In light of the Forest Service's explanations, it was not arbitrary or capricious for the Forest Service to focus the Project's purpose and need statement on treatment rather than prevention. Cf. Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 591–94 (9th Cir.1988) (agency could define scope of noxious weed management project to focus on the use of herbicides to control and eradicate weeds instead of on prevention measures). LOWD argues that the purpose is unreasonably narrow because it assumes herbicides will be used as the primary means for controlling and eradicating invasive plants.
In light of the Forest Service's explanations, it was not arbitrary or capricious for the Forest Service to focus the Project's purpose and need statement on treatment rather than prevention. Cf. Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 591-94 (9th Cir. 1988) (agency could define scope of noxious weed management project to focus on the use of herbicides to control and eradicate weeds instead of on prevention measures). LOWD argues that the purpose is unreasonably narrow because it assumes herbicides will be used as the primary means for controlling and eradicating invasive plants.
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, which governs judicial review of an agency's preparation of an EIS and of the Corps' decision to grant a 404 permit, the court "shall set aside any agency action" undertaken "without observance of procedure required by law" or found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D)(1982); Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1988) ("NCAP"); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1). Ark argues that its successful administrative challenge to the Environmental Assessment for the Burnt Mountain egress trail in 2006, which turned on the agency's failure to evaluate the area's roadless characteristics, rendered it an “interested” person under § 1501.7(a)(1) with the same rights as the plaintiff in Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588 (9th Cir.1988). But, as the District Court recognized, Ark Initiative, 64 F.Supp.3d at 109, Ark's partial and local administrative victory concerning development on a single parcel of roadless land, years before the Service's state-wide rulemaking, is a far cry from the interest of the plaintiff organization in Lyng “as a litigant earlier in th[at] action”—the very action that successfully mandated the new EIS of which the organization sought notice.
The level of "detail that NEPA requires depends upon the nature and scope of the proposed action."California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982); Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 592 (9th Cir. 1988). Considerably less detail is required for a programmatic EIS than for a site-specific project.
However, NEPA does not require that the EA consider alternatives other than those which address the purpose and need of the project, or those which amount to nothing more than a challenge to the announced management policy of the agency. See Northwest Coal. for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1988). In the instant case, the Mad River EA considered an adequate range of alternatives in relation to the stated purpose and need for the project.
I conclude that defendants have properly relied on information from the EPA and that there is no gap in the information on inert ingredients that requires independent research. In Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lying, 844 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit approved an environmental impact statement in which not all the ingredients of the proposed formulations were known to the government. The government in that case, as here, reasoned that identified active ingredients, rather than unknown inert ingredients, should be its focus in evaluating herbicide formulations, and the government's analysis cast doubt on the possibility that the herbicide formulations were more toxic than their active ingredients alone.
See Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1116-17 ("The primary purpose of the scoping period is to notify those who may be affected by a proposed government action which is governed by NEPA that the relevant entity is beginning the EIS process; this notice requirement ensures that interested parties are aware of and therefore are able to participate meaningfully in the entire EIS process, from start to finish." (citing Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides (NCAP) v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1988))). Wyoming argues that the "[scoping regulations] do require that environmental information of `high quality' be made available to public officials and citizens `before decisions are made and before actions are taken.'"
The Army must consider all reasonable alternatives within the purpose and need it has defined. See Nw. Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides (NCAP) v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 592 (9th Cir.1988) ("[I]t is the scope of the program that influences any determination of what alternatives are viable and reasonable."). Appellants ask us to find that the Army defined the purpose and need statement in the SEIS too narrowly.
The primary purpose of the scoping period is to notify those who may be affected by a proposed government action which is governed by NEPA that the relevant entity is beginning the EIS process; this notice requirement ensures that interested parties are aware of and therefore are able to participate meaningfully in the entire EIS process, from start to finish. See Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides(NCAP) v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1988). Other purposes of the scoping period include narrowing the issues to receive in-depth treatment in the EIS and determining the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be addressed in the EIS.