Salvodon v. Ricotta, No. 07-CV-174, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106132, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013) (finding no claim stated based on threatened use of taser alone); Noe v. West Virginia, No. 3:10-CV-38, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76906, at *20 (N.D. W.Va. July 29, 2010) (“[M]erely pointing a taser at the plaintiff cannot support a claim for excessive force, especially in the light of the plaintiff's ‘protest' to being questioned about his possession of a controlled substance.”).

However, the undersigned does not find that Wiedemann's mere drawing of his taser by itself would amount to an excessive use of force. Cf. Matthews v. Oebus, No. 14-6003, 2018 WL 1378178 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2018) [Pointing of taser, in and of itself, did not give rise to a claim of excessive force]; Noe v. W. Virginia, No. 10-38, 2010 WL 3025561 at *7 (N.D.W. Va. July 29, 2010) [same]; Wallace v. Poulos, No. 08-0251, 2009 WL 3216622 at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2016) [same]; Guilford v. Frost, 269 F. Supp. 3d 816, 829 (W.D. Mich. 2017) [Sixth Circuit has never held pointing a taser, as opposed to discharging it, constitutes excessive force]. (ECF No. 70 at 16-17 n.8 (emphasis added).)

The Sixth Circuit has "never found that pointing a taser, as opposed to actually discharging one, constitutes the use of excessive force." Evans v. Plummer, 687 F. App'x 434, 442 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the claim in the context of the less-demanding Fourth Amendment claim concerning excessive force during arrest); Guilford v. Frost, 269 F. Supp. 3d 816, 829 (W.D. Mich. 2017) (another Fourth Amendment case); see also Salvodon v. Ricotta, 2013 WL 3816728 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013) (no claim stated based on threatened use of taser alone); Noe v. West Virginia, 2010 WL 3025561 (N.D.W.Va. July 29, 2010) (merely pointing a taser cannot support a claim for excessive force). While some courts have held that the threat to use a taser combined with the pointing of a taser can violate a prisoner's rights under the Eighth Amendment, such conduct can only amount to a violation if done with a solely malicious purpose, such as to instill gratuitous fear.

As to Officer Bradley-Harrington, there is no allegation that she was involved in the altercation described above, apart from the claim that she pointed—but did not discharge—a can of mace at Eck's face as he was being handcuffed by Officer Neal. Briefly pointing a can of mace at Eck, without more, is not enough to support a claim for excessive force. See Wilkinson v. Slankard, No. CV 1-08-1494-CKJ, 2009 WL 1586946, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2009) ("mere fact" that defendant "pointed the pepper spray can at plaintiff does not equate to excessive force"); cf. Noe v. W. Virginia, No. 3:10-CV-38, 2010 WL 3025561, at *7 (N.D.W. Va. July 29, 2010) ("merely pointing a taser at the plaintiff cannot support a claim for excessive force"). Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment as to Eck's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Officer Bradley-Harrington.

The Sixth Circuit has rejected an Eighth Amendment claim where a prison officer's use of a stun gun was necessary to enforce his orders on a recalcitrant inmate, Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 601 (6th Cir. 1992), and courts in other jurisdictions have found that the mere threat to use a taser does not support a claim of excessive force, especially where the prisoner is non-compliant with the instructions of the officer in question. See Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he evidence in this case does not support finding an unconstitutional use of the taser gun against Michenfelder himself, who has complained only of its threatened use in the course of a strip search."); Salvodon v. Ricotta, No. 07-CV-174, 2013 WL 3816728, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013) (finding no claim stated based on threatened use of taser alone); Noe v. West Virginia, No. 3:10-CV-38, 2010 WL 3025561, at *7 (N.D.W. Va. July 29, 2010) ("[M]erely pointing a taser at the plaintiff cannot support a claim for excessive force, especially in the light of the plaintiff's 'protest' to being questioned about his possession of a controlled substance."). Thus, the claim related to the taser will be dismissed.

Multiple courts considering similar facts, however, have found that merely showing a Taser—or indeed, a gun—to gain compliance does not exceed the de minimis level of force which officers are privileged to use to effect arrests. See Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Woolman's conduct in drawing his gun and pointing it at Edwards, without any indication Woolman intended or attempted to fire the gun, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation."); Salvadon v. Ricotta, 2013 WL 3816728, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013) ("Mere threatening language and gestures ... do not ... amount to [a] constitutional violation") (citations omitted); Noe v. West Virginia, 2010 WL 3025561, at *7 (N.D.W.V. July 29, 2010) ("[M]erely pointing a taser at the plaintiff cannot support a claim for excessive force.") (citing Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988)).

Courts in other jurisdictions have found that the threatened use of a taser does not support a claim of excessive force. See Salvodon v. Ricotta, 2013 WL 3816728 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013) (no claim stated based on threatened use of taser alone); Noe v. West Virginia, 2010 WL 3025561 (N.D. W.Va. July 29, 2010) (merely pointing a taser cannot support a claim for excessive force). On the other hand, some courts have suggested that even benign use of a taser must serve a purpose beyond simply inflicting gratuitous fear.

Likewise, courts in other jurisdictions have found that threatened use of a taser does not support a claim of excessive force. See Salvodon v. Ricotta, 2013 WL 3816728 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013) (no claim stated based on threatened use of taser alone); Noe v. West Virginia, 2010 WL 3025561 (N.D. W.Va. July 29, 2010) (merely pointing a taser cannot support a claim for excessive force). On the other hand, some courts have suggested that even benign use of a taser must serve a purpose beyond simply inflicting gratuitous fear.