Opinion
CIVIL 3:21-cv-823
04-08-2022
SANDRA NORTHCUTT Plaintiffs, v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Defendant.
Richardson, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY, United States Magistrate Judge.
This is an employment discrimination action filed by the pro se Plaintiff against the Defendant under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., (Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990), 29 U.S.C. §621 (Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Civil Rights Act of 1964), T. C. A. §4-21- 401 (Tennessee Human Rights) and T. C. A. §50-1-304 (Tennessee's Retaliatory Discharge Statute) on October 28, 2021. Docket No. 1. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 20, 2022. Docket No. 12. The Plaintiff's response was due February 3, 2022. Plaintiff did not respond. The Court issued a show cause order on February 14, 2022, for Plaintiff to respond to the Motion to Dismiss by February 25, 2022
LAW AND ANALYSIS
It is well settled that Federal trial courts have the inherent power to manage their own dockets, Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1961), and Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the Court to dismiss an action upon a showing of a clear record of delay, contumacious conduct, or failure to prosecute by the plaintiff. See Carter v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) “confers on district courts the authority to dismiss an action for failure of a Plaintiff to prosecute the claim or comply with the Rules or any order of the Court. Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Department, 529 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2008)(citing Knoll v. AT & T, 176 F.3d 359, 362-3 (6th Cir. 1999)); Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2013)(“It is well settled that a district court has the authority to dismiss sua sponte a lawsuit for failure to prosecute.”). Similarly, this Court's Local Rules provides that “[c]ivil suits that have been pending for an unreasonable period of time without any action having been taken by any party may be summarily dismissed . . . without prejudice to refile or to move the Court to set aside the order of dismissal for just cause.” Local Rule 41.01(a)(dismissal for unreasonable delay. Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a tool for district courts to manage their dockets and avoid unnecessary burdens on opposing parties and the judiciary. See Schafer, 529 F.3d at 736 (quoting Knoll, 176 F.3d at 363).
The Court considers four factors in determining whether dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate: (1) the willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the plaintiff; (2) whether the opposing party has been prejudiced by the plaintiff's conduct; (3) whether the plaintiff was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) the availability and appropriateness of other, less drastic sanctions. Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep't, 529 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2008). A dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) constitutes an adjudication on the merits unless the dismissal order states otherwise. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted, however, that dismissal under Rule 41(b) is a “harsh sanction” and should only apply in extreme situations where there is a “clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Carter, 636 F.2d at 161, quoting Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1978).
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal of an action if a Plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the Court. See, Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir., 1991). “[W]hile pro se litigants may be granted some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal training, there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements that a lay person can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Id. “[T]he lenient treatment of pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
When a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more favorably than a party who is represented. Id. Additionally, Courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of inaction or dilatoriness of the party seeking relief.” Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
This is not a case of a plaintiff simply filing documents past deadlines or filing inadequate briefs. See Mulbah v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 261 F.3d 586, 593-94 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the district court abused its discretion by granting a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute). Giving due consideration to each of the factors, the Court finds that dismissal for failure to prosecute is an appropriate and necessary sanction, as no alternative sanction “would protect the integrity of pre-trial procedures.” Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980).
B. The Case at Bar
The pro se Plaintiff filed this action on October 28, 2021. Docket No. 1. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 20, 2022. Docket No. 12. The Court issued a show cause order on February 14, 2022. Docket No. 13. To date Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion to Dismiss or the Show Cause Order and she was forewarned that failure to respond may result in this action being dismissed.
The undersigned finds that dismissal under Rule 41(b) Fed.R.Civ.P. is appropriate because the four relevant factors, considered under the “relaxed” standard for dismissal without prejudice show a record of delay, refusal to advance the case and failure to comply with the Court's orders.
With respect to the first factor, Plaintiff has failed to take any action to advance this litigation. Apart from requesting a duplicate summons, it does not appear that the Plaintiff has taken any action with respect to this litigation. These failures show willfulness or fault.
As to the second factor -prejudice to the defendants- they have been parties to this litigation notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to take action. A “defendant cannot be expected to defend an action, that Plaintiff has apparently abandoned, not to mention the investment of time and resources expending to defend this case.” Miles v. Sheffield, 2009 WL 3497794, at *2 (E. D. Mich. October 28, 2009)(internal quotations marks and citations omitted). While the Defendants have not been forced in invest time and resources to defend this case, they are still named parties to a federal lawsuit. All parties have a right to a just and prompt resolution to their cases. The failure to advance litigation, as the Plaintiff has here, prejudices the parties and reflects the type of situation where the Court should intervene.
The third and fourth factors likewise weigh in favor of dismissal. Here, the Plaintiff was warned that her failure to cooperate in this litigation through the show cause order could result in a recommendation that her case be dismissed. Likewise, the less drastic sanction of dismissal without prejudice is appropriate here. Plaintiff has failed to explain why she has not responded to Defendant's motion to dismiss or done anything to advance this litigation in that time period.
Because all four factors weigh in favor of dismiss the undersigned recommends that this action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends this action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in accordance with Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The undersigned also recommends that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 12) be DISMISSED as MOOT.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen (14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).