Lack of causation, particularly a finding of one hundred per cent third-party causation, defeats liability under either LSA-C.C. Art. 2315 or LSA-C.C. Art. 2317. In Norris v. The City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983), and Orazio v. Durel, 407 So.2d 75 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1981), a motorist's negligence in entering an intersection when he knew the traffic light was malfunctioning was the cause of the accident, exonerating the City from liability under LSA-C.C. Art. 2315 or LSA-C.C. Art. 2317. In this case, the trial court found the negligence of the two drivers to be one hundred per cent of the cause of the accident.
In brief to this court, the City advances the same position, raising additional cases for consideration. See Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1983); Orazio v. Durel, 407 So.2d 75 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1981).
On March 7, 1994, NOPSI's initial motion for summary judgment was denied by the trial judge, who cited this court's opinion in Lemire v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 538 So.2d 1151 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 542 So.2d 1383 and 543 So.2d 2 (La. 1980), which stated, in pertinent part, as follows: Under a negligence theory there must be a showing that NOPSI knew or should have known the lights were not working, and that it failed to repair them. See, Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983) and the cases cited therein. The record is clear that no such showing has been made.
Under a negligence theory there must be a showing that NOPSI knew or should have known the lights were not working, and that it failed to repair them. See, Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983) and the cases cited therein. The record is clear that no such showing has been made.
To be liable in negligence the City must have had actual or constructive notice that a danger existed. Ponthier v. City of New Orleans, 496 So.2d 1050 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986); writ denied 498 So.2d 15 (La. 1986); Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983). A parish acts negligently when a defective traffic control device causes injury and the parish has either actual or constructive notice of the defective condition and fails to correct it within a reasonable time.
The S WB relies on two cases in arguing that it is only liable for negligence if it had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect. Clairmont v. City of New Orleans, 492 So.2d 1247 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986); Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983). The trial court specifically found that the S WB had knowledge because they were responsible for making the hole.
To be liable in negligence, a governmental authority must have had actual or constructive notice that a danger existed. Ponthier v. City of New Orleans, 496 So.2d 1050 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986), writ denied, 498 So.2d 15 (La. 1986); Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983). In the instant case, the evidence established that the yield sign controlling the traffic exiting the northbound lane of La. Highway 1 had been damaged prior to plaintiff's accident.
Lack of causation, particularly a finding of one hundred per cent third-party causation, defeats liability under either LSA-C.C. Art. 2315 or LSA-C.C. Art. 2317. In Norris v. The City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983), and Orazio v. Durel, 407 So.2d 75 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1981), a motorist's negligence in entering an intersection when he knew the traffic light was malfunctioning was the cause of the accident, exonerating the City from liability under LSA-C.C. Art. 2315 or LSA-C.C. Art. 2317. In this case, the trial court found the negligence of the two drivers to be one hundred per cent of the cause of the accident.
To be liable in negligence, the City must have had actual or constructive notice that a danger existed. Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983). Under the circumstances of the instant case, where there is no record of complaints prior to the collision or any prior occurrence to put the City on constructive notice of the missing sign, we hold that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof and the trial judge erred in concluding that the City knew or should have discovered that the intersection posed a danger or that "vandals had destroyed or moved the sign. . . ."
Because no showing was made that the City, in the instant case, had notice of the existence of the pot hole, no finding of liability based on negligence can be made. See Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1983). STRICT LIABILITY OF THE CITY