Opinion
02 Civ. 906 (JSM)
December 13, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff claims that her former employer, Memorial SloanKettering Cancer Center, fired her in retaliation for her having asserted claims that she was the victim of age discrimination. This action was filed after the Court dismissed her prior action alleging age discrimination and Title VII retaliation claims, and declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state and city law retaliation claims. Having moved to Connecticut, Plaintiff re-filed her state law retaliation claim in this court as a diversity action.
The Defendant now moves to dismiss the retaliation claims on the ground that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff from disputing that the Hospital had a legitimate reason for terminating her. The motion to dismiss is granted.
In the opinion dismissing the prior action the Court found:
nothing in the testimony contradicts the testimony of both Perchick and Ferrero that she honestly believed that Plaintiff was not performing in a competent manner. There is no factual basis that would support a finding that her stated reason for terminating Plaintiff for lack of competence was a pretext for age discrimination.
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Thus, because there is no evidence to demonstrate that the Hospital's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is false or that the Hospital was motivated by age discrimination, the Hospital's motion for summary judgment is granted.O'Hara v. Memorial Sloan Ketterinci Cancer Center, 2000 WL 1459798, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000).
The Court recognizes that there are cases where the evidence may not support a claim of discrimination but will still be sufficient to support a claim of retaliation. See, e.g., Cifra v. Gen. Electric Co., 252 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2001); Dominic v. Consol. Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1987). However, in either a discrimination or a retaliation case, where the Defendant articulates a legitimate reason for the termination of the employee, the Plaintiff must prove that her employer's articulated reason for her discharge was a pretext. See Holtz v. Rockefeller Co., 258 F.3d 62, 81 (2d Cir. 2001); Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 443 (2d Cir. 1999)
In Plaintiff's prior action the evidence about the alleged acts of retaliation was before the Court when it concluded that "[t]here is no factual basis that would support a finding that [the employer's] stated reason for terminating Plaintiff for lack of competence was a pretext." Thus, this case is similar to Clarke v. Carlucci, 834 F. Supp. 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), in which Judge Sprizzo held that a plaintiff who had previously filed a claim under Title VII was collaterally estopped in a age discrimination case from contesting a finding that her employer's stated reason for her termination was not a pretext, noting:
since Title VII and ADEA cases are both governed by the McDonnell Douglas standard, which allows a defendant to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination by proving a legitimate business reason, the issue of whether IBM can prove such a reason is identical with respect to both Clarke's Title VII and ADEA claims.
Having had the opportunity to litigate her claim that her employer's stated reason for its actions was a pretext, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from re-litigating that issue here.
But even if collateral estoppel did not prevent Plaintiff from re-litigating the question whether her employer's stated reason for her termination was a pretext, the full record does not provide a basis on which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the Hospital's stated reason for terminating Plaintiff was a pretext. As the Court noted in the earlier opinion, even the testimony of an ex-employee who was friendly to Plaintiff and hostile to her supervisor, supported the supervisor's testimony that she "honestly believed that Plaintiff was not performing in a competent manner." Moreover, while Plaintiff points to actions taken by her immediate superior, Tara Spiess, shortly after Plaintiff's lawyer wrote to the hospital's human resources department, the evidence from both Spiess and the official in the human resources department was that Spiess was unaware of Plaintiff's discrimination complaint until after Plaintiff was suspended. Plaintiff herself contends that well before Plaintiff was suspended Spiess thought she should be terminated and was simply following procedures in documenting performance issues. Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 11.
Since Plaintiff cannot prove that her employer's stated reason for her termination was a pretext, her retaliation claim must be dismissed.