Under the Administrative Procedures Act, which governs judicial review of an agency's preparation of an EIS and of the Corps' decision to grant a 404 permit, the court "shall set aside any agency action" undertaken "without observance of procedure required by law" or found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D)(1982); Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1988) ("NCAP"); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
The level of "detail that NEPA requires depends upon the nature and scope of the proposed action."California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982); Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 592 (9th Cir. 1988). Considerably less detail is required for a programmatic EIS than for a site-specific project.
However, NEPA does not require that the EA consider alternatives other than those which address the purpose and need of the project, or those which amount to nothing more than a challenge to the announced management policy of the agency. See Northwest Coal. for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1988). In the instant case, the Mad River EA considered an adequate range of alternatives in relation to the stated purpose and need for the project.
I conclude that defendants have properly relied on information from the EPA and that there is no gap in the information on inert ingredients that requires independent research. In Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lying, 844 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit approved an environmental impact statement in which not all the ingredients of the proposed formulations were known to the government. The government in that case, as here, reasoned that identified active ingredients, rather than unknown inert ingredients, should be its focus in evaluating herbicide formulations, and the government's analysis cast doubt on the possibility that the herbicide formulations were more toxic than their active ingredients alone.
See Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1116-17 ("The primary purpose of the scoping period is to notify those who may be affected by a proposed government action which is governed by NEPA that the relevant entity is beginning the EIS process; this notice requirement ensures that interested parties are aware of and therefore are able to participate meaningfully in the entire EIS process, from start to finish." (citing Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides (NCAP) v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1988))). Wyoming argues that the "[scoping regulations] do require that environmental information of `high quality' be made available to public officials and citizens `before decisions are made and before actions are taken.'"
The primary purpose of the scoping period is to notify those who may be affected by a proposed government action which is governed by NEPA that the relevant entity is beginning the EIS process; this notice requirement ensures that interested parties are aware of and therefore are able to participate meaningfully in the entire EIS process, from start to finish. See Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides(NCAP) v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1988). Other purposes of the scoping period include narrowing the issues to receive in-depth treatment in the EIS and determining the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be addressed in the EIS.
In light of the Coalition's narrow statement of the issue on appeal, we do not reach the question of whether the Government gave adequate notice of the environmental assessments contained within the 1986 PSS and 1987 ISS, or if the failure to do so prejudiced the Coalition. See Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 595 (9th Cir. 1988) (failure to comply with NEPA's notice requirements did not require an agency decision to be set aside where the violation did not prejudice the plaintiffs). [5] We conclude that, in matters of local concern, NEPA's public notice requirement is satisfied by utilizing any one of the methods listed in 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b)(3).
Though the NEPA implementing regulations have since been amended, the purpose and need of the Gather Plan still determined the scope of reasonable alternatives in 2017. See 'Ilio'ulaokalani Coal. v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The scope of reasonable alternatives that an agency must consider is shaped by the purpose and need statement articulated by that agency.”); Nw. Coal. for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 592 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is the scope of the program that influences any determination of what alternatives are viable and reasonable.”); Env't Def. Ctr., 36 F.4th at 879 (“The NEPA regulations in effect at the time the agencies issued the EA set forth criteria for the agencies to consider when determining whether an action . . . requires a full EIS.”).
Nothing in the cited regulation demands that an agency individually notify each and every potentially “interested person” about a NEPA-related rulemaking process, and Plaintiffs have failed to identify a single case so holding. They have invoked one decision in support of their argument, Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588 (9th Cir.1988), but the circumstances there were a far cry from this case. In Lyng, an anti-pesticide group had obtained an injunction against an agency's use of pesticides on the ground that the agency had not performed the required environmental analysis under NEPA. Seeid. at 590.
This notice requirement ensures that interested parties are aware of and able to participate meaningfully in the entire EIS process, from start to finish. See, Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides (NCAP) v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 594–95 (9th Cir.1988). In this case, WSDOT set up an informational website and hotline, distributed newsletters, and held community meetings and public briefings.