Opinion
3-12-0498
07-10-2013
In re MARRIAGE OF PHYLLIS DIANE NORRIS, Petitioner-Appellee, and JAMES ROBERT NORRIS, Respondent-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the 9th Judicial Circuit,
McDonough County, Illinois,
Appeal No. 3-12-0498
Circuit No. 07-D-37
Honorable
Richard H. Gambrell,
Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McDade and O'Brien concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the trial court did not err in its rulings on reimbursement, the classification of property, dissipation, the admission of expert testimony, the valuation of assets, or in its ultimate ruling on the division of marital property and the allocation of debts between the parties. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. ¶ 2 After a bench trial on property division and debt allocation, the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage of petitioner, Phyllis Diane Norris (Phyllis), and respondent, James Robert Norris (Robert). Robert appeals from that judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his claim for reimbursement for marital funds spent on Phyllis's nonmarital real property; (2) classifying certain Met Life stock as Phyllis's nonmarital property; (3) denying his claim of dissipation as to two life insurance policies that were cashed in by Phyllis after the parties had separated; (4) admitting into evidence and relying upon the written opinions of value of Phyllis's expert witness as to certain real property; and (5) its ultimate ruling dividing the marital property and allocating the debt between the parties. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 Phyllis and Robert were married in January 1993, had six children, and lived in Bushnell, Illinois (McDonough County). They separated in May 2007 and Phyllis filed for dissolution. An order was entered in April 2008 requiring Robert to pay temporary child support. In April 2010, the parties entered into a joint parenting agreement and order wherein Robert waived any claim of maintenance and his child support obligation was set at 28% ($265 per week) of his net income, which was less than the statutory guidelines. ¶ 5 The parties were unable to agree as to the property division and debt allocation and submitted that matter for bench trial, which took place over three days in September, October, and December 2011. To assist the court in its decision, each of the parties submitted a written summary of his or her assets and debts and a proposed property division. The evidence presented at trial consisted of the testimony of Phyllis and Robert, the testimony of each party's expert witness as to the value of the real property that was in dispute, and various documents that were admitted as exhibits. That evidence established that: (1) at the time of trial, Phyllis was 45 years old, resided in the marital home on Washington Street in Bushnell, worked at a hospital in Macomb, and had an annual income of about $111,500 per year; (2) Robert was 54 years old, resided in Bushnell in a home owned by the parties on Hail Street, worked at a company in Bushnell, and had an annual income of about $53,800; (3) the parties' six children were between 6 and 16 years of age; (4) the parties' marital assets consisted of three parcels of real property in Bushnell (the Cole Street property, the Washington Street property, and the Hail Street property), certain vehicles, various retirement accounts, various life-insurance policies with cash value, and various items of personal property; (5) the Cole Street property had been sold prior to trial at a public auction, along with some items of marital personal property, and its value was not in dispute; (6) the value of the Washington and Hail Street properties was in dispute; (7) after the separation and prior to trial, Phyllis cashed in two of her life insurance policies that were apparently acquired or paid for during the marriage; (8) Phyllis owned some Met Life stock in her name alone, the classification of which was in dispute, which she had received from a life insurance policy that she had purchased prior to the marriage; (9) the parties agreed on the present value of the marital interest of the retirement accounts; (10) Phyllis owned as nonmarital real property a commercial building on Ludwig Street in Bushnell that she had purchased prior to the marriage and that the parties had used during the marriage as a storage space and as a temporary office for Robert; and (11) the parties' debts consisted of a mortgage on the Washington Street property, vehicle loans, various credit card debts, and certain personal loans that Robert had received from his parents. ¶ 6 As for the contested value of the Washington and Hail Street properties, each party presented the testimony of an expert witness. Phyllis's expert witness, Leland Hoyle, testified that he had lived in Bushnell since 1952 and had worked as an auctioneer, real estate broker, and appraiser from 1970 until 2000, when he had become disabled and retired. Hoyle had prepared about 200 appraisals or opinions of value in his career and was familiar with every home in Bushnell. Hoyle did not obtain a real estate appraiser's license, which became required in Illinois in 2000, and was not a licensed appraiser. According to Hoyle, there was a distinction between an appraisal, which he was not providing, and an opinion of value, which he was providing. Other than in this case, Hoyle had not provided an opinion of value since the year 2000, when he quit doing so because of pressure being placed on those providing opinions of value to exaggerate the value because of the overinflation in the market. Hoyle still invested in real estate, however, kept up to date on the sale prices of homes in Bushnell, and attended every home auction in Bushnell. ¶ 7 During his testimony, Hoyle described the procedure that he followed in developing an opinion of value, which included obtaining information on the property from the assessor's office, researching comparable properties, viewing the subject property and the comparable properties, and making adjustments to the value based upon location and depreciation. Hoyle had prepared written opinions of value on the properties in November 2010 and testified that those opinions were still valid as of the date of trial. Based on his experience, Hoyle opined that the value of the Washington Street property was $80,000 and that the value of the Hail Street property was $84,000 and explained how he formed those opinions. Hoyle noted that the written opinions that he had provided did not reflect the procedure that he followed or the calculations that he used to determine the value of the properties. Hoyle had also prepared an opinion of value as to the Cole Street property, which he opined was $27,000, and explained how he formed that opinion. That property was sold at a public auction 10 months later for a gross sale price of $27,000 and was purchased by Phyllis's father after some competitive bidding. ¶ 8 At the conclusion of Hoyle's testimony, Phyllis moved to admit the three written opinions of value. Robert objected, claiming that Hoyle lacked the necessary expertise and that the written opinions were incomplete because they did not reflect Hoyle's calculations. The trial court admitted the exhibits over Robert's objection, finding that Hoyle was qualified to render opinions of value and that Robert's concerns went to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility. ¶ 9 Robert's expert witness, Dennis Williamson, testified that he lived in Littleton, Illinois, had been a licensed appraiser for the past 16 years, and had completed 200 to 300 residential appraisals per year (about 4,000 over the course of his career), including 5 to 10 appraisals per year on property in Bushnell. During his testimony, Williamson described the requirements necessary to become a licensed appraiser and the process that he went through in preparing an appraisal, which included inspecting the property, taking pictures and measurements, finding similar properties that had sold within the past year, making adjustments to the estimated value of the subject property based upon the differences between the subject property and the similar properties, and preparing a written report showing the estimated value and the adjustments or calculations that were made in determining that value. When Williamson was preparing an appraisal, the reference materials that he used included the real estate records at the courthouse and the multiple listing service for the area. ¶ 10 In September 2008, Williamson was hired by Robert and Phyllis to prepare appraisals on four properties in Bushnell that were involved in the divorce-the Washington Street property, the Hail Street property, the Ludwig Street property, and the Cole Street property. Williamson appraised all of the properties again in April 2011, except for the Cole Street property, at the request of Robert. Based on his appraisal, Williamson opined that the fair market value of the Hail Street property was $35,000. According to Williamson, the Hail Street property had a substantial amount of external problems and was in a distressed condition, which had a negative effect on the value of the property. Williamson opined further that the value of the Washington Street property, which needed a lot of work but was not in a distressed condition, was $102,000 and that the value of the Ludwig Street property was $25,000. As part of his work in 2008, Williams had prepared an appraisal on the Cole Street property and had determined the value of the property to be $12,000. He was surprised to learn that the property had later sold at a public auction for $27,000. At the conclusion of Williamson's testimony, his appraisals on the Washington and Hail Street properties were offered into evidence by Robert, along with copies of the tax bills for the Washington Street property for various years, and were admitted by the trial court. ¶ 11 In addition to the expert testimony, each of the parties presented his or her own testimony and numerous photographs of the property in which he or she resided (the Washington or Hail Street property) to establish that the particular property was in a deteriorated condition and had a reduced value. ¶ 12 One of the issues raised at trial by Robert was alleged contribution from the marital estate to the Ludwig Street property (Phyllis's nonmarital property). On that issue, Phyllis testified that the real estate taxes on the Ludwig Street property were about $800 per year and were paid during the marriage from either Robert or Phyllis's income. Phyllis also acknowledged that certain repairs had been completed on the property during the marriage using marital funds or efforts. Robert testified that marital funds were used to pay the property taxes on the Ludwig Street property and to pay for insurance and repairs. A list that Robert had prepared of the repairs that he could remember was admitted into evidence with a few supporting receipts and copies of the property tax bills. One of the receipts attached to the list indicated that it was actually for the Washington Street property, and the trial court stated that it would not consider that receipt. The majority of the information on repairs, however, was based solely upon Robert's memory. ¶ 13 Another issue that was raised at trial by Robert was a possible dissipation claim against Phyllis regarding the life insurance policies that she had cashed in after the parties had separated. As to that matter, Phyllis testified that she had cashed in two policies between the time when the parties had separated and when Robert had started paying child support. Phyllis used the proceeds from the policies to pay for various household expenses and expenses of the children and also to obtain a new life insurance policy with a higher coverage amount. The premium on the new policy was about $600 or $700 per year. Earlier in her testimony, Phyllis had described at length the extracurricular activities in which the children were involved and all of the specific costs associated with those activities, which Phyllis paid for by herself. Phyllis also paid for the cost of the children's health insurance and for 60% of all unreimbursed medical expenses. Phyllis's monthly expenses, including those of the household and for the children, were listed in detail in her financial affidavit, and she provided testimony about those expenses as well. In addition, it was noted during the trial testimony that for several years during the marriage, marital funds were used to pay for Robert's prior child support obligation of $95 per week. ¶ 14 A third issue that was raised at the trial was the classification of the Met Life stock. On that issue, Phyllis testified that the Met Life stock was issued in her name alone on a life insurance policy that she purchased prior to the marriage. Phyllis could not remember whether she had received the stock before the parties were married or after. Robert did not know when the stock was received but stated that he first remembered noticing the dividend amounts listed on the parties' joint tax return in about 1996. ¶ 15 At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court issued a written judgment for dissolution of marriage (judgment). In the judgment, the trial court: (1) found the value of the Washington Street property to be $93,450 and the value of the Hail Street property to be $83,832; (2) awarded to Phyllis the Washington Street property, where she was residing, and made Phyllis solely responsible for the remaining mortgage on that property; (3) awarded to Robert the Hail Street property, where he was residing, which had no mortgage; (4) awarded to each party an equal share of the net proceeds from the sale of the Cole Street property and some of the personal marital property at public auction; (5) awarded to each party his or her own vehicle or vehicles and made each party solely responsible for any remaining loan balance on those vehicles; (6) divided the marital portions of the retirement accounts between the parties and awarded the nonmarital portions (or accounts) to each party individually; (7) required Phyllis to transfer about $65,500 from her retirement account to Robert by way of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to equalize the award of marital retirement accounts between the parties; (8) awarded to each party his or her own life insurance policies; (9) awarded to each party the marital personal property that was in her of his possession; (10) awarded to each party his or her own nonmarital personal property; (11) allocated each party's individual debt to that particular party; (12) awarded all of the proceeds from the sale of the Ludwig Street property to Phyllis; (13) set Robert's child support obligation in the amount that had previously been agreed to by the parties in the joint parenting agreement and order; and (14) denied Robert's claim of reimbursement to the marital estate for contributions made to the Ludwig Street property. The trial court did not specifically mention Robert's claims of dissipation as to the life insurance policies that Phyllis cashed in after the separation and did not require Phyllis to repay those funds. Robert appealed the trial court's judgment.
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 As his first contention on appeal, Robert argues that the trial court erred in failing to require Phyllis to reimburse the marital estate for contributions made to the Ludwig Street property. Robert asserts that the marital estate was entitled to reimbursement because over $21,000 of marital funds were used during the course of the marriage to pay for the property taxes, insurance, and repairs on the property. ¶ 18 Phyllis argues that the trial court's ruling was proper and should be affirmed. Phyllis asserts that no reimbursement was required because: (1) Robert failed to establish a right to contribution by clear and convincing evidence; (2) marital funds were used to pay a nonmarital debt of Robert-child support from his previous marriage-and that amount exceeded the amount of reimbursement that was sought; and (3) the marital estate was already compensated because the property was used as a storage facility for the parties during the marriage, which saved the parties the cost of renting a storage space. ¶ 19 In reply, Robert contends that the amount of contribution to the Ludwig Street property was clear from the evidence and that there is no support in the law for Phyllis's assertion that the contribution amount should be offset by the amount that was paid during the marriage for Robert's prior child support obligation. ¶ 20 In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, a trial court's factual findings-such as whether property is marital or nonmarital, the fair market value of property, whether reimbursement is appropriate, or whether dissipation has occurred-will not be reversed on appeal unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re Marriage of Hubbs, 363 Ill. App. 3d 696, 699-700 (2006) (in general, value of assets, and dissipation); In re Marriage of Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d 200, 205 (2005) (in general, value of assets, and dissipation); In re Marriage of Ford, 377 Ill. App. 3d 181, 185-86 (2007) (reimbursement); In re Marriage of Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d 346, 351 (2000) (classification of property). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if it is clearly apparent from the record that the trial court should have reached the opposite conclusion or if the finding itself is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based upon the evidence presented. Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006). ¶ 21 Section 503(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) provides, under certain circumstances, for reimbursement to the marital estate for contributions made to the nonmarital property of either spouse. See 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(2) (West 2010). For reimbursement to be required, the contribution must be traceable by clear and convincing evidence and must not have been intended as a gift to the receiving estate. 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(2) (West 2010). In addition, there is no right to reimbursement if the marital estate has already been compensated by its use of the nonmarital property during the marriage. In re Marriage of Crook, 211 Ill. 2d 437, 454 (2004). The burden of proof to establish that reimbursement is appropriate is on the party seeking reimbursement. In re Marriage of Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d 639, 644 (1993). ¶ 22 Upon review of the record in the present case, we find that the trial court's denial of Robert's claim for reimbursement was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 350. The evidence presented in support of Robert's claim for reimbursement was the property tax bills, Robert's testimony based primarily upon his own personal recollection of the amount spent on repairs, and a few receipts. There was no indication in any of the evidence presented whether the amount contributed to the Ludwig Street property was intended as a gift. The trial court found that Robert had not established a right to contribution by clear and convincing evidence, and we cannot say that the trial court's conclusion in that regard was erroneous. It was the trial court's role to weigh the evidence, to determine if the evidence was sufficient, and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses on the question of contribution. See id. at 350-51; Werries, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 642. Even if we had disagreed with the basis for the trial court's decision, we would still have to uphold that finding because it is clear from the evidence presented that the marital estate had already been compensated for the value of the contribution since the Ludwig Street property was used during the marriage as a storage space for the parties and as a temporary office for Robert. See Crook, 211 Ill. 2d at 454; In re Marriage of Albrecht, 266 Ill. App. 3d 399, 401 (1994). Having concluded that Robert's claim for reimbursement was properly denied, we need not rule upon Phyllis's assertion regarding the use of marital funds to pay Robert's prior child support obligation. ¶ 23 As his second point of contention on appeal, Robert argues that the trial court erred in classifying the Met Life stock as Phyllis's nonmarital property. Robert asserts that the stock was acquired during the marriage and was presumed to be marital property and that Phyllis did not rebut the presumption. ¶ 24 Phyllis argues that the trial court's ruling was proper and should be affirmed. Phyllis asserts that the stock was correctly classified as her nonmarital property because the stock was received from a life insurance policy that was purchased by Phyllis prior to the marriage. In making that assertion, Phyllis notes that in one of his pretrial summaries, Robert listed the stock as Phyllis's nonmarital property, which Phyllis equates to a stipulation by Robert that the stock was nonmarital property. ¶ 25 Robert refutes that assertion and contends that he never agreed or stipulated in the trial court proceedings that the Met Life stock was Phyllis's nonmarital property. ¶ 26 Before property can be assigned or divided in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, it must first be classified by the trial court as either marital or nonmarital. Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 351; In re Marriage of Cecil, 202 Ill. App. 3d 783, 787 (1990). A trial court's factual determination in that regard will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 205; Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 351. Under section 503(b)(1) of the Act, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution is presumed to be marital property, regardless of how title is actually held. 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2010); Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 351-52. A party can rebut the presumption of marital property by showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property falls into one of the categories of exceptions listed in section 503(a) of the Act. See 750 ILCS 5/503(a), (b)(1) (West 2010); Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 352. One of the listed categories of exceptions is property acquired before the marriage. 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2010). Thus, it has been found that a life insurance policy acquired prior to the marriage was the nonmarital property of the spouse that acquired the policy. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Henke, 313 Ill. App. 3d 159, 172-73 (2000). ¶ 27 With that authority in mind, we conclude that the trial court's ruling-that the Met Life Stock was Phyllis's nonmarital property-was sufficiently supported by the evidence. First and foremost, it was never established that the Met Life stock was acquired during the marriage as neither party could remember when Phyllis received the stock. Thus, the presumption of marital property does not apply. See 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) (West 2010); Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 351-52. In addition, there was no dispute that the stock was issued on a life insurance policy that Phyllis had purchased prior to the marriage. Under those facts, it was proper for the trial court to classify the stock as Phyllis's nonmarital property. See Henke, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 172-73. Having reached that conclusion, we need not determine whether Robert's pretrial summary constituted a stipulation that the stock was nonmarital property as asserted by Phyllis. ¶ 28 As his third point of contention on appeal, Robert argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider or account for the marital life insurance policies that Phyllis had cashed in, which Robert claims was dissipation of a marital asset. Phyllis argues that there was no dissipation because she used the proceeds for marital purposes-to obtain a new life insurance policy with more favorable coverage and to pay for expenses of the household and the children during the time period before she started receiving child support. In response, Robert asserts that child support has no bearing on this issue because it was resolved by agreement between the parties long before trial. ¶ 29 The issue of dissipation is generally a fact-intensive inquiry that calls upon the trial court to make a credibility determination as to the explanation given by the spouse charged with dissipation as to how the funds were used. See In re Marriage of Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d 965, 983-84 (1992). A trial court's ruling on the issue of dissipation will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 204-05. ¶ 30 Dissipation occurs when one spouse uses a marital asset for his or her sole benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 983. Whether dissipation has occurred is dependent upon the unique facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id. The spouse charged with dissipation (the charged spouse) has the burden to show by clear and specific evidence how the marital funds were spent. Id. General and vague statements as to the use of the funds are not sufficient. Id. If the charged spouse fails in his or her burden to show that the funds in question were used for marital purposes, the trial court will make a finding of dissipation. Hubbs, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 702. However, if the charged spouse can show that the funds were spent on a legitimate family expense that was necessary and appropriate, dissipation will not be found. See Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 983. ¶ 31 In the instant case, upon review of the record, we find that the trial court's implicit ruling on dissipation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although Phyllis used marital funds when she cashed in the two life insurance policies during the parties' separation, she did not use those funds for a purpose unrelated to the marriage. The testimony established without dispute that the proceeds were used to pay for the expenses of the household and the children and to obtain a new life insurance policy with a greater coverage amount. The amount of those expenses was set forth at length in Phyllis's testimony and in her financial affidavit. That evidence provided ample support for a finding of no dissipation. See Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 983. The trial court's ruling on dissipation, therefore, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 350. ¶ 32 As his fourth point of contention on appeal, Robert argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony and corresponding exhibits of Phyllis's expert witness, Leland Hoyle, as to the value of the Washington Street and Hail Street properties and in relying on that evidence in determining the value of the properties. In support of his argument, Robert asserts that: (1) Hoyle was not qualified to provide expert testimony as to the value of the properties; (2) even if Hoyle was qualified, his opinion should not have been given any weight because of his lack of expertise; and (3) it was erroneous for the trial court to disregard Williamson's appraisals, which were more competent and reliable than Hoyle's opinions of value, and to simply adopt the assessed value, as set forth in the corresponding exhibits, as the value of the properties. Phyllis disagrees with Robert's assertions and argues that the trial court's ruling was proper and should be affirmed. ¶ 33 A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Gordon, 221 Ill. 2d 414, 428 (2006). The threshold for finding an abuse of discretion is high and will not be overcome unless it can be said that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court. In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 460 (2008). A person will be allowed to testify as an expert witness if: (1) his experience and qualifications provide him with knowledge on the subject in question that is beyond that of the average person; and (2) his testimony will aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusions. Thompson, 221 Ill. 2d at 428. There is no set rule as to how an expert may acquire his specialized knowledge or experience-it may be obtained through practical application, scientific study, education, training, research, or any combination thereof. Id. at 428-29. The fact that a witness is not licensed in a particular field is but one factor in the overall determination of whether he is qualified to testify as an expert and is not a bar, in and of itself, to qualification as such or to admissibility of the testimony. Id. at 432-33. ¶ 34 The valuation of assets in a dissolution proceeding, on the other hand, is a question of fact for the trial court to determine, and its decision in that regard will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 203-05. The general rule is that assets are valued as of the date the judgment of dissolution was entered. In re Marriage of Stone, 155 Ill. App. 3d 62, 70 (1987). To properly determine the value of marital assets, the trial court must have before it competent evidence of value. Id. It is the trier of fact's responsibility to resolve any conflicts in the testimony or other evidence presented regarding the value of assets. Id. at 70-71. As long as the trial court's valuation is within the range testified to by the expert witnesses, it will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal. Id. at 71. ¶ 35 Having reviewed the record in the present case, we find that the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in allowing Leland Hoyle (Phyllis's expert) to testify as an expert witness. As the record demonstrates and the trial court noted, Hoyle had over 40 years of experience in valuing real estate as a real estate broker, auctioneer, and appraiser. In addition, Hoyle had lived in Bushnell since 1952, was familiar with every house in Bushnell, went to all of the real estate auctions in Bushnell, and had knowledge of real estate values in Bushnell that went far beyond that of an ordinary person. Based upon Hoyle's knowledge and experience, it was proper for the trial court to allow Hoyle to testify as an expert witness on the value of the properties and to admit the corresponding exhibits. See Thompson, 221 Ill. 2d at 428-29. As the trial court correctly noted, any criticisms by Robert as to Hoyle's qualifications went to the weight of his testimony (and the corresponding exhibits) and not to admissibility. See Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Bohne, 415 Ill. 253, 264-65 (1953). ¶ 36 As to the value of the property, we find that the trial court's determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Best, 223 Ill. 2d at 350. In making its decision, the trial court had before it the conflicting testimony of two experts, extensive testimony and numerous photographs from the parties as to the condition of the properties, and the values set forth on the property tax records that were submitted. The trial court determined that the value of each property was the amount listed on the property tax records, an amount that was within the range of value established by the two experts. On these facts, we will not disturb the trial court's ruling on the value of the properties. See Stone, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 70-71. ¶ 37 As his final contention on appeal, Robert argues that the trial court erred in its ultimate determination as to the division of the marital assets and allocation of debts. In making that argument, Robert initially re-asserts his previous contentions-that a proper distribution would have included the value of the life insurance policies that Phyllis had cashed in (Robert's claim of dissipation), would have treated the Met Life stock as marital property, and would have considered the contributions made by the marital estate to the nonmarital Ludwig Street property of Phyllis (Robert's claim for reimbursement). Since we have addressed those contentions above, we will not address them again here. Robert asserts further, however, that the division of marital property is inequitable when considered in light of the facts that Phyllis's income is double that of Robert and that Phyllis receives child support from Robert. ¶ 38 Phyllis argues that the trial court's ruling was proper and should be affirmed. In support of the fairness of the trial court's ruling, Phyllis points out that she has the greater burden of raising the six children, that Robert pays far less than the statutory guideline percentage of child support, and that Robert received a house to reside in that did not have a mortgage on it. ¶ 39 A trial court's ultimate division of marital assets and allocation of debts in a dissolution proceeding will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 205; In re Marriage of Joynt, 375 Ill. App. 3d 817, 822 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court. Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460. ¶ 40 The Act requires the trial court in a dissolution proceeding to divide the marital property between the parties in just proportions considering all relevant factors. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2010). Some of the factors to be considered include: (1) the contribution of each party to the marital estate; (2) any dissipation by either party of marital or nonmarital property; (3) the value of the property assigned to each party; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the relevant economic circumstances of each party; (6) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each party; (7) the custodial provisions for the parties' children; (8) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; and (9) the reasonable opportunity of each party for future acquisition of capital assets and income. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2010); Joynt, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 821-22. The touchstone of whether any particular division is proper is whether it is equitable in nature. Joynt, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 821. An equitable division of property, however, does not require that it be mathematically equal. Id. In determining whether a particular division is equitable, each case must be evaluated based upon its own unique facts. Id. ¶ 41 After reviewing the record in the present case, we find that the trial court's distribution of the marital assets and debts did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d at 460. In making its ruling, the trial court considered all of the relevant factors, including the income of each of the parties. The trial court awarded to each of the parties the home in which he or she resided, his or her own vehicles, an appropriate share of the retirement accounts, and an equal share of the property that had been sold at public auction. The trial court also allocated to each party his or her own individual debts and the debts associated with the property he or she had received. The trial court's ruling amounted to a fair and equitable division of the net marital property and we do not find that its decision was erroneous under the facts of the present case. See Vancura, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 204-05; Joynt, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 822. It was the trial court's responsibility to hear the evidence presented at trial and to weigh the factors in reaching an appropriate distribution of the property, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court as to those matters on appeal. See In re Marriage of Sheber, 121 Ill. App. 3d 328, 337-38 (1984).
¶ 42 CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McDonough County. ¶ 44 Affirmed.