Opinion
2:24-CV-572-JHC-GJL
07-12-2024
FIDEL LEON ODIMARA, Petitioner, v. DREW BOSTOCK, Respondent.
NOTING Dated: July 30, 2024
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Grady J. Leupold United States Magistrate Judge
Petitioner Fidel Leon Odimara, who is currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Northwest ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, Washington and is proceeding pro se, brings this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas action contending his detention is not mandatory, nor does it comply with the United States Constitution. Dkts. 1, 3. Currently before the Court for consideration is Respondent's combined Motion to Dismiss the Petition and Return. Dkt. 6.
Having considered the parties' submissions, the balance of the record, and the governing law, the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 6) be GRANTED and that the Petition (Dkt. 3) either be DISMISSED for failure to exhaust or DENIED on the merits.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Immigration Status and Proceedings
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nigeria who entered the United States in 1997. Dkt. 3 at 2; Dkt. 7-1 at 1 (Exhibit A). Though he states he initially entered the United States on a tourist visa, Dkt. 3 at 2, Petitioner adjusted his status to Legal Permanent Resident on June 3, 2009. Id.; Dkt. 7-1 at 1 (Exhibit A).
On October 3, 2022, Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 24-months' incarceration by the United States District Court, Central District of California, following his plea of guilty to the offense of Conspiracy to Engage in Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Dkt. 7-2 at 175. As part of his guilty plea, Petitioner admitted that the underlying conspiracy involved funds exceeding $10,000. Id. at 12-15.
During his term of incarceration, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging Petitioner with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which provides for removal of noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D) & (U). Dkts. 7-3 (Exhibit C), 7-4 (Exhibit D).
Following the completion of his sentence in December 2023, Petitioner was detained by ICE pending a final administrative determination of removal. Dkt. 7-5 (Exhibit E). Shortly thereafter, on January 2, 2024, Petitioner, through counsel, moved for a bond hearing in the immigration court. Dkt. 7-6 (Exhibit F). Though no specific date is provided in the record, Petitioner states he appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) for an individualized bond hearing “on or about the end of January 2024.” Dkt. 3 at 3. Following the hearing, the IJ found it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's bond as his detention pending the issuance of a final removal order was statutorily mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Dkt. 7-7 (Exhibit G). Petitioner reserved, but did not file, an appeal to the IJ's decision. Id. at 3 (deadline to appeal February 29, 2024); Dkt. 3 at 5.
B. Federal Habeas Petition
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 26, 2024, originally naming Alejandro Mayorkas as Respondent. Dkts. 1, 3. On April 30, 2024, the Court entered an Order substituting Drew Bostock (the field office director for NWIPC) as Respondent and directed Respondent Bostock to show cause why the Court should not grant habeas relief. Dkt. 4. In response, Respondent filed a combined Motion to Dismiss the Petition and Return. Dkt. 6. Petitioner responded in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 8, and Respondent replied in support, Dkt. 9. Therefore, this matter is now fully briefed and ripe for consideration.
II. DISCUSSION
The Petition raises two arguments for habeas relief: (1) the IJ erred in determining that Petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony for which 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) mandates detention and (2) his continued detention without an individualized bond hearing violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Dkt. 3 at 4-5; see also Dkt. 8. With respect to the first argument, Petitioner acknowledges that a conviction for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) may qualify as an aggravated felony in some instances but asserts that his conviction does not qualify because “there was no [monetary] loss” attributed to him. Id. at 6. As relief, Petitioner requests that this Court order his release from custody or, in the alternative, order an individualized bond hearing. Dkt. 3 at 4.
Respondent maintains that Petitioner is not entitled to his requested relief, arguing that his detention is mandated by § 1226(c) and comports with due process. Dkts. 6, 9. Respondent argues further that the Petition should be dismissed on prudential grounds because Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. Dkt. 6 at 6-7; Dkt. 9 at 4.
The undersigned agrees with Respondent's exhaustion argument and finds the Petition should be dismissed on prudential grounds. However, out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned examines the Petition on the merits and, in doing so, finds the Petition may also be denied on the merits.
A. Petitioner Has Not Satisfied Prudential Exhaustion
“On habeas review under § 2241, exhaustion is a prudential rather than jurisdictional requirement.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2011). The necessity of exhaustion, therefore, is governed by sound judicial discretion. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992), superseded by statutory amendment as noted in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738(2001). Nevertheless, “[p]rudential limits, like jurisdictional limits and limits on venue, are ordinarily not optional.” Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35-36, n. 5 (2006).
To determine whether prudential exhaustion is appropriate, courts consider whether “(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). Even if the Puga factors weigh in favor of prudential exhaustion, the requirement may be waived “where administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting S.E.C. v. G.C. George Sec., Inc., 637 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1981)). When a petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative remedies and exhaustion is not waived, “a district court should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011).
Here, Petitioner concedes he did not appeal the IJ's decision regarding his ineligibility for an individualized bond hearing. Dkt. 3 at 5. Thus, the Court must consider whether circumstances for application or waiver of prudential exhaustion exist. Based on the current record, the second and third Puga factors weigh in favor of prudential exhaustion, and any of the reasons to waive such exhaustion are lacking.
Petitioner disagrees, arguing that the delays incurred by pursuing an administrative appeal and the Board of Immigration Appeals' (“BIA”) inability to review his constitutional claim would have made the exercise futile and caused him irreparable harm. Dkt. 3 at 5; Dkt. 8 5-6. He also argues that exhaustion is not required where a habeas petition challenges conditions imposed on bond. Id.
Petitioner's second argument is unavailing because the instant Petition challenges the denial of a bond hearing, not bond conditions. As for his first argument, Petitioner is correct that the BIA could not grant his requested relief on constitutional grounds. This does not mean, however, that filing an administrative appeal would have been a fruitless exercise as Petitioner also seeks relief on statutory grounds. If the BIA were to resolve Petitioner's 18 U.S.C. § 1226(c) argument in his favor, then it could have ordered the IJ to consider his eligibility for bond- which is precisely the relief requested here. See, e.g., Francisco Cortez v. Nielsen, No. 19-cv-00754-PJH, 2019 WL 1508458, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019) (holding that constitutional issues raised in an immigration habeas petition do not render an administrative appeal futile where the BIA could grant relief without reaching the constitutional question) (citing Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that prudential exhaustion is appropriate in this case and recommends the Petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust. However, out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned examines the Petition on the merits and recommends disposition of this case on alternative grounds.
B. Petitioner's Detention is Statutorily Mandated
In assessing the Petition on the merits, the Court begins with Petitioner's argument regarding the statutory basis for his detention. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1226 provides the framework for the arrest, detention, and release of noncitizens who are present in the United States and have been placed in removal proceedings. Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 529-530 (9th Cir. 2023). Section 1226(a) grants the DHS discretionary authority to arrest and either to detain, or to release on bond, noncitizens “pending removal proceedings,” unless the noncitizen falls within one of the categories of criminals described in § 1226(c), for whom detention is mandatory until removal proceedings have concluded. 8 U.S.C. § 1226; Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 846-48 (2018). Section 1226(c)'s mandatory detention applies to any noncitizen who “is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B).
Although the relevant statutory sections refer to the Attorney General, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 471, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred most immigration law enforcement functions from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to the DHS, the DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration Review retained its role in administering immigration courts and the BIA. See Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 828 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
This case involves mandatory detention under § 1226(c) as Petitioner has been deemed removable for committing an aggravated felony covered in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and as defined in §§ 1101(a)(43)(D) & (U). Dkt. 7-3 at 5 (Exhibit C).
Under Section 1101(a)(43), the term “aggravated felony” means:
(D) an offense described in section 1956 of Title 18 (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957 of that title (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000; [and]
(U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph.8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(D) & (U) (emphasis added). By arguing that he was not convicted of an aggravated felony because he merely conspired to launder funds and was not directly responsible for any monetary loss, Petitioner ignores the effect of Section 1101(a)(43)(U) on the definition of an aggravated felony. Even if the Court were to accept that his conspiracy conviction does not qualify as an aggravated felony under subsection (D), it clearly qualifies as an aggravated felony under the broad sweep of subsection (U).
This result is confirmed by looking to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Fuentes v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2015). Similarly, the Fuentes petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering and, as a result, was deemed removable for committing an aggravated felony as defined by §§ 1101(a)(43)(D) & (U). Fuentes, 788 F.3d at 1180. The Circuit Court first explained that immigration courts must look to the specific circumstances of a noncitizen's money-laundering conviction to determine whether the monetary threshold of subsection (D) is met. Id. at 1181 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009)). And, when looking to the underlying circumstances of a conviction, the relevant inquiry is the total amount of funds laundered as opposed to the monetary loss to a victim. Id. at 1183 (citing Chowdhury v. INS, 249 F.3d 970, 972-74 (9th Cir. 2001)). Using this approach, the Circuit Court concluded there was sufficient evidence in the petitioner's presentencing report to find that she “conspired to launder more than $10,000” and was therefore an aggravated felon within the combined meaning of subsections (D) and (U). Id.
Likewise, here, Petitioner's plea agreement demonstrates he conspired to launder funds in excess of $10,000. Dkt. 7-2 (Exhibit B). In particular, Petitioner admitted he conspired to “defraud victims and launder funds,” he admitted he knew the conspiracy's “transactions with criminally derived proceeds, at times, exceeded $10,000,” he admitted that his participation in the conspiracy touched on (1) payments “totaling more than $27,000” and (2) “a wire transfer of $36,274” between bank accounts, and, most importantly, he admitted it was “reasonably foreseeable” to him that these amounts were derived from “the scheme intended to defraud victims.” Id. at 14-15. Thus, Petitioner's argument for why he is not an aggravated felon subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is unavailing.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner's detention is statutorily mandated until his removal proceedings have concluded and that he is not entitled to release or a bond hearing on statutory grounds.
C. Petitioner's Detention Comports with Due Process
Even if mandatory under § 1226(c), the Court must next consider whether Petitioner's continued detention without a bond hearing is consistent with due process. In this regard, Petitioner argues that his ongoing detention violates due process and that he is entitled to either immediate release or a bond hearing. Dkt. 3 at 5, 8-11; Dkt. 9 at 6-20. Respondent counters that Petitioner's continued mandatory detention is reasonable and compliant with due process. Dkt. 6 at 7-13.
Established law permits Petitioner's mandatory detention pending removal so long as the length of such confinement remains reasonable. Accordingly, the relevant inquiry before the Court is solely whether Petitioner's term of mandatory pre-removal detention has exceeded constitutional reasonableness.
In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), holding that “the Government may constitutionally detain deportable [noncitizens] during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.” 538 U.S at 518-21, 526 (2003). Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, which created the majority, reasoned that, beyond this limited period, due process may require “an individualized determination as to [a noncitizen's] risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified” Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
Since Demore, the Ninth Circuit has expressed “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the government's arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). Although the due process analysis for extended detention under § 1226(c) remains an open question in the Ninth Circuit, this Court and “essentially all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, ‘will-at some point-violate the right to due process.'” Martinez v. Clark, No. 2:18-cv-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019) (quoting Sajous v. Decker, No. 18-cv-2447-AJN, 2018 WL 2357266, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018)) (collecting cases); Djelassi v. ICE Field Office Director, 434 F.Supp.3d 917, 923-24 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (granting habeas petition and ordering bond hearing for noncitizen whose mandatory detention had become unreasonably prolonged); Ashemuke v. ICE Field Office Director, No. 2:23-cv-1592-RSL-MLP, 2024 WL 1683797, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 29, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1676681 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 18, 2024) (denying bond hearing where mandatory detention was not yet unreasonable).
See Avilez, 69 F.4th at 538 (declining to rule on whether due process required a bond hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c) and remanding to the district court for consideration of that claim); Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Whether due process requires a bond hearing for [noncitizens] detained under § 1226(c) is not before us today. And we take no position on that question.”).
In cases involving § 1226(c), this Court applies the “multi-factor analysis that many other courts have relied upon to determine whether § 1226(c) detention has become unreasonable.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6-7. This analysis, which is referred to as the Martinez test, involves the following factors:
(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) whether the detention will exceed the time the petitioner spent in prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable; (4) the nature of the crimes the petitioner committed; (5) the conditions of detention; (6) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner; (7) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (8) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal.Id. at *9.
The Court will now apply the Martinez test to assess whether Petitioner's ongoing detention has become unreasonable.
1. Length of Detention to Date
The current length of Petitioner's detention is the first and most important factor of the analysis. See, e.g., Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9; Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266, at *10. The longer a noncitizen's mandatory detention continues beyond a “brief' period of detention, the harder it is to justify without an individual bond determination. See Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266, at *10 (“[D]etention that has lasted longer than six months is more likely to be ‘unreasonable', and thus contrary to due process, than detention of less than six months.”); Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9 (finding nearly 13-month detention weighed in favor of granting a bond hearing); Liban M.J. v. Sec 'y of Dep't of Homeland Sec., 367 F.Supp.3d 959, 963-64 (D. Minn. 2019) (“Although there is no bright-line rule for what constitutes a reasonable length of detention, Petitioner's [12-month] detention has lasted beyond the ‘brief' period assumed in Demore.”); Ashemuke, 2024 WL 1683797, at *4 (concluding the petitioner's ongoing detention of eleven months-and seven months at the time his petition was filed-extended beyond a presumptively valid brief period of detention); see alsoDemore, 538 U.S at 531 (upholding ongoing detention of six months).
Here, Petitioner was detained for four months at the time he filed his Petition, and his detention has now extended to approximately six months. Because Petitioner's current detention has reached-but not yet exceeded-the brief period of detention upheld in Demore, this first factor is neutral or, at most, weighs slightly in favor of granting a bond hearing.
2. Likely Duration of Future Detention
The Court next “considers how long the detention is likely to continue absent judicial intervention; in other words, the anticipated duration of all removal proceedings including administrative and judicial appeals.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9.
At this junction, any estimate as to how long Petitioner's detention will continue would require a degree of speculation. Even so, Petitioner's representation that he is in the early stages of his removal proceedings provides some context. Specifically, Petitioner represents that his individual hearing on removal is scheduled for July 23, 2024, with the possibility for a lengthy appeal process to follow. Dkt. 8 at 14-15. Thus, if Petitioner receives and appeals an unfavorable removal decision, it is conceivable that his detention could continue for at least another 12 months. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Frequently Asked Questions, www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/faq.php (last accessed July 1, 2024; addressing anticipated timelines for civil appeal from notice of appeal until final decision). However, given the degree of speculation involved in this estimation, the second factor weighs only slightly in favor of granting a bond hearing. See Ashemuke, 2024 WL 1683797, at *4 (concluding uncertainty inherent to removal proceedings weighed neutrally upon relief); Barraza v. ICE Field Office Director, No. 2:23-cv-1271-BHS-MLP, 2023 WL 9600946, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2023), report and recommendation adopted., 2024 WL 518945 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2024) (acute possibility of continued detention pending active appeal weighs in favor granting a bond hearing).
3. Criminal History
Under the third and fourth factors, the Court assesses the current length of detention against the length of the detainee's criminal sentence and the nature of his crime. Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9; Cabral v. Decker, 331 F.Supp.3d 255, 262 (S.D.N.Y, 2018). These factors are indicative of whether the detainee would be a danger to the community or a risk of flight such that a bond hearing would be futile. See Cabral, 331 F.Supp.3d at 262; Ashemuke, 2024 WL 1683797, at *5.
Here, Petitioner's criminal conviction resulted in a 24-month custodial sentence, and he served approximately 14 months of that sentence. Dkt. 7-2 at 175 (Exhibit B); Dkt. 8 at 15. Thus, Petitioner's ongoing detention has not exceeded his criminal sentence. Regarding the nature of his crime, Petitioner argues he was not directly involved in harming any victims and, in this way, it appears he seeks to distance himself from the admissions in his plea agreement. Regardless of how he now chooses to characterize his criminal involvement, Petitioner pled guilty to involvement in a substantial money laundering conspiracy.
According to Petitioner's indictment, the criminal enterprise in which he was admittedly involved defrauded elderly and otherwise vulnerable victims of nearly $6 million. Dkt. 7-2 at 92 (Exhibit B). In his plea agreement, Petitioner admitted involvement in maintaining bank accounts capable of receiving up to $450,000 of fraudulent payments from those victims. Id. at 15. Given the length of Petitioner's sentence and the substantial conspiracy in which he was a part, the Court finds the third and fourth factors weigh against a bond hearing.
4. Conditions of Detention
Under the fifth factor, the Court considers the conditions of Petitioner's detention at the facility where he is currently detained. Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9. “The more that the conditions under which the [noncitizen] is being held resemble penal confinement, the stronger [the] argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing.” Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F.Supp.3d 853, 860 (D. Minn. 2019) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
The current record is devoid of any evidence regarding the conditions of Petitioner's detention at NWIPC. Thus, this factor weighs neither for nor against a bond hearing. See, e.g., Ashemuke, 2024 WL 1683797, at *6; Barraza, 2023 WL 9600946, at *6.
5. Delays in Removal Proceedings
Under the sixth and seventh factors, the Court considers “the nature and extent of any delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the government, respectively.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *10. A noncitizen is entitled to raise legitimate defenses to his removal, “and such challenges to his removal cannot undermine his claim that detention has become unreasonable.” Liban M.J., 367 F.Supp.3d at 965 (citing Hernandez v. Decker, 2018 WL 3579108, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2018)). Thus, this factor only weighs against a petitioner when he “has ‘substantially prolonged his stay by abusing the processes provided.'” Hechavarria v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 49, 56 n.6 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 436 (2009)). On the other hand, unreasonable delays caused by immigration courts or government officials weigh against a respondent. Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266, at *11.
Here, there is no allegation or evidence of any undue delays in Petitioner's ongoing removal proceedings. As such, the sixth and seventh factor weigh neutrally on whether a bond hearing should be ordered in this case.
6. Likelihood Removal Proceedings Will Result in a Final Order of Removal
Finally, the Court considers “the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal.” Liban M.J., 367 F.Supp.3d at 965. “In other words, the Court considers whether the noncitizen has asserted any defenses to removal.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *10 (citing Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266, at *11). “Where a noncitizen has not asserted any grounds for relief from removal, presumably the noncitizen will be removed from the United States, and continued detention will at least marginally serve the purpose of detention, namely assuring the noncitizen is removed as ordered.” Id. at *10. “But where a noncitizen has asserted a good faith challenge to removal, ‘the categorical nature of the detention will become increasingly unreasonable.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Given the current posture of Petitioner's removal proceedings, there is simply not enough information available to allow the Court to predict whether Petitioner's removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. In the absence of sufficient information to assess the likely success of any challenge to Petitioner's removal, the Court finds this final factor is neutral.
7. Weighing the Factors
As discussed above, two factors clearly weigh in favor of Respondent, two of the eight factors only weigh slightly in Petitioner's favor, and the remaining four factors are neutral. At this juncture, the undersigned finds that the factors in Petitioner's favor (i.e., the current and future length of his detention) are outweighed by those favoring Respondent (i.e., factors relating to the underlying criminal conviction and sentence). Thus, the Court concludes Petitioner has not demonstrated that his detention to date is unreasonable such that an individualized bond hearing would be required to comport with due process.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Petition may also be denied on the merits.
III. CONCLUSION
As set forth above, the undersigned recommends that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 6) be GRANTED and that Petitioner's federal habeas Petition (Dkt. 3) either be DISMISSED for failure to exhaust or DENIED on the merits.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on July 30, 2024, as noted in the caption.