc. 95), twenty-two pages of briefing "supporting response to show cause order" with exhibits (Doc. 96), and an obliquely responsive twenty-two-page, exhibit-laden "Motion for Leave to Show Defendants Falsified Liability Coverage Exists for Allstate's Vehicle" (Doc. 101).
MONETARY SANCTIONS
Having considered the pleadings, the parties' briefing, and the law, the Court finds that monetary sanctions against O'Neal are appropriate.
O'Neal is therefore ORDERED to pay monetary sanctions as follows:
• $500 to Allstate Indemnity Insurance Co.;
• $500 to Morris Bart LLC;
• $500 to Keith Gann;
• $500 to Albert Trousdale;
• $500 to Jeff Knight;
• $500 to William Pylant;
• $500 to Lisa Bailey;
• $500 to Davis L. Middlemas;
• $500 to the State of Alabama for maintaining the suit against the Honorable Charles E. Hundley, III; and
• $2000 to the City of Huntsville for maintaining the suit against Trey Riley, Eddie Blair, Charles A. Fann, and the City of Huntsville.
All payments must be made by March 3, 2021 . Failure to pay by the deadline may subject O'Neal to further sanctions.
PERMANENT INJUNCTION
Monetary sanctions alone will not deter O'Neal from filing further frivolous lawsuits. A permanent injunction is therefore in order.
Although a plaintiff may not "be completely foreclosed from any access to the court," Procup v. Strickland , 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986), his right to a judicial forum is nevertheless "neither absolute nor unconditional," Miller v. Donald , 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n , 936 F.2d 512, 516 (11th Cir. 1991) ). Because "[f]rivolous and vexatious lawsuits" clog the judicial machinery and "threaten the availability of a well-functioning judiciary to all litigants," a district court may impose restrictions on a person's access to conserve its resources and safeguard the right for the general public. Miller , 541 F.3d at 1096.
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), empowers federal courts to combat vexatious litigants through the procedural bulwark of a permanent injunction to dispel frivolous litigation. Id. Under this authority, a district court may prohibit a party from filing in federal courts, state courts, and other fora without pre-filing approval. See Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co. , 307 F.3d 1277, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). District courts also have both "the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions." Procup , 792 F.2d at 1073–74 (citing In re Martin-Trigona , 737 F.2d 1254, 1261–62 (2d Cir. 1984) ). The courts possess this authority even where the underlying suit states no "judicial federal claim." See id. at 1073–74. "Were a frivolous lawsuit a bar to the court's inherent jurisdiction, the court would be powerless to act upon even a flood of frivolous lawsuits which threatened to bring judicial business to a standstill." Id. at 1074.
O'Neal's filings are constant, abusive, and enormously costly. Parties forced to defend themselves against O'Neal's unmitigated abuse must spend considerable time parsing his repetitive, jargon-rich pleadings, and spend their money on legal fees or, if attorneys, on increased malpractice-insurance premiums. The judicial system is no less burdened by his baseless suits. Courts across the nation have because of O'Neal spent countless hours reviewing filings, holding hearings, and drafting orders that lead invariably to dismissal. Well-established legal doctrines like Article III standing, res judicata, and the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, developed each to protect would-be parties from the burdens of repeat and meritless litigation, doctrines meant to preserve the integrity of our federalist system, have all failed to deter O'Neal from bringing suit after frivolous suit. His briefs here and elsewhere show that he understands the role that they serve but will sue nevertheless, even when there is no chance of success on the merits. These doctrines may thus preclude recovery, but they have failed to prevent needless litigation—a failure that has borne enormous costs to society.
This case presents a prime example. Though it appears that O'Neal incurred genuine physical injuries in his car accident with Gendron, none of the four lawsuits that he's filed has concerned legitimate claims against the tortfeasor or insurers, both of whom worked with O'Neal and his mother from the first to resolve his insurance claims. Rather, each case was based on a legally frivolous theory of law designed to harass the defendants. That there is no basis but harassment here is evident by his choice of defendants, a set that includes the state-court judge that presided over the lawsuits and the attorneys involved in litigating those actions. This sue-the-judge, sue-the-attorneys tactic of re-litigation is not new to O'Neal. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Smith , 5:14-CV-1365-MHH (N.D. Ala. 2014) (dismissing as frivolous a lawsuit against a Madison County Circuit Judge and several local attorneys).
For these reasons, and for the reasons stated at the show-cause hearing, the Court finds it appropriate to permanently enjoin O'Neal from serving or filing new actions or other legal documents without pre-service or pre-filing leave of court. This permanent injunction supersedes the preliminary injunction entered on August 27, 2020. (Doc. 91). In formulating this injunction, the Court has endeavored to preserve O'Neal's right to access the courts to vindicate meritorious claims and defend himself in all manner of proceedings. Based on his past filings, the Court concluded that the injunction, as fashioned, is no broader than necessary to prevent further abusive filings and will not vitiate O'Neal's right to bring meritorious claims in the future. Wendell Dwayne O'Neal is therefore permanently enjoined as follows:
I. Filing Motions or Other Documents in Pending Cases
Wendell Dwayne O'Neal is hereby permanently enjoined from serving or filing any motion, affidavit, declaration, pleading, briefing, response, or other document in any pending case brought by him or on his behalf without pre-service or pre-filing leave of court. O'Neal may obtain leave to serve or file the proffered document only from the court.
All documents proffered for service or filing must satisfy the following conditions:
1. Every document must be accompanied by an affidavit or unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury . Any motion, affidavit, declaration, pleading, briefing, response, or other document that O'Neal seeks to serve or file must be accompanied by an affidavit or unsworn declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that attests to the necessity for filing, certifies that the document is submitted in good faith, and indicates the names of those persons upon whom the document is to be served and the address at which service will be made. This provision will not apply to notices of appeal.
2. Communications with the Court must be made by formal motion. If O'Neal or any other person or entity acting on his behalf or in concert with him wishes to communicate with the Court, he or she shall do so only by formal motion made under applicable law as may be appropriate in the circumstances. Neither court personnel nor any person acting under the Court's direction will be under any obligation to respond in any way to any letter, telephone call, or informal communication from O'Neal, or from any person or entity acting on his behalf or in concert with him.
3. Failure to answer communications will imply neither waiver, agreement, nor consent with the O'Neal's views or requests. Failure by the Clerk or other court personnel, or persons acting under the Court's direction, to respond to any communication from O'Neal or any person acting on his behalf or in concert with him shall in no sense be deemed to imply approval of, agreement with, or consent to the views or requests expressed in the communication.
4. All documents filed in this Court must comply with Eleventh Circuit brief-formatting requirements. Any motion, affidavit, declaration, pleading, briefing, response, or other document that O'Neal seeks to serve or file in the Northern District of Alabama must comply with the Eleventh Circuit's briefing requirements, including double spacing between lines and 14-point Times New Roman type.
The Clerk of Court will convey all documents proffered by O'Neal to the Court for review. Failure to comply with any of these conditions will, nevertheless, be sufficient cause for the Clerk of Court to refuse to accept any proffered document, or to return it, or for the Court to summarily deny O'Neal permission to serve or file it.
II. Filing New Actions, Proceedings, and Matters in the Federal Courts or Other Federal Fora
Wendell Dwayne O'Neal is hereby permanently enjoined from filing or attempting to initiate any new lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter in any federal court, agency, tribunal, committee, or other federal forum of the United States, against any person or entity, or serving any person or entity with any paper purporting to initiate any lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter without first obtaining leave of that court, agency, tribunal, committee, or other forum. In seeking leave, O'Neal, or any person or entity acting for him, or at his behest, must comply with each of the following requirements:
1. The complaint or document purporting to commence a lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter must be accompanied by either the full filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Any motion for permission to proceed or to appeal in forma pauperis shall be accompanied by an affidavit or unsworn declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that indicates with particularity: (1) the date and disposition of the most recent denial by this court or the Court of Appeals of any motion to proceed in forma pauperis , and (2) the new facts, if any, that demonstrate O'Neal's indigency that have not previously been alleged in support of an earlier unsuccessful motion to proceed or appeal in forma pauperis.
2. The complaint or other document purporting to commence a lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter must be accompanied by a $1,000 bond. If the Court determines that the complaint or other document has been filed in good faith, the bond will be returned to O'Neal; and if the Court determines that the case has not been filed in good faith, the bond will be forfeit and the proceeds paid into the registry of the Court.
3. All new cases must be accompanied by a motion requesting leave to file the action. The complaint or document purporting to commence a lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter must be filed with a motion captioned "Application for Leave to File in Accordance with the Order of the Northern District of Alabama." The motion shall be accompanied by the following exhibits:
A. Exhibit 1 : A copy of this order;
B. Exhibit 2 : An affidavit or unsworn declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 certifying whether he has previously raised the claim at issue in the complaint or other filing in any court, agency, tribunal, committee, or other forum; and
C. Exhibit 3 : A list of every lawsuit, action, proceeding, matter, or complaint that O'Neal has filed or that has been filed on his behalf in any court, agency, tribunal, committee, or other forum, against every defendant or respondent in the lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter he wishes to file or attempt to initiate.
4. If O'Neal is granted leave to file the complaint or other document, each defendant or respondent shall be served in the new lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter with a copy of the complaint or other document and the materials specified in subsections (3)(A)–(C).
Failure to comply with the terms of this order will be sufficient grounds for a federal court, agency, tribunal, committee, or other federal forum to deny any motion by O'Neal for leave to file. Moreover, the failure to advise a federal court, agency, tribunal, committee, or other federal forum in which he has filed a lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter of the materials specified in subsections (3)(A)–(C), may be considered sufficient grounds for dismissal of the lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter.
III. Commencing New Actions or Participating in Proceedings in Non-Federal Courts
In any document that commences a new lawsuit, proceeding, or matter or in which he seeks to intervene or participate in any then-existing action, proceeding, or matter in any state, county, or municipal court, or in any other non-federal court, agency, tribunal, or forum in the United States, Wendell Dwayne O'Neal or any individual or entity acting for him or at his behest or in concert with him must attach to the document a copy of this order.
Wendell Dwayne O'Neal is further permanently enjoined from filing or attempting to initiate any new lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter in any state, county, or municipal court, or in any other non-federal court, agency, tribunal, or forum in the State of Alabama against any person or entity, or from serving any person or entity with any paper purporting to initiate any lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter without first obtaining leave of that court, agency, tribunal, committee, or other forum. In seeking leave, O'Neal, or any person or entity acting for him, or at his behest, must comply with each of the following requirements:
1. The complaint or document purporting to commence a lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter must be filed with a motion captioned "Application for Leave to File in Accordance with the Order of the Northern District of Alabama." The motion shall be accompanied by the following exhibits:
A. Exhibit 1 : A copy of this order;
B. Exhibit 2 : An affidavit or unsworn declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 certifying whether he has previously raised the claim at issue in the complaint or other filing in any court, agency, tribunal, committee, or other forum; and
C. Exhibit 3 : A list of every lawsuit, action, proceeding, matter, or complaint that O'Neal has filed or that has been filed on his behalf in any court, agency, tribunal, committee, or other forum, against every defendant or respondent in the lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter he wishes to file or attempt to initiate.
2. If O'Neal is granted leave to file the complaint or other document, each defendant or respondent shall be served in the new lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter with a copy of the complaint or other document and the materials specified in subsections (1)(A)–(C).
Failure to comply with the terms of this order will be sufficient grounds for any state, county, or municipal court, or any other non-federal court, agency, tribunal, or forum in the State of Alabama to deny any motion by O'Neal for leave to file. Moreover, the failure to advise a state, county, municipal, or other non-federal court, agency, tribunal, or forum in the State of Alabama in which he has filed a lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter of the materials specified in subsections (1)(A)–(C), may be considered sufficient grounds for dismissal of the lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter.
IV. Lawsuits, Actions, Proceedings, Investigations, or Matters Anywhere Against Persons or Entities That Have Encountered Wendell Dwayne O'Neal in the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
Wendell Dwayne O'Neal is permanently enjoined from commencing or purporting to commence or attempting to initiate any lawsuit, action, proceeding, investigation or matter of any kind in any forum or tribunal—judicial or administrative, federal, state, or local, including professional disciplinary and grievance committees—without leave of this Court, against any person or entity that has encountered him in any capacity, or that has had any connection with litigation involving him in any way, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama or the courts of the State of Alabama—including: (a) judicial officers or other court personnel; (b) counsel involved in any proceeding in which O'Neal has been involved; and (c) other litigants involved in any proceedings in which O'Neal has been involved.
V. Persons Acting in Concert with Wendell Dwayne O'Neal Are Fully Bound by the Terms of This Order
All provisions of this order that personally apply to Wendell Dwayne O'Neal shall apply equally to persons or entities acting at his behest, at his direction, or in concert with him.
VI. Failure to Honor the Terms of This Order Are Punishable by Contempt
Failure to honor the terms of this order shall subject Wendell Dwayne O'Neal, and any person or entity acting at his behest, at his direction, or in concert with him, to applicable penalties for contempt of court, including fine or imprisonment.
VII. Leave to File—Time Limit and Separate Certification
1. If Wendell Dwayne O'Neal is granted leave to file any document or paper in any lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter under any section of this order, he shall take the actions required to file the document or paper within ten days of leave being granted, and his failure to do so shall be sufficient grounds for a refusal by the relevant forum to accept the document.
2. Each separate paper or document that O'Neal is granted leave to file under any section of this order shall have attached to it a proper certification of service.
VIII. Service of Documents
Wendell Dwayne O'Neal is hereby permanently enjoined from serving upon any person or entity any document, summons, subpoena, motion, affidavit, declaration, or other paper purporting to be served in connection with any lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter brought in any federal court, agency, tribunal, or forum of the United States, or in any state, county, municipal, or other non-federal court, agency, tribunal, or forum in the State of Alabama unless (1) a lawsuit, action, proceeding, or matter has in fact been commenced in that forum, the identity of which is apparent on the face of the paper, and (2) the document, summons, subpoena, motion, affidavit, declaration, or other paper is timely and properly filed with the court, agency, tribunal, or forum indicated on the paper in compliance with the requirements of the preceding sections of this order.
IX. Limitations
This order is subject to the following limitations:
1. Nothing in this order shall be construed as having any effect on Wendell Dwayne O'Neal's ability to defend himself in any criminal action brought against him, or in any civil action in which he is named as a defendant. In the latter case, however, this order shall be binding on any counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party complaint that he may seek to file.
2. Nothing in this order shall be construed to prohibit O'Neal or anyone acting on his behalf from retaining a licensed attorney to represent him in any cause of action in any legal forum. The terms of this injunction do not apply to any licensed attorney that O'Neal should retain to represent
him in any forum in which the attorney is a member in good standing and eligible to practice.
CONCLUSION
Because the claims present no substantial federal question and the parties are non-diverse, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, and this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE . All pending motions are denied as moot, and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case.
DONE and ORDERED this December 4, 2020.