Office of Personnel Management v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

13 Citing cases

  1. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump

    318 F. Supp. 3d 370 (D.D.C. 2018)   Cited 13 times
    In AFGE v. Trump, 318 F. Supp. 3d 370 (D.D.C. 2018), the American Federation of Government Employees ("AFGE") and numerous other federal employee unions brought consolidated cases, contending that (1) the President had no statutory or constitutional authority to issue executive orders pertaining to the field of federal labor relations; (2) provisions within the Executive Orders conflicted with particular sections of the Statute in a manner that abrogated the unions' statutory right to bargain collectively; and (3) the Executive Orders violated the Constitution, specifically the Take Care Clause and the First Amendment right to freedom of association.

    Not surprisingly, the D.C. Circuit has confirmed that government officials are not permitted to issue government-wide regulations "that merely restate[ ] a statutorily guaranteed prerogative of management" in order to "render a bargaining proposal nonnegotiable when the underlying statutory prerogative does not do so[.]" Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. , 864 F.2d 165, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

  2. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, I.R.S. v. F.L.R.A

    996 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1993)   Cited 6 times
    Reviewing the FLRA’s holding as to whether a government-wide rule displaced the duty to bargain under the Statute, indicating that the FLRA may hear such claims

    Whatever deference we must extend to the Authority's characterization of the Circular as an "applicable law" under the statute does not extend to an interpretation of the Circular itself at odds with the document's plain meaning and patently contrary to OMB's intent. Cf. Office of Personnel Management v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 165, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1988). We generally do not grant any deference to the FLRA's interpretation of regulations promulgated by other agencies.

  3. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.

    751 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 2014)   Cited 5 times

    The FLRA, however, has no special competence in the interpretation of the IG Act, so we accord no deference to its interpretation of that statute. See, e.g., IRS v. FLRA, 902 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C.Cir.1990); Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 165, 171 (D.C.Cir.1988). Therefore, we review de novo the Authority's decision insofar as it purports to construe the requirements of the IG Act. NRC, 25 F.3d at 232–33.

  4. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 951 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

    412 F.3d 119 (D.C. Cir. 2005)   Cited 3 times

    Contrary to the FLRA's position, past decisions have found interference with the right to assign work only when the proposal would restrict who performs a task or when a task may be performed, and with good reason. In passing the FSLMRS, Congress sought "to promote collective bargaining and the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements," Dep't of the Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, Ga. v. FLRA, 962 F.2d 48, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil Service, a key supporter of the compromise management rights provisions Congress adopted, see Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1988), explained that these provisions constitute "narrow exception[s] to the general obligation to bargain," 124 Cong. Rec. 29,187 (1978) (statement of Rep. Clay). See also id. at 29,198 (statement of Rep. Ford) (explaining that management rights provisions should "be narrowly construed"). While FLRA precedent comports with this understanding of the statute's purpose and management rights provisions, the Authority's conclusion that the proposals here interfere with the right to assign work does not. After all, "[i]f an [agency] was released from its duty to bargain whenever" a proposal requires work by agency personnel, or even just when implementation of the proposal would cause "hardship, the [agency's] duty to bargain would practically be non-existent in a large proportion of cases."

  5. U.S. Air Tour Ass'n v. F.A.A

    298 F.3d 997 (D.C. Cir. 2002)   Cited 34 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, when a model's methodology is challenged, the agency must "provide a complete analytic defense" (quoting Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force, 705 F.2d at 535)

    The problem for the FAA, however, is that it is not the Park Service, and "deference is inappropriate when [an agency] interprets regulations promulgated by a different agency." Office of Pers. Mgm't v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 165, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see Dep't of the Treasury v. FLRA, 837 F.2d 1163, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Nor is the FAA entitled to deference for its own interpretation of "substantial restoration of the natural quiet," as Congress expressly reserved for the Secretary of the Interior the authority to interpret that statutory term.

  6. Amax Land Company v. Quarterman

    181 F.3d 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1999)   Cited 11 times
    Adopting the State Farm rationale

    MMS defends its authority to employ shifting rates by contending that § 3717(c)(2)'s apparently plain prohibition of shifting rates applies only when an agency chooses to impose the "minimum" CVF rate and not when an agency exerts its authority, drawn from these provisions or others, to assess a higher rate. Even aside from the fact that we owe no deference to MMS' interpretation of a statute it does not administer, see, e.g., Scheduled Airlines Traffic Offices v. Department of Defense, 87 F.3d 1356, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996); OPM v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 165, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1988); the DCA is unambiguous on this issue. 31 U.S.C. § 3717(a)(1) requires agencies to assess interest on overdue obligations and sets a floor on the rate chosen at the CVF rate. The ceiling is established by 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A): the agency may not choose an arbitrary or capricious rate.

  7. National Treasury Employees Union v. F.L.R.A

    30 F.3d 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1994)   Cited 13 times
    Noting that "we frequently remand matters to agencies while leaving open the possibility that the agencies can reach exactly the same result as long as they . . . explain themselves better or develop better evidence for their position"

    But we owe no deference to the FLRA's views about what OPM's regulation, 5 CFR § 430.504(d), means when it calls for performance awards to be "reviewed and approved" by agency officials. On that we owe deference only to OPM. See, e.g., Department of the Army, Aberdeen Proving Ground v. FLRA, 890 F.2d 467, 470, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Office of Personnel Management v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 165, 167, 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Since OPM has not announced an authoritative interpretation of § 430.504(d), we must construe the regulation for ourselves. And we disagree with the FLRA's understanding of it. While the union's proposal would certainly cabin the agency's discretion over the timing and amount of performance awards, and indeed over who will receive them, we do not think that it intrudes on any discretion that § 430.504(d) insists agencies must retain.

  8. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

    962 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1992)   Cited 44 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Outlining FLRA position

    By ascribing certain management rights to agencies, but tempering those rights through the requirement of impact and implementation bargaining, Congress sought to strike a compromise between the agency's need to manage itself efficiently and the employees' right to participate in the decisions that affect them. See Office of Personnel Management v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1988). That the balance struck by Congress is a delicate one — easily upset by a untoward shift of power to either party — is aptly demonstrated by the facts of this case.

  9. Department of the Army v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

    890 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1989)   Cited 2 times

    Id. § 7106(a).See generally Office of Personnel Management v. FLRA, 864 F.2d 165, 167-71 (D.C. Cir. 1988); American Federation of Gov't Employees, Local 32 v. FLRA, 853 F.2d 986, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing interrelationship between §§ 7117 and 7106). FLRA is responsible for effecting the aims of the FSLMRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1), and this court has jurisdiction to review FLRA final orders for arbitrariness and capriciousness, id. §§ 7123(a), (c).

  10. Overseas Education Ass'n v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

    876 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1989)   Cited 7 times
    Applying Chevron

    Id. § 7106(b)(3) (emphasis added). See also OPM v. FLRA, 274 U.S.App.D.C. 362, 369, 864 F.2d 165, 172 (1988) (§ 7106(b) clearly provides exceptions to management rights under § 7106(a), and agency cannot circumvent § 7106(b) exceptions by promulgating regulations tracking only § 7106(a)); Association of Civilian Technicians v. FLRA, 244 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 159, 756 F.2d 172, 180 (1985) ("proposals to make `appropriate arrangements' for employees adversely affected by a [reduction in force] are negotiable under subsection (b)(3) even if they would directly interfere with the exercise of management's authority under subsection (a)"); Local 32, AFGE v. FLRA, 234 U.S.App.D.C. 292, 294, 728 F.2d 1526, 1528 (1984) ("Act's legislative history further supports a reading of § 7106(b)(3) as permitting the negotiation of some constraints on § 7106(a) management prerogatives"); AFGE, Local 1923 v. FLRA, supra note 8, 260 U.S.App.D.C. at 348, 819 F.2d at 308 ("[i]f implementation of the proposed arrangement would not interfere excessively with managerial prerogatives, it is appropriate and therefore negoti