It is axiomatic that a party's failure to timely invoke a remedy does not make it inadequate. Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). ARP's moot claim (due to its successful protest) as to entry '7552-2 and Harrison's successful protests as to two entries not included in its complaint amply demonstrate that far from being exercises in futility, timely protests on their part as to the remaining entries at issue in these suits were opportunities for picking low-hanging fruit.

That is an express statement requiring an importer to challenge the legality of Customs' classification or liquidation decisions via the protest procedures in §§ 1514 and 1515. See Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed.Cir.1988) (noting the perceived “pervasive requirement throughout the statute to channel all nonexcepted protests through § 1514 even when those protests go to the legality of a custom official's action”). And the Trade Court has jurisdiction over such a challenge exclusively via § 1581(a).

See id. at 1305, 1311–12.See also Alden Leeds Inc. v. United States, 476 Fed.Appx. 393, 395–96, 401 (Fed.Cir.2012) (non-precedential) (holding that § 1581(i) was not available where importer did not file a protest of Customs' deemed liquidation of certain entries despite a suspension order from Commerce until Commerce published final results of an administrative review, well after the deadline in § 1514 ); Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1369, 1373–76 (Fed.Cir.2002) (holding that protests to liquidations on the basis that they should have been liquidated at a deemed liquidation rate rather than a final rate could have been timely made under § 1514, but that since the protests were untimely, there was no jurisdiction under § 1581(i) ); US JVC Corp. v. United States, 184 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1999) (applying Juice Farms to “closely parallel” facts); Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 912–13, 915 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that, where Customs failed to hold liquidation in suspense, and where importer failed to realize this had occurred, only requesting reliquidation later, the liquidation was final under § 1514 and a statutory deadline could not be tolled via § 1581(i) ).Carbon does not argue that bulletin notices of the liquidations were not posted, as is required by regulation.

Id. at 1346. In sum, even though it is undisputed that Customs' 2005 reliquidations were erroneous, AHAC's failure to challenge those reliquidations in the Court of International Trade resulted in those liquidations becoming final and conclusive. Id.; see also Cherry Hill, 112 F.3d at 1559 (“this court does not recognize a distinction between ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement”); Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed.Cir.1988) (same); United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 66 C.C.P.A. 50, 593 F.2d 1015, 1020 (1979) (same). We therefore affirm the Court of International Trade's decision that AHAC is legally obligated to pay under its continuous bond.

Even if the plaintiffs in U.S. Shoe were not aware of the potential administrative remedy, the availability of jurisdiction under § 1581(i) has always hinged on whether the plaintiffs could have used a method that would result in § 1581(a) jurisdiction, not whether they actually used it. See Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a legal remedy "is not made inadequate simply because appellant failed to invoke it within the time frame it prescribes"). Turning to the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that, even if plaintiffs had filed a case brief contesting application of the Reseller Policy, Commerce's determination regarding the issue would not have constituted a 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) determination which qualifies for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).

To the contrary, the Federal Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a case that involved Commerce's erroneous exclusion of an importer's name from a suspension of liquidation list regarding entries then subject to a countervailing duty order. See Omni USA, Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The case arose in the aftermath of the President's transfer of the administration of countervailing duties from the Treasury Department to Commerce.

The Government cited 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514, 1515 (2002) and several Federal Circuit cases to support its view that liquidations performed in violation of a court order must be challenged at the administrative level, where — under § 1515(a) — Customs has two years within which to rule on a protest. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("the underlying policy of section 1514 . . . is to channel challenges to liquidations through the protest mechanism"); see also Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Government's attempt to justify its inaction on the basis of these authorities was not only a losing endeavor, it was not substantially justified.

The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under section 516(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930. Moreover, Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), a "parallel" case cited by Commerce as requiring Plaintiff to protest under § 1520(c) in a situation such as this, is inapposite to the case before this Court. Because the plaintiff in Omni U.S.A. missed the opportunity to protest under § 1520(c) and § 1581(a), Plaintiff was precluded from asserting all claims under § 1581(i) jurisdiction.

And this court in Macrotel International Corp., 34 Fed. Cl. at 99 n. 2, as an alternative ground for dismissing the case, held that it had no jurisdiction because Macrotel did not exhaust its administrative remedies in a liquidation dispute with Customs. Cf. Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 916 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that failure by an importer to timely challenge Customs' failure to hold liquidation of entries in suspense, pending review of AD/CVD order, within a year of the date of liquidation of entries as mandated by statute, negated the importer's claim to a refund of deposit of estimated countervailing duties). Throughout its pleadings and other filings, Forest Products' arguments in favor of this court's jurisdiction hopelessly confuse and conflate two different aspects of its case: Customs' purported misclassification of Forest Products' imported lumber products, and an alleged separate Customs investigation relating to the same misclassified wood products, which may or may not result in either civil or criminal penalties.

In those cases, the precedent of the Federal Circuit "does not recognize a distinction between `void' and `voidable' liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement of section 1514." Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559 (citing Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), andJuice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed Cir. 1995)). These cases, however, do not address a situation in which Commerce and Customs have failed to effectuate a § 1516a(c) court-ordered injunction.