An administrative proceeding does not toll the limitations period unless the proceeding is a mandatory prerequisite to filing suit. Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 n. 7 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 56, 102 L.Ed.2d 34 (1988); Lipp v. United States, 301 F.2d 674, 675, 157 Ct.Cl. 197 (Ct.Cl. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932, 83 S.Ct. 1540, 10 L.Ed.2d 691 (1963). Filing an administrative protest with Customs was not a prerequisite to MELA's suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).

In this case, however, Juice Farms did not show that the relief in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), if properly invoked, would have been inadequate, let alone manifestly inadequate. If Juice Farms had protested within ninety days of bulletin notices, it would have had an opportunity to protest the legality of Customs' liquidations in the Court of International Trade. As this court has stated, a remedy is not inadequate "simply because appellant failed to invoke it within the time frame it prescribes." Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915, 6 Fed. Cir. (T) 99, 104, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988). Juice Farms, the importer, bears the burden to check for posted notices of liquidation and to protest timely.

Id. at 1021. A similar ruling was made by this court in Omni U.S.A., Inc., v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Customs Service, in an admitted error, liquidated an entry at an incorrectly high duty, although it was required to have held the liquidation in suspense.

With regard to notice, the importer must assert the existence of an inadvertence to Customs "within the proper time and with sufficient particularity to allow remedial action." Hambro Automotive Corp. v. United States, 458 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (Cust.Ct. 1978); see Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 916 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming Court of International Trade's dismissal of untimely reliquidation request under § 1520(c)(1)). In this case, ITT brought to the attention of Customs within one year after liquidation that "[a] mistake of fact occurred in the initial creation of the broker's records which resulted in the subsequent misclassification of the entries covered by this claim."

The court expressly rejected the argument that "voidable" liquidations must be protested, but "void" liquidations do not. The decision in Deringer was followed by this court in Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995), both of which confirmed that this court does not recognize a distinction between "void" and "voidable" liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement of section 1514. In the Omni case, Customs was supposed to hold the liquidation of the entries in suspense, but instead liquidated the entries prematurely.

As indicated, whether legal or illegal, a liquidation not protested within 90 days becomes final as to all parties. 19 U.S.C. § 1514; Juice Farms v. United States, 18 CIT 1037, 1040 (1994)("An importer cannot treat an illegal liquidation as void; rather, the importer must remain vigilant and protest the legality of such a liquidation within 90 days of notice."), aff'd, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 914-15 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The court in Deringer noted that 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)

An untimely or otherwise illegal reliquidation by Customs is not void; it is only voidable. See e.g., Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 6 Fed. Cir. (T) 99, 103, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (1988); United States v. A.N. Deringer, 66 CCPA 50, 55, 593 F.2d 1015, 1020 (1979). An importer must raise a contention of illegality by filing a timely protest against the reliquidation; otherwise, the reliquidation will become final and conclusive. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5); Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States, 67 Cust.Ct. 155, 163, 332 F. Supp. 203, 209 (1971).

The importer bears the burden for examining all notices posted to determine whether its goods have been liquidated, and to protest timely. Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 11 CIT ___, 663 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 56, 102 L.Ed.2d 34; Goldhofer, 13 CIT at ___, 706 F. Supp. at 895. Moreover, there is a presumption of regularity which attaches to government acts.

Defendants contend that a legal remedy is "not made inadequate simply because appellant failed to invoke it with the time frame it prescribes." (ITC Br. at 9 (citing Omni U.S.A. Inc., v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).)

The asserted flaw in this case is not in the accuracy of the liquidation or the lawfulness of the process leading up to it, but in the effect that the government seeks to give it — the effect of displacing the liquidation that had already taken effect by operation of law pursuant to the `deemed liquidation' statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a).Id. at 1559 (distinguishing Juice Farms, 68 F.3d 1344; Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988); and United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 66 C.C.P.A. 50, 593 F.2d 1015 (1979)). Thus, the Federal Circuit recognized a distinction for a deemed liquidation argument.