Opinion
C. A. WC-2018-0327
04-22-2022
MERLYN P. O'KEEFE and MARY ELLEN O'KEEFE, individually and as Trustees of The O'Keefe Revocable Living Trust Dated December 3, 2007, Plaintiffs, v. DONALD G. REARDON, PATRICIA W. REARDON, ROBERT C. JAMES and LOIS A. JAMES, individually and as Trustees under The James Revocable Living Trust Dated August 31, 1999, MYRTH YORK, individually and as Trustee of The Myrth York Trust - 1986 Dated June 2, 1986, JOHN P. CHAMPNEY, DENISE E. CHAMPNEY, JOSHUA R. JAMES, and JENNIFER A. JAMES, Defendants.
For Plaintiff: Merlyn P. O'Keefe, Esq. (pro se) For Defendant: William Landry, Esq. Neil P. Philbin, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Merlyn P. O'Keefe, Esq. (pro se)
For Defendant: William Landry, Esq. Neil P. Philbin, Esq.
DECISION
TAFT-CARTER, J.
This matter is before the Court for decision following a non-jury trial on Counts I, II, VI, and VII of the Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Merlyn P. O'Keefe (Mr. O'Keefe) and Mary Ellen O'Keefe, individually and as Trustees of The O'Keefe Revocable Living Trust (collectively Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Defendants Myrth York, individually and as Trustee of The Myrth York Trust (Ms. York), Donald G. Reardon (Mr. Reardon) and Patricia W. Reardon (Mrs. Reardon) (collectively the Reardons), Robert C. James (Mr. James) and Lois A. James (Mrs. James), individually and as Trustees under the James Revocable Living Trust (collectively the James Parents), John P. Champney (Mr. Champney) and Denise E. Champney (Mrs. Champney) (collectively the Champneys), and Joshua R. James (J. James) and Jennifer A. James (J. A. James). Also before the Court is Ms. York's Crossclaim and requests for relief, along with the RJC Defendants' conditional adverse possession claims.
When appropriate to do so, the Court will refer to all defendants in this matter as "the Defendants." As a group, the James Parents, J. James, and J.A. James will be collectively referred to as "the James Relatives." Additionally, for convenience, the Reardons, Champneys, and James Relatives will collectively be referred to as the "RJC Defendants."
I Travel of the Case
Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint in this matter-i.e., the Amended Complaint-on October 16, 2018. See Docket. The Amended Complaint contains seven counts: Count I, Permanent Injunctive Relief; Count II, Permanent Injunctive Relief; Count III, Declaratory Judgment; Count IV, Claim of Reimbursement for Maintenance of Private Road; Count V, Permanent Injunctive Relief; Count VI: Adverse Possession for Portions of Cul-de-Sac Area; Count VII: Adverse Possession for Entire Cul-de-Sac Area. See generally id. at 6-15.
This claim was asserted with respect to the James Relatives for their alleged trespasses and obstructions on a road in which all parties to this action own a one-sixth undivided interest (the Private Road). (Am. Compl. 6-7.)
This claim was asserted with respect to the Reardons for their alleged trespasses and obstructions on the Private Road. (Am. Compl. 8-9.)
This claim was asserted against all Defendants to this action, seeking an order "commanding Defendants to relocate all components of the private road . . . within [their] location depicted on the [WHA] plat, and to construct and maintain it to the specifications set forth therein." (Am. Compl. 12-13.)
In response to the Amended Complaint, Ms. York filed her amended answer and crossclaims, admitting the allegations contained under Counts I-III, denying the majority of allegations under Counts IV-VII, and requesting denial of the claims for relief listed under Counts V-VII. (York Answer and Cross-cls. of Def. Myrth York in Resp. to Am. Compl. (York's Answer and Cross-cls. in Resp. to Am. Compl.) 1-2.) The RJC Defendants also filed an amended answer, wherein they denied Plaintiffs and Ms. York's material allegations and alleged three separate counterclaims: Count I, Easement by Substitution and/or Prescription; Count II, Trespass and Encroachment; Count III, Reimbursement as to Maintenance and Improvements for Private Road. See generally Answer to Am. Compl. and Countercls. of Defs. Donald G. Reardon, Patricia W. Reardon, Robert C. James and Lois A. James, John P. Champney, Denise E. Champney, Joshua R. James, and Jennifer A. James and Corresponding Answer and Countercls. in Resp. to Cross-cl. and Am. Cross-cl. of Def. Myrth York to the Extent Necessary.
On September 18, 2019, the RJC Defendants and Plaintiffs entered a stipulation whereby their affirmative defenses were dismissed with prejudice and three conditional orders of dismissal were deemed satisfied, thus resulting in the dismissal of the RJC Defendants' counterclaims as well. See Stipulation 1-2 (Sept. 18, 2019).
Plaintiffs decided to press the following counts at trial: (a) Count I seeking a permanent injunction against the James Relatives for alleged obstructions and trespasses within the Private Road; (b) Count II seeking a permanent injunction against the Reardons for alleged obstructions and trespasses within the Private Road; (c) Count VI seeking adverse possession of certain portions of the cul-de-sac area; and (d) Count VII seeking adverse possession of the entire cul-de-sac area. See Pls.' List of Claims for Trial 1-2. In a document titled "Plaintiffs' List of Claims for Trial," Plaintiffs unambiguously stated that "[a]ll other claims set forth in the [A]mended [C]omplaint are waived." Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing, the following claims are before this Court for decision:
(1) Plaintiffs' request for permanent injunctions against the James Relatives for alleged trespasses and obstructions;
(2) Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction against the Reardons for alleged trespasses and obstructions;
(3) Plaintiffs' claim to certain portions of the cul-de-sac area via adverse possession;
(4) Plaintiffs' claim to the entirety of the cul-de-sac area via adverse possession;
(5) Ms. York's request for an order requiring permanent monumentation of the Private Road; and
(6) Ms. York's request for enforcement of the Organizational Covenant and related provisions.
In response to the RJC Defendants' conditional claim for adverse possession, Plaintiffs argue that the RJC Defendants are precluded from asserting such a claim because of the stipulation entered between the parties on September 18, 2019. (Resp. Br. of Pls. O'Keefe to Post Trial Brs. of the Landry Defs. and Def. York (Pls.' Resp. Br.) 2; see also Stipulation 1-2 (Sept. 18, 2019) (stipulation regarding RJC Defendants' defenses and counterclaims). Expanding on this argument, Plaintiffs argue the RJC Defendants failed to: (a) affirmatively plead adverse possession and (b) seek leave of the Court to amend their pleadings to add such a claim. See Pls.' Resp. Br. 9-10. However, the RJC Defendants have made it clear that they only wish to proceed with their conditional adverse possession claims in the event that the Court rules in favor of Plaintiffs under Counts VI and VII of the Amended Complaint. See Post Trial Br. of Defs. Donald G. Reardon, Patricia W. Reardon, Robert C. James & Lois A. James, Trustees, John P. Champney, Denise E. Champney, Joshua R. James, and Jennifer A. James (Defs.' Post-Trial Mem.) 21-23. Based on the determination that Plaintiffs have failed to establish adverse possession under Counts VI and VII, see infra Section IV.B, the RJC Defendants' conditional counterclaim is not before the Court for decision. See Defs.' Post-Trial Br. 21-23.
This action proceeded to trial without a jury on April 12 and 13, 2021. At trial, Plaintiffs presented the following witnesses: Charee Jackson-as a professional engineer with Jackson Surveying-and Mr. O'Keefe. See Hr'g Tr. Index. After conclusion of Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, the RJC Defendants presented the following witnesses: Mr. James, J. James, J.A. James, Mr. Reardon, Mrs. Reardon, Mrs. Champney, and Mr. Champney. See id. Finally, after the RJC Defendants completed their presentation of evidence, Ms. York took the stand to testify and present evidence related to her Crossclaim. See id.
The Court requested Plaintiffs and Defendants (the Parties) submit post-trial briefs in lieu of closing arguments. See Hr'g Tr. at 200:1-14, Apr. 13, 2021; Post-Trial Mem. of Pls. O'Keefe (Pls.' Post-Trial Mem.); Post-Trial Br. of Defs. Donald G. Reardon, Patricia W. Reardon, Robert C. James & Lois A. James, Trustees, John P. Champney, Denise E. Champney, Joshua R. James, and Jennifer A. James (Defs.' Post-Trial Mem.); see generally Myrth York's Post-Trial Mem. (York's Post-Trial Mem.). Jurisdiction is pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14(a).
II Findings of Fact
The Court has reviewed the evidence presented at trial by the Parties and makes the following findings of fact.
This action involves a dispute between neighbors who possess mutual easement for the right to pass and use a private road (the Private Road), which is located off of Ministerial Road in South Kingstown, Rhode Island. See generally Am. Compl.; Ex. 32 (Declaration of Easements and Covenants Regarding the "Private Road" Shown on "Final for Residential Compound White Horn Acres in the Town of South Kingstown, Rhode Island Property of Joseph Cappuccio & Edgar Brown 35 Normandy Rd. Wakefield, R.I.; Country Dr. Charlestown, R.I. Nov., 1980 Donald W. Jackson R.L.S. Box 454 Charlestown, R.I., Scale: 1" = 100'") (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 1-2). The Parties each own an undivided one-sixth interest in the Private Road. See Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 1-2). The Private Road is referred to as Larkin Pond Road North. See Ex. 11 (aerial images of Larkin Pond Road) (depicting name of Private Road).
The Parties share in ownership of the Private Road based on title to their respective properties in a residential compound known as White Horn Acres (WHA). See Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 1-2; Ex. 1 (Final Residential Compound WHA in the Town of South Kingstown, Rhode Island) (WHA Plat).
WHA was developed by Joseph Cappuccio and Edgar Brown (collectively the WHA Developers) in the 1980s. Ex. 1 (WHA Plat); see also generally Ex. 31 (WHA Restrictions and Conditions Statement of Subdividers Pursuant to Section III of Rules and Regulations (WHA Restrictions and Conditions Statement); Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants). WHA is depicted on a plat plan, entitled "Final Residential Compound White Horn Acres in the Town of South Kingstown, Rhode Island Property of Joseph Cappuccio & Edgar Brown 35 Normandy Rd. Wakefield, R.I.; Country Dr. Charlestown, R.I. Nov., 1980 Donald W. Jackson R.L.S. Box 454 Charlestown, R.I., Scale: 1" = 100'" (the WHA Plat). See Ex. 1 (WHA Plat). WHA was approved by the Town of South Kingstown Planning Board (the SKPB), and the WHA Plat was duly recorded on June 3, 1980. (Ex. 1 (WHA Plat); Hr'g Tr. 12:2-13, Apr. 12, 2021.)
The original tract was subdivided into six residential lots with one lot dedicated for open space. (Ex. 1 (WHA Plat); Ex. 31 (WHA Restrictions and Conditions Statement), at 1; Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 1.) The WHA Plat also provided for the creation of the Private Road with "the purpose of providing access to [WHA] and enhancing and protecting the desirability and attractiveness of [WHA] as a whole and said lots situated thereon." (Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 2.) By design, the Private Road is to span thirty feet in diameter, and the improved width of the road used for purposes of ingress and egress is to span twenty feet in diameter. See Ex 1 (WHA Plat).
The road specifications as set forth on the WHA Plat indicate the Private Road was never intended to be completely improved. (Ex. 1 (WHA Plat).) The location and dimensions for the Private Road are credibly and accurately depicted on the WHA Plat. See id.
In addition to its approval of the WHA Plat, the SKPB also approved conditions, restrictions, and easements relating to WHA that are detailed in the following documents: (a) the Declaration of Easements and Covenants Regarding the "Private Road" (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants) and (b) the Town of South Kingstown Restrictions and Conditions Statement. See generally Ex. 31 (WHA Restrictions and Conditions Statement), at 1; Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants). Both of those documents were duly recorded on June 3, 1981. See Ex. 31 (WHA Restrictions and Conditions Statement), at 1 (containing recordation date and time); Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 1 (containing the same).
There is no dispute that the Parties have title to property within WHA, whereby they each hold a one-sixth interest in the Private Road-in the manner depicted on the WHA Plat-as tenants in common. See generally Exs. 33-38 (Title Reports for Properties Located in WHA); Ex. 1 (WHA Plat).
Plaintiffs own South Kingstown Assessor's Plat 30, Lot 18 in fee simple, which is identified as Lot 4 on the WHA Plat (the O'Keefe Property). See Ex. 36 (Title Report for 309 Larkin Pond Road North); Ex. 1 (WHA Plat); Ex. 2 (Location Plan of Private Road for WHA in the Town of South Kingstown, RI Prepared for Merlyn P O'Keefe & Myrth York November 2017 (Private Road Location Plan).
The James Parents own South Kingstown Assessor's Plat 30, Lot 20 in fee simple-as trustees of the James Revocable Living Trust dated August 31, 1999-which is identified as Lot 2 on the WHA Plat (the James Farm). See Ex. 35 (Title Report for Property at 224 Larkin Pond Road North); Ex. 1 (WHA Plat); Ex. 2 (Private Road Location Plan).
J. James and J. A. James own South Kingstown Assessor's Plat 30, Lot 15-as tenants by the entirety-which is identified as Lot 5 on the WHA Plat (the James WHA Residence). See Ex. 34 (Title Report for Property at 155 Larkin Pond Road North); Ex. 1 (WHA Plat); Ex. 2 (Private Road Location Plan).
The Champneys own South Kingstown Assessor's Plat 30, Lot 14-as tenants by the entirety-which is identified as Lot 6 on the WHA Plat. See Ex. 38 (Title Report for Property at 119 Larkin Pond Road North); Ex. 1 (WHA Plat); Ex. 2 (Private Road Location Plan).
The Reardons own South Kingstown Assessor's Plat 30, Lot 21-as tenants by the entirety-which is identified as Lot 1 on the WHA Plat (the Reardon Property). See Ex. 37 (Title Report for Property at 158 Larkin Pond Road North); Ex. 1 (WHA Plat); Ex. 2 (Private Road Location Plan).
Finally, Ms. York owns South Kingstown Assessor's Plat 30, Lot 19-as Trustee of The Myrth York Trust dated June 2, 1986-which is identified as Lot 3 on the WHA Plat. See Ex. 33 (Title Report for Myrth Property); Ex. 1 (WHA Plat); Ex. 2 (Private Road Location Plan).
The shared ownership interests and intended use of the Private Road are described as follows:
"[T]he Owners of the numbered platted lots on the 'Development' shall have a mutual perpetual easement in the 'Private Road' as described and delineated on said plat of the Development for all purposes for which streets, roads and highways are customarily used, including, but not limited to, the right to pass and repass on foot or on horseback or by vehicles of any kind, to construct, use, maintain and repair sewers, drainage ditches or pipes, water lines, gas lines, overhead or underground electric and communication lines, and for the parking of vehicles in a manner which will not interfere with passage by others." (Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 2-3.)
At the time that the residential compound was approved, the WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants mandated that an organization be formed and charged with the care and maintenance of the Private Road (the Organizational Covenant). (Ex. 31 (WHA Restrictions and Conditions Statement), ¶ 8; Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 3.) It is undisputed, however, that a formal organization has never been created. See Hr'g Tr. 107:7-108:25, 146:17-21, Apr. 13, 2021.
Despite that, it is clear that a majority of the Parties have worked cooperatively to maintain the Private Road. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 40:12-22, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 113:17-114:4; 153:16-154:13, Apr. 13, 2021. The Private Road has been maintained in excellent condition through an informal arrangement between the RJC Defendants. See Hr'g Tr. 40:12-22, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 113:17-114:4; 153:16-154:13, Apr. 13, 2021.
For instance, Mr. James has plowed the Private Road up to the point where the driveway for the James Farm is located-i.e., before the bend at which the Private Road turns toward the O'Keefe Property-every winter since he purchased the property in 1981. See Hr'g Tr. 108:6-25, 113:17-20; see also Ex. 11 (aerial images of Larkin Pond Road) (showing area at which Private Road turns toward the O'Keefe Property). The RJC Defendants use their own rakes and front-end loaders to level the Private Road. (Hr'g Tr. 113:17-21, Apr. 13, 2021.) In addition, J. James cuts the grass along the Private Road and rids the Private Road of obstructions. Id. at 153:16-154:5. Moreover, the RJC Defendants have purchased special equipment in connection with their efforts to maintain the Private Road in excellent condition-e.g., a special grader to fix potholes after heavy rainstorms. Id. at 113:21-24. The nature of the road maintenance required this equipment be parked or placed in proximity to the Private Road given its frequent use. See Hr'g Tr. 40:12-22, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 113:17-114:4; 153:16-154:13, Apr. 13, 2021.
While Mr. O'Keefe and Ms. York testified they are in favor of creating a formal organization to regulate the use and maintenance of the Private Road, the RJC Defendants were unanimous in their belief that such an organization is not necessary or advisable because they are satisfied with the current arrangement. See Hr'g Tr. 107:11-108:12, 146:11-150:7, 161:3-165:13, 168:23-170:11, 177:20-178:11, 185:23-188:2, 191:22-192:25, 195:5-22, 198:23-199:12, Apr. 13, 2021.
At trial, Plaintiffs relied on the Jackson Survey and photographs in an attempt to establish, over the course of time, items were placed on the Private Road by several of the RJC Defendants. See generally Hr'g Tr. 35:16-58:13, Apr. 12, 2021. However, most of the items have since been removed. See id. at 43:14-45:4; Hr'g Tr. 94:7-95:12, 116:1-117:22, Apr. 13, 2021. Furthermore, the evidence established that the vehicles and equipment which the RJC Defendants placed near the Private Road to conduct routine maintenance did not impede Plaintiffs' ability to utilize the Private Road. (Hr'g Tr. 88:10-89:10, Apr. 13, 2021.)
Throughout the years, Mr. O'Keefe has developed a razor focus on the activities of his neighbors and taken great exception to their placement of items near or on the Private Road. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 56:20-58:4, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 89:20-22, 95:13-96:10, Apr. 13, 2021. He has taken over one hundred photographs of his neighbors' properties and filed various complaints against them with the Town of South Kingstown. (Hr'g Tr. 89:20-22, 95:13-96:10, 129:15-130:8, Apr. 13, 2021.) It is clear to this Court that Mr. O'Keefe's strong animosity toward the RJC Defendants led to the filing of this lawsuit. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 21:23-29:4, 35:16-37:25, 45:14-24, 46:24-50:10, 51:25-52:24, 56:20-58:4, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 89:20-22, 95:13-96:10, Apr. 13, 2021.
For example, Mr. O'Keefe took exception to the placement of items and installation of a gate (the James Farm Gate) on the Private Road near the James Farm. See Hr'g Tr. 21:23-29:4, 46:24-50:10, Apr. 12, 2021 (describing objects at issue, Mr. O'Keefe's issues therewith, and related exhibits); see also Hr'g Tr. 118:7-24, Apr. 13, 2021 (Mr. James describing gate and installation of the same). The credible trial evidence establishes that Mr. James erected the James Farm Gate in 2010, which has remained in the same location ever since. (Hr'g Tr. 118:7-24, 119:3-14, Apr. 13, 2021.) Prior to the erection of the James Farm Gate, the credible testimony established that there existed two very large stone posts in the same location-which were installed by the Girl Scouts of America-on a consistent basis prior to the transfer of title in the James Farm to the James Revocable Living Trust dated August 31, 1999. Id. at 118:19-120:12.
Mr. O'Keefe also complained in his testimony that there are stone piles near the James Farm Gate located within the Private Road. See Hr'g Tr. 45:14-24, Apr. 12, 2021; see also Ex. 5 (Photo of Private Road). Credible testimony demonstrates that Mr. James placed those rock piles in 2016 following a confrontation he and his son (J. James) had with Mr. O'Keefe on July 4, 2016. (Hr'g Tr. 120:16-122:11, Apr. 13, 2021.) At that time, Mr. James was leaving the James Farm and observed Mr. O'Keefe approaching in his vehicle. Id. Mr. O'Keefe then tried to pass Mr. James twice by driving up onto grass area on the James Farm, and a confrontation ensued. Id. A day later, July 5, 2016, Mr. James placed the stone piles along the Private Road where they have remained to this day. See id. at 121:17-122:19. The record clearly demonstrates the placement of these items was in response to Mr. O'Keefe's hostility and dangerous behavior directed toward Mr. James. See id. at 120:16-122:15.
Mr. O'Keefe also took issue with J. James parking a white SUV and a ride-on lawnmower on the side of the Private Road. (Hr'g Tr. 35:16-37:25, Apr. 12, 2021 (discussing contents of Exs. 12-14 (photos taken depicting section of Private Road in front of the James WHA Residence and vehicles placed there)).) Mr. O'Keefe observed the SUV parked in the Private Road "a dozen times a year" starting in 2018, but never confronted J. James regarding placement of that vehicle in the roadway. Id. at 36:1-4; Hr'g Tr. 86:2-23, Apr. 13, 2021 (discussing contents of Ex. 12 (photo of Private Road containing white SUV)). While these parked vehicles would not prevent a vehicle from passing on the Private Road, the testimony presented supports a finding that the vehicles-and other objects placed nearby them-had the potential to create issues in the event two vehicles were passing one another at that juncture simultaneously. (Hr'g Tr. 37:11-19, Apr. 12, 2021.)
Mr. O'Keefe likewise testified that there are fence posts in the vicinity of the James WHA Residence that are on the Private Road, which he has seen in the same place in his travels to and from the O'Keefe Property since the year 2000. (Hr'g Tr. 89:23-90:9, Apr. 13, 2021 (referencing Ex. 7 (picture of Private Road and posts in front of the James WHA Residence)).) Additionally, credible testimony establishes Mr. James installed the fence posts in front of the James WHA Residence in the mid-1980s and that the posts have remained in the same location ever since. Id. at 114:17-115:3 (referencing Ex. 7 (photo of Private Road and fence posts)); id. at 153:6-8. Mr. O'Keefe also confronted Mr. Reardon concerning bushes in front of the Reardon Property that have been in the Private Road since at least 1990. Id. at 173:18-174:16 (referencing Ex. 8 (photo of Private Road near the Reardon Property)); Hr'g Tr. 58:5-8, Apr. 12, 2021 (referencing the same).
Mr. O'Keefe took further exception to an obstruction created by a large tree located on the Private Road near the land designated for open space after a significant storm had passed through the area in 2018. (Hr'g Tr. 51:25-52:24, Apr. 12, 2021 (referencing Ex. 20 (Mr. O'Keefe's photo of tree in roadway); Hr'g Tr. 127:20-128:22, Apr. 13, 2021 (referencing and discussing the same); see also Ex. 2 (Private Road Location Plan) (depicting area designated as "open space").) The testimony elicited from Mr. O'Keefe, Mr. Reardon, and Mr. James-when viewed in conjunction with Mr. O'Keefe's actions (i.e., taking pictures and calling the police)-clearly demonstrates Mr. O'Keefe believed Mr. Reardon and Mr. James were responsible for creating the obstruction in question. See Hr'g Tr. 51:25-52:24, Apr. 12, 2021; Ex. 20 (Mr. O'Keefe's photo of tree on the Private Road); Hr'g Tr. 129:15-130:16, 175:24-177:5, Apr. 13, 2021. Yet, the credible evidence and testimony demonstrates Mr. Reardon and Mr. James were working diligently to remove an obstruction created by the storm, taking hours out of their day to complete a demanding project that benefitted all the residents of WHA. See Hr'g Tr. 129:15-130:16, 175:24-177:5, Apr. 13, 2021.
Mr. O'Keefe also testified regarding the presence of branches on the Private Road roughly six months after Mr. James and Mr. Reardon removed the fallen tree. (Hr'g Tr. 52:25-53:15.) However, no evidence was presented demonstrating the branches in question were placed there by any of the Parties. See id.
Another point of contention is the cul-de-sac area located at the end of the Private Road and closest to the O'Keefe Property. See Ex. 2 (Private Road Location Plan) (depicting location of cul-de-sac in bottom right portion of map). Mr. O'Keefe, an experienced attorney, testified he did not know the cul-de-sac was listed as a common piece of property and assumed he owned that area outright. (Hr'g Tr. 81:4-14, Apr. 13, 2021.) It is within the cul-de-sac area that Plaintiffs assert claims of adverse possession. (Am. Compl. 6-9; Pls.' List of Claims for Trial 2.)
On the cul-de-sac, there is a shed belonging to Plaintiffs that has been in the same location since 1983. (Hr'g Tr. 59:20-61:5, Apr. 12, 2021 (referencing Ex. 9 (picture of shed) and Ex. 18 (certified copy of tax card for the O'Keefe Property).) In addition, Plaintiffs planted a star magnolia, pachysandra plants, and sod within the dimensions of the cul-de-sac in 2002, which have remained there ever since. Id. at 65:14-66:22 (referencing Ex. 24 (enlargement of cul-de-sac with markings for location of specific items)); id. at 67:1-70:2 (referencing and marking the same). Beyond presentation of this evidence, Plaintiffs sought to establish their claims of adverse possession with respect to the cul-de-sac area largely through Mr. O'Keefe's testimony. See generally Hr'g Tr. 59-79, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 80-85, Apr. 13, 2021.
Additional testimony was elicited regarding the presence of rhododendron bushes, but there was insufficient evidence presented to determine whether the rhododendron bushes are within the dimensions of the Private Road. (Hr'g Tr. 61:11-62:14, Apr. 12, 2021 (referencing Ex. 10 (photo of Private Road and rhododendrons)); see also Pls.' Post-Trial Mem. 60 (recognizing lack of sufficient factual evidence for precise location of rhododendrons with respect to the Private Road).)
For instance, Mr. O'Keefe testified that the cul-de-sac area is covered in pea stone and that "[a]t this time of year, the plow guys push it up, and little by little we restore it and then it's - the cycle starts all over again." (Hr'g Tr. 79:2-11, Apr. 12, 2021.) He also stated that there existed a ten-foot high basketball hoop anchored in concrete located in the cul-de-sac from 2001 to 2007. (Hr'g Tr. 81:4-82:2, Apr. 13, 2021.) Mr. O'Keefe further testified that in 2010 they hired a gentleman named Glenn Pierce (Mr. Pierce) to maintain the lawn on the O'Keefe Property and the plants in the cul-de-sac area. (Hr'g Tr. 64:12-18, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 84:22-85:6, Apr. 13, 2021.) Mr. O'Keefe gave Mr. Pierce permission to park his car on the cul-de-sac-starting in July 2010-while carrying out his work at the O'Keefe Property "during the growing season." (Hr'g Tr. 64:12-18, 68:11-69:22, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 82:13-18, 83:24-85:6, Apr. 13, 2021.) Mr. O'Keefe offered additional testimony that his children also parked their cars in the cul-de-sac area periodically from 2003 to 2007. (Hr'g Tr. 82:19-83:20, Apr. 13, 2021.)
Additionally, Mr. O'Keefe testified that his family owned at least one German Shepherd dog from 2000 to 2014. (Hr'g Tr. 72:23-25, Apr. 12, 2021.) He represented that the German Shepherds-two of which he bought in 2002-acted as vicious guard dogs of the O'Keefe Property during that time frame. See id. at 71:9-73:18. Mr. O'Keefe explained that the purchase of the two additional German Shepherds created the need for an electric fence to be installed. Id. at 71:16-72:11. Mr. O'Keefe stated that the O'Keefe Property had three or four signs alerting people to the presence of a dog contained by the fence from 2002 to 2014, but that only one of those signs remains posted today. Id. at 74:17-75:6 (referencing Ex. 23 (invisible fence sign)).
Furthermore, Mr. O'Keefe stated "there were no trespassing signs before we got there and a beware of dog sign . . . that was there when we moved in[to] [our home] in 2000." Id. at 76:11-14. Mr. O'Keefe also testified that "no trespassing" signs were posted at the opening of the cul-de-sac within the first couple of years that they owned the O'Keefe Property and that one of those signs has been in the same location since at least 2002. Id. at 76:15-77:6 (referencing Ex. 22 (no trespassing sign)). Finally, Mr. O'Keefe also attested that private property signs were posted at the entrance of the cul-de-sac since 2000 and that they remained there "up until the past couple of years." Id. at 77:7-23 (referencing Ex. 21 (private property notice)).
Mr. O'Keefe's testimony was credibly rebutted. Mr. James testified that he never saw any signs on Plaintiffs' property, and that he was never told he could not enter or make use of the cul-de-sac area. (Hr'g Tr. 125:25-126:25, Apr. 13, 2021.) Additionally, Mr. Reardon and the Champneys testified that no one declared the cul-de-sac area was off limits to them, and Mrs. Champney stated she did not recall seeing any signs in the area to that effect. Id. at 174:21-175:13, 189:22-191:13, 193:23-194:23.
However, J. James recalled seeing a "no trespassing" sign in the cul-de-sac area but testified that the sign looked "ancient" and was posted in that location before Plaintiffs purchased their property. Id. at 157:8-15. Moreover, like several of the other RJC Defendants, J. James and J.A. James testified they were never told that the cul-de-sac area was off limits to them. Id. at 154:14-156:15, 167:25-168:2.
While Mr. O'Keefe testified that no one would go into the cul-de-sac area during the time he owned the property, the credible evidence demonstrated otherwise. See Hr'g Tr. 78:3-5, Apr. 12, 2021. Several of the RJC Defendants testified credibly and without hesitation that they have made use of the cul-de-sac and continue to do so to this day. See Hr'g Tr. 122:20-124:5, 155:2-156:12, 166:23-167:24, Apr. 13, 2021.
For example, Mr. James testified he ran through the cul-de-sac area frequently for a span of twenty-five years to access neighboring turf fields and that he still does so periodically. Id. at 122:20-123:20, 134:15-135:3. Mr. James further stated that he takes his pickup truck and tractors into the cul-de-sac area on a regular basis. Id. at 123:21-124:2.
J. James stated that he has taken walks with his wife, J.A. James, down the street into the cul-de-sac area since 2008. Id. at 154:14-155:20. J. James also testified that he would use his motorcycle to regularly travel into the cul-de-sac from 1985 to 2003 to visit his friend who lived at what is now the O'Keefe Property. Id. at 154:14-155:2. Even though J. James' friend no longer resides at said property, J. James has travelled down into the cul-de-sac area two to three times a month on the various vehicles he owns since 2008. Id. at 154:14-155:20. Similarly, J.A. James testified she has done distance running at least once a month since 2008, using the cul-de-sac to complete her runs "or just cool down and take a walk." Id. at 166:23-167:13.
Unlike the James Relatives, the Reardons testified that they have not made regular use of the cul-de-sac area over the years. See id. at 174:21-175:10, 179:12-22. Mr. Reardon testified he only used the cul-de-sac on roughly ten occasions when his son was younger and needed assistance after riding his go-kart on the Private Road. Id. at 174:21-175:10. Mrs. Reardon offered the same testimony regarding her use of the Private Road. Id. at 179:12-22.
Finally, the record demonstrates that although Plaintiffs had dogs contained by an electric fence, the RJC Defendants still made use of the cul-de-sac area while the dogs were contained by said fence-i.e., between 2002 and 2014. See id. at 127:1-19, 168:3-7, 175:14-17. Moreover, several of the RJC Defendants testified they either never or rarely saw the O'Keefe's dogs. See id. at 156:16-157:7, 168:3-7, 190:23-191:2.
It was in light of the rising tensions between the RJC Defendants and Mr. O'Keefe that Plaintiffs filed the instant action on July 2, 2018. See Docket.
III Standard of Review
Rule 52(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . ., the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon[.]" Super. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Therefore, in a non-jury trial, "'[t]he trial justice sits as a trier of fact as well as of law."' Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1239 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984)). In that role, the trial justice "'weighs and considers the evidence, passes upon the credibility of the witnesses, and draws proper inferences."' Id. (quoting Hood, 478 A.2d at 184). "Also, it is permissible for the trial justice to draw inferences from the testimony of witnesses, and such inferences, if reasonable, are entitled on review to the same weight as other factual determinations." Rhode Island Mobile Sportfisherman, Inc. v. Nope's Island Conservation Association, Inc., 59 A.3d 112, 118 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 86 (R.I. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted).
However, the trial justice "'need not engage in extensive analysis to comply with'" the requirement of Rule 52(a). JPL Livery Services, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island Department of Administration, 88 A.3d 1134, 1141 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Connor v. Schlemmer, 996 A.2d 98, 109 (R.I. 2010)). In fact, the "'trial justice's analysis of the evidence and findings in the bench trial context need not be exhaustive . . . if the decision reasonably indicates that [the trial justice] exercised [his or her] independent judgment in passing on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses[.]'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Notarantonio v. Notarantonio, 941 A.2d 138, 144-45 (R.I. 2008)).
IV
Analysis
A
Permanent Injunction
Under Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert they are entitled to relief in the form of permanent injunctions against the Reardons and James Relatives. See Am. Compl. 6-9. Specifically, Plaintiffs' position is that the Reardons and James Relatives have placed items in the Private Road that constitute trespasses and obstructions interfering with their legal rights as co-equal tenants in common. Id. Plaintiffs request that the Court grant these particular forms of relief: (a) permanent injunctions against the Reardons and James Relatives barring them from "obstructing the use of the [P]rivate [R]oad by Plaintiffs or placing any objects within the thirty foot width thereof, except for 'the parking of vehicles in a manner which will not interfere with passage by others[]'"; and (b) permanent injunctions against the Reardons and James Relatives commanding them "to maintain the portions of the private road abutting their respective properties so that it may be used by all other co-tenants for its intended purposes." See Am. Compl. 7-9; Pls.' List of Claims for Trial 1.
Plaintiffs further assert that the following obstructions and trespasses were established as interfering with their rights to use and enjoy the Private Road: (a) that the Reardon Property "has bushes in the road at the Southern foot of its driveway and, just to the east of these bushes, a fence is also in the Private Road"; (b) the James WHA Residence "had ten posts in a broken line"; and (c) the James Farm "has a farm gate hung on two posts at the foot of its driveway and cairns[, ]" which are "in the Private Road." (Pls.' Post-Trial Mem. 49-50.) It is in light of these alleged obstructions and continuing trespasses that Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to permanent injunctive relief under Counts I and II. Id. at 50; Am. Compl. 6-8; Pls.' List of Claims for Trial 1.
Ms. York also joins Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief but requests the grant of such relief be with respect to: (a) "structure[s]," which she defines as "any framework or construction with identifiable elements giving stability and form and able to resist strains and stresses," and (b) "shrubbery or saplings or any other type of vegetation that would interfere with passage by motor vehicle[.]" (York's Post-Trial Mem. 12-13.)
In response, the RJC Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to prove any trespass occurred due to a lack of evidence demonstrating any of the Parties "caused any type of interference with the[ir] mutual reciprocal privileges with respect to the right of way for its intended purposes, or that was different than the way all the other owners used it." (Defs.' Post-Trial Mem. 10-15.)
In general, "the appropriate remedy for a continuing trespass is injunctive relief." See Rose Nulman Park Foundation ex rel. Nulman v. Four Twenty Corp., 93 A.3d 25, 29 (R.I. 2014) (citing Raposa v. Guay, 84 R.I. 436, 444, 125 A.2d 113, 117 (1956); Bentley v. Root, 19 R.I. 205, 207, 32 A. 918, 919 (1895); 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 103 at 706 (2010)). Under Rhode Island law, "[t]he issuance and measure of injunctive relief rest in the sound discretion of the trial justice." Cullen v. Tarini, 15 A.3d 968, 981 (R.I. 2011).
Upon request for the issuance of injunctive relief, this Court is to consider and weigh the following:
"whether the moving party (1) has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) will suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief, (3) has the balance of the equities, including the possible hardships to each party and to the public interest, tip in its favor, and (4) has shown that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will preserve the status quo." Iggy's Doughboys, Inc. v. Giroux, 729 A.2d 701, 705 (R.I. 1999) (citing Fund for Community Progress v. United Way of Southeastern New England, 695 A.2d 517, 521 (1997)).
1
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The first factor to consider is Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits with respect to their claim for permanent injunctions. See id. In Rhode Island, there is no requirement that the party seeking injunctive relief establish "a certainty of success[;]" instead, Rhode Island law only requires that the party seeking the injunction make a prima facie case for such relief. See Fund for Community Progress, 695 A.2d at 521.
It is well settled that tenants in common are entitled to possession of the entire property in which they have a common ownership interest, subject to a reciprocal right of their cotenants. See Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005, 1014 (R.I. 2007) (citing Sheldon F. Kurtz, Moynihan's Introduction to the Law of Real Property 282 (4th ed. 2005)). As such, for the issuance of a permanent injunction with respect to alleged violation of shared property by one's cotenant, a plaintiff must establish the alleged activity or object "interferes with the legal rights of the owner" and that the rights in question "cannot be adequately protected except by an injunction which will eliminate the trespass." Santilli v. Morelli, 102 R.I. 333, 338, 230 A.2d 860, 863 (1967).
Furthermore, with respect to a property owned by tenants in common, "one cotenant . . . may become a trespasser, as some of the authorities hold, if [their] entry is accompanied by acts which amount to an ouster of [their] cotenants or is followed by destruction of the common property." Buchanan v. Jencks, 38 R.I. 443, 446, 96 A. 307, 309 (1916) (emphasis added); see id. at 446-49, 96 A. at 310 (discussing precedent from other jurisdictions and applying requirement of ouster or destruction of common property); see also, e.g., Stanley v. Stanley, 928 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Vt. 2007) (quoting Booth v. Adams, 11 Vt. 156, 158 (1839)); Collins v. Sussex Trust Co., 1990 WL 63948, at *1 (Del. Super. Feb. 14, 1990); Foisy v. Bishop, 232 A.2d 797, 799 (Me. 1967); Taylor v. Bradford, 244 S.W.2d 482, 483-84 (Ky. 1951); Sons v. Sons, 186 N.W. 811, 812 (Minn. 1922); Bloom v. Sawyer, 89 S.W. 204, 207 (Ky. 1905). Additionally, it is well settled that "one tenant in common may make any reasonable use of the land held, so long as it does not operate to exclude the other tenants from enjoying their equal privileges." Silvia v. Helger, 75 R.I. 397, 399, 67 A.2d 27, 28 (1949).
Thus, to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs must present prima facie evidence to demonstrate the Reardons and James Relatives breached duties owed to them as tenants in common by using the Private Road in an unreasonable manner, thereby ousting Plaintiffs, destroying any portion of the Private Road as commonly held property, or preventing Plaintiffs from enjoying their rights with respect to the same. See id.; Morelli, 102 R.I. at 338, 230 A.2d at 863. Plaintiffs must also show that a permanent injunction is the only adequate remedy available to eliminate the alleged trespasses and obstructions. Morelli, 102 R.I. at 338, 230 A.2d at 863.
There is no dispute that the Parties are tenants in common with respect to the Private Road. The WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants provides that landowners within WHA have the right to use the Private Road for
"all purposes for which streets, roads and highways are customarily used, including, but not limited to, the right to pass and repass on foot or on horseback or by vehicles of any kind, to construct, use, maintain and repair sewers, drainage ditches or pipes, water lines, gas lines, overhead or underground electric and communication lines, and for the parking of vehicles in a manner which will not interfere with passage by others." (Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 2-3 (emphasis added).)
Thus, all of the Parties have the right to use and enjoy the Private Road within the scope provided for in the WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants. See Silvia, 75 R.I. at 399, 67 A.2d at 28. Therefore, the first basis for Plaintiffs' claim for a permanent injunction-i.e., alleged trespasses-requires that Plaintiffs present prima facie evidence that the actions of the Reardons and James Relatives were unreasonable and amounted to either destruction of the commonly held property or ouster of Plaintiffs from the same. See Buchanan, 38 R.I. at 446-49, 96 A. 307, 309-10; Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661, 668 n.8 (R.I. 1986); City of Providence v. Doe, 21 A.3d 315, 320 (R.I. 2011); Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 1-3 (establishing Private Road as commonly held property by WHA residents).
Here, there was no evidence presented that the Reardons or James Relatives acted so unreasonably so as to effectively oust Plaintiffs from the Private Road or any portion thereof. Also, no evidence was presented demonstrating that the Reardons or James Relatives destroyed any portion of the Private Road. Instead, the evidence demonstrates and supports a finding that all of the Parties are able to make use of the Private Road for ingress and egress, due in large part to the efforts of the Reardons and James Relatives and their willingness to remove objects from the Private Road to avoid interfering with the rights of their cotenants. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 108:6-25, 113:17-24, 130:12-131:6, 153:16-154:5, 175:24-177:5, Apr. 13, 2021; see also id. at 94:7-95:12, 116:1-117:22 (testimony regarding removal of objects from the Private Road).
As such, the credible evidence and testimony demonstrates Plaintiffs' requests for injunctive relief predicated upon alleged trespasses do not show a likelihood of success on the merits. See Iggy's Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705; Buchanan, 38 R.I. at 446-49, 96 A. at 309-10; Mesolella, 508 A.2d at 668 n.8; City of Providence, 21 A.3d at 320.
With respect to the two occurrences which Plaintiffs claim obstructed and prevented them from using the Private Road, the record is void of evidence demonstrating any of the Defendants were responsible for the obstructions at issue. See Hr'g Tr. 51:25-53:9, Apr. 12, 2021; 127:20-131:6, Apr. 13, 2021. The first incident occurred when a tree fell on the Private Road after a storm, which Mr. James and Mr. Reardon expended considerable time and effort to remove. (Hr'g Tr. 127:20-131:6, Apr. 13, 2021.) The second incident occurred six months later when Plaintiffs were driving home one night and there was a "bundle of branches that were laid across the road" that prevented them from driving down the Private Road. (Hr'g Tr. 53:6-9, Apr. 12, 2021.)
Here, the credible trial evidence demonstrates that the Reardons and James Relatives do not trespass or create obstructions on the Private Road. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 127:20-131:6, Apr. 13, 2021. Instead, the Reardons and James Relatives make concerted efforts to ensure all the Parties can exercise their right to use and enjoy the Private Road. See, e.g., id.
Therefore, Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits with respect to their claims for injunctive relief against the Reardons and James Relatives due to a lack of prima facie evidence demonstrating the Reardons or James Relatives have committed trespasses against Plaintiffs' property rights as tenants in common, or that they were responsible for the two obstructions identified at trial. See Fund for Community Progress, 695 A.2d at 521; Iggy's Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705; Morelli, 102 R.I. at 338, 230 A.2d at 863.
2 Irreparable Harm
Litigants seeking injunctive relief must prove that they "stand[] to suffer some irreparable harm that is presently threatened or imminent and for which no adequate legal remedy exists to restore that plaintiff to its rightful position." Fund for Community Progress, 695 A.2d at 521. "Irreparable injury must be either 'presently threatened' or 'imminent'; injuries that are prospective only and might never occur cannot form the basis of a permanent injunction." Rhode Island Turnpike & Bridge Authority v. Cohen, 433 A.2d 179, 182 (R.I. 1981).
As discussed above, Plaintiffs presented testimony and evidence regarding two incidents where they were unable to exercise their rights to utilize the Private Road for ingress and egress within WHA. (Hr'g Tr. 51:25-53:9, Apr. 12, 2021; 127:20-131:6, Apr. 13, 2021.) However, the record is void of evidence demonstrating that the alleged trespasses and obstructions caused Plaintiffs irreparable harm that cannot be cured absent injunctive relief. Here, the record supports the exact opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 127:20-131:6, Apr. 13, 2021.
Of note, the Reardons and James Relatives have removed objects from the roadway to the extent they may interfere with the rights of their co-equal tenants in common. See Hr'g Tr. 94:7-95:12, 116:1-117:22, Apr. 13, 2021. For instance, Mr. James credibly testified that he removed all items that were photographed by Mr. O'Keefe shortly after this lawsuit was filed, and there are no objects in the right of way now. Id. at 116:1-117:22. Mr. O'Keefe recognized the removal of those items as well, demonstrating that the James Relatives and Reardons are more than willing to respect and accommodate the rights of the other tenants in common absent a permanent injunction. See Hr'g Tr. 94:7-95:12, 116:1-117:22, Apr. 13, 2021.
What is more, in one of the two instances Plaintiffs complain of where they could not make use of the Private Road, Mr. James and Mr. Reardon took it upon themselves to remove the large tree that had fallen in the middle of the roadway and consequently caused an obstruction. See Hr'g Tr. 127:20-131:6, Apr. 13, 2021. Clearly, the efforts of the Reardons and James Relatives-along with the other RJC Defendants-is the reason that the Private Road is maintained in excellent condition, thus permitting all of the Parties to enjoy their rights as co-equal tenants in common. See Hr'g Tr. 40:12-22, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 113:17-114:4; 153:16-154:13, Apr. 13, 2021. As such, the evidence presented here does not demonstrate that the Reardons or the James Relatives interfered with Plaintiffs' rights as cotenants with respect to the Private Road or that they are likely to do so in the future. See Silvia, 75 R.I. at 399, 67 A.2d at 28.
Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the Reardons, James Relatives, or any items located within the dimensions of the Private Road interfere with their legal rights as cotenants of the Private Road such that they stand to suffer threatened or imminent harm of an irreparable nature requiring the imposition of a permanent injunction. See Morelli, 102 R.I. at 338, 230 A.2d at 863; Cohen, 433 A.2d at 182. Therefore, the second factor favors the RJC Defendants as well. See Iggy's Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705
3 Balance of the Equities
Determining whether the balance of the equities tips in Plaintiffs' favor calls for examination of potential hardships the respective parties might suffer and whether the public interest would be served by the issuance or denial of a permanent injunction against the Reardons or the James Relatives. See Iggy's Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705.
Here, the record does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs suffer hardship by virtue of the alleged obstructions placed and trespasses committed by the Reardons and the James Relatives. Instead, the credible evidence and testimony clearly demonstrates that the RJC Defendants see to the completion of many difficult tasks and projects to ensure Plaintiffs do not suffer hardship. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 40:12-22, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 94:7-95:12, 108:6-25, 113:17-114:4; 116:1-117:22, 127:20-131:6, 153:16-154:13, Apr. 13, 2021. Hence, there is no basis to conclude that Plaintiffs will suffer hardship absent injunctive relief.
On the other hand, issuing a permanent injunction whereby the Reardons and James Relatives would be required to undertake additional projects and constantly consider whether their actions are violative of such an order would cause significant hardship on their part. See Am. Compl. 7-9 (containing requested forms of injunctive relief); Iggy's Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705. In addition, there is no basis for finding that a permanent injunction would serve the public interest as the dispute in question pertains to a private roadway contained within a private residential compound. See Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 1; Ex. 2 (Private Road Location Plan); Iggy's Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705.
Therefore, it is clear that the balance of the equities weigh in favor of the Reardons and James Relatives. See Iggy's Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705.
4 Preservation of Status Quo
The final factor to consider is whether granting Plaintiffs' requests for permanent injunctions will preserve the status quo. See Iggy's Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705. This factor requires consideration of the particular factual circumstances that existed prior to the controversy in question. See, e.g., Allaire v. Fease, 824 A.2d 454 (R.I. 2003); Town of North Kingstown v. International Association of Firefighters, Local 1651, AFL-CIO, 65 A.3d 480, 483 (R.I. 2013); Pucino v. Uttley, 785 A.2d 183, 188 (R.I. 2001).
In the instant matter, the credible evidence and testimony indicates the Private Road was used peaceably by the parties and without conflict prior to the issues between Mr. O'Keefe and the RJC Defendants. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 122:20-124:2, 134:15-135:3, 154:14-155:20, 166:23-167:13, 174:21-175:10, 179:12-22, Apr. 13, 2021. Furthermore, the evidence indicates the instant controversy arose out of Mr. O'Keefe's laser focus on his neighbors' activities and use of the Private Road. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 51:25-52:17, 58:5-8; Hr'g Tr. 129:15-131:6, 173:18-174:16, 177:6-10. As such, granting Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction will not maintain the status quo that existed prior to the instant controversy. See Hr'g Tr. 122:20-124:2, 134:15-135:3, 154:14-155:20, 166:23-167:13, 174:21-175:10, 179:12-22, Apr. 13, 2021. Instead, granting such extraordinary relief will significantly alter the status quo and disrupt the effective system the RJC Defendants have instituted for care and maintenance of the Private Road. See Hr'g Tr. 40:12-22, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 94:7-95:12, 108:6-25, 113:17-114:4; 116:1-117:22, 127:20-131:6, 153:16-154:13, Apr. 13, 2021.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court does not find that issuance of a permanent injunction will help preserve the status quo, meaning that factor cuts in favor of the RJC Defendants as well. See Iggy's Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705.
In sum, each of the factors to be considered in connection with Plaintiffs' requests for permanent injunctions weigh in favor of the RJC Defendants. Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs' requests for issuance of permanent injunctions under Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint are denied. See id.
B Adverse Possession
Plaintiffs maintain that they have presented evidence indicating that they "have constructed, installed, maintained, and used certain structures and features within the cul-de-sac" for more than ten years. (Am. Compl. ¶ 48.) For instance, Plaintiffs highlight testimony and evidence regarding the placement of a shed and landscaping features within the cul-de-sac area. See Pls.' Post-Trial Mem. 62-63; Ex. 24 (enlargement of cul-de-sac with markings for location of specific items). They also maintain that they have done so in an actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous, and exclusive manner such that they are entitled to a finding of adverse possession with respect to the entirety of the cul-de-sac area, or, at the very least, certain portions upon which they have placed landscaping and personal property. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48-53. As such, Plaintiffs demand a finding that these actions, as alleged, entitle them to adverse possession of the entire cul-de-sac or certain portions thereof. See id.
The RJC Defendants respond that Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to support either of the claims for adverse possession with respect to the cul-de-sac area. (Defs.' Post-Trial Mem. 15-16.) The RJC Defendants assert there was no evidence presented that they were excluded from any portion of the Private Road or that Plaintiffs ever provided notice that they were claiming exclusive ownership to any portion of the cul-de-sac area. Id. To support this position, the RJC Defendants highlight testimony of their witnesses demonstrating the cul-de-sac was still being used by persons other than Plaintiffs during the relevant ten-year time frame purportedly giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims for adverse possession. Id. at 16-17. In addition, the RJC Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' attempts to prove adverse possession through evidence of alleged guard dogs, no trespassing signs, and landscaping features are insufficient based on Rhode Island's heightened standard to establish adverse possession against fellow cotenants. Id. at 18-19.
In Rhode Island, G.L. 1956 § 34-7-1 governs claims for adverse possession and states in pertinent part as follows:
"Where any person or persons, or others from whom he, she, or they derive their title . . . shall have been for the space of ten (10) years in the uninterrupted, quiet, peaceful and actual seisin and possession of any lands . . . claiming the same as his, her or their proper, sole and rightful estate in fee simple, the actual seisin and possession shall be allowed to give and make a good and rightful title to the person or persons, their heirs and assigns forever . . . ." Section 34-7-1.
Our Supreme Court "has long held that to establish adverse possession, a claimant's possession must be 'actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive' for at least ten years." Tavares v. Beck, 814 A.2d 346, 350 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Carnevale v. Dupee, 783 A.2d 404, 409 (R.I. 2001)). Additionally, a litigant asserting adverse possession "must establish each of these elements by 'strict proof, that is, proof by clear and convincing evidence."' Id. (quoting Sherman v. Goloskie, 95 R.I. 457, 465, 188 A.2d 79, 83 (1963)). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade the factfinder that a proposition is "highly probable, or must produce in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction that the allegations in question are true." Cahill, 11 A.3d at 88 n.7 (quoting 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 173 at 188-89 (2008)).
Furthermore, a litigant claiming title by adverse possession against cotenants must also demonstrate acts of possession that are "not only inconsistent with but in exclusion of the continuing rights of the other cotenants[]" by clear and convincing evidence. Spangler v. Schaus, 106 R.I. 795, 805, 264 A.2d 161, 166 (1970) (citing City of Providence v. Devine, 58 R.I. 204, 192 A. 212 (1937)). "[I]f one cotenant seeks to sever his relationship as a cotenant of the others and render his possession adverse, he must clearly show that his possession is so overt, notorious, and so wholly inconsistent with the other cotenants' rights as to be equivalent to an ouster between a landlord and a tenant." Id. (emphasis added). To establish an ouster of a cotenant with respect to real property, "definite facts must appear in evidence showing the wrongful dispossession or exclusion from the common property of the person entitled to the possession thereof." Kahnovsky v. Kahnovsky, 67 R.I. 208, 214, 21 A.2d 569, 572 (1941).
Therefore, Plaintiffs' burden is even stronger in this case because it is well settled that "[s]tronger evidence is required to establish the adverse possession of a cotenant than the adverse possession of a stranger." Spangler, 106 R.I. at 805, 264 A.2d at 166 (citing Sabins v. McAllister, 76 A.2d 106 (Vt. 1950), overruled on other grounds, Lague, Inc. v. Royea, 568 A.2d 357 (Vt. 1989)).
For purposes of adverse possession, "the term 'hostile' does not connote a communicated emotion but, rather, action inconsistent with the claims of others." Lee v. Raymond, 456 A.2d 1179, 1183 (R.I. 1983) (citing Taffinder v. Thomas, 119 R.I. 545, 552, 381 A.2d 519, 523 (1977)). "A person is a hostile occupant of the land when he mistakes his boundary but continuously asserts dominion over the property for the statutory period." Id.
Similarly, adverse possession claimants "must show that their use of the land was sufficiently open and notorious to put a reasonable property owner on notice of their hostile claim." Tavares, 814 A.2d at 352. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that '"no particular act to establish an intention to claim ownership is required to give notice to the world of the claim,' and that '[i]t is sufficient for the claimant to go upon the disputed land and use it adversely to the true owner."' McGarry v. Coletti, 33 A.3d 140, 145 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183). At the same time, "the requisite act must 'put a reasonable property owner on notice' that his property is being claimed." Id. at 147 (citation omitted). The hostility requirement is thus closely related to the requirement that the possession be both open and notorious. See id.; Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183.
1 Adverse Possession of Entire Cul-de-Sac Area
The RJC Defendants' witnesses each credibly testified that Plaintiffs never provided notice of their claim to the cul-de-sac area. (Hr'g Tr. 125:25-126:25, 154:14-156:15, 167:25-168:2, 174:21-175:13, 189:22-191:12, 193:23-194:23, Apr. 13, 2021.) When asked, Mr. James, J. James, and the Champneys stated Plaintiffs never informed them that they could not use the cul-de-sac area. Id. at 125:25-126:25, 154:14-156:15, 189:22-191:12, 193:23-194:23. Likewise, Mr. Reardon also testified he was never told that the cul-de-sac area was off limits and that he never encountered difficulty making use of the same. Id. at 174:21-175:13.
In addition, the credible evidence and testimony demonstrates that the RJC Defendants made consistent use of the cul-de-sac area during the relevant time period for Plaintiffs' claim of adverse possession, and that the RJC Defendants never knew of Plaintiffs' hostile claim of right to the cul-de-sac area prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit. See id. at 122:20-124:5, 134:15-135:3, 154:14-155:20, 166:23-167:13; Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183. While Plaintiffs make much of the German Shepherds they owned-which they maintain acted as guard dogs contained by an electric fence-the credible testimony demonstrates that said dogs were rarely seen outside, if ever. See id. at 156:16-157:7, 168:3-7, 190:23-191:2. In fact, the RJC Defendants clearly established that they never felt restricted from using the cul-de-sac due to the presence of the O'Keefe's dogs. See id. at 127:1-19, 168:3-7, 175:14-17. Furthermore, the RJC Defendants have made use of the cul-de-sac area as a roadway-in the manner prescribed in the WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants-despite the presence of "no trespassing" signs and private property signs which Mr. O'Keefe stated were posted near and around the cul-de-sac. Id. at 103:1-11, 125:25-126:14, 157:8-23, 191:3-13; see also Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 3 (detailing rights of cotenants with respect to Private Road).
The RJC Defendants could not possibly be trespassers within the cul-de-sac by simply entering the area and using it given their status as tenants in common of the Private Road. See Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005, 1014 (R.I. 2007); Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661, 668 n.8 (R.I. 1986); Santilli v. Morelli, 102 R.I. 333, 338, 230 A.2d 860, 863 (1967). As such, it stands to reason that the Defendants did not understand the posted signage to be directed toward them while utilizing the cul-de-sac area.
Based on the credible trial record and testimony of the RJC Defendants' witnesses, Plaintiffs have failed to furnish strict proof that their claim to the entirety of the cul-de-sac area was sufficiently hostile, open, and notorious. See Spangler, 106 R.I. at 805, 264 A.2d at 166; Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183; Tavares, 814 A.2d at 352. Moreover, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate their actions were so inconsistent with the rights of the other cotenants so as to be the equivalent of an ouster. See Spangler, 106 R.I. at 805, 264 A.2d at 166; Kahnovsky, 67 R.I. at 214, 21 A.2d at 572. As such, Plaintiffs' claim to the entirety of the cul-de-sac via adverse possession fails as a matter of law. See § 34-7-1; Spangler, 106 R.I. at 805, 264 A.2d at 166; Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183; Tavares, 814 A.2d at 352.
2 Adverse Possession of Cul-de-Sac Portions
As with their claim to the entirety of the cul-de-sac area, Plaintiffs must satisfy each of the elements for adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence and demonstrate their activities have effectively excluded the Defendants from using and enjoying the Private Road as co-equal tenants in common. Tavares, 814 A.2d at 350; Spangler, 106 R.I. at 805, 264 A.2d at 166.
Here, Plaintiffs' claim of adverse possession with respect to certain parts of the cul-de-sac area pertains to the following items: (a) the shed located within the cul-de-sac and its "appurtenant flagstone walkway[, ]" and (b) the area adjacent to the shed which contains the pachysandra patch, star magnolia, and sod. (Pls.' Post-Trial Mem. 62-63; Ex. 24 (enlargement of cul-de-sac with markings for location of specific items).)
While testimony was elicited regarding the presence of rhododendrons near the O'Keefe Property, there was insufficient evidence presented to ascertain the precise location of that landscaping. See Pls.' Post-Trial Mem. 60 (stating proposed finding of fact with respect to rhododendrons). Therefore, the rhododendrons are not at issue for purposes of adjudicating Plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession to certain portions of the cul-de-sac. See id.
As discussed above, the credible testimony demonstrates that the Defendants were not aware of Plaintiffs' claim of right to the cul-de-sac or any portion thereof. See Hr'g Tr. 122:20-124:5, 134:15-135:3, 154:14-155:20, 166:23-167:13, Apr. 13, 2021. Moreover, while Plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate actual possession of the areas containing the shed and landscaping, the placement and erection of items in the Private Road is a common practice in WHA. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 35:16-37:25, 56:20-58:4, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 86:2-23, 89:23-90:9, 114:17-115:3, 118:7-24, 119:3-14, 120:16-122:11, Apr. 13, 2021.
For example, there was ample testimony regarding Mr. James' installation of the James Farm Gate on the Private Road in 2010. See Hr'g Tr. 21:23-29:4, 46:24-50:10, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 118:7-24, 119:3-14, 119:19-120:12, Apr. 13, 2021. There was also substantial evidence and testimony presented regarding fence posts in front of the James WHA Residence that have been in the same location on the Private Road since the mid-1980s. See Hr'g Tr. 89:23-90:9, Apr. 13, 2021 (referencing Ex. 7 (picture of Private Road and posts in front of the James WHA Residence)); id. at 114:17-115:3 (referencing the same); id. at 153:6-8). Additionally, the bushes in front of the Reardon Property have been located within the dimensions of the Private Road since at least 1990. Id. at 173:17-174:16 (referencing Ex. 8 (photo of Private Road near the Reardon Property)); Hr'g Tr. 57:21-58:8, Apr. 12, 2021 (referencing the same).
Plaintiffs did take issue with items being in the roadway, as evidenced by the Notices of Intent to Interrupt Adverse Possession which were admitted into evidence. See Exs. 25-30 (Notices of Intent to Interrupt Adverse Possession sent to RJC Defendants). However, Plaintiffs are the only residents of WHA to have done so, and the credible evidence demonstrates Plaintiffs' issuance of said notices was spurred by Mr. O'Keefe's bitterness toward the RJC Defendants. See, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 56:20-58:4, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 89:20-22, 95:13-96:10; Apr. 13, 2021. Compare, e.g., Hr'g Tr. 51:25-52:17, Apr. 12, 2021, with Hr'g Tr. 129:15-131:6, 175:24-177:10, Apr. 13, 2021. Moreover, Plaintiffs saw the James Farm Gate, fence posts, and bushes located within the Private Road on a routine basis but did not take any action to challenge their placement within the Private Road until after a significant length of time had passed-i.e., on November 20, 2017. See Exs. 25-30 (Notices of Intent to Interrupt Adverse Possession sent to RJC Defendants).
Thus, the weight of the evidence plainly indicates a reasonable property owner in WHA would lack sufficient notice of a hostile claim of right to portions of the Private Road by virtue of personal property and landscaping located therein, especially when such items do not adversely impact the Parties or their property rights with respect to the Private Road. See Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 2-3 (establishing cotenants' easement rights with respect to the Private Road); Hr'g Tr. 21:23-29:4, 46:24-50:10, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 118:7-24, 119:3-14, 119:19-120:12, Apr. 13, 2021; Tavares, 814 A.2d at 352; Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183. That is precisely the case here, as the Defendants were unaware of Mr. O'Keefe's purported adverse possession of the cul-de-sac by placing or erecting items on the Private Road that do not interfere with the Parties' rights as cotenants. See Hr'g Tr. 21:23-29:4, 46:24-50:10, Apr. 12, 2021; Hr'g Tr. 118:7-24, 119:3-14, 119:19-120:12, Apr. 13, 2021; Tavares, 814 A.2d at 352; Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' claim to certain portions of the cul-de-sac via adverse possession does not rise to the level of strict proof that said claim was sufficiently hostile, open, and notorious. See Spangler, 106 R.I. at 805, 264 A.2d at 166; Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183; Tavares, 814 A.2d at 352. Rather, the record demonstrates that the Defendants lacked sufficient notice of Plaintiffs' claim to any portion of the cul-de-sac. See § 34-7-1; Spangler, 106 R.I. at 805, 264 A.2d at 166; Lee, 456 A.2d at 1183; Tavares, 814 A.2d at 352. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not furnish strict proof that their placement of personal property and landscaping in the cul-de-sac area was so inconsistent with the rights of the other cotenants such that the Defendants were effectively excluded from exercising their continuing rights as cotenants or ousted from certain portions of the cul-de-sac. See Spangler, 106 R.I. at 805, 264 A.2d at 166; Kahnovsky, 67 R.I. at 214, 21 A.2d at 572.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' requests for relief under Counts VI and VII of the Amended Complaint are denied. See § 34-7-1; Tavares, 814 A.2d at 350; Spangler, 106 R.I. at 805, 264 A.2d at 166.
C Ms. York's Crossclaim and Requests for Relief
The remaining issues pertain to Ms. York's requests for: (a) enforcement of the Organizational Covenant, and (b) permanent monumentation of the Private Road. See York's Post-Trial Mem. 11-13.
1 Enforcement of Organizational Covenant
Ms. York argues that the Organizational Covenant must be enforced, maintaining it is legally binding on the Parties and improves the marketability of all the WHA Properties. Id. at 5-7. Ms. York also contends that G.L. 1956 § 34-4-21 is inapplicable and does not bar the operative nature of the Organizational Covenant because that statute imposes time limitations on restrictive covenants, whereas the Organizational Covenant is affirmative in nature. Id. at 7-8; see § 34-4-21.
In response, the RJC Defendants argue that there is no legal basis to force the Parties to create an organization for care and maintenance of the road, especially since there is already an "amicable system" in place designed to achieve that objective. (Defs.' Post-Trial Mem. 23-24.)
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized as a "basic principle of statutory construction" that, if a statutory section "is clear and unambiguous," the courts will apply "the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute" and will not "delve into any further statutory interpretation." Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482, 489 (R.I. 2018). In fact, "'[i]t is only when a statute is ambiguous that [the courts] apply the rules of statutory construction and examine the statute in its entirety to determine the intent and purpose of the Legislature.'" Id. (quoting State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014)). In other words, "'[i]f a statute is clear and unambiguous [the courts] are bound to ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the statute and [the] inquiry is at an end."' In re Kapsinow, 220 A.3d 1231, 1234 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Olsen v. DeMayo, 210 A.3d 431, 435 (R.I. 2019)).
Additionally, it is well settled that "[a]s a general proposition of statutory construction, titles do not control the meaning of statutes." Orthopedic Specialists, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 120 R.I. 378, 383-84, 388 A.2d 352, 355 (1978). That rule is "subject to the judicial gloss that where there is doubt as to the meaning of a provision in a statute, the title of the statute may be consulted as a guide." Id. at 384, 388 A.2d at 355 (citing Pickering v. Pickering, 64 R.I. 112, 10 A.2d 721 (1940)). As such, the title of a statute cannot "control or vary the meaning of a statute where that statute is unambiguous." Id. (citing Blais v. Franklin, 31 R.I. 95, 77 A. 172 (1910)).
The Rhode Island General Assembly has addressed obsolescence of covenants affecting interests in real estate by creating a statute that imposes a thirty-year limitation period for said covenants. See § 34-4-21. That particular statute, § 34-4-21, is titled "[l]imitation of restrictive covenants." Id. However, that does not control whether § 34-4-21 applies solely to restrictive covenants. See Orthopedic Specialists, Inc., 120 R.I. at 383-84, 388 A.2d at 355. Rather, the Court must first examine whether the scope of § 34-4-21 is unambiguously drafted-based on the language utilized therein-such that the title of the statute need not be considered to give § 34-4-21 its full effect. See id.
Section 34-4-21 provides in pertinent part as follows:
"If a covenant or restriction concerning the use of land . . . is created by any instrument taking effect after May 11, 1953, the covenant or restriction, if unlimited in time in the instrument, shall cease to be valid and operative thirty (30) years after the execution of the instrument creating it[.]" Section 34-4-21 (emphasis added).
The language of § 34-4-21 is clear and unambiguous such that this Court is bound to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words utilized therein without delving into additional statutory interpretation. See id.; Raimondo, 177 A.3d at 489. A plain reading of § 34-4-21 provides covenants and restrictions become obsolete when the following requirements are satisfied: (a) the document containing the covenant or restriction concerns the use of land; (b) the document containing the covenant or restriction came into effect after May 11, 1953; and (c) the covenant or restriction has been in existence for thirty years or longer. See § 34-4-21.
Here, the provision in question is the Organizational Covenant, which states that owners of land in WHA shall "form an organization, either unincorporated or incorporated, hereinafter referred to as the 'Organization', for the purpose of caring for, maintaining and plowing said strip of land designated as 'PRIVATE ROAD' and establishing Rules and Regulations for the safe use of said 'PRIVATE ROAD'." (Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 3.) Thus, the Organizational Covenant concerns use of the land, as it plainly states one of its overriding purposes is to ensure the establishment of rules and regulations for the safe use of the Private Road. Id. Additionally, the WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants took effect after May 11, 1953, and the Organizational Covenant contains no temporal limitation. See id. at 1, 4 (listing date of instrument as June 1, 1981).
Based on the foregoing, the requirements set forth in § 34-4-21 are satisfied such that the Organizational Covenant is no longer valid or operative as a matter of law. See id. at 1, 3-4; § 34-4-21. As such, Ms. York's request for relief ordering the formation of an organization or association for purposes of caring and maintaining the Private Road, levying annual charges and special assessments, and the creation of a voting system relief is hereby denied by virtue of the unenforceability of the Organizational Covenant. See § 34-4-21; Ex. 32 (WHA Declaration of Easements and Covenants), at 3-4.
2 Permanent Monumentation
Ms. York requests the installation of permanent monumentation demarcating the boundary lines of the Private Road. (York's Pretrial Mem. 2; York's Post-Trial Mem. 13.) Ms. York also requests that the Parties do so in a joint fashion and share the costs of said installation. See York's Pretrial Mem. 2; York's Post-Trial Mem. 13.
Here, there is a lack of evidence demonstrating the Parties should be ordered to "jointly engage and pay a surveyor to perform monumentation of the location and dimensions of the Private Road[.]" (York's Post-Trial Mem. 13.) Moreover, the Court has not been presented with the relevant legal authority or mechanism through which the parties should be ordered to arrange and pay for monumentation of the Private Road. As such, there is no basis for the Court to grant Ms. York's request to order permanent monumentation be installed with the costs of doing so, and that request is consequently denied.
Based on the foregoing, Ms. York's requests for relief with respect to the Organizational Covenant and permanent monumentation of the Private Road are hereby denied.
V Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that judgment shall enter for the RJC Defendants with respect to Counts I, II, VI, and VII of the Amended Complaint. Ms. York's requests for relief are denied and judgment shall enter for the RJC Defendants regarding the same.
Counsel shall prepare the appropriate order.