It is well established that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) is limited to those cases in which relief would otherwise be "manifestly inadequate." Juice Farms, ___ Fed. Cir. (T) at ___, 68 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., ___ Fed. Cir. (T) ___, ___, 18 F.3d 1581, 1584 (1994)); accord Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 6 Fed. Cir. (T) 99, 104, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (1988). Here, JVC's plea for jurisdiction under § 1581(i) is based on the same analysis that JVC uses to support its claim for equitable tolling and jurisdiction under § 1581(a).

See Goldhofer Fahrzeugwerk GmbH Co. v. United States, 885 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Second, the importer bears the burden of checking for posted notices of actual assessment of duties and of timely protesting.See Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States 663 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also 21A Am.Jur.2dCustoms Duties and Import Regulations § 204 (1998) (citing Tropicana Prods., Inc. v. United States, 713 F. Supp. 415 (1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 504 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). As this court pointed out in Juice Farms, when the importer bears the burden of examining the bulletin notices and protesting within the statutory time limits, then the importer is not entitled to equitable tolling if its own lack of diligence caused the untimely filing.

The court expressly rejected the argument that "voidable" liquidations must be protested, but "void" liquidations do not. The decision in Deringer was followed by this court in Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995), both of which confirmed that this court does not recognize a distinction between "void" and "voidable" liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement of section 1514. In the Omni case, Customs was supposed to hold the liquidation of the entries in suspense, but instead liquidated the entries prematurely.

In this case, however, Juice Farms did not show that the relief in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), if properly invoked, would have been inadequate, let alone manifestly inadequate. If Juice Farms had protested within ninety days of bulletin notices, it would have had an opportunity to protest the legality of Customs' liquidations in the Court of International Trade. As this court has stated, a remedy is not inadequate "simply because appellant failed to invoke it within the time frame it prescribes." Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915, 6 Fed. Cir. (T) 99, 104, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988). Juice Farms, the importer, bears the burden to check for posted notices of liquidation and to protest timely.

To the contrary, the Federal Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in a case that involved Commerce's erroneous exclusion of an importer's name from a suspension of liquidation list regarding entries then subject to a countervailing duty order. See Omni USA, Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The case arose in the aftermath of the President's transfer of the administration of countervailing duties from the Treasury Department to Commerce.

In those cases, the precedent of the Federal Circuit "does not recognize a distinction between `void' and `voidable' liquidations for purposes of determining the applicability of the protest requirement of section 1514." Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559 (citing Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988), andJuice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed Cir. 1995)). These cases, however, do not address a situation in which Commerce and Customs have failed to effectuate a § 1516a(c) court-ordered injunction.

The importer bears the burdens of examining all notices posted to determine whether its goods have been liquidated and of lodging any protest thereof in a timely manner. See, e.g., Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 11 CIT 480, 483, 663 F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988). This burden is bolstered by the presumption that "public officials perform their duties in a manner consistent with law". Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States, 60 CCPA 162, 167, C.A.D. 1105, 480 F.2d 1352, 1356 (1973).

An unlawful reliquidation by Customs is not void, but rather is merely voidable. Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 56, 102 L.Ed.2d 34 (1988); United States v. A.N. Deringer, Inc., 66 CCPA 50, 55, C.A.D. 1220, 593 F.2d 1015, 1020 (1979); Computime Inc. v. United States, 9 CIT 553, 556-57, 622 F. Supp. 1083, 1086 (1985). Neither the legality nor correctness of a reliquidation by Customs may be disturbed unless a timely protest is filed according to the procedures in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1982 Supp. V 1987), and failure to do so within the stated period leaves the reliquidation final.

That is an express statement requiring an importer to challenge the legality of Customs' classification or liquidation decisions via the protest procedures in §§ 1514 and 1515. See Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed.Cir.1988) (noting the perceived “pervasive requirement throughout the statute to channel all nonexcepted protests through § 1514 even when those protests go to the legality of a custom official's action”). And the Trade Court has jurisdiction over such a challenge exclusively via § 1581(a).

See id. at 1305, 1311–12.See also Alden Leeds Inc. v. United States, 476 Fed.Appx. 393, 395–96, 401 (Fed.Cir.2012) (non-precedential) (holding that § 1581(i) was not available where importer did not file a protest of Customs' deemed liquidation of certain entries despite a suspension order from Commerce until Commerce published final results of an administrative review, well after the deadline in § 1514 ); Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1369, 1373–76 (Fed.Cir.2002) (holding that protests to liquidations on the basis that they should have been liquidated at a deemed liquidation rate rather than a final rate could have been timely made under § 1514, but that since the protests were untimely, there was no jurisdiction under § 1581(i) ); US JVC Corp. v. United States, 184 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1999) (applying Juice Farms to “closely parallel” facts); Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 912–13, 915 (Fed.Cir.1988) (holding that, where Customs failed to hold liquidation in suspense, and where importer failed to realize this had occurred, only requesting reliquidation later, the liquidation was final under § 1514 and a statutory deadline could not be tolled via § 1581(i) ).Carbon does not argue that bulletin notices of the liquidations were not posted, as is required by regulation.