Opinion
21-P-1068
12-09-2022
MONNIE ELIZABETH KOU EVELYNE NYAHN v. MAMA MANDA COOPER-NYAHN.
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of a Superior Court judge dismissing her complaint for, among other reasons, failure to state a claim. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).
Background.
The plaintiff, who represents herself, filed her complaint in the Superior Court on October 12, 2021. To the extent that we are able to parse her allegations, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to release the plaintiff's "documents of properties of the New York Yankees and other assets" totaling $6.75 billion, the plaintiff's "[s]hare of [her] Father's cyborg (Sean Combs) properties" having a value of at least $700 million, and life insurance money and property worth $2 million; and that by failing to release these "properties" to the plaintiff the defendant "[i]ntentional[ly] interfer[ed] with [her] inheritance." The plaintiff's complaint included a demand for a jury "with Scientologists."
We understand the plaintiff to be referring to the musician of this name.
Interwoven with these allegations are the plaintiff's somewhat opaque references to the risk that she will lose "cybernetic connections" if her property is not restored.
On October 20, 2021, a judge dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for reasons including her failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). This appeal followed.
The judge also concluded that the plaintiff's claims were outside the jurisdiction of the Superior Court and that they were precluded by a prior pending action. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (9), as amended, 450 Mass. 1403 (2008). Given our conclusion, we need not reach these additional grounds. The judge ruled sua sponte. The plaintiff does not challenge the judge's ruling on that basis.
Discussion.
"We review an order on a motion to dismiss de novo." A.L. Prime Energy Consultant, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 479 Mass. 419, 424 (2018). To survive a rule 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss, a pleading must include "factual 'allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)' an entitlement to relief." Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must offer more than mere "labels and conclusions." Iannacchino, supra, quoting Twombly, supra at 555. "The factual allegations must raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)" (quotation omitted). Galiastro v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 165 (2014).
On appeal, the plaintiff essentially details her need for the money and other property she contends the defendant has wrongfully withheld from her, reiterates the same allegations made in her complaint, and refers to additional items of damages based on her original claims. She does not cite any legal authority to support her argument that the judge erred in rendering his decision in this case. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019) (requiring that appellant's brief contain, inter alia, "citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies" and cautioning that "[t]he appellate court need not pass upon questions or issues not argued in the brief").
Passing over the inadequacy of the plaintiff's appellate briefing, however, we conclude that even under the relatively generous standard articulated in Iannacchino the plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636. This is not because of the nature of her allegations -- their implausibility is not a basis for dismissal. See Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (under Twombly, "[n]on-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must ... be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible"). Our conclusion is based on the plaintiff's failure to allege with sufficient specificity the basis for her entitlement to the property she claims was being withheld from her by the defendant. The plaintiff claims that the defendant was required "to release" the property at issue, but she does not adequately articulate why the defendant was required to do so -- for example, the plaintiff does not allege any facts to show her ownership interest in the billions of dollars she claims have been withheld, or her entitlement to the properties belonging to Sean Combs. As a result, although her claims are "consistent with" a right to recovery, they do not "plausibly suggest[] ... an entitlement to relief." Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636.
Judgment affirmed.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.