Id. The PRRB relied on its rule that a Plaintiff must meet its filing deadlines or suffer dismissal of its appeal. See PRRB Instructions at II.B.I. Courts have time and again found that the crafting of such procedural rules is well within agency authority and expertise. See, e.g., Inova Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir. 2000); Novacare, Inc. v. Thompson, 357 F. Supp. 2d 268, 273 (D.D.C. 2005); United Home Care v. Thompson, No. 99-3123, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2002). Rapid City does not dispute that it had notice of the rule, and that it violated it. Pl.'s Mot. at 5-6.

The Court disagrees. In deciding not to reinstate Plaintiff's appeals, the record “demonstrate[s] that the Board exercised its discretion in a manner that was rational and that it considered the factors relevant to the decision.” Novacare, Inc. v. Thompson, 357 F.Supp.2d 268, 272 (D.D.C. 2005).

The case law, however, is not definitive as to whether such a civil action would even be possible. Although at least one circuit-court and one district-court decision have assumed that such denials were reviewable under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard, see Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. Sebelius , 649 F.3d 1153, 1159–61 (9th Cir.2011) ; Novacare, Inc. v. Thompson , 357 F.Supp.2d 268, 272–73 (D.D.C.2005), two other district courts have passed over this same question. See Kidney Ctr. of Hollywood v. Shalala , 63 F.Supp.2d 51, 54 (D.D.C.1999) (dismissing on other grounds a case where government argued that "decisions to deny reinstatement of the appeals[ ] are not subject to review"); Livingston v. Sullivan , No. 89–2281, 1991 WL 126007, at *2 (D.D.C. June 28, 1991) (dismissing case and denial-of-reinstatement argument because plaintiff died); cf. Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala , 525 U.S. 449, 453, 119 S.Ct. 930, 142 L.Ed.2d 919 (1999) (holding that refusal to reopen is not appealable).

Although this is an issue of first impression for us, several other courts have held that the Board's decision to dismiss an appeal for failure to timely submit a position paper does not constitute arbitrary and capricious conduct. See High Country Home Health, 359 F.3d at 1311-1312 (holding that the Board's dismissal of a provider's appeal because of failure to submit its final position paper, due to staffs failure to properly docket the due date, was not arbitrary and capricious); see also Inova, 244 F.3d at 351 (concluding that dismissal of a provider's appeal because of failure to submit a position paper due to "administrative oversight" was not arbitrary and capricious); Nova-care, Inc. v. Thompson, 357 F.Supp.2d 268, 272-73 (D.D.C. 2005) (explaining that dismissal because of failure to submit a position paper due to miscommunication with the provider's attorney was not arbitrary and capricious). We join these courts and hold as a matter of first impression in this Circuit, that the Board's dismissal of Kaiser's appeal for failure to file a preliminary position paper as required by the Board's procedural rules was not arbitrary or capricious. Kaiser was forewarned that failure to file the position paper would result in dismissal of the appeal. The Board considered Kaiser's arguments for excusing the failure and denied Kaiser's request to reinstate the appeal. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the Board abused its discretion.

Courts have routinely upheld the authority of the PRRB to dismiss appeals based on missed position paper filing deadlines. See, e.g., Novacare v. Thompson, 357 F. Supp.2d 268, 272 (D.D.C. 2005) (describing the position paper deadlines as "`reasonable and necessary to the smooth functioning of the agency's appellate process, and therefore [compliance therewith] cannot be considered arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion'") (quoting UHI, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.3d 993, 996-97 (6th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs also do not dispute that they failed to seek reinstatement of the 2002 Group Appeals as permitted by the Board's Instructions.