Opinion
J. A18020/16 No. 2002 MDA 2015
10-25-2016
WILLIAM O'BRIEN AND DIANE O'BRIEN, HIS WIFE, AND CHARLES CATANIA, JR. v. OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY APPEAL OF: CHARLES CATANIA, JR.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered October 14, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Civil Division at No. 2002-06690 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., AND STEVENS, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Charles Catania, Jr. ("Catania"), appeals from the October 14, 2015 order dismissing his motion for post-trial relief, which requested the trial court to modify its March 12, 2015 order denying the declaratory judgment action filed by William O'Brien and Diane O'Brien (hereinafter, "the O'Briens"), and determining that appellee, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company ("Ohio Casualty"), was not required to either defend or indemnify the O'Briens in an accident involving Catania, pursuant to their homeowner's insurance policy. After careful review, we affirm.
On March 16, 2016, the O'Briens filed a letter with this court indicating that they will not be filing a separate brief in this matter and "respectfully adopt" Catania's brief as their own.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
According to the parties' filed Joint Stipulation of Facts, this case arises out of an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident occurring on July 22, 2001. [Catania] was in attendance at a graduation party at [the O'Briens'] residence. [Catania] was driving an ATV owned by [the O'Briens'] son, Casey O'Brien, when he hit loose gravel, causing the ATV to slide and strike a tree and telephone pole. The ATV finally came to rest in a yard located at 300 Spangenberg Road, Lake Ariel, PA. As a result of the ATV accident, [Catania] suffered serious personal injuries.
[The O'Briens] were issued a renewal homeowners policy regarding their property located at RR #3, Box 468, Lake Ariel, Pennsylvania. Section II, Coverage E of the policy addresses personal liability and coverage for any bodily injury claims brought against an insured. Section II(1)(f)(2) sets forth certain policy exclusions and states that liability coverage does not apply to bodily injury arising out of "[t]he entrustment by an 'insured' of a motor vehicle or any other motorized land conveyance to any person." Id.[] at 13. Subsequent language provides this policy exclusion does not apply to:
(2) a motorized land conveyance designed for recreational use off public roads, not subject to motor vehicle registration and:
(a) not owned by an "insured"; or
(b) owned by an "insured" and on an "insured location".
Trial court opinion, 10/14/15 at 1-2 (heading omitted; citations in original).
Id.[] at 14. [Ohio Casualty] made an internal determination that there should be no liability coverage nor duty to defend under the policy due to the aforementioned exclusion.
On August 6, 2001, Catania filed a complaint against the O'Briens seeking damages for injuries he sustained as a result of this accident. On December 20, 2002, the O'Briens filed an action for declaratory judgment, which sought a declaration that Ohio Casualty owed duties to defend and indemnify the O'Briens pursuant to their insurance policy. On November 21, 2003, the O'Briens filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 27, 2004, the trial court denied the O'Briens' motion because issues of material fact existed as to whether the accident occurred on an "insured location." On February 21, 2006, Catania filed a "Petition for Leave of Court to Intervene." Following a hearing, the trial court ultimately granted Catania's petition to intervene on July 30, 2009.
Thereafter, on July 11, 2012, Ohio Casualty filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the trial court on September 3, 2012. The trial court heard argument on the O'Briens' declaratory judgment action on February 18, 2015. On March 12, 2015, the trial court filed a memorandum and order dismissing the O'Briens' declaratory judgment action. The March 12, 2015 order further stated as follows:
[I]t is declared that the location of the ATV accident cannot meet the policy definition of an "insured location" under the policy of insurance. Therefore, [the O'Briens] lack insurance coverage and [Ohio Casualty] is not required to either defend nor [sic] indemnify the O'Briens pursuant to their policy of insurance.Trial court order, 3/12/15 at ¶ 2.
On April 9, 2015, Catania filed a notice of appeal from the March 12, 2015 order. On May 12, 2015, this court issued a per curiam order finding that Catania failed to file post-trial motions, in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 227.1, and directing him to show cause as to why his appeal should not be dismissed. ( Per curiam order, 5/12/15.) Thereafter, on May 18, 2015, Catania filed a motion for post-trial relief while his appeal was still pending. On June 3, 2015, this court filed a per curiam order dismissing Catania's appeal "without prejudice to be refiled after disposition of the post-trial motions." ( Per curiam order, 6/3/15 at ¶ 3.) The trial court heard oral argument on Catania's motion for post-trial relief on August 25, 2015. On October 14, 2015, the trial court filed a memorandum and order dismissing Catania's motion. This timely appeal followed on November 10, 2015.
The trial court did not order Catania to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
On appeal, Catania raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether declaratory judgment should be granted in favor of [the O'Briens] and [Catania], when the insurance policy between [the O'Briens] and [Ohio Casualty] created a duty for Ohio Casualty to defend and indemnify the O'Briens and provide homeowners' insurance coverage for an ATV accident involving [Catania], when: 1) the policy provides for insurance coverage for bodily injury that occurs on an "insured location;" 2) an "insured location" is defined under the policy as "any premises used in connection" with a "residence premises;" 3) the location of the Catania ATV accident was on a township road; and 4) the public road was alongside or near to the O'Brien[s'] residence premises and the O'Briens made continuous or repeated exercise of the township road?Appellant's brief at 5-6.
2. Whether a township road is an "insured location" and "any premises used in connection" with a "residence premises" under the terms of the insurance policy issued to the O'Briens by Ohio Casualty given the use of the township road by the O'Briens near their home and the facts of Catania's ATV accident?
3. Whether Ohio Casualty is required to defend and indemnify the O'Briens pursuant to the policy of insurance issued to the O'Briens for the Catania ATV accident?
"Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is limited to determining whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion or committed an error of law. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court if the court's determination is supported by the evidence." National Cas. Co. v. Kinney , 90 A.3d 747, 753 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). "[W]e will review the decision of the [trial] court as we would a decree in equity and set aside the factual conclusions of that court only where they are not supported by adequate evidence." Erie Ins. Group v. Catania , 95 A.3d 320, 322 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied , 104 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). "However, when reviewing an issue of law in a declaratory judgment action, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo." Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Catalini , 18 A.3d 1206, 1209 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
The task of interpreting [an insurance] contract is generally performed by a court rather than by a jury. The purpose of that task is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the terms used in the written insurance policy. When the language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language. When a provision in a policy is ambiguous, however, the policy is to be construed in favor of the insured to further the contract's prime purpose of indemnification and against the insurer, as the insurer drafts the policy, and controls coverage. Contractual language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense. Finally, [i]n determining what the parties intended by their contract, the law must look to what they clearly expressed. Courts in interpreting a contract, do not assume that its language was chosen carelessly. Thus, we will not consider merely individual terms utilized in the insurance contract, but the entire insurance provision to ascertain the intent of the parties.Erie Ins. Exch. v. E.L., 941 A.2d 1270, 1273 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied , 956 A.2d 435 (Pa. 2008) (citations omitted).
In the instant matter, the trial court authored two comprehensive opinions wherein it set forth its rationale for denying the O'Briens' declaratory judgment action and dismissing Catania's motion for post-trial relief. ( See trial court opinion, 3/12/15; trial court opinion, 10/14/15.) Following our careful review of the record, including the briefs of the parties and the applicable case law, it is our determination that there is no merit to the issues Catania raises on appeal. Specifically, we agree with the trial court that the location of the ATV accident in question did not fall within the definition of an "insured location" under the O'Briens' insurance policy with Ohio Casualty. ( See trial court opinion, 3/12/15 at 7-8; trial court order, 3/12/15 at ¶ 2; trial court opinion, 10/14/15 at 6-7.) Contrary to Catania's claim, the record further reveals that the rationale set forth in the Haines and Gardner decisions, although not binding on this court, was applicable to the instant matter. ( See trial court opinion and order, 3/12/15 at 7-8; trial court opinion and order, 10/14/15 at 6-7.) Additionally, we agree with the trial court's interpretation of the term "use," as defined in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. MacDonald , 850 A.2d 707, 711 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied , 863 A.2d 1148 (Pa. 2004). Specifically, the trial court stated as follows:
Haines v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WL 1257982 (E.D. Pa. 2010), affirmed , 417 Fed. Appx. 151 (3d.Cir.Pa. 2011).
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gardner , 79 Pa. D.&C. 4th 150 (Pa.Com.Pl., Huntingdon County 2006), affirmed , 928 A.2d 1135 (Pa.Super. 2007).
[A]ccording to the plain meaning of use, as interpreted in MacDonald , [the O'Briens] did not repeatedly or customarily use either a private road nor [sic] the private property where [Catania's] accident concluded. [The O'Briens] admit to never having been at the precise location of the ATV accident. Additionally, Casey O'Brien admits to only riding his ATV on Lake Spangenberg Road once or twice. Arguably, this would not meet the definition of "use" contained in the homeowner's insurance policy, nor interpreted in Haines , because Lake Spangenberg Road is a public thoroughfare.Trial court opinion, 10/14/15 at 8, quoting trial court opinion, 3/12/15 at 8-9.
We further note that the trial court devotes a portion of its October 14, 2015 opinion to addressing Ohio Casualty's claim that Catania's motion for post-trial relief was untimely under Pa.R.C.P. 227.1. ( See trial court opinion, 10/14/15 at 5-6.) Read in relevant part, Rule 227.1 provides as follows:
(c) Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after
. . . .
Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(2).(2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision in the case of a trial without jury.
This court has recognized, however, that "[a] trial court is free to either dismiss an untimely post-trial motion or ignore the motion's untimeliness and consider it on its merits." Ferguson v. Morton , 84 A.3d 715, 718 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied , 97 A.3d 745 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
We note that although the trial court acted within its authority in choosing to address Catania's untimely post-trial motion on its merits, the filing of an untimely post-trial motion does not toll the 30-day period within which to file a timely appeal. See Vietri ex rel. Vietri v. Delaware Valley High Sch., 63 A.3d 1281, 1288 (Pa.Super. 2013) (stating, "a post-trial motion that is infirm—whether for untimeliness or other reasons—does not toll the time for appeal."). But for this court's per curiam order dismissing Catania's appeal "without prejudice to be refiled after disposition of the post-trial motions," his instant appeal would be deemed untimely. ( See Per curiam order, 6/3/15 at ¶ 3.)
Instantly, the trial court found that Catania's motion for post-trial relief was untimely because it was filed 57 days after its March 12, 2015 order denying the declaratory judgment action, but rejected Ohio Casualty's allegation of prejudice and elected to address Catania's motion on the aforementioned substantive grounds. ( See trial court opinion, 10/14/15 at 6, citing Pa.R.C.P. 277.1(c).) As noted, we agree with the trial court that Catania's substantive arguments warrant no relief.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court's March 12 and October 14, 2015 opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of Catania's issues. We, therefore, adopt the trial court's opinions as our own for purposes of further appellate review.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/25/2016
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