Nos. 05-08-00972-CR, 05-08-00973-CR, 05-08-00974-CR, 05-08-00975-CR
Opinion Filed April 2, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F07-58985-L, F07-59037-L, F07-59105-L, F07-73821-L.
Before Justices RICHTER, LANG, and MURPHY.
Opinion By Justice LANG.
In a single proceeding, appellant Jason Allan Ojena waived a jury and entered non-negotiated guilty pleas to four counts of aggravated robbery in four cases. The trial court accepted appellant's guilty pleas and found appellant guilty in each case. Further, the judgment in trial court cause number F07-73821-L states appellant pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph in that case and the trial court found the enhancement paragraph true. Following a punishment hearing, punishment was assessed by the trial court at twenty-three years' confinement in each of the four cases, with the sentences to run concurrently. In thirteen issues on appeal, appellant asserts (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel in all four cases; (2) his convictions in all four cases violate due process; (3) his convictions in all four cases violate article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; and (4) the judgment in trial court cause number F07-73821-L erroneously contains a recitation he pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph and the trial court found the enhancement paragraph true. Based on the record and the analysis below, we decide appellant's thirteen issues against him. The trial court's judgments are affirmed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was arrested November 10, 2007, and charged by indictments with aggravated robbery in trial court cause numbers F07-58985-L, F07-59037-L, F07-59105-L, and F07-73821-L. Each of the four indictments stated in relevant part appellant, in the course of committing robbery, "did then and there use and exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: a FIREARM." (emphasis original). In addition, the indictment in trial court cause number F07-73821-L included an enhancement paragraph alleging a prior conviction of appellant for aggravated sexual assault of a child. At a hearing on March 24, 2008, appellant waived reading of the indictments and pleaded guilty before the trial court in all four cases. Signed judicial confessions in which appellant also consented to the stipulation of evidence were admitted in each case with no objection. The trial court found appellant's pleas of guilty were freely and voluntarily made and appellant was competent to make those pleas. An undated, unsworn pro se letter from appellant to the trial court was filed May 7, 2008, in cause number F07-59037-L. The letter bore the cause numbers of each of the four cases at issue. In the letter, appellant asserted in part he used a toy gun in the commission of the offenses in those cases. Specifically, appellant wrote he obtained a plastic gun from a "dollar store" and "would pull out the toy holding it down because the front of the chamber was neon orange" and he "did not want the clerk [to] see that the gun was fake." The trial court held a punishment hearing on June 26, 2008. During that hearing, Dinora Ayuar testified she was working as a cashier at Roco's Market on November 5, 2007. According to Ayuar, at approximately 1 p.m., appellant entered the store, selected a drink from the cooler, and "came to the front to pay." Then, Ayuar testified, appellant grabbed a gun from his "front waistband," pointed the gun at her, and said, "Give me the money or I'll shoot you." Ayuar testified she was scared and thought appellant was going to kill her. Ayuar told him, "Please don't shoot me. I have a kid. Please, take the money." Ayuar testified she did not recall seeing an "orange tip" on the gun appellant pointed at her. Nathan Starrett testified he was working at Dark Tan on McKinney Avenue in Dallas on November 9, 2007. At approximately 4:30 p.m., appellant entered Dark Tan and asked Starrett for change for a dollar. Starrett testified when he "opened the draw" to make change, appellant pulled a gun from his pocket, pointed it at Starrett's chest, and said, "Give me the rest of it." Starrett told appellant he had only $20. According to Starrett, appellant replied, "You have three seconds to give me the money, or I'm going to shoot you." Starrett felt frightened and gave appellant the money. Starrett testified the gun appellant pointed at him appeared real and did not have an "orange tip." Appellant testified in relevant part that in addition to the four robberies to which he had pleaded guilty, he was also "accepting responsibility" for "some other convenient [sic] store robberies" that took place at approximately the same time and "were talked about" in his interviews with police. Appellant testified he used a toy handgun purchased from "a dollar store" in committing the robberies. Appellant testified the toy handgun had "an orange thing at the end of it" that he colored over with "a Sharpie." According to appellant, part of "the orange" could still be seen. However, during the robberies, he held the toy handgun "down to where the victims in these cases couldn't see that." On cross-examination by the State, appellant acknowledged that when he was arrested for the offenses at issue, there was a "gun" hidden underneath the couch where he was sitting. Further, during appellant's cross-examination by the State, the following exchange occurred: Q. Would you agree with me, when you went into these stores, you knew exactly what you were doing?
A. I had-yes, I did.
Q. You had the intent to scare these people so badly that they would give you anything and everything that they had in the cash register and think that you were going to kill them if they didn't do so; is that correct?
A. What I wanted to do was go in there and get the money and to scare them but not inflict any harm on them.
Q. But you had the intent to scare them.
A. I had the intent to get the money.
Q. You also had the intent to scare them. Isn't that why you painted the gun, to make it look like a real gun?
A. Yes.
At the conclusion of the punishment hearing, the trial court found appellant guilty in each of the four cases in which he had pleaded guilty. Additionally, the trial court's judgments show the trial court affirmatively found appellant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offenses in trial court cause numbers F07-58985-L, F07-59037-L, and F07-73821-L. The trial court found the enhancement paragraph in cause number F07-73821-L true. Following the trial court's assessment of punishment, appellant filed timely notices of appeal in each of the four cases. II. APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERYA. Applicable Law
Under section 29.02(a) of the Texas Penal Code, a person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a) (Vernon 2003). Section 29.03(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides in relevant part a person commits aggravated robbery "if he commits robbery as defined in Section 29.02, and he . . . uses or exhibits a deadly weapon." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003). "Deadly weapon" means (1) a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury or (2) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Accordingly, a person who uses a real gun in a robbery commits aggravated robbery, whereas a person who uses a toy commits "only robbery." Payne v. State, 790 S.W.2d 649, 652 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). B. Appellant's Complaints Regarding His Convictions1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
In appellant's first, second, third, and fourth issues, which are argued jointly, he contends he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in each of the four cases at issue. The State responds the record does not support appellant's claim he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. We address appellant's first four issues together. a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We examine ineffective assistance of counsel claims under well-known standards. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). It is appellant's burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms and (2) but for counsel's errors, there was a reasonable probability the result of the preceding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 696-97 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) ( Strickland test applies to cases involving guilty pleas). We examine the totality of counsel's representation and the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether appellant received effective assistance, but do not judge counsel's strategic decisions in hindsight. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. Rather, we strongly presume counsel's competence. Id. Any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Id.; see also Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). In most cases, a silent record providing no explanation for counsel's actions will not overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. See Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813-14. Further, trial counsel should ordinarily be given an opportunity to explain his actions before being deemed ineffective. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 111; Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 836. Absent such an opportunity, we will not find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was "so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it." Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392. b. Application of Law to Facts
Appellant contends trial counsel was deficient for not moving to withdraw his guilty pleas because his pro se letter and his trial testimony regarding his use of a toy gun "squarely raised the specter of an involuntary confession" to the offense of aggravated robbery. In addition, appellant asserts trial counsel, despite eliciting testimonial evidence from appellant about his use of a toy gun, "merely argued for probation in closing, never once mentioning that [a]ppellant should be held culpable for robbery instead of aggravated robbery." According to appellant, these deficiencies were so profound as to constitute "a complete breakdown in the adversarial process" and, therefore, a "presumption of prejudice" applies. Alternatively, appellant asserts, he was prejudiced because (1) trial counsel's implicit concession effectively prevented the trier of fact from finding him guilty only of robbery and (2) trial counsel's concession of guilt as to aggravated robbery effectively labeled appellant an abject liar. Thus, appellant argues, trial counsel set the stage for a finding of guilt of aggravated robbery and a consequent sentence in excess of that available for robbery. With regard to the first prong of the Strickland test, appellant did not file a motion for new trial raising ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the record is silent as to trial counsel's reasons for not withdrawing appellant's guilty pleas or arguing appellant should be convicted of robbery rather than aggravated robbery. However, appellant contends there can be no rational explanation for trial counsel's actions because the State "elicited, submitted, and sponsored evidence that [a]ppellant used a toy gun" when, on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked appellant, "Isn't that why you painted the gun, to make it look like a real gun?" Appellant cites Crawford v. State, 603 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980), for the proposition that "[w]hen a question containing an assumption is answered affirmatively the impression left is that the assumption is true." However, Crawford does not support appellant's contention the State, by its question, "elicited, submitted and sponsored evidence that [a]ppellant used a toy gun." Crawford involved the denial of a motion for mistrial based on a prosecutor's question that assumed the defendant in that case had attempted to poison the deceased. Id. The court of criminal appeals stated, "When [defendant's] son affirmatively answered the prosecutor's question, the jury was left with a clear impression that such an attempt had occurred." Id. The Crawford court concluded that, under the circumstances of that case, it could not be seriously argued the trial court's instruction to disregard was sufficient to remove that impression from the minds of the jurors. Id. The issue of whether the State had "elicited, submitted, or sponsored evidence" as a result of the prosecutor's question was not addressed in Crawford. Id. Appellant cites no other authority in support of his contention. Accordingly, we conclude appellant's contention regarding evidence allegedly "elicited, submitted and sponsored" by the State presents nothing for this Court's review. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (appellant's brief must contain clear and concise argument for contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to record). The record shows appellant was properly admonished and informed in writing of the charges alleged in the indictments in each case. Further, the record shows appellant testified he was responsible for "some other convenient [sic] store robberies" that "were talked about" in his interviews with police. In light of those other robberies, it is possible trial counsel believed it was in appellant's best interest to plead guilty in the four cases at issue. Additionally, the record shows (1) two complainants testified the gun used by appellant did not appear to be a toy, (2) appellant acknowledged there was a "gun" hidden underneath the couch where he was sitting when he was arrested, and (3) no physical evidence was introduced in the trial court. Therefore, it is possible trial counsel thought a rational fact-finder might believe appellant was lying about using a toy gun, and a motion to withdraw appellant's guilty pleas or find appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of robbery would be to appellant's detriment. Because the record is silent regarding any explanation for trial counsel's actions, we cannot conclude appellant has met his burden to overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. See Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506-07 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) ("The record in this case is insufficient to support the conclusion [appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel] because appellant did not develop a record in the trial court for the purpose of establishing this claim."); Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 111 (where record was silent as to why trial counsel took or failed to take actions at issue, court could not conclude appellant established trial counsel's performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness). An appellant's failure to make either of the required showings of deficient performance and sufficient prejudice defeats a claim of ineffective assistance. Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 110. Appellant's first, second, third, and fourth issues are decided against him. 2. Violation of Due Process
In his fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth issues, which are argued jointly, appellant contends his convictions in the four cases at issue violate due process because (1) his guilty pleas were not voluntary and (2) "it is possible the trial court silently withdrew [a]ppellant's plea without informing him." The State responds appellant's convictions for aggravated robbery in the four cases at issue do not constitute a violation of his rights to due process. We address appellant's fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth issues together. a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The due process standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea is "whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). "Due process of law is not denied by a conviction based on a plea of guilty that is accompanied by 'a strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the State and [a defendant's] clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence.'" Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 344 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 38). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 provides that, in general, as a prerequisite for preserving a complaint for appellate review, the record must show a complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion stating the grounds for the complaint with sufficient specificity. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. A defendant challenging the voluntariness of a guilty plea must comply with the requirements of rule 33.1 to properly preserve such a complaint for appellate review. Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 339. b. Application of Law to Facts
Appellant argues his pro se letter, his in-court testimony elicited by his counsel, and his in-court testimony elicited by the State "combine to clarify [he] confessed to having a toy gun." Further, appellant contends any conclusion he was voluntarily confessing to aggravated robbery was undermined by the following: (1) appellant interpreted alleged communications by trial counsel regarding counsel's heavy workload as "a threat to the attention that would be afforded [appellant's] case" and (2) there is no indication in the record a "video confession" mentioned by the prosecutor during the punishment hearing was admitted into evidence. Therefore, appellant contends, his guilty pleas in the cases at issue were not voluntary. However, the record does not show appellant's complaint regarding the voluntariness of his pleas was preserved pursuant to rule 33.1. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. The record shows appellant was fully informed of the charges against him and waived his rights prior to making his judicial confessions. He judicially confessed to committing aggravated robbery with "a deadly weapon, to-wit: a FIREARM" as alleged in the indictments. (emphasis original). At the plea proceeding, appellant waived a jury and reading of the indictments and orally confirmed to the trial court he wished to enter "a plea of guilty on all four cases." Without properly complaining at trial by means of a timely objection, motion, or request that an inquiry should be made into the voluntariness of his plea, appellant failed to preserve that issue for appellate review. See Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 338. Additionally, in what appears to be a separate due process argument, appellant asserts that although a trial court has no duty to sua sponte withdraw a defendant's guilty plea, "in practice, sua sponte withdrawals take place but the parties remain forever unaware that this occurred." (emphasis original). Appellant cites McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet), for the proposition that when evidence is introduced in a guilty plea case that either makes a defendant's innocence evident or reasonably and fairly raises an issue as to his guilt, the trial court has the authority to consider the facts of the case and decide the evidence did not create a reasonable doubt as to guilt. According to appellant, in such circumstances, the trial court is not required to affirmatively withdraw the defendant's plea before choosing to evaluate the State's evidence under a reasonable doubt standard. Appellant contends "[b]ecause of the strong evidence of a toy, . . . the [trial court in the cases at issue] may have switched standards and applied the reasonable doubt standard . . . as opposed to the lesser guilty plea standard which relieves the State of its burden to prove all the elements of the offenses." Appellant asserts this process is "abhorrent" and "at odds with the concept of fundamental fairness and [d]ue [p]rocess." However, appellant does not assert a "sua sponte withdrawal" of his guilty pleas by the trial court actually occurred or cite facts from the record to support such an occurrence. Accordingly, we conclude appellant's contention regarding the "sua sponte withdrawal" of his pleas that "may have" occurred presents nothing for this Court's review. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (appellant's brief must contain clear and concise argument for contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to record). We decide against appellant on his fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth issues. 3. Violation of Article 1.15
In his ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth issues, which are argued jointly, appellant asserts his convictions in the four cases at issue violated article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The State responds appellant's convictions do not constitute a violation of article 1.15. We address appellant's ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth issues together. a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The entry of a valid guilty plea has the effect of admitting all material facts alleged in the formal criminal charge. Tijerina v. State, 264 S.W.3d 320, 322-23 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. ref'd). Once a defendant enters a valid guilty plea in a bench trial, the State is no longer constitutionally required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 323 (citing Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986)). However, in Texas, the State is statutorily required to support a guilty plea with evidence. Id. Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly rendered and recorded, unless the defendant, upon entering a plea, has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing . . . provided, however, that it shall be necessary for the state to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same. The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and further consents either to an oral stipulation of the evidence and testimony or to the introduction of testimony by affidavits, written statements of witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of the judgment of the court. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon 2005). "The State is required to introduce supporting evidence that 'embrace[s] every essential element of the offense charged.'" Tijerina, 264 S.W.3d at 323 (quoting Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)). Accordingly, our review in such cases is limited to a determination of whether the State introduced evidence of guilt embracing every essential element of the offense charged. Id.; see also Wright v. State, 930 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.). b. Application of Law to Facts
Appellant does not dispute the State introduced into evidence his signed judicial confessions, in which he swore he used "a deadly weapon, to-wit: a FIREARM" in committing the offenses at issue. (emphasis original). Appellant acknowledges a judicial confession, alone, will sustain a conviction on a guilty plea. See Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Wright, 930 S.W.2d at 133. However, appellant asserts there was "additional evidence adduced here regarding whether the alleged weapon was a toy or a gun creating a conflict as to guilt of aggravated robbery or robbery." Specifically, appellant contends his pro se letter, his testimony, and "the State's question assuming that testimony's veracity" present "not a mere conflict but an affirmative reflection [he] was guilty only of robbery." The record shows two complainants testified appellant used a gun that appeared to be real and did not have an "orange tip." Further, appellant acknowledged on cross-examination there was a "gun" hidden underneath the couch where he was sitting when he was arrested. At most, the evidence is conflicting. See Tijerina, 264 S.W.3d at 324. Therefore, a judicial confession is sufficient to meet the requirements of article 1.15 with regard to the cases at issue. See id. We conclude the record contains sufficient evidence embracing the elements of the offense of aggravated robbery to support appellant's guilty pleas. See id. at 323. Appellant's ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth issues are decided against him. III. ENHANCEMENT PARAGRAPH IN CAUSE NUMBER F07-73821-L
In his thirteenth issue, appellant asserts the judgment in trial court cause number F07-73821-L erroneously contains recitations appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph in that case and the trial court found the enhancement paragraph true. According to appellant, that judgment should be modified to delete those recitations. The State responds the presumption of regularity prohibits modification of the judgment in F07-73821-L.A. Applicable Law
The presumption of regularity is a judicial construct that requires a reviewing court, absent evidence of impropriety, to indulge every presumption in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and documents in the lower court. Light v. State, 15 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see also Jones v. State, 77 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (absent evidence to contrary, regularity of trial court's judgment and records is presumed) (citing Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984)); Song Sun Hwang v. State, 130 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. ref'd). If a presumption of regularity applies, a reviewing court must consider "whether there is evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption." Light, 15 S.W.3d at 107; see also Simms v. State, 848 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd) (applying presumption of regularity where judgment showed trial court found enhancement paragraph true). An appellate court has the power to modify an incorrect judgment to make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary information before it to do so. See Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd); see also Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b). B. Application of Law to Facts
Appellant asserts (1) the record does not show he pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph in trial court cause number F07-73821-L in open court or in the plea agreement, (2) had he pleaded true to that enhancement paragraph, the plea agreement would have reflected a different punishment range than was stated, and (3) the copies of the plea agreement and judicial confession in cause number F07-73821-L contained in the clerk's record do not reflect a "file mark," and the "index to the clerk's record indicates that neither [of those documents] were filed." However, the plea agreement in cause number F07-73821-L shows appellant agreed to plead true to the enhancement paragraph in that case. Further, the signed judicial confession in that case includes the enhancement paragraph. Although the index to the clerk's record indicates neither of those documents was "file marked," both documents are contained in the record. An instrument is deemed filed when it is placed in the custody or control of the clerk, regardless of whether a file-mark is placed on the instrument. See Stansberry v. State, 239 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Williams v. State, 767 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd). Appellant does not assert, and the record does not show, the plea agreement and judicial confession in cause number F07-73821-L were not "placed in the custody or control of the clerk." See Stansberry, 239 S.W.3d at 263. Because the record does not contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity with regard to the trial court's judgment in cause number F07-73821-L, that judgment is presumed correct. See Light, 15 S.W.3d at 107; Breazeale, 683 S.W.2d at 450. Accordingly, appellant's request to modify that judgment is denied. We decide against appellant on his thirteenth issue. IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude appellant has not met his burden to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the four cases at issue. Further, we conclude appellant's convictions in those cases did not violate due process or article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Finally, because the record does not contain sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity as to the trial court's judgment in trial court cause number F07-73821-L, appellant's request to modify that judgment is denied. We decide appellant's thirteen issues against him. The trial court's judgments are affirmed.