Opinion
Civil Action RE-18-273
08-18-2020
DEBORAH L. OGLE, Plaintiff, v. OVERLOOK ROAD AT BRIDGTON ASSOCIATION, Defendant,
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARYGAY KENNEDY, JUSTICE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Deborah L. Ogle's ("Ogle" or "Plaintiff) motion for summary judgment. Ogle argues that the terms of a settlement agreement between the two parties in this action are unambiguous and she is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Overlook Road at Bridgton Association ("Association" or "Defendant") puts forth multiple arguments for why the Plaintiff's motion should be denied. For the following reasons, the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is hereby denied, II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD
Ogle is the Trustee of the Deborah Lee Ogle Revocable Trust. ('Trust") (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 1.) The Trust owns a parcel of land in the Town of Bridgton, Maine, more particularly described in the deed form Ogle to the Trust dated August 24, 2005 and recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds in Book 23104, Page 319. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 2.) The Association is a registered Maine non-profit organization established on February 12, 1996, (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 3.)
The subdivision plan for the Kezar Heights subdivision was approved by the Town of Bridgton Planning Board on July 6, 2004 and recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds in Plan Book 204, Page 439. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 4.) The Ogle property is within the Kezar Heights subdivision in Bridgton, Maine. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 5.) The Ogle property is about 36.15 acres and has approximately 1070 feet of frontage on Kezar Heights Road. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 6.)
In 2008, the Association initiated a small claims matter against Ogle in Bridgton District Court (BRIDC-SC-2008-110) ("Prior Lawsuit"). (Pl.'s S.M.F. J 7.) The Association prevailed in that lawsuit and Ogle appealed; the matter was then settled through the execution of a settlement agreement ("Mutual Release"). (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 8.) The Mutual Release states the "[t]he parties also agree that the association will pay to have the electrical service completed along the length of Kezar Heights Road and specifically brought in front of Ogle's property when Ogle its successor or assigns receives a building permit for the property at no direct or indirect expense to or as an assessment against Ogle, her heirs or assigns or the Ogle Property." (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 9.) As part of the settlement, the parties agreed to comprehensive amendments to both the Bylaws and the Articles of Incorporation; specifically, the Mutual Release provided that the Fourth Amendment to the Bylaws and the restated articles were to be enacted and recorded. (Def.'s S.A.M.P. ¶ 11.) Those amendments made it clear that the residents of the White Mountain Way were part of the Association, that Ogle had the rights and obligations of a member of the Association, and the powers of the Association to make assessments for the ownership, operation, and use of the Road. (Def.'s S.A.M.F. ¶ 12.)
In 2011, Ogle received a building permit from the Town of Bridgton to build a residence on the western side of her property, and, pursuant to the Mutual Release, the Association paid to have electrical service brought to a point on the Ogle Property approximately 215 feet along Kezar Heights Road, which reached in front of Ogle's home. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 10; Def.'s S.A.M.F. ¶ 1.) The electrical service stops at the Ogle residence and does not continue to the end of Kezar Heights Road where it meets Knights Hill Road. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 11; Def.'s S.A.M.F. ¶ 5.)
In 2016, Ogle received a building permit from the Town of Bridgton for a structure on the eastern side of the Ogle Property. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 12.) Ogle testified that she obtained the building permit to build a garage. (Def.'s S.A.M.F. ¶ 2.) On or about July 10, 2016, Ogle provided a copy of the building permit to the Association and, pursuant to the Mutual Release, requested to have the cost of the electrical service to the proposed structure paid for by the Association. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 13.) On or about November 6, 2016 the Association voted to "... take no action to fulfill the Ogle request..." because the Association believed it had already fulfilled its obligation under the Mutual Release. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 14; Def.'s S.A.M.F. ¶ 3.) Electrical service in the subdivision starts at the northern end of Kezar Heights Road where it intersects with Knights Hill Road and extends until it ends at the western side of the Ogle Property." (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 15.) Ogle's property is the last lot along the Kezar Heights Road that does not also border a public road. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 16.) Extending the electricity along the entire length of Kezar Heights Road, as described by the Plaintiff in their motion would mean extending it along the length of the Ogle property, along the length of the Hague property, to Knights Hill Road, forming a semicircle. (Def.'s S.A.M.F. ¶ 4.) Ogle was asked in an interrogatory for all information regarding her damages and she stated she lost an agreement for the construction of the garage, that she could not sell lots without electricity, the cost of the building permit, and attorney's fees. (Def.'s S.A.M.P. ¶ 6.) At her deposition, Ogle could not put any value on any of the categories of damages except for the $25 building permit. (Def.'s S.A.M.F.¶ 7.)
Finally, Ogle is currently in arrears on her assessments. (Def .'s S.A.M.F. ¶ 15.) Ogle previously filed a Motion to Enforce the Mutual Release, however, the court denied her motion, along with a motion from the Association, as moot. (Def .'s S.A.M.F. ¶¶ 16-17.)
III. ANALYSIS
a. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial when a material fact is in dispute, Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep't, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 12, 974 A.2d 276, nor an arena for trial by affidavit, Hutz v. Alden, 2011 ME 27, ¶ 16, 12 A.3d 1174. Instead, summary judgment is proper only when a review of the parties' statements of material facts and the record evidence to which they refer, considered in the light most favorable to a nonmoving party, establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Estate of Kay v. Estate of Wiggins, 2016 ME 108, 59, 143 A.3d 1290. A contested fact is "material" if has the potential to influence the outcome of the case. Lewis v. Concord General Uut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 34, ¶ 10, 87 A.3d 732. A "genuine" issue of material fact exists if the factfinder must decide between competing versions of the truth. Lewis, 2014 ME 34, 87 A.3d 732. Judgment as a matter of law is not warranted if "any reasonable view of the evidence could sustain a verdict for the opposing party pursuant to the substantive law that is an essential element of the claim." Merriam v. Wanger, 2000 ME 159, ¶ 7, 757 A.2d 778. When material facts are contested, the dispute must be resolved through fact-finding at trial- "even if the likelihood of success at trial by one party or another is small." Rose v. Parsons, 2014 ME 73, 5 4, 118 A.3d 220; Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 7, 784 A.2d 18.
If a properly supported motion is filed, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that a factual dispute exists sufficient to establish a prima facie case for each element of the claim or defense in order to avoid summary judgment. Watt v. Unifirst Corp., 2009 ME 47, ¶ 21, 969 A.2d 897. The evidence proffered by the nonmoving party is assessed for sufficiency -not persuasiveness -such that a court can make a factual determination without speculating. Estate of Smith v. Cumberland County, 2013 ME 13, ¶ 19, 60 A.3d 759.
b. Complaint Count I
Ogle's motion for summary judgment comes down to the issue of whether or not the relevant provision of the Mutual Release is unambiguous and, if it is unambiguous, whether or not the language supports her reading. In her motion for summary judgment, Ogle argues that the Mutual Release is in fact unambiguous and that the Association must pay to have electrical service along the entire length of Kezar Heights Road. The Association argues that Count I is barred by the statute of limitations; the Association met its obligation under the Mutual Release as a matter of law; plaintiff cannot seek to recover for breach of contract when she has not substantially complied with the contract; Count I is barred by res judicata; and the Plaintiff has not provided evidence of any damages.
Whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a matter of law. Hare v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, 471 A.2d 1041, 1044 (Me. 1984). "The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law." Chadwick-BaRoss, Inc. v. T. Buck Constr. Inc., 627 A.2d 532, 534 (Me. 1993). A contract is considered to be ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. Id.
Viewing the relevant language of the Mutual Release in a light most favorable to the Association, as the non-moving party, the Court believes that the language is ambiguous. Reasonable courts could certainly disagree on the meaning of". . . along the length of Kezar Heights Road and specifically brought in front of Ogle's property when Ogle its successor or assigns receives a building permit for the property .. .." (Pl.'s S.M.F. ¶ 9.) One court could agree with Ogle that 'along the length of Kezar Heights Road' means that the Association is required to install electrical service along the entirety of Kezar Heights Road. However, another reasonable court could rightfully question the purpose and utility of the language that states "and specifically brought in front of Ogle's property when Ogle its successor or assigns receives a building permit for the property" when considered in context of the entire Mutual Release. Further, if the language of the Mutual Release meant what Ogle says it does, why would she not insist that the electricity be extended along the entire length of Kezar Heights Road when she obtained a building permit back in 2011 It would also be curious why the Association's obligation to extend property beyond the Ogle Property would be triggered by the condition of Ogle obtaining a building permit for her property. Viewing the language of the Mutual Release in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds the relevant provision of the Mutual Release to be ambiguous. Therefore, the Court hereby denies Ogle's motion for summary judgment.
Interestingly, the Association actually uses the phrase 'along the length of to mean 'along the entire length of in its statement of material fact. In Def.'s S.A.M.F. ¶ 4, the Association states that “[e]xtending the electricity along the entire length of Kezar Heights Road ., . would mean extending it along the length of the Ogle property [and] along the length of the Hague property .. .." In the scenario where electricity is extended 'along the entire length' of Kezar Heights Road, the electricity would also be extended along the entire length of the Ogle and Hague properties; or, as the Association puts it, 'along the length of the Ogle and Hague properties.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the parties have very different views on the other's obligations under the Mutual Release. The language of the relevant provision could reasonably support multiple constructions which renders this issue unsuitable for summary judgment.
The entry is: 1.
Plaintiffs Motion to for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a) the Clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this Order by reference in the docket.