Norris v. Harrison

8 Citing cases

  1. Strother v. Dist. of Columbia

    372 A.2d 1291 (D.C. 1977)   Cited 41 times
    Explaining that "the Wrongful Death Act . . . allows recovery for pecuniary loss to the decedent's next of kin (e.g., loss of support) occasioned by the death"

    For example, non-heirs, who are beneficiaries under a will are not legal representatives for the purposes of the survival statute until probate is had and their rights have ripened. Norris v. Harrison, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 105 n. 3, 198 F.2d 953, 954 n. 3 (1952). The phrase "personal representative" as used in the Wrongful Death Act, D.C. Code 1973, § 16-2702, is more restrictive and refers only to an officially appointed administrator or executor.

  2. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Ribo, Inc.

    686 F. Supp. 48 (D.R.I. 1988)   Cited 10 times
    Applying 25 U.S.C. § 81, a federal statute limiting an Indian tribe's capacity to contract, to non-trust lands held in fee simple by the Narragansett Tribe, the court analogized to the Nonintercourse Act and found Section 81 applicable to lands acquired by purchase (citing Alonzo, 249 F.2d at 196)

    Even more fundamental is the Defendants' lack of standing to challenge the deed to Parcel II. It is well settled that, in the absence of fraud, only the grantor, grantee or one who would take some interest in the real estate as a result of setting aside a deed may attack the deed's validity. E.g., Norris v. Harrison, 198 F.2d 953, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1952); City of Bluefield v. Taylor, 365 S.E.2d 51, 55 (W.Va. 1987). The Defendants do not fall into any of those categories.

  3. Somerville v. Randall

    908 A.2d 1155 (D.C. 2006)

    See Armstrong v. Lear, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 169, 175-76, 6 L.Ed. 58 (1827) (appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia); Norris v. Harrison, 91 U.S.App. D.C. 103, 104, 198 F.2d 953, 954 (1952); Baldwin v. Wylie, 2 Hay. Haz. 126, 131 (C.C.D.C.1853). See also 3 W. BOWE D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 26.8, at 22 (rev.3d ed. 2004) ("[E]very instrument of a testamentary character whether it passes realty or personalty or both, must be admitted to probate in order to give it legal effect and to make it operative as an instrument which passes title to devisees or legatees.")

  4. In re Estate of Richmond

    701 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 2005)   Cited 4 times

    See Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 818 (N.D. 1988). Donald has not cited, and we have not found, any authority that would prohibit Black from attempting to rely upon the alleged invalidity of the marriage as proof of fraud for purposes of challenging her mother's testamentary devise to Donald. Compare Norris v. Harrison, 198 F.2d 953, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (indicating in dictum that appellants could attack marriage and conveyance of property if will which devised to them disputed property was admitted to probate). [¶ 10] We conclude Black has standing in this probate proceeding and is not prohibited from relying on the alleged invalidity of Donald and Lois's marriage as evidence of fraud.

  5. Estate of Mullin v. Duenas

    296 Mich. App. 268 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 13 times
    In Rodenhiser, we affirmed the trial court's finding that the personal representatives of the wife's estate failed to overcome the presumption of the marriage's validity by "clear and definite proof" showing "that [the wife] was of unsound mind to the extent that she had no reasonable perception of the nature and effect of the marriage agreement she consummated with [the husband]."

    It cannot be annulled at the suit of the heirs of the spouse imposed upon or other third persons.” Id., § 60, p. 585 (2007), citing Gibbons v. Blair, 376 N.W.2d 22 (N.D.1985); Norris v. Harrison, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 198 F.2d 953 (1952); In re Succession of Ricks, 893 So.2d 98 (La.App.2004). We conclude that it is proper to apply to this case the general proposition that an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud can only be brought by the defrauded spouse while both parties to the marriage are living and the marriage cannot be annulled by the heirs of the spouse or other third persons, such as next friends.

  6. Smithfield Estates v. Heirs of Hathaway

    C.A. No. PC-2003-4157 (R.I. Super. Aug. 15, 2011)

    Moreover, it is "well settled" that a grantor, grantee or one who would take some interest in the real estate as a result of setting aside a deed may attack the deed's validity. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. RIBO, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 48 (D.R.I. 1988) (citing Norris v. Harrison, 198 F.2d 953, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1952)); City of Bluefield v. Taylor, 365 S.E.2d 51, 55 (W. Va. 1987)) (emphasis added). "Standing does not require that the party prove their case before the commencement of trial."

  7. Smithfield Estates, LLC v. Heirs of John M. Hathaway

    C.A. No. PC-2003-4157 (R.I. Super. Aug. 15, 2011)

    Moreover, it is "well settled" that a grantor, grantee or one who would take some interest in the real estate as a result of setting aside a deed may attack the deed's validity. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. RIBO, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 48 (D.R.I. 1988) (citing Norris v. Harrison, 198 F.2d 953, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1952)); City of Bluefield v. Taylor, 365 S.E.2d 51, 55 (W. Va. 1987)) (emphasis added). "Standing does not require that the party prove their case before the commencement of trial."

  8. Doukas v. George

    12 Misc. 2d 958 (N.Y. Misc. 1958)   Cited 1 times

    Section 82 provides in part "An action does not abate by any event if the cause of action survives or continues." This being an action sounding in fraud, the causes survive because the injury claimed is not to the person ( Snyder v. Schneider, 154 Misc. 26, affd. 244 App. Div. 778; Norris v. Harrison, 198 F.2d 953; Brackett v. Griswold, 103 N.Y. 425). The County of Suffolk, for whom the coplaintiff Kirkup, Jr., appears as Commissioner of Public Welfare, could benefit from a continuation of such causes if they should be sustained and a judgment based thereon entered in favor of a representative of the estate of the deceased.