(citing United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Section 2255 generally may not be employed to relitigate questions which were raised and considered on direct appeal"); Sonneberg v. United States, 2003 WL 1798982, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2003) ("It is well settled that a petitioner generally may not relitigate issues that were decided adversely to him on direct appeal by means of a Section 2255 petition"); Nunez v. United States, 2008 WL 2705016, at *6 (D. N.J. July 8, 2008) (same)). See alsoU.S. v. Braddy, 837 Fed.Appx. 112, 115 (3d Cir. 2020) ("A §2255 motion does not function as a second appeal, seeUnited States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982), and thus it does not ordinarily allow for re-review of issues raised on direct appeal.")

Although most of the waiver cases decided in this Circuit examine the validity of a guilty plea agreement waiver provision, the one other opinion that examines the validity of a sentencing agreement waiver provision followed the same standard as outlined above. See Nunez v. United States, 2008 WL 270516, at *2-3, (D. N.J. July 8, 2008). B. Collateral Attack Waiver

See U.S. v. Eason, 509 F. App'x 180 (3d Cir. 2013). According to Third Circuit law, a petitioner cannot use 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to relitigate an issue already litigated on direct appeal. United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Section 2255 generally may not be employed to relitigate questions which were raised and considered on direct appeal"); Sonneberg v. United States, No. 01-2067, 2003 WL 1798982, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2003) ("It is well settled that a petitioner generally may not relitigate issues that were decided adversely to him on direct appeal by means of a Section 2255 petition"); Nunez v. United States, No. 07-1193 (FLW), 2008 WL 2705016, at *6 (D.N.J. July 8, 2008) (same). Here, Petitioner argued on direct appeal that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his counsel had been ineffective for, among other things, failing to file a motion to suppress and failing to issue numerous objections.

It is well settled in the Third Circuit that, in general, a petitioner cannot use 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to relitigate an issue already litigated on direct appeal. See Sonneberg v. United States, Civ. No. 01-2067, 2003 WL 1798982, at *2 (3d Cir. 2003) (movant "may not relitigate issues that were decided adversely to him on direct appeal by means of a Section 2255 petition"); United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Palumbo, 608 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Curry v. U.S., Civ. No. 11-5800, 2015 WL 733274 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2015); Pinkston v. U.S., Civ. No. 08-5493, 2009 WL 792283 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2009); Nunez v. U.S., Civ. No. 07-1193, 2008 WL 2705016 (D.N.J. July 8, 2008). Thus, absent certain circumstances, Petitioner is precluded from relitigating the sufficiency of the evidence.

Accordingly, this Court sees no reason to disturb the prior decision of the Third Circuit rejecting Stradford's speedy trial issues. See United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Scherer, 673 F.2d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1982); Orejuela, 639 F.2d at 1057; Nunez v. United States, Civ. No. 07-1193 (FLW), 2008 WL 2705016 (D.N.J. July 8, 2008). B. Ground Two: Jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge

These claims fail because they are not related to the negotiation of the guilty plea agreement. See, e.g., Nunez v. United States, Civ. No. 07-1193, 2008 WL 2705016, *3 (D.N.J. July 8, 2008) (reasoning that ineffective assistance of counsel can overcome waiver "only if the record of the criminal proceeding revealed that the claim that the waiver was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel was meritorious" (internal quotation omitted)). The Third Circuit has implied that defendants may seek habeas relief for some potentially viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims, notwithstanding collateral-attack waivers.