See Goldhofer Fahrzeugwerk GmbH Co. v. United States, 885 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Second, the importer bears the burden of checking for posted notices of actual assessment of duties and of timely protesting.See Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States 663 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also 21A Am.Jur.2dCustoms Duties and Import Regulations § 204 (1998) (citing Tropicana Prods., Inc. v. United States, 713 F. Supp. 415 (1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 504 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). As this court pointed out in Juice Farms, when the importer bears the burden of examining the bulletin notices and protesting within the statutory time limits, then the importer is not entitled to equitable tolling if its own lack of diligence caused the untimely filing.

Id. at 1346. In sum, even though it is undisputed that Customs' 2005 reliquidations were erroneous, AHAC's failure to challenge those reliquidations in the Court of International Trade resulted in those liquidations becoming final and conclusive. Id.; see also Cherry Hill, 112 F.3d at 1559 (“this court does not recognize a distinction between ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement”); Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed.Cir.1988) (same); United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 66 C.C.P.A. 50, 593 F.2d 1015, 1020 (1979) (same). We therefore affirm the Court of International Trade's decision that AHAC is legally obligated to pay under its continuous bond.

An administrative proceeding does not toll the limitations period unless the proceeding is a mandatory prerequisite to filing suit. Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 663 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 n. 7 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 56, 102 L.Ed.2d 34 (1988); Lipp v. United States, 301 F.2d 674, 675, 157 Ct.Cl. 197 (Ct.Cl. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932, 83 S.Ct. 1540, 10 L.Ed.2d 691 (1963). Filing an administrative protest with Customs was not a prerequisite to MELA's suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).

Even if the plaintiffs in U.S. Shoe were not aware of the potential administrative remedy, the availability of jurisdiction under § 1581(i) has always hinged on whether the plaintiffs could have used a method that would result in § 1581(a) jurisdiction, not whether they actually used it. See Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a legal remedy "is not made inadequate simply because appellant failed to invoke it within the time frame it prescribes"). Turning to the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that, even if plaintiffs had filed a case brief contesting application of the Reseller Policy, Commerce's determination regarding the issue would not have constituted a 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) determination which qualifies for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).

The asserted flaw in this case is not in the accuracy of the liquidation or the lawfulness of the process leading up to it, but in the effect that the government seeks to give it — the effect of displacing the liquidation that had already taken effect by operation of law pursuant to the `deemed liquidation' statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a).Id. at 1559 (distinguishing Juice Farms, 68 F.3d 1344; Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988); and United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 66 C.C.P.A. 50, 593 F.2d 1015 (1979)). Thus, the Federal Circuit recognized a distinction for a deemed liquidation argument.

Although the type of claim that a party raises and the availability of administrative remedies may affect the accrual of the party's cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), a party's decision to pursue " permissive administrative remedies does not toll running of the statute of limitation[s] or delay accrual of the cause of action." Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 11 CIT 480, 483 n. 7, 663 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 n. 7 (1987), aff'd, 6 Fed. Cir. (T) 99, 840 F.2d 912, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 56, 102 L.Ed.2d 34, reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 961, 109 S.Ct. 405, 102 L.Ed.2d 393 (1988) (citing Lipp v. United States, 157 Ct.Cl. 197, 301 F.2d 674, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932, 83 S.Ct. 1540, 10 L.Ed.2d 691 (1962)) (emphasis added). The need for finality, which the foregoing principle furthers, becomes more pronounced when a party pursues an administrative remedy that is unavailable as a matter of law.