Opinion
No. HHD-CV07-4034418
June 10, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
HEARING IN DAMAGES I STATEMENT OF CASE
The plaintiff, police officer Gabriele Nyenhuis, brings this indemnification action against her employer, Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), pursuant to General Statutes § 53-39a. By way of complaint, dated December 4, 2007, the plaintiff seeks damages for economic loss relating to attorneys fees, vacation time, earned time, sick time and overtime for the period from April 20, 2006, to November 8, 2007.
On June 30, 2008, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, which was subsequently granted, and the matter was ordered scheduled for a hearing in damages. A hearing in damages was held on March 19, 2009. The last post-trial brief was filed on May 29, 2009.
II FINDINGS OF FACT
The MDC maintains a municipal police department known as the Metropolitan District police department. The MDC employs the plaintiff as a police officer. The plaintiff is a municipal employee, as defined by General Statutes §§ 7-101a and 53-39a.
On April 19, 2006, while working as a police officer, she was involved in an incident with Steven Atkins, a member of the public. The day after the Atkins incident, April 20, 2006, Robert Zaik, manager of labor relations for the MDC, attended a meeting with the chief executive officer of the MDC. At this meeting, it was determined that, due to Atkins' citizen complaint against her, the plaintiff would be taken off uniform patrol status and placed on administrative duty immediately. As a result of being placed on administrative duty, the plaintiff was stripped of her police powers and was unable to work a patrol duty.
While on administrative duty, the plaintiff worked a forty-hour schedule, Monday to Friday, 7:30 a.m. to 4 p.m., and was paid straight time. During this period, the plaintiff did some maintenance-type work and was later placed on desk duty.
Sometime after April 20, 2006, the Atkins incident was referred to the West Hartford police department, and the plaintiff eventually became aware that she was under criminal investigation. While the investigation was pending, she contacted and hired an attorney.
On June 14, 2006, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with one-count of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61, reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of § 53a-64 and falsely reporting an incident in the second degree in violation of § 53a-180c for crimes allegedly committed by the plaintiff in the course of her duty and employment as a MDC police officer on or about April 19, 2006, and May 3, 2006.
On November 5, 2007, after completion of a jury trial in the Hartford Superior Court, the plaintiff was found not guilty of all charges related to the Atkins incident. On November 8, 2007, the MDC returned the plaintiff to uniformed status. She was able to return to full patrol rotation after completing firearm orientation.
On or about February 6, 2009, counsel for the parties entered into an agreement regarding the plaintiff's claim for attorneys fees, which is awaiting final approval by the MDC and payment. Based on this agreement, the court will not address the issue of the plaintiff's claim for attorneys fees under § 53-39a.
From April 19, 2006, to December 31, 2006, the plaintiff's pay rate was $28.54 per hour. During the period of January 1, 2007, to November 8, 2007, the plaintiff's pay rate was $29.39 per hour.
Throughout the time she was defending herself from the criminal investigation, the plaintiff used vacation and earned time to attend court hearings, meet with her attorney and prepare for court. Additionally, her attorney gave her assignments to assist in her defense and to minimize her legal expenses, which she completed using vacation and earned time. The plaintiff admitted that she did some of these assignments on weekends. Besides taking a few vacation days to chaperone a youth group trip in August 2006, the plaintiff claims she exclusively used her vacation time for her court case. The parties stipulated that the plaintiff took time off for her court case on six specific days (6/29/06, 8/25/06, 9/22/06, 10/6/06, 11/8/06, 12/1/06). The plaintiff used vacation and earned time for her court case until her time ran out. In December 2006, the chief of police gave the plaintiff permission to attend to her legal matters without taking leave.
In addition to using vacation and earned time, the plaintiff used sick time when she was physically unable to perform her duties as a result of the prosecution. On occasion, the plaintiff suffered from stress that made her physically unable to go to work and from diarrhea. The plaintiff did not document how much sick time she took due to stress.
The plaintiff did not keep detailed records of her leave time. When taking time off, the plaintiff submitted time-off forms or left a message for the duty sergeant. There is no documentary evidence identifying the specific reason why she took time off on given day. She was not required to provide a reason for her absence and did not tell anyone at the MDC the specific reason why she was taking time off. For the most part, the plaintiff was unable to remember the reason she took time off on specific days.
The evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff used 192 hours of sick leave, 47.5 hours of earned time and 249.25 hours of vacation time. On some days, she took off a whole day. On other days, she took off a portion of a day.
Overtime pay is also at issue. The plaintiff claims economic loss for the overtime pay she was unable to earn while on administrative duty. During this period, the plaintiff was covered by Article 8.9.d of the collective bargaining agreement, which provides that "[o]vertime work necessary to maintain continuity of operations will be distributed as equally as possible on an annual basis for all employees assigned to shift operations." As a result of losing the opportunity to work additional overtime, the plaintiff claims that she suffered financial hardship.
The plaintiff is making her overtime claims based on the 150 percent time and a half rate, not the 200 percent double-time rate. From April 19, 2006, to December 30, 2006, the scheduled overtime rate (150 percent) was $42.81. From December 31, 2006, to November 8, 2007, the scheduled overtime rate (150 percent) was $44.09.
Before being placed on administrative duty, the plaintiff had a history of earning overtime. In 2003, she earned 513.25 overtime hours. During 2004, the plaintiff was paid for 335.5 overtime hours. In 2005, she was paid for 612.25 overtime hours. Between January 1, 2006, and April 19, 2006, the plaintiff worked 150.25 hours of overtime. From April 19, 2006, to November 8, 2007, the plaintiff earned some overtime hours when the chief of police had staff meetings.
For the 2006 calendar year, the average overtime for the six other comparable MDC police officers was 812.08 hours. The plaintiff worked 99.25 overtime hours prior to her arrest. The net amount of overtime was 712.83 hours. The overtime rate (150 percent) was $42.81.
For the 2007 calendar year, the average overtime for the six other comparable MDC police officers was 760.66 hours. The plaintiff worked forty-seven overtime hours after her acquittal. The net amount of overtime was 713.66 hours. The overtime rate (150 percent) was $44.09.
At the hearing, Zaik testified that the defendant was contesting the overtime claims on the ground that the MDC had to pay another police officer overtime to cover for the plaintiff when she was on administrative duty.
In November 2007, before bringing this action, the plaintiff filed grievance complaints, relating to the overtime claim and the time accrual claim, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Before a final determination, on or about February 10, 2009, the plaintiff withdrew her grievance complaints. The plaintiff chose to proceed with the instant action.
III DISCUSSION
The plaintiff seeks indemnification for economic losses resulting from the criminal prosecution stemming from the Atkins incident. The statute in question, General Statutes § 53-39a, provides: "Whenever, in any prosecution of an officer of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, or a member of the Office of State Capitol Police or any person appointed under section 29-18 as a special policeman for the State Capitol building and grounds, the Legislative Office Building and parking garage and related structures and facilities, and other areas under the supervision and control of the Joint Committee on Legislative Management, or a local police department for a crime allegedly committed by such officer in the course of his duty as such, the charge is dismissed or the officer found not guilty, such officer shall be indemnified by his employing governmental unit for economic loss sustained by him as a result of such prosecution, including the payment of any legal fees necessarily incurred. Such officer may bring an action in the Superior Court against such employing governmental unit to enforce the provisions of this section." (Emphasis added.)
A Exhaustion Doctrine
The threshold issue is whether the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to award damages to the plaintiff for the economic loss she sustained because of the prosecution. The MDC contends that the court does not have jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust the grievance procedure. The plaintiff argues that the court has jurisdiction because that administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate.
"Because of the importance of promoting the orderly settlement of grievances by the method chosen by the parties, [i]t is well settled under both federal and state law that, before resort to the courts is allowed, an employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures, such as those contained in the collective bargaining agreement . . . Failure to exhaust the grievance procedures deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction . . . The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to encourage the use of grievance procedures, rather than the courts, for settling disputes . . . A contrary rule would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective [bargaining] agreements." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford v. Hartford Municipal Employees Ass'n., 259 Conn. 251, 282-83, 788 A.2d 60 (2002).
There are, however, exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. "Despite the important public policy considerations underlying the exhaustion requirement, we have grudgingly carved several exceptions from the exhaustion doctrine . . . We have recognized such exceptions, however, only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes . . . One of the limited exceptions to the exhaustion rule arises when recourse to the administrative remedy would be demonstrably futile or inadequate." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 432, 673 A.2d 514 (1996).
"It is well established that [a]n administrative remedy is futile or inadequate if the agency is without authority to grant the requested relief . . . It is futile to seek a remedy only when such action could not result in a favorable decision and invariably would result in further judicial proceedings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Neiman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 259, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004). "It is not the plaintiff's preference for a particular remedy that determines whether the remedy . . . is adequate . . . and an administrative remedy, in order to be `adequate,' need not comport with the plaintiffs' opinion of what a perfect remedy would be." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, supra, 236 Conn. 434.
First, the court notes that this is not a case based on common law claims. See Hunt v. Prior, supra, 236 Conn. 429 ("We agree with the trial court that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies deprived the court of jurisdiction over his common law claims.")
Instead, the statute in question, § 53-39a, allows for a broad range of economic damages. "The general purpose of the statute [§ 53-39a] is to permit police officers to recoup the necessary expenses that they have incurred in defending themselves against unwarranted criminal charges arising out of their conduct in the course of their employment." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Cislo v. Shelton, 240 Conn. 590, 598, 692 A.2d 1255 (1997). It is axiomatic that necessary expenses for a criminal defense may include attorneys fees, court costs, marshal fees, discovery costs, deposition expenses, scientific testing, expert fees, transcript costs, as well as lost wages, vacation time, earned time, sick time, overtime and pension benefits.
In this case, the grievance procedure is futile or inadequate because under § 53-39a, a plaintiff police officer may seek damages for economic loss that are potentially greater than the relief available pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The grievance procedure would not allow for many of the above-mentioned necessary criminal defense expenses. Thus, the plaintiff has demonstrated that resort to the grievance procedure would necessarily have been futile or inadequate.
Furthermore, putting aside the question of futility or inadequacy, the exhaustion doctrine is not required in the present case pursuant to General Statutes § 31-51bb. Section 31-51bb provides: "No employee shall be denied the right to pursue, in a court of competent jurisdiction, a cause of action arising under the state or federal Constitution or under a state statute solely because the employee is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Nothing in this section shall be construed to give an employee the right to pursue a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for breach of any provision of a collective bargaining agreement or other claims dependent upon the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement."
In Genovese v. Gallo Wine Merchants, Inc., 226 Conn. 475, 628 A.2d 946 (1993), the Supreme Court considered the applicability of § 31-51bb to an employee's filing of a retaliatory discharge claim despite the existence of a collective bargaining agreement. In that case, the employee claimed that the trial court improperly concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded his cause of action pursuant to General Statutes § 31-290a, which prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against any employee because the employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Id., 479. The court held that "[b]oth the language of § 31-51bb and the legislative history indicate that the legislature intended to overturn our decision in Kolenberg v. Board of Education, supra, and thereby eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff who is subject to a collective bargaining agreement exhaust all grievance and arbitration procedures before pursuing any statutory remedies in the trial court. Section 31-51bb provides that a cause of action arising under the state or federal constitution or state statute cannot be lost solely because the employee is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Plainly, therefore, an employee who does not exhaust the grievance procedures established in a collective bargaining agreement may pursue a cause of action in the Superior Court if the cause of action is premised on an independent statutory claim. To hold otherwise would be to deny such an employee the right to pursue a statutory action solely because of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement." Id., 481-82.
Subsequently, in Hartford v. Hartford Municipal Employees Ass'n., supra, 259 Conn. 284, which was an appeal from a labor relations board's decision finding that a city had committed an unfair labor practice, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he authority to arbitrate or settle a grievance is strictly limited by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the submission by the parties . . . The grievance or arbitration proceeding, therefore, is concerned with the contract and not with statutes . . . If . . . the contract does not require the arbitrators to apply legal standards, arbitrators are not required to decide according to law . . . By contrast, the board is charged with determining whether an unfair practice, as defined by statute, has been committed and with remedying any violations . . . Consistent with this distinction, we have held that an employee who does not exhaust the grievance procedures established in a collective bargaining agreement may pursue a cause of action in the Superior Court if the cause of action is premised on an independent statutory claim." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
It follows from the holdings of Genovese and Hartford that § 31-51bb permits a plaintiff police officer, despite filing a prior grievance under a collective bargaining agreement, to pursue, in court, a statutory claim pursuant to § 53-39a.
In this case, the plaintiff is pursuing an independent statutory cause of action arising under § 53-39a, thereby satisfying the requirements of § 31-51bb. Unlike Bigio v. Montagna, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 00 0442522 (October 2, 2003, Gilardi, J.), the plaintiff is not pursuing a common-law claim, such as negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See also Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 429 (holding that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies deprived the court of jurisdiction over common law claims.)
For the above-stated reasons, the court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's statutory claim under § 53-39a.
B Economic Loss
The next issue to be considered is whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to prove the economic losses claimed. The plaintiff seeks indemnification of the economic losses relating to: (1) Overtime and seniority; (2) pension benefits and contributions; and (3) insurance, sick time and vacation time. The defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof of establishing that she sustained economic loss as a result of the prosecution and demonstrating the appropriate amount of any such loss, aside from attorneys fees, which are not presently at issue.
As previously noted, "[§ ]53-39a . . . authorizes indemnification for economic loss, including legal fees, incurred by officers of local police departments who are prosecuted for crimes allegedly committed by them in the course of their duties when the charges against them are dismissed or they are found not guilty . . . The general purpose of the statute is to permit police officers to recoup the necessary expenses that they have incurred in defending themselves against unwarranted criminal charges arising out of their conduct in the course of their employment." (Citations omitted.) Cislo v. Shelton, supra, 240 Conn. 598. Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004) defines "economic loss" as "[a] monetary loss such as lost wages or lost profits. The term [usually] refers to a type of damages recoverable in a lawsuit."
To determine what constitutes "economic loss" for purposes of § 53-39a, this court has looked for guidance to the limited case law interpreting economic loss under that statute. In Smith v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 02 0815432 (March 27, 2003, O'Neill, J.), the plaintiff was a police officer arrested on two counts of sexual assault. After completion of a jury trial the plaintiff was found not guilty on both counts. Id. He then brought an action against his employer pursuant to § 53-39a. Id. The court awarded the plaintiff: (1) attorneys fees without interest, (2) costs, (3) lost wages, (4) lost overtime, and (5) lost sick time, pension, contributions and vacation time in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The court also deducted the amount the plaintiff received from other employment. Id.
In another case, D'Angelo v. Spada, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV01 0806912 (March 14, 2005, Wagner, J.T.R.), the court also considered whether § 53-39a supported the award of economic damages for lost wages, lost health benefits and lost retirement benefits. There, the plaintiff was employed as an officer of the division of state police within the department of public safety. Id. The court, citing Smith v. Hartford, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0815432, denied the employer's motion to strike the economic loss claims encompassing lost wages, lost health benefits, and lost retirement benefits, while striking the plaintiff's request for medical expenses, travel expenses, and attorneys fees and other costs related to defending the claim for indemnification. Id.
The relevant caselaw supports a finding that the plaintiff in this case was acting in the course of her duties under § 53-39a. In Santana v. Hartford, 94 Conn.App. 445, 448, 894 A.2d 307, aff'd, 282 Conn. 19, 918 A.2d 267 (2007), the plaintiff police officer was charged with felony drug charges. After a jury trial, the plaintiff was found not guilty of three of the counts and a judgment of acquittal was rendered on the remaining counts. Id., 449-50. In determining whether the plaintiff was entitled to indemnification, the Santana court cited Smith v. Hartford, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0815432, as an example of when alleged crimes committed by a police officer are connected to a police officer's official duties. The court noted: "In that case, police Officer Eric Smith was dispatched to a residence to check on the welfare of a young child. Smith questioned the occupants of the residence on two occasions and determined that the child was not in danger. One of the occupants subsequently filed a complaint against Smith, alleging that he `engaged in sexually provocative conversation, fondled her breast and grabbed her buttocks.' Following an investigation, Smith was charged with two counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a. Following a jury trial, Smith was acquitted of all the charges . . ." Id., 455 n. 8. The court found that: "In Smith, the charges of criminal conduct stemmed from the plaintiff officer's investigative efforts to determine the status of the child. Clearly, it was within the scope of his employment to investigate the welfare of a young child. There was a direct connection or nexus between his official duties and the alleged criminal conduct of which he ultimately was acquitted." Id., 456 n. 8. The Santana court distinguished Smith in the following ways: "In the present case, there is no such connection. The plaintiff was charged with participating in an illegal activity [, felony drug charges,] that had no connection to his official duties. The mere fact that he was alleged to have used his status as a police officer to facilitate such activity does not make it within the course of his duty. Absent some connection to his duties as a police officer, the plaintiff is not entitled to indemnification pursuant to General Statutes § 53-39a." Id. See also Link v. Shelton, 186 Conn. 623, 628, 443 A.2d 902 (1982) (police officer was acting in the course of his duty within the meaning of § 53-39a based on a number of factors, including that the officer was on duty).
In this case, there was a direct connection or nexus between the plaintiff's official duties and the alleged criminal conduct of which she ultimately was acquitted. On April 19, 2006, the plaintiff was in uniform, on duty, working in her position as a MDC police officer, and using a marked MDC police car when the Atkins incident occurred. As in Link v. Shelton, supra, 186 Conn. 628, the plaintiff was on duty when the alleged illegalities occurred. This is not a situation like Santana v. Hartford, supra, 94 Conn.App. 448, where the police officer was charged with participating in an illegal activity, felony drug charges, that had no connection to his official duties. The plaintiff was acting in the course of her duties so as to be entitled to indemnification under § 53-39a. Like the plaintiff in Smith, she may recover for her economic loss relating to the prosecution.
In weighing the evidence in this case, the court has considered the lack of detailed records relating to the vacation, earned and sick time taken. The plaintiff has met her burden of proof, however, by her credible testimony and the other evidence offered. As to overtime, the evidence supports the plaintiff's claim that she was unable to work overtime because of the prosecution and, as a result, she suffered a corresponding economic loss of overtime earnings. Thus, pursuant to § 53-39a, the plaintiff is entitled to be indemnified for economic loss sustained by her for a "crime allegedly committed."
Finally, the court must determine the date from which the plaintiff may seek recovery for economic losses stemming from the prosecution. The plaintiff seeks indemnification for economic costs accrued beginning on her date of offense, April 19, 2006, until the termination of the prosecution. The MDC contends that even if the plaintiff is entitled to indemnification, she may only recover for economic losses sustained beginning on the date of her arrest, which was June 14, 2006, rather than on the date of the offense. The parties have highlighted an apparent ambiguity in the statute, as § 53-39a does not indicate whether economic loss may be calculated from the date of offense or the date of charge or arrest.
The court applies the following well-established principles of statutory construction. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 181-82, 914 A.2d 533 (2007).
Section 53-39a provides in relevant part that "[w]henever, in any prosecution of an officer . . . for a crime allegedly committed by such officer in the course of his duty as such, the charge is dismissed or the officer found not guilty, such officer shall be indemnified by his employing governmental unit for economic loss sustained by him as a result of such prosecution, including the payment of any legal fees necessarily incurred." (Emphasis added.)
It is unclear from the plain language of the statute whether the phrase "such prosecution" encompasses losses incurred in the time after the offense but prior to when formal criminal charges are brought or an arrest occurs.
Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004) defines "prosecution" as "[a] criminal proceeding in which an accused person is tried." Earlier editions of Black's Law Dictionary, however, define "prosecution" more broadly. For example, an edition published in 1979 notes that the term "prosecution" is "also used respecting civil litigation, and includes every step in action, from its commencement to its final determination." Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979).
The legislative history of § 53-39a does not provide guidance as to the meaning of "such prosecution," as the enacting legislation, Public Acts 1973, No. 73-627, was a substitute bill passed by consent calendar without debate.
Furthermore, courts interpreting § 53-39a have not reached the question of whether "such prosecution" includes the time after the offense but before formal charges are brought. For example, in Link v. Shelton, supra, 186 Conn. 632, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not recover costs sustained as a result of bringing a separate action for indemnification under the statute, concluding that "that the legislature, in authorizing indemnification for attorneys fees sustained `as a result of such prosecution,' did not authorize recovery of attorneys fees sustained as a result of a separate action to enforce the right to indemnification under § 53-39a." The Link court did not, however, address the present issue in its discussion of the phrase "such prosecution."
Despite the lack of legislative and judicial guidance as to this question, the court concludes that the legislative purpose behind § 53-39a weighs in favor of construing "such prosecution" to also include the time period between the offense and the formal charge or arrest in the limited situation where an officer faces economic loss due to unwarranted discipline stemming from the offense predating the imposition of criminal charges. "The general purpose of the statute [§ 53-39a] is to permit police officers to recoup the necessary expenses that they have incurred in defending themselves against unwarranted criminal charges arising out of their conduct in the course of their employment." (Citations omitted.) Cislo v. Shelton, supra, 240 Conn. 598. In order to achieve this purpose, officers should be able to recover economic losses incurred from the date of offense leading to the unwarranted criminal charges.
In the present case, the plaintiff faced immediate economic loss following the offense because the MDC put her on administrative leave from the date of offense pending the resolution of the Atkins incident, and a criminal investigation was soon commenced. Thus, the law and evidence support indemnification from the start date of April 19, 2006, the day a crime was allegedly committed, to the end date of November 8, 2007, the day the plaintiff was returned to active duty after she was acquitted and the case was dismissed.
The plaintiff has proved that she is entitled to recover for economic losses for lost overtime, vacation, earned, and sick time sustained by her as a result of the above-mentioned prosecution. The court has set forth the damage calculations in the following table.
TBTABLE Claims 4/19/06-12/31/06 1/1/07-11/8/07 Total (hourly rate = $28.54) (hourly rate = $29.39) (overtime rate = $42.81) (overtime rate $44.09) Vacation 96.75 hours X $28.54 = 128.5 hours X $29.39 = $6,537.85 time $2,761.24 $3,776.61 Earned 15 hours X $28.54 = 24.5 hours X $29.39 = $1,148.15 time $428.10 $720.05 Sick 81.5 hours X $28.54 = 111 hours X $29.39 = $5,588.30 time $2,326.01 $3,262.29 Over- 661.83 hours X $42.81 = 713.66 hours X $44.09 = $59,798.20 time $28,332.94 $31,465.26 Total $73,072.50 TB/TABLE
IV CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the above-stated reasons, the court awards damages to indemnify the plaintiff for the following economic loss pursuant to General Statutes § 53-39a:
TBTABLE Vacation Time: $6,537.85 Earned Time: $1,148.15 Sick Time: $5,588.30 Overtime: $59,798.20 Total: $73,072.50 TB/TABLE
The plaintiff is awarded damages from the defendant in the total amount of $73,072.50.