Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. Sandefur v. Cherry

    718 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1983)   Cited 18 times
    In Sandefur we certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court the issue of whether the medicaid plan violated a freedom of choice statute similar to La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.65.

    1 (West Supp. 1983); La.Sup.Ct.R. XII.See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13:72.1; see also, e.g., Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 574 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1978); Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Hertz Corp., 573 F.2d 306, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). We recognize that this approach is contrary to the general principle of avoiding decision of federal questions when state questions might moot the federal claim.

  2. Walters v. Inexco Oil Co.

    670 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1982)   Cited 5 times

    The United States Supreme Court expressly sanctioned and applied this procedure in Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974).Compare Matter of Cooke, 643 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981) (Florida); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 574 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1978) (Louisiana); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Young, 638 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1981) (Georgia); Hale v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 581 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978) (Alabama) with Phillips v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981) (Brown, J., dissenting as to Georgia certification and concurring as to Texas certification); Duke v. University of Texas at El Paso, 663 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1981) (Texas courts have no authority to hear certified questions from federal courts), relying upon United States Life Insurance Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965) (holding Supreme Court has no power under Texas constitution). Following our customary practice we request counsel to submit a joint statement of facts and proposed agreed certificate of the questions, see West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 504 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1974).

  3. Champagne v. Chevron U.S. A., Inc.

    605 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1979)   Cited 11 times
    In Champagne v. Chevron, U.S.A., 605 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1979), we affirmed a finding that a fire hose connected to the drilling rig's water system was an appurtenance.

    It reasons that the failure of the nozzle did not constitute "ruin;" therefore, it cannot be liable. In Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 574 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1978), this Court certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court a question as to the meaning of the word "ruin" in article 2322 in a case where injuries and death were caused by the explosion of a hot water heater on a drilling platform. See generally Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 561 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977).

  4. Weil v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.

    478 So. 2d 697 (La. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 2 times

    [See Green v. Texas and Pacific Railway Co., 369 So.2d 248 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1979) for a similar situation.] Consequently, this Court holds that the failure of the driver to stop and see and hear what she could have seen and heard was a proximate cause of the accident constituting contributory negligence which bars her recovery from the Railroad Co. [A discussion of defendant liability under a strict liability theory is unnecessary at this time, as victim fault is a defense and a bar to recovery under strict liability as well as negligence. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 265 So.2d 1285 (La.Sup.Ct. 1978)] "The negligence of Weill [sic] can not, however, be imputed to her guest passenger Hess. White v. State Farm, 64 So.2d 245 ([La.]Sup.Ct. 1953).