The court expressly rejected the argument that "voidable" liquidations must be protested, but "void" liquidations do not. The decision in Deringer was followed by this court in Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995), both of which confirmed that this court does not recognize a distinction between "void" and "voidable" liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement of section 1514. In the Omni case, Customs was supposed to hold the liquidation of the entries in suspense, but instead liquidated the entries prematurely.

In those cases, the precedent of the Federal Circuit "does not recognize a distinction between `void' and `voidable' liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement of section 1514." Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559 (citing Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), andJuice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed Cir. 1995)). These cases, however, do not address a situation in which Commerce and Customs have failed to effectuate a § 1516a(c) court-ordered injunction.

That is an express statement requiring an importer to challenge the legality of Customs' classification or liquidation decisions via the protest procedures in §§ 1514 and 1515. See Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed.Cir.1988) (noting the perceived “pervasive requirement throughout the statute to channel all nonexcepted protests through § 1514 even when those protests go to the legality of a custom official's action”). And the Trade Court has jurisdiction over such a challenge exclusively via § 1581(a).

See id. at 1305, 1311–12.See also Alden Leeds Inc. v. United States, 476 Fed.Appx. 393, 395–96, 401 (Fed.Cir.2012) (non-precedential) (holding that § 1581(i) was not available where importer did not file a protest of Customs' deemed liquidation of certain entries despite a suspension order from Commerce until Commerce published final results of an administrative review, well after the deadline in § 1514 ); Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1369, 1373–76 (Fed.Cir.2002) (holding that protests to liquidations on the basis that they should have been liquidated at a deemed liquidation rate rather than a final rate could have been timely made under § 1514, but that since the protests were untimely, there was no jurisdiction under § 1581(i) ); US JVC Corp. v. United States, 184 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1999) (applying Juice Farms to “closely parallel” facts); Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 912–13, 915 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that, where Customs failed to hold liquidation in suspense, and where importer failed to realize this had occurred, only requesting reliquidation later, the liquidation was final under § 1514 and a statutory deadline could not be tolled via § 1581(i) ).Carbon does not argue that bulletin notices of the liquidations were not posted, as is required by regulation.

Defendants contend that a legal remedy is "not made inadequate simply because appellant failed to invoke it with the time frame it prescribes." (ITC Br. at 9 (citing Omni U.S.A. Inc., v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).)

As indicated, whether legal or illegal, a liquidation not protested within 90 days becomes final as to all parties. 19 U.S.C. § 1514; Juice Farms v. United States, 18 CIT 1037, 1040 (1994)("An importer cannot treat an illegal liquidation as void; rather, the importer must remain vigilant and protest the legality of such a liquidation within 90 days of notice."), aff'd, 68 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 914-15 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The court in Deringer noted that 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)

Finally, relative to summary judgment, Intercargo insists that in any event there are numerous genuine material issues of fact for trial, and consequently, the government's motion must be denied and this action proceed to a trial by jury, as demanded. Citing United States v. Utex International, Inc., 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Omni U.S.A v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 913 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 56, 102 L.Ed.2d 34 (1988); United States v. A.N. Deringer, 66 CCPA 50, 55, 593 F.2d 1015 (1979), SCA Int'l Inc. v. United States, 14 CIT 59, 1990 WL 13547 (1990), Computime, Inc. v. United States, 9 CIT 553, 557, 622 F. Supp. 1083 (1985), Juice Farms Inc. v. United States, ___ CIT ___, Slip Op 94-172, 1994 WL 631649 (Nov. 9, 1994), appeal docketed, CAFC Dec. 8, 1994, and Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. v. Unites States, ___ CIT ___, ___, 865 F. Supp. 877 (1994), the government maintains, correctly that even if the October 28, 1988 liquidation is illegal, because the period in which to liquidate the entry was not timely suspended or extended, such liquidation is not void, bu merely voidable; that pursuant to § 1514 even a voidable liquidation is "final and con elusive" unless contested by a timely protest that Intercargo's failure to file at the administrative level a protest against either the liquidation or the demand for payment under its

Although the type of claim that a party raises and the availability of administrative remedies may affect the accrual of the party's cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), a party's decision to pursue " permissive administrative remedies does not toll running of the statute of limitation[s] or delay accrual of the cause of action." Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 11 CIT 480, 483 n. 7, 663 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 n. 7 (1987), aff'd, 6 Fed. Cir. (T) 99, 840 F.2d 912, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 56, 102 L.Ed.2d 34, reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 961, 109 S.Ct. 405, 102 L.Ed.2d 393 (1988) (citing Lipp v. United States, 157 Ct.Cl. 197, 301 F.2d 674, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 932, 83 S.Ct. 1540, 10 L.Ed.2d 691 (1962)) (emphasis added). The need for finality, which the foregoing principle furthers, becomes more pronounced when a party pursues an administrative remedy that is unavailable as a matter of law.

And this court in Macrotel International Corp., 34 Fed. Cl. at 99 n. 2, as an alternative ground for dismissing the case, held that it had no jurisdiction because Macrotel did not exhaust its administrative remedies in a liquidation dispute with Customs. Cf. Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 916 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that failure by an importer to timely challenge Customs' failure to hold liquidation of entries in suspense, pending review of AD/CVD order, within a year of the date of liquidation of entries as mandated by statute, negated the importer's claim to a refund of deposit of estimated countervailing duties). Throughout its pleadings and other filings, Forest Products' arguments in favor of this court's jurisdiction hopelessly confuse and conflate two different aspects of its case: Customs' purported misclassification of Forest Products' imported lumber products, and an alleged separate Customs investigation relating to the same misclassified wood products, which may or may not result in either civil or criminal penalties.