In support of this position, appellants cite authorities from other jurisdictions and one California superior court decision. It is interesting to note that two of the authorities relied upon, Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755 [ 81 S.E.2d 222] and State v. Dyson, 89 Ga. App. 791 [ 81 S.E.2d 217], were expressly rejected in Market St. Ry. Co. v. California State Board of Equalization, 137 Cal.App.2d 87 [ 290 P.2d 20]. Mr. Justice Peters, speaking for the court, stated at pages 97-98:
Market also refers to two Georgia cases where it was held that the Georgia sales tax statute did not apply to the sale of an entire business. ( Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755 [ 81 S.E.2d 222]; State v. Dyson, 89 Ga. App. 791 [ 81 S.E.2d 217].) The Novak case is the key case.
The meaning of a revenue statute cannot be extended by implication. Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755, 757 ( 81 S.E.2d 222) (1954). Through the mechanism of the SPLOST, the General Assembly allowed its sovereign power to tax and collect to be employed by a county so that it could collect a special, consented-to tax for constitutionally permitted purposes.
The language of OCGA § 48-5-48.2 (a) (1) and (b) (3) carefully uses the all-encompassing descriptive term "inventory of finished goods," instead of "tangible property," because the General Assembly intended to include all classes of tangible property under the constitution without enumerating each so that there would be equal treatment to avoid constitutional implications as to equal protection, rational purpose, and disparate treatment. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II and Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III (a), (b) (1), (2); U.S. Const., Amendment XIV; Fayette County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Ga. Utilities Co., 186 Ga. App. 723, 724 ( 368 S.E.2d 326) (1988); Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755, 757 ( 81 S.E.2d 222) (1954). Further, since manufacturers of motor vehicles in Georgia are foreign corporations, to exclude motor vehicles as a separate class of tangible property from the freeport exemption provisions of OCGA § 48-5-48.2 might deny such non-resident corporations the same privileges accorded Georgia citizens.
This definition is consistent with the principle directing construction of the policy against the insurer as well as with the interpretation given to the term "business" in other contexts. See Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 131 Ga. App. 761, 763-764 (2) ( 206 S.E.2d 672) (1974) ("business pursuits" exclusion in homeowners' insurance policy applies to one's primary or regular occupation, not to an activity engaged in during one's spare time); Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755, 758 ( 81 S.E.2d 222) (1954) (the term "engage in business" in retail sales tax statute means activity that habitually occupies time, attention, and labor of persons for purpose of livelihood or profit). Like the exclusion at issue in Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Perimeter Tractor c. Repair, 192 Ga. App. 243 ( 384 S.E.2d 449) (1989), the exclusion here "`focuses on the person in whose charge the vehicle is at collision-time.
[Cits.]" Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755, 757 ( 81 S.E.2d 222) (1954). See also Mousetrap of Atlanta v. Blackmon, 129 Ga. App. 805 ( 201 S.E.2d 300) (1973).
[Cits.]" Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755, 757 ( 81 S.E.2d 222). Strictly construing OCGA § 48-5-299 (a) so as to resolve any doubt in favor of Barland, I fail to see how that code section empowers the board of tax assessors to correct clerical defects in the tax assessment notice after the full amount of taxes due have been paid. In my opinion OCGA § 48-5-299 (a) merely requires the board of tax assessors to assess taxable property at a just and fair evaluation. It cannot be interpreted "to mean the Board can act with unlimited discretion, or arbitrarily or for any purpose not specifically set forth in the statute."
Lichtenstein v. State, 34 Ga. App. 138 ( 128 S.E. 704); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Dukes, 121 Ga. 787 (7) ( 49 S.E. 788); White v. Sikes, 129 Ga. 508 ( 59 S.E. 228); Theus v. State, 114 Ga. 53 ( 39 S.E. 913); Williams v. City of Tifton, 3 Ga. App. 445 (2) ( 60 S.E. 113); Kimmel v. Mayor c. of Americus, 105 Ga. 694 (2) ( 31 S.E. 623)." Redwine v. Novak, 89 Ga. App. 755 ( 81 S.E.2d 222). Under the facts of this case the trial court correctly denied the motion for summary judgment.
This section, taken alone, would indicate that there was imposed a privilege tax, not on the consumer, but on persons selling or possessing for sale, and the incident of the tax would fall upon the enjoyment of the privilege of sale or possession for sale and not upon the sale itself. Cf. Oxford v. J. D. Jewell, Inc., 215 Ga. 616 ( 112 S.E.2d 601); Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755 ( 81 S.E.2d 222). Turning to other portions of the Act, § 2 defined "distributor" to mean, inter alia, an importer or in-state manufacturer; "dealer" was defined as one other than a distributor who was engaged in the business of selling cigars or cigarettes.
Ga. L. 1951, pp. 360, 363; 1953, pp. 182-4, 192-5, 199, 301; 1960, pp. 153, 156, 157. While the case of Novak v. Redwine, 89 Ga. App. 755 ( 81 S.E.2d 222), held that a casual and isolated sale made by one not engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail was not subject to the sales and use tax, it appears the 1960 amendment changed the rule in the Novak case. This conclusion is derived from the language of Section 2 (a): "Every person making a sale or sales of tangible personal property at retail . . . shall be a retailer and a dealer as defined in this act. . ."