Primock v. Goldenberg, 161 Minn. 160, 200 N.W. 920, 37 A.L.R. 484. Plaintiff's reliance upon that assumption did not necessarily become negligence unless and until he became aware that Thompson could not or would not slacken his speed. Primock v. Goldenberg, supra; Guthrie v. Brown, 192 Minn. 434, 256 N.W. 898; Duffey v. Curtis, supra; Montague v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. 194 Minn. 546, 261 N.W. 188; Ernst v. Union City Mission, supra; Nye v. Bach, 196 Minn. 330, 265 N.W. 300. The majority opinion reasons that the presence of Thompson's car 125 feet away, approaching at 45 to 50 miles an hour, charged plaintiff with knowledge that Thompson could not or would not slacken his speed or otherwise make allowances for plaintiff's presence. In support of this it is said that it was physically impossible for Thompson to stop his car within 125 feet.

Such a construction of subdivision (a) would be opposed to common sense and would go a long way toward converting what was intended to be a rule to prevent accidents into a rule which might well increase the hazards of the road by encouraging drivers to take close and unjustified chances. It is our view that subdivision (a) was not intended to conflict with subdivision (b), but was enacted to enable the driver of an automobile which has reached an intersection an appreciable length of time ahead of cars approaching from his right, to cross the intersection without having to wait until such cars have passed through. It places the duty upon the driver of a car approaching from the right to yield the right of way to the driver of a car on the left, where that car is actually in possession of the intersection. See and compare, Montague v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 194 Minn. 546, 261 N.W. 188; Duffey v. Curtis, 193 Minn. 358, 258 N.W. 744; Nye v. Bach, 196 Minn. 330, 265 N.W. 300. We do not regard subdivision (a) as applicable to the situation here involved, where the rate of speed of the Walkup car and the distance it traveled into the intersection before it was struck indicated that it had reached the intersection a split second ahead of the Bardsley car.

Such a construction of subdivision (a) would be opposed to common sense and would go a long way toward converting what was intended to be a rule to prevent accidents into a rule which might well increase the hazards of the road by encouraging drivers to take close and unjustified chances. It is our view that subdivision (a) was not intended to conflict with subdivision (b), but was enacted to enable the driver of an automobile which has reached an intersection an appreciable length of time ahead of cars approaching from his right, to cross the intersection without having to wait until such cars have passed through. It places the duty upon the driver of a car approaching from the right to yield the right of way to the driver of a car on the left, where that car is actually in possession of the intersection. See and compare, Montague v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 194 Minn. 546, 261 N.W. 188; Duffey v. Curtis, 193 Minn. 358, 258 N.W. 744; Nye v. Bach, 196 Minn. 330, 265 N.W. 300. We do not regard subdivision (a) as applicable to the situation here involved, where the rate of speed of the Walkup car and the distance it traveled into the intersection before it was struck indicated that it had reached the intersection a split second ahead of the Bardsley car.

It is obvious that a jury might justifiably conclude that at the time of the accident the operator of defendants' truck was guilty of violation of the foregoing statutory regulations and that such violations were the proximate cause of the accident. Guthrie v. Brown, 192 Minn. 434, 256 N.W. 898; Montague v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. 194 Minn. 546, 261 N.W. 188; Nye v. Bach, 196 Minn. 330, 265 N.W. 300; Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 219 Minn. 541, 18 N.W.2d 582. 2.

It is true, we have held that the driver of a car approaching from the right must yield the right of way to a driver on the left when the latter is actually in possession of the intersection. Montague v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. 194 Minn. 546, 261 N.W. 188; Duffey v. Curtis, 193 Minn. 358, 258 N.W. 744; Nye v. Bach, 196 Minn. 330, 265 N.W. 300. Such rule is not applicable here, where plaintiff's testimony and that of his principal witness, as well as the testimony of defendant and the physical facts and exhibits all clearly indicate that defendant, approaching the intersection from the right, was well within the same and had possession thereof, with the attendant right of way, at a time when plaintiff was still some 53 feet back and to the left of defendant. Under such circumstances, it is clear that plaintiff's failure to accord defendant his statutory right of way constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law on the part of plaintiff.

The charge of the court that insurance had nothing to do with the case, that the case was to be decided upon the facts, without regard to insurance, and that the jurors would violate their oaths if they did not so decide it, dealt with the matter so fully and emphatically that no prejudice to either party could have resulted under the circumstances. Martin v. Schiska, 183 Minn. 256, 236 N.W. 312; Nye v. Bach, 196 Minn. 330, 265 N.W. 300. Affirmed.