A criminal defendant is entitled to a hearing on mental competency whenever there is "sufficient evidence of incompetency." O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44, 55 (D.D.C. 2004)(citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966)). However, a Court need only order a competency evaluation "if the court has 'reasonable cause' to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial."

The emergency motion before the Court challenges the adequacy of medical treatment furnished to an individual in United States custody. This Court has previously resolved a similar motion in the Guantanamo detainee context. See O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C. 2004) (denying detainee's emergency motion to compel independent medical evaluation and production of medical records). As in that case, petitioner's motion here "must be assessed against the background of a consistent body of law reflecting the reluctance of courts to second-guess the medical treatment provided to prisoners by government officials."

At oral argument, the parties agreed that for a court to intervene in conditions of confinement decisions, the actions of the prison staff must demonstrate "deliberate indifference" to the detainee's well-being. Oral Arg. (Jan. 26, 2009); see O.K. v. Bush, 344 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C. 2004). Petitioners do not in this most recent round of motions make an explicit argument that their treatment amounts to a Constitutional violation, but their past arguments on similar facts, as well as their current allegations of severe mistreatment, suggest as much.

Despite this emotionally-charged language to which Al-Ghizzawi consistently resorts throughout his briefing, the Court does not find that irreparable harm will result from declination of the emergency relief requested. Keeping in mind the "consistent body of law reflecting the reluctance of courts to second-guess the medical treatment provided to prisoners by government officials," Al-Ghizzawi has not demonstrated that his ongoing care is deficient in any way.See O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2004). A prisoner must usually demonstrate that government officials have exhibited "deliberate indifference" to his "serious medical needs."

Rather, Austin can establish a constitutional violation in this setting by demonstrating that Thomas acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1998);see also Fraternal Order of Police Dep't of Corrections Labor Comm. v. Williams, 375 F.3d 1141, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that deliberate indifference satisfies the "shocks the conscience" test in "circumstances where the State has a heightened obligation toward individuals," such as where "the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will") (citations and quotation marks omitted); O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44, 61 n. 23 (D.D.C. 2004). Austin must therefore allege in his complaint and support with competent evidence that Officer Thomas knew of Austin's serious medical condition and disregarded the risk that condition posed to Austin's health or safety.

The Court denied that motion in a memorandum opinion and order dated October 26, 2004, explaining that an individual does not enjoy a right to a determination of his mental competence to bring a habeas action, and even if there existed such a right, petitioners had failed to submit competent evidence calling into question petitioner's competence to assist in the litigation of the habeas claims in this case. See O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44, 54-60 (D.D.C. 2004). Meanwhile, on August 17, 2004, the Calendar and Case Management Committee of the Court issued an order instructing the judges presiding over Guantánamo petitions to transfer those petitions to Senior Judge Joyce Hens Green for the limited purpose of coordination and management.

In his brief on appeal, however, Paul does not argue directly that he enjoys a constitutional right to be competent during a habeas corpus proceeding, and the authority most nearly on point runs against the claim. O.K. v. Bush, 344 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C. 2004); see also Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a contention that Ford should be extended, in the context of a first federal habeas proceeding, to include an "ability-to-assist counsel requirement" — that is, "a determination of whether the convict possesses the ability to inform counsel or the court of any fact which might exist which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful."); Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1240-43, 111 S.Ct. 2872, 115 L.Ed.2d 1038 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining that the Eighth Circuit "concluded that petitioner's ability to recognize or communicate facts that might make his punishment unlawful or unjust was of no legal consequence," and acknowledging that Justice Powell in Ford rejected an "ability-to-assist counsel" definition of incompetence, but urging the Court to consider a "strong argument" to the contrary). Paul argues instead that a right to competence is grounded in "federal law," and

An incompetent person can of course have a legal claim, and it will be prosecuted by his guardian or (in the antiquated legal phrase) his "next friend," but the fact of his incompetence will not be allowed to interrupt or delay the proceeding. See the helpful discussion in O.K. v. Bush, 344 F.Supp.2d 44, 55-57, n. 14 (D.D.C.2004). But in Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit, in an exhaustive opinion by Judge Kozinski, held that in a capital case a petitioner for federal habeas corpus must be competent to assist his counsel; if not, the proceeding must be stayed.

Plaintiff alleges that D.C. violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. "[C]ourts have held that pretrial detainees" such as Mr. Powers have a "due-process right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from prison officials' `deliberate indifference' to their substantial medical needs." Powers-Bunce, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (citing O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44, 61 n. 23 (D.D.C. 2004)). "Courts have consistently held that this right belonging to pretrial detainees is `at least as great as' the analogous Eighth Amendment right and, therefore, generally treat the two claims as analytically identical.

As a result of an intervening 60-day stay of the proceedings, the Government filed its opposition to this motion on March 27, 2009. Petitioner replied on April 15, 2009. Based on a review of the pleadings, and for the reasons set forth by Judge Bates in his opinion in O.K. v. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C. 2004), it is hereby: On the same day it filed its motion requesting a competency hearing-the subject of this order-Petitioner moved for a 60-day stay of this litigation in the hope he would be transferred to another country [Dkt. # 200].