Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-1009-D
January 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this action seeking relief concerning Dallas County policy for refunding cash bail bonds, the court holds that plaintiffs' federal-law claim must be dismissed without prejudice because it is not ripe, and it declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs' pendent state-law claims. Accordingly, the court grants in part defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismisses this action without prejudice.
I
After plaintiffs Francisco Obregon, Jr. ("Obregon") and Wilfredo Matute ("Matute") were arrested in Dallas County, they were required to post bonds to secure their release. Each posted a $500 cash bail bond with the Dallas County Sheriff through a third party. The Dallas County Sheriff issued a receipt to the person who posted each bond. Obregon and Matute maintain that, after they complied with the terms and conditions of their bonds, they could not recover the funds because, under Dallas County policy, the District and County Clerks refund cash bail bonds only to the third parties who pay the funds to the Sheriff, not to the persons accused. Based on the policy, Obregon and Matute considered it fruitless to request that the funds be returned to them, and they filed the instant lawsuit.
Obregon and Matute maintain in this putative class action that defendants are liable in their official capacities for retaining cash bail bonds during the period 1970 to 2002. They contend that defendants are obligated under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.02 (Vernon 1977) to return the cash to the defendant on whose behalf the cash bail bond was posted. Obregon and Matute bring claims for breach of statutory duty (i.e., violating article 17.02), unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and unlawful taking of property (remediable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), seeking actual and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, and attorney's fees. They request certification of a class of tens of thousands of similarly-situated individuals.
Defendants are Bill Melton, Dallas County Treasurer, Virginia Porter, Dallas County Auditor, Earl Bullock, Dallas County Clerk, Jim Hamlin, Dallas County District Clerk, Jim Bowles, Dallas County Sheriff, and Lee Jackson, Dallas County Judge. Although plaintiffs allege in their complaint that defendants are sued individually and in their official capacities, see Compl. at 1, they state in their brief that "the individual named as Defendants in this cause" are sued "in their official capacities only," Ps. Aug. 15, 2003 Br. at 2; see also Ps. App. 5 (stipulating that plaintiffs are seeking relief against defendants in their official capacities).
Article 17.02 defines "bail bond" as
a written undertaking entered into by the defendant and his sureties for the appearance of the principal therein before some court or magistrate to answer a criminal accusation; provided, however, that the defendant upon execution of such bail bond may deposit with the custodian of funds of the court in which the prosecution is pending current money of the United States in the amount of the bond in lieu of having sureties signing the same. Any cash funds deposited under this Article shall be receipted for by the officer receiving the same and shall be refunded to the defendant if and when the defendant complies with the conditions of his bond, and upon order of the court.
Obregon and Matute move for partial summary judgment, seeking a determination that article 17.02 requires that the person accused of a crime rather than the person who posted the funds receive the refund of cash bail bond deposit. Defendants cross-move for summary judgment, contending, inter alia, that plaintiffs' takings claim is not ripe.
They posit that, if they prevail on this threshold issue, the court should then certify this case as a class action and consider the question of damages.
II
The court need only address defendants' contention that plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe.
A
"A takings claim is not ripe until (1) the relevant governmental unit has reached a final decision as to what will be done with the property and (2) the plaintiff has sought compensation through whatever adequate procedures the state provides." Sandy Creek Investors, Ltd. v. City of Jonestown, 325 F.3d 623, 626 (5th Cir. 2003); see Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 933 (5th Cir. 1993). Ripeness is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction as to which plaintiffs have the burden of proof. See Samaad, 940 F.2d at 934 (noting that ripeness is jurisdictional matter that cannot be waived); Manguno v. Prudential Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff has burden of establishing court's subject matter jurisdiction).
Defendants contend that Obregon and Matute never requested from the County Clerk or via court order the refund of the cash bail bonds posted in their cases and that the County Clerk has never received a court order directing that the funds be refunded to them or to the third-party payers. They assert that the County Clerk will refund the bonds, less an administrative fee, at the request of plaintiffs or the third-parties and upon receipt of a court order. Defendants therefore maintain that Obregon and Matute have not shown that they have sought compensation through available procedures.
Plaintiffs oppose defendants' ripeness argument. They "agree that before an action may be maintained, they must avail themselves of remedies available through state procedures." Ps. Sept. 24, 2003 Br. at 3. But they argue that lack of an adequate remedy through state mechanisms for recovery of this property relieves them of the obligation of proceeding with a meaningless effort. Plaintiffs quote the parties' stipulation of fact that it is Dallas County policy to refund cash funds deposited for a bond "only to the individual shown on the bond receipt unless the person requesting the disbursement furnishes the appropriate clerk's office (District or County Clerk) with a notarized statement assigning the bond from the original person indicated on the receipt to the person requesting disbursement[.]" Ps. Sept. 24, 2003 Br. at 3 (citing Ps. App. 4). They contend that defendants' own policy establishes that it is impossible to recover their funds, and that the procedure that permits a refund to the accused when the third party payer assigns the fund requires action by the third party, not the state, and there is no available remedy for plaintiffs to obtain a refund absent such intervention. Plaintiffs posit that the availability of a court order begs the question, because the order is ministerial in nature and is prepared by the clerk only after a third party seeks a refund.
B
The court holds that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that their takings claim is ripe. Article 17.02 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny cash funds deposited under this Article shall be receipted for by the officer receiving the same and shall be refunded to the defendant if and when the defendant complies with the conditions of his bond, and upon order of the court." Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' interpretation of article 17.02 is correct, this command is so clear that it requires an act that is deemed "ministerial" under Texas law. See Baize v. Shaver, 935 S.W.2d 498, 499-500 (Tex.App. 1996, orig. proceeding) (holding that, to obtain writ of mandamus in criminal case, relator must show that demanded act is ministerial, and concluding under article 17.02 that trial court had ministerial duty to return bail bond money where defendant did not breach any conditions of bond); DeLeon v. Pennington, 759 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex.App. 1988, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding "that the court's duty to refund the cash deposits is a ministerial one"). Plaintiffs thus have a clear statutory right to move the court for an order compelling the return of their bail money to them. See Baize, 935 S.W.2d at 499 (referring to motion for return of bond money). This is so regardless whether, by policy, the Dallas County District and County Clerks do not prepare such orders for a judge until a third party seeks a refund. Plaintiffs can proceed directly in court by motion. And if a party directly moves the court for an order and relief is denied, he can seek a writ of mandamus in the Texas court of appeals. See id. at 500 (granting mandamus relief following refusal to issue order following defendant's compliance with conditions of bond); DeLeon, 759 S.W.2d at 202 (granting writ of mandamus following judge's refusal of written motion for release of bond money).
Plaintiffs concede in the brief in support of their summary judgment motion that the court's duty is ministerial. See Ps. Aug. 15, 2003 Br. at 6.
Plaintiffs are therefore incorrect in contending that "[t]he procedure for obtaining an order is defined by the procedures of the Defendants[.]" See id Defendants cannot by policy deprive plaintiffs of a motion that is available under Texas law.
Even if no formal charges are brought, an arrested person who is entitled to a bail refund can seek a writ of mandamus in an original proceeding demanding that the Sheriff, a public official, perform the ministerial act of refunding it. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. 1991) (requiring mayor to hold election on question of abolishing city's corporate existence); Bichsel v. Carver, 159 Tex. 393, 321 S.W.2d 284, 285 (1959) (addressing proceeding seeking mandamus relief to require police chief to reinstate suspended policeman). The parties have stipulated that "[c]ash funds deposited with the courts in Dallas County . . . are received by the Sheriff," and those cash funds are held by the Sheriff "until the bail bond is released[.]" Ps. App. 4.
Where the state provides a clear statutory right to relief, a mechanism to obtain such relief, and a remedy (via mandamus) when the ministerial act of granting the relief is not carried out, and the plaintiffs asserting a takings claim have not availed themselves of this available remedy, their claim is not ripe. The court therefore concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this cause of action.
III
Having dismissed plaintiffs' federal-law claim, the court now decides whether it will exercise jurisdiction over their state-law claims.
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). . . .In cases where all of the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the general rule is that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the court has dismissed all claims over which it had pendent jurisdiction.Priester v. Lowndes County, ___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 15902, at *9 (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2004) (citation omitted). In the exercise of its discretion, the court declines to consider the merits of defendants' motion on the state-law claims, and instead dismisses without prejudice plaintiffs' remaining claims. These claims present issues of state law that are better decided by Texas courts. Plaintiffs remain free to file these claims in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (tolling state statute of limitations for at least 30 days when court dismisses claim over which it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction).
* * *
Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is denied, and defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted to the extent that the court holds that plaintiffs' federal-law takings claim is not ripe. This action is dismissed without prejudice by judgment filed today.
SO ORDERED