Opinion
A158385
12-05-2019
N.M., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. JD02769702)
On September 5, 2019, the juvenile court set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and select a permanent plan for three-year-old Abdul K. Seeking review by extraordinary writ, Abdul's mother, N.M. (mother), contends that the court erred by refusing to return Abdul to her care or alternatively by terminating her reunification services. We deny mother's petition on the merits.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
BACKGROUND
I. The Dependency Petition and Exercise of Jurisdiction
In April 2018, the Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition alleging that 18-month old Abdul came within the juvenile court's dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) due to his parents' failure or inability to provide him adequate, regular care. The Agency alleged three sets of facts in support for jurisdiction. First, parents had failed to demonstrate their ability to properly care of Abdul, who is "medically fragile," suffers from malnutrition, and has been diagnosed with "oral [a]version, motor delay, global hypertonia, reflux, and is G-Tube dependent." Abdul had been hospitalized several times for failure to thrive, would gain weight when in the hospital, and would lose weight once returned home. Second, parents had a history of domestic violence and in March they had a physical altercation in front of Abdul, while he was lying on his back covered in vomit. Third, parents had previously been afforded family maintenance and family reunification services but concerns about their inability to care for Abdul persisted.
According to the detention report, the Agency decided to remove Abdul when he was in the hospital for the fourth time in six months due to lack of weight gain. Mother, who is from Afghanistan, reported that her estranged husband, who is from Pakistan, was very strict and subjected her to domestic violence for 12 years until a few weeks before the petition was filed, when he abruptly moved out of the home and stopped supporting mother and their five children. Mother admitted needing help; she reported that she loved her children but she was overwhelmed. Abdul's four siblings, who were in second, fourth, sixth and seventh grade, all reported that they felt safe and appeared well cared for in mother's home. Abdul's father, N.K. (father), was interviewed at the hospital. He and mother both reported that the reason Abdul gained weight during hospital stays was because he exerted less energy when confined to a crib.
On April 4, 2018, Abdul was detained by the juvenile court and placed in foster care. A combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing was scheduled for May 24. The Agency recommended that Abdul be declared a dependent and that both parents receive reunification services. According to the Agency report, Abdul was doing well in his placement. The foster family was comfortable caring for Abdul's special needs, was supportive of Abdul's family and accommodated liberal visitation. Mother, however, was not doing well. She and three of her children moved into a shelter after father left the country with their other child. Mother was distraught, reported that her extended family could not take her in and was unsure what she would do without father's support. The Agency had not heard from father.
Mother opposed the Agency's recommendation to make Abdul a court dependent, so the matter was continued for a contest. In September 2018, the Agency filed an addendum report recommending that no services be provided to father, who could not be located. The Agency reported that mother had some support from maternal relatives and was receiving public assistance, which had allowed her to meet the basic needs of her older children, but she failed to demonstrate that she was capable of caring for Abdul by following proper guidelines for his feeding and G-tube maintenance.
Following a contested hearing in September 2018, the court found the allegations in Abdul's dependency petition were true, and adjudged him a court dependent. The court appointed counsel for both parents but also found that the Agency performed a reasonably diligent search for father, who could not be located. Reunification services were ordered for mother.
II. The Reunification Period
In October 2018, the Agency requested approval of a change in Abdul's foster care placement, which the court granted in early November. The original foster care family requested the change because they were having trouble meeting Abdul's medical needs and because mother failed to respect appropriate boundaries. The new placement was described by the Agency as "the Non Related Extended Family Member (NREFM) Home" of a couple, who was committed to ensuring that Abdul attend all medical appointments and to setting appropriate boundaries with mother. When the court approved the new placement, it reduced mother's visits to one supervised visit a week for two hours, with the proviso that visits would be increased to twice a week if mother had three consecutive successful visits.
The 6-month status review hearing was set for March 2019. The Agency recommended that the dependency continue, that reunification services to mother be terminated and that the matter be set for a section 366.26 hearing, with a plan of adoption by Abdul's current caregivers.
In its status review report, the Agency included a summary of Abdul's social services history. He came to the attention of the Agency several days after his premature birth because of a positive toxicology report for opiates and exposure to methadone. Mother had been using opiates for years to treat chronic pain and also took medication for anxiety and depression. While in the hospital, she reported domestic abuse by her husband but then recanted. The Agency provided informal family maintenance services, but Abdul had to be removed from the home in January 2017. In April, Abdul was returned to the custody of his father, again with maintenance services. That dependency case was dismissed in December 2017, after parents "ensured" that Abdul's health issues were being addressed, father completed domestic violence counseling, and mother produced consistent negative drug tests. However, four months later, the Agency filed the current petition based on evidence that parents were still unable to meet Abdul's needs.
Regarding the family's current status, the Agency had not heard from father, and mother was living temporarily with her parents or with her brother. The social worker reported that mother clung to her erroneous belief that Abdul would be returned to her once she stabilized her housing. The social worker attempted to explain the reasons Abdul was not in mother's care, but she continued to say that he would be returned to her at the next hearing.
Mother's case plan included a parenting class and individual therapy, for which she received several referrals. She was late getting started with her parenting class, but by February 2019, she was regularly attending. Mother had tried two therapists, who both reported she did not regularly attend appointments, was difficult to engage, and appeared to question the benefits of therapy. Reports about mother's supervised visits raised additional concerns. She was often late and needed to be reminded about basic rules, like not to bring her children to visits when they were sick, and not to bring food for Abdul. The social worker also had to remind mother to not to use her visit time to talk with the interpreter about her personal problems.
Mother's visits did not include G-tube feedings because she had failed to regularly attend Abdul's medical appointments or to demonstrate an understanding of his medical needs. Problems arose at some of the appointments mother did attend. For example, mother had been disruptive when the nurse attempted to train both foster mothers about how to feed Abdul. During one meeting, the nurse had to ask mother to leave the room. After the appointment, mother was found in an empty room rocking back and forth and stating several times she wanted Abdul returned to her. Mother's behavior led the nurse to inquire whether she was taking prescription drugs or opiates, which she denied.
Abdul appeared to be comfortable and well cared for in his foster home placement. He was gaining weight, speaking one-word sentences and seemed happy. The foster parents continued to express a desire for adoption. They lived near the maternal grandparents, who had supported the placement and committed to playing an active role in Abdul's life.
At mother's request, the Agency attempted to evaluate the maternal grandparents as a possible alternate placement. Although mother previously reported that her family disowned her, maternal relatives were providing the family with financial assistance and temporary housing. Maternal grandmother reported that during the first dependency she could not take Abdul because of a problem with her health, which had since resolved, and that she wanted to take him now. However, maternal grandfather reported that he was the only driver in the home, but he was not able to drive Abdul to appointments because of a heart problem. The maternal grandparents wanted Abdul returned to mother, but they were willing to take him if the court so ordered. However, they were not willing to participate in an assessment because it would be disruptive, and they had too many people who came and went from their home. They refused to be evaluated even when an interpreter explained this was a prerequisite.
Summarizing its concerns, the Agency reported that mother was not compliant in therapy, was not consistent about attending Abdul's appointments, and appeared to have untreated mental health issues. She did not understand why Abdul was removed from her care and needed reminders about her responsibilities. Most important, mother's lack of comprehension about Abdul's medical needs impacted her ability to demonstrate that she could care for him. Thus, the Agency recommended that family reunification services be terminated so that Abdul could be permanently placed with his non-relative extended family foster care providers.
Mother opposed the Agency recommendation and the matter was continued for a contest. In the meantime, the Agency filed addendum reports regarding mother's progress toward completing her case plan during the period between April and June 2019.
The Agency reported that mother's irregular attendance and strange behavior at Abdul's medical appointments continued. Abdul's gastroenterologist advised the Agency she would be concerned if Abdul was placed in a home with mother because the child was distressed by mother's " 'disruptive and disturbing' " behavior. Also, mother was still not having consistently positive visits with Abdul. Sometimes, she required prompting about very basic rules, or she would leave for a period in the middle of a visit without any explanation. On one visit, mother rolled around on the floor by herself for about three minutes, and she was also observed " 'rough-housing' " with Abdul. In April, mother's individual therapist had reported that services were being terminated due to non-compliance. Later that month, mother told the social worker she was going to live with her brother in Modesto and wanted to attend therapy there.
The Agency reported that it made several referrals for mother to be evaluated for substance abuse to determine whether to add substance abuse services to her case plan due to her history, but she repeatedly cancelled or missed appointments. Eventually, she was evaluated on May 29, returned a negative test that day, and was referred for weekly random testing.
III. The Contested Review Hearing
The contested review hearing began on June 12, 2019 and was conducted over several court sessions. After reports were admitted into evidence, the county elicited testimony from two witnesses, Nancy Roth, the Agency's nurse for "medically fragile" children, and Agency social worker, Melanie Pang.
Roth, who became Abdul's medically fragile nurse in May 2017, testified that she is concerned mother cannot care for Abdul's medical needs. During her testimony, Roth gave three primary reasons for this concern. First, she had never seen mother use the G-tube to feed Abdul. Second, mother expressed the view that Abdul can eat food, which ignores the fact that he has oral aversion. Oral aversion does not mean Abdul cannot eat food but that he will throw up the food if he does eat it. As Roth explained, "the more he would throw up the more weight he would lose. And so it becomes a vicious cycle. And if you did try and put food in his mouth he would gag and throw up." The third reason for Roth's concern was that mother did not pay attention when doctors spoke about Abdul's condition, so she did not get a "clear understanding of what was happening at the appointments." Roth's impression was that mother did not struggle to comprehend the issues, but rather that she just failed to pay attention. Roth's concerns were based on her personal observations. She met mother in July 2017, during Abdul's first dependency case, after he was returned to his parent's home. In the years since then, Roth interacted with mother approximately 20 times, with 9 or 10 of those interactions being one-on-one encounters.
Roth testified that before Abdul was detained from parents for the second time, she visited the family home approximately seven times and the only person she saw use the G-tube was father. More recently, Roth has observed mother at Abdul's medical appointments, and she recounted an October 2018 appointment when mother interfered with the new foster mother's training about how to use Abdul's G-tube. Abdul was lying on the table and mother was essentially "laying on top of him talking to him." She refused to leave him alone for the training, so Roth asked her to leave the room. Then a staff person came in and asked if mother was okay because she "was out in the hall stumbling." Roth went and found mother and asked if she was taking drugs. Mother said she was only taking Neurontin and Motrin. Roth recalled other appointments when mother would play with Abdul or "just kind of lay over him and talk with him" when doctors tried to examine him.
Regarding Abdul's progress, Roth testified that when Abdul was in mother's care, he lost weight and was hospitalized multiple times. When mother visited Abdul at his first foster home, she brought food for him that he should not have been eating and fed it to him even though it made him throw up. Abdul is doing well in his current foster home. In the last six months, he gained weight and was hospitalized only once, which was because of a virus. Because he is putting on weight, the family is implementing a plan to decrease G-tube feedings, so that Abdul may be able to take more food by mouth.
Ms. Pang, the Agency social worker, was assigned to Abdul's case in September 2018. Pang testified that she recommends terminating mother's parental rights because there is no substantial probability reunification will occur. Pang doubts mother's ability to reunify because she "constantly needs reminders to attend Abdul's appointments and her own appointments," and because she "does not show a clear understanding of Abdul's medical needs."
Pang also testified that mother's compliance with her case plan has been minimal. Mother's plan requires her to attend Abdul's appointments, participate in individual therapy, complete a parenting class, complete substance abuse screening, and participate in visitation. The parenting class is the only component mother completed.
Pang testified that mother missed 9 of the 24 medical appointments that Abdul had during Pang's tenure. Pang routinely provided mother with reminders about these appointments. After mother moved to Modesto, she asked the Agency to send reminders to her brother. At that point, Pang began sending appointment reminders to both mother and her brother. Mother gave multiple reasons for missing appointments, such as that she forgot or was sick. Pang was also concerned by mother's behavior at appointments she did attend. Pang was present at two of those appointments. At one, mother used "a high-raised volume" to talk to the foster mother, which necessitated having separate visits with the two women. At the other appointment, it seemed that mother did not pay attention. She did not ask questions or express concerns in response to the foster mom's report regarding Abdul.
Regarding other plan requirements, Pang testified that mother was referred for individual therapy, but her therapist terminated her in April 2019 due to non-compliance. The Agency gave mother a new referral after she moved to Modesto, where mother attended 2 out of 4 scheduled appointments. She repeatedly missed or cancelled appointments for a substance abuse assessment, which she finally completed in May at which time she was referred for weekly drug tests, which she failed to do. Finally, mother had attended approximately 15 of her last 20 scheduled visits with Abdul. Her behavior during visits was inconsistent and she often needed reminders to be cautious around Abdul.
After the Agency completed its case, the contested review was continued for mother to present her evidence. There were several additional continuances and when the hearing resumed in August 2017, the parties stipulated that the review had become a combined 6- and 12-month status review.
Before mother called her witnesses, the court admitted another report that the Agency completed in late July 2019. The Agency reported that, since the last hearing, mother continued to need repeated reminders about her appointments and that she had still failed to participate in random drug testing. Also, there was a recent incident when she left her daughter at a gas station because she did not realize the girl had gotten out of the car, and she had to call the police for help getting her back.
At the hearing, mother's first witness was her brother, Nazir, who testified that he has been in regular contact with mother since Abdul was born. Nazir tries to provide mother with whatever support she needs. For example, when Abdul was first removed in 2017, Nazir contacted the Agency social worker to try to "resolve the issue." Since then, Nazir has helped mother with translation because her English was not 100%, with transportation at times, and with communication, to help her understand what needed to be done to improve the situation. He has also provided financial support. At the time he gave his testimony, Nazir saw mother almost every day because she and her children had been living in his home since May.
Nazir has noticed a difference in mother since 2017 when Abdul was born; he believes mother "improved a lot from the situation that she was in." During her marriage, mother had some traumatic experiences, but now she is going to therapy and keeping up with appointments. Nazir has seen her communication improve and she is taking good care of her children. Nazir acknowledged that in the past mother may have had some mental health issues when she was on medications that impacted her ability to understand and communicate with others, but she had not experienced these problems for at least one and a half or two years.
Mother was the final witness. When she began her testimony, she spoke English, but the court instructed her to use her interpreter because the court wanted to make sure that she understood everything and also that her responses were clearly understood. Despite this admonition, mother sometimes began her answers in English and began to answer questions before they were translated, which led to confusion.
Mother testified that Abdul was removed from her care because of his weight and because of domestic violence. Mother did not know why Abdul was losing weight and testified that the doctors did not know either. She recalled that when Abdul was an infant, she asked her husband for help because she had other kids to care for, so they sought help from a nurse and then Abdul was put in the hospital. After mother took Abdul to the hospital four or five times, he was put in foster care. Mother testified that she always followed whatever advice the doctor gave her, but Abdul's weight just kept going up and down.
Mother was aware that her case plan required her to attend Abdul's medical appointments and testified that she attended 90 percent of them. She missed one because her car broke down and another time she was sick. Mother explained that she did not ask many questions at appointments because Abdul was not in her care but under the care of his foster mom and because everyone was aware of Abdul's health problems. During appointments, doctors tended to direct their attention to foster mom, but sometimes they addressed mother. Mother recounted an appointment at the end of 2018 when the foster mom reacted badly. According to mother, Abdul was on the ground playing with garbage, so she picked him up to wash his hands, so he would not get sick. The foster mom told her not to do that because she always acted like she was the "real mom." Mother testified that this was the only argument she had with the foster mom and after the encounter the medical staff was "much nicer" to mother.
Mother testified that for the first five months of her case, she was not able to attend most of her individual therapy appointments because she was homeless, but since she moved to Modesto she has attended all her appointments. But then she admitted missing two appointments, once because her car broke down and another time because she was sick. Mother believes that therapy has helped her to deal with stress and makes her feel better. She also testified that her life has stabilized in other ways. She has a year lease in Modesto and wants to be there. Her brother and family are helping with finances and she recently applied for a job at Taco Bell. Finally, mother testified that she has complied with her visitation requirement. She currently has weekly visits with Abdul but used to have longer visits twice a week until the foster mom complained that it was too much for Abdul and that the visits were making him sick. Mother acknowledged that she missed some visits because of car problems and for other reasons as well.
Under cross-examination, mother testified that she did not understand why this case was in juvenile court. She felt she had done everything a mother could do. She acknowledged that Abdul is medically fragile and that he was removed because the court found that she and her husband were unable to demonstrate that they could properly care for him. But she denied playing any role in his malnutrition. Mother testified that she always fed Abdul what he was supposed to eat and made sure his needs were met but he didn't gain enough weight and she insisted that this problem continued even when he was in foster care. During the first dependency case, she was offered and completed family maintenance services, and in the current case she was "given a plan of things that [she] needed to do to have [her] son back at home," and she did everything she was told to do.
IV. The Juvenile Court Rulings
On September 5, 2019, the juvenile court held a hearing to announce its rulings, beginning with the material contested issues. First, returning Abdul home would still pose a substantial risk of detriment to his safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. Second, there was no substantial probability that Abdul could or would be returned to mother and safely maintained in her home prior to the date of an 18-month review. Third, mother was provided with reasonable services, including a case plan and case management services.
The court's reasonable services finding was based on evidence that services offered to mother included: referrals to therapy; transportation assistance; regular contact with the social worker to facilitate case plan compliance; providing lists of Abdul's medical appointments to facilitate attendance; language services, including interpreters, provided for meetings and appointments and visits; a substance abuse assessment; and a parent advocate to assist with supervised visits with the goal of monitoring progress so visits could be increased. The court also made express findings that the Agency identified the problems that led to Abdul's removal and offered services designed to address those problems, and that it maintained contact with mother and attempted to assist mother in areas where compliance proved difficult.
Regarding mother's progress, the court began by affirming there is no question she loves her children. The court also acknowledged that mother faced many challenges and that she made efforts to engage in the reunification process. Despite some progress, however, she was unable to move beyond supervised visits or even to a level of increased visits. The court expressed particular concern regarding mother's inability or unwillingness to recognize the reasons Abdul became a court dependent. Another "significant" issue was mother's failure to demonstrate her ability to care for Abdul even after services were provided over a long period. As evidence this problem had not been ameliorated, the court referred to letters Abdul's doctor sent to the Agency in March and May of 2019. As evidence of mother's failure to make progress toward her goals during visitation, the court cited reports from the supervisor that mother continued to require prompting, that she held Abdul too tightly, was too loud around him and did not focus her attention on him.
The court reiterated that mother was trying but opined that she was overwhelmed. Also, it appeared that she viewed the demands of her case plan "as another form of abuse." And, mother failed to prioritize her obligations. For example, she did not complete the substance abuse screening and testing requirement for ten months. The court emphasized there was no hard evidence of a current substance abuse problem. However, in light of a reported prior 10-year history of substance abuse, the Agency simply wanted to confirm that substance abuse was not a problem.
The court concluded by making detailed findings on issues that must be addressed at status hearings, reiterating its conclusions that reasonable services were provided, and that a substantial risk of detriment precluded returning Abdul to the care of mother. The court also terminated reunification services and continued the matter of a section 366.26 hearing.
DISCUSSION
I. Issues Presented and Standard of Review
Mother contends that the order to set this case for a section 366.26 hearing must be reversed because Abdul should have been returned to her care at the conclusion of the status review. Alternatively, mother argues she was entitled to an additional period of reunification services.
At the 6-month and 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court must "order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) The Agency has the burden of proving this detriment. However, "the failure of the parent . . . to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental." (Ibid.)
If a dependent child cannot be returned safely to the parent at the 12-month review, the juvenile court has discretion to extend the reunification period to the 18-month deadline only if it finds that (1) reasonable reunification services have not been provided, or (2) there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of the parent and "safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time." (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
The juvenile court's findings on these issues are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard of review. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763 [substantial risk-of-detriment finding]; Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688-689 [termination of reunification services].). Under this standard, "we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders. [Citation.] 'We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.' " (Kevin R. at pp. 688-689.)
II. The Substantial Risk-of-Detriment Finding
In reviewing a risk-of-detriment finding, we look for evidence of a "substantial" risk, such that returning the child to parental custody "represents some danger to [the child's] physical or emotional well-being." (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 788.) Pertinent factors include the extent to which the parent participated in reunification services (§ 366.22, subd. (a); Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748), and the efforts or progress the parent made toward eliminating the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement. (§ 366.22, subd. (a); In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1141-1142.)
Here, there is substantial evidence that mother made only partial progress in reaching the objectives of her case plan, and that she failed to demonstrate that she fully understood and would meet Abdul's special needs. Agency reports and witness testimony support the juvenile court's finding that Abdul could not be returned safely to mother at the 12 month juncture because there would still be a substantial risk to Abdul's health, safety and well-being. Disputing these conclusions, mother makes two basic arguments.
First, mother contends that the court erred by failing to recognize that she was entitled to an especially strong presumption that Abdul would be returned to her, based on the fact that her older children had not been removed from her care. We disagree; mother's ability to care for her other children is not dispositive here. During the reunification period, there is a statutory presumption that the child "should" be returned home unless the Agency "demonstrates" that returning the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 420.) This risk-of-detriment inquiry focuses on the reason that the child was removed and, in this case, that reason was specific to Abdul, who has serious medical conditions that require special care. There is substantial evidence mother has not been able to demonstrate her ability to provide that care.
Mother cites cases that do not support her legal proposition that some parents of dependent children are entitled to a stronger presumption than others that their child will be returned during the reunification period. (See Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322; In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394; T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229.) Further, these cases are factually inapposite. Neither Jennifer A. nor Yvonne W. involved a dependent child who was removed because of the parents' inability to care for a special medical condition. (Jennifer A., at p. 1328; Yvonne W., at p. 1397.) And, while this court's decision in T.J. involved a dependent child with a medical condition, it did not involve a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a risk-of-detriment finding. (T.J., at p. 1250.)
Mother's second argument is that her progress toward completion of her case plan was substantial rather than partial and that she did alleviate or mitigate the causes of the dependency. She argues, for example, that there is "no evidence" she failed to participate in court-ordered programs because she "attended the majority of visits and medical appointments with Abdul" and she had valid excuses for appointments she missed. Attending a majority of the appointments is not the standard. The Agency provided evidence that mother did not regularly attend her appointments despite the Agency's reasonable efforts to assist her. There is also substantial evidence that mother forgot to attend appointments despite repeated reminders, and, importantly, that she often failed to participate actively in services when she did attend them.
Furthermore, mother's contention that she has mitigated the problems that led to this dependency is based exclusively on testimony from herself and her brother. She considers the Agency's evidence only to challenge the credibility of service providers, such as Abdul's doctor and the Agency visitation supervisor, who expressed the view that mother lacked skills to be a safe caregiver for Abdul. These arguments are incompatible with our standard of review. We summarize briefly the information these providers reported to the Agency, which was based on their first-hand encounters and observations, with the caveat that it is only some of the substantial evidence presented at the review hearing that supports the risk-of-detriment finding.
In March 2019, Abdul's gastroenterologist expressed in writing her strong recommendation against returning Abdul to the home of his family "if his mother is in the home at any time." Dr. Gleghorn reported that mother was "disruptive" and "disturbing" during Abdul's medical appointments and opined that Abdul would "lose all the ground that he has gained" if he was returned to mother's care. Dr. Gleghorn confirmed her view the following May, writing: "I would like to emphasize that I feel that his biologic[al] mother would not be capable of the calm and the organization to assume his care. She has failed in the past, even [with] a lot of support. In addition, her overemotional fussing with him has been counterproductive to his calm learning and coping skills. He should not be placed in her home, even if another person was nominally in [c]harge of him there." As late as August 5, 2019, the staff who supervised mother's visits reported that mother "ha[d] not made any progress towards her goals," that she needed prompting from her support counselor, she grabbed her child too tightly, her voice was too loud, and she did not remain focused on Abdul during visits.
Focusing on the issue that caused Abdul to be removed from his mother's care—her failure adequately to address his medical needs—we find, especially in Dr. Gleghorn's letters, substantial evidence supporting the finding of a continuing risk of detriment to Abdul's health and safety. Thus, the juvenile court did not err by refusing to return Abdul to mother at the conclusion of the 12-month review hearing.
II. The Termination of Mother's Reunification Services
Because the juvenile court found that Abdul could not be returned safely to mother, its discretion to extend the reunification period was limited, as noted previously. To extend the reunification period to the 18-month deadline, the court would have had to find that mother was not provided with reasonable services or that there was a substantial probability Abdul would be returned to the physical custody of mother and "safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time." (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) Mother contends that both of these circumstances apply here. We disagree.
A. Reasonable Services Were Provided
" '[T]he focus of reunification services is to remedy those problems which led to the removal of the children.' [Citation.] A reunification plan must be tailored to the particular individual and family, addressing the unique facts of that family. [Citation.] A social services agency is required to make a good faith effort to address the parent's problems through services, to maintain reasonable contact with the parent during the course of the plan, and to make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult. [Citation.] However, in most cases more services might have been provided and the services provided are often imperfect. [Citation.] 'The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.' " (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598-599.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the finding that mother was provided with reasonable services. She was given the means and opportunity to participate in Abdul's medical treatment in order to demonstrate that she could and would attend to Abdul's special needs. The Agency also identified problems mother was experiencing that may have impeded her from caring for Abdul and provided services to address those problems, such as a parenting class, therapy, and substance abuse screening. Finally, mother was provided with visitation in a supervised setting, where she could demonstrate her ability to care for Abdul. Mother disagrees with the court's reasonable services finding, contending her services were deficient in four respects. But each of her complaints misconstrues the record.
First, mother intimates that she was unable to attend services because the Agency failed to provide her with adequate transportation services. To the contrary, the record shows that the social worker gave mother BART tickets, an AMTRAK pass, maps and an interpreter to provide directions, as well as rides to some of her appointments. Even if we accept that mother missed some appointments because of unforeseen car problems, there is other significant evidence that her failure regularly to attend appointments was also indicative of her inability to manage the many responsibilities necessary to meet Abdul's special needs.
Mother contends that transportation-related services were inadequate because all the social worker did was provide her with mileage reimbursement forms that she did not know how to complete. Mother's record citations simply do not support this claim, but show instead that during a May 2019 phone call, mother complained to the social worker that she had submitted a mileage reimbursement form but had not received payment. The social worker responded that she had not yet received the form. A few months later, in July, the social worker reported that mother had requested documentation of her visits from the visitation supervisor so that she could obtain reimbursement. If anything, these encounters suggest that mother did know how to obtain reimbursement from the Agency for her mileage.
Mother's second argument is that the Agency did not assist her in locating housing. Importantly, mother's housing situation had nothing to do with the reason Abdul was removed. Nor was there any dispute that mother had stable housing at the time of the review hearing. Beyond that, we find evidence inconsistent with mother's claim that she was denied needed housing assistance. In October 2018, when mother was still living in her Berkeley home, the social worker and an interpreter met her there and assisted her in contacting a city official about securing section 8 housing assistance at a home of the friend of mother's brother. At that time, mother told the social worker her parents would not allow her to live in a shelter and that she would stay with them in Fremont, if need be.
Mother's argument appears to be that her unstable housing situation explains why she was unable to attend services. We acknowledge the difficulty of mother's housing and transportation problems but conclude mother over-states the extent to which they explain her failure to participate in services. Mother makes the erroneous claim that her visitation was reduced because of her failure to attend visits due to unstable housing. Visits were reduced and ordered to be supervised because when Abdul was in his first foster care placement, mother fed him food that made him sick and failed to respect appropriate boundaries.
Mother's third objection is that the Agency did not provide her with "[a]ppropriate" translation services, despite knowing that her English language skills were so limited that she needed assistance to make a basic phone call. Again, the record does not support this claim.
Preliminarily, we observe that mother's writ counsel downplays mother's language skills. Agency reports reflect Abdul's family is "multi-cultural and multi-ethnic," that mother is from Iran and father is from Pakistan. Mother reports that she speaks multiple languages including Farsi, Dari, and Hindi. The record also contains persuasive evidence that mother communicates well in English. For example, in May 2018, the social worker placed a call to mother using a "Language Line Interpreting Service," but mother insisted on speaking English. Subsequently, in late August 2018, when the social worker was unable to secure translation services for a planned phone call, she placed the call anyway based on her observation that mother had functional English. During that call mother stated that she wanted to proceed without an interpreter and " 'that she speaks eight (8) languages, however she is not good at reading or writing in any language, as she had limited formal education as a child.' "
Furthermore, mother's substantive contention that a language barrier prevented her from engaging in services is not consistent with the incidents she refers us to. She relies primarily on a September 2018 visit in Fairfield, which was supervised by a private agency. When the staff person who supervised that visit asked mother to speak English, she responded that it was illegal to stop her from speaking in her language and asked for a supervisor's contact information to give to her lawyer. The staff person provided mother with contact information for her supervisor and for the county social worker and with a copy of the visitation rules. The worker also offered to contact the county for mother and request a translator for her visits. This encounter does not support mother's assertion that she was denied adequate translation services.
Mother also suggests that the reason she did not pay attention at medical appointments was because the Agency failed to provide her with a Dari interpreter. First, mother's premise that she was denied a Dari interpreter at medical appointments is supported by a single citation to a page in the record that does not exist. Second, the social worker reported that she ensured a Farsi interpreter was at every appointment and available to mother and her family. Nothing in the record indicates that these translation services were inadequate. Moreover, Abdul's long-time nurse, Ms. Roth, concluded from her personal observations that mother's failure to participate in medical appointments was due to inattention not a lack of comprehension.
Finally, mother contends that the Agency failed to provide her with the medical training that she was punished for not having. The record shows that, prior to the current dependency, mother was trained about how to use the G-tube every time Abdul was hospitalized. Mother was reminded of this fact at a September 2018 team meeting when she voiced her objection to the Agency's recommendation to reinstitute the dependency case. During that same meeting, mother was reminded that before she could manage the G-tube she needed to learn what foods Abdul could not eat, such as the candy, chips and other food the family had been bringing to visits. According to the Agency report, mother stated that she understood she needed to address these issues.
Mother makes the sound point that if using Abdul's G-tube was "the issue in this dependency" case, then the Agency should have tailored mother's case plan to provide her with training "to help her learn how to properly manage it." However, inability to use the G-tube was not the problem, but rather a symptom of the problem that led to this dependency. Abdul became a court dependent for the second time in his short life because even after many months of family maintenance and reunification services, his parents would not or could not provide him with the type and level of care required for his special medical needs. After an additional 12 months of services, mother continued to deny any responsibility for Abdul's failure to thrive while he was in her care, and to claim that the doctors did not know why he struggled to gain weight. This testimony from mother herself constitutes substantial evidence that she did not avail herself of the opportunity to learn from medical care providers how to care for Abdul.
During the reunification period, the Agency provided many services designed to assist mother in demonstrating that she was willing and able to meet Abdul's special needs, and yet at the 12-month juncture mother's partial progress did not resolve that central problem, or other relevant challenges that she faced in the aftermath of her marriage. The question is not whether the Agency could have done more, but whether the services provided were reasonable. There is substantial evidence in this record supporting the reasonable services finding.
B. There Was No Substantial Probability of Returning Abdul to Mother
Once the juvenile court found that mother received reasonable services, it had authority to extend the reunification period to the 18-month deadline only if there was a "substantial probability" that Abdul could be returned to the physical custody of mother and safely maintained in her home within the extended period. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) To find such a probability existed, the court would have had to find, among other things, that mother made "significant progress" in resolving the problems that led to the dependency and that she "demonstrated the capacity and ability" to complete her plan objectives and provide for Abdul's "safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs." (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(B) & (C).)
Here, the court found that mother did not make significant progress in resolving the problems that led to this dependency, notwithstanding some effort to engage in services, and that she did not demonstrate the ability or capacity to reach the core objective of the case plan, which was to provide a safe home for Abdul, where she would meet his medical needs. These findings are supported by the substantial evidence we have already discussed. Thus, the juvenile court did not have authority to extend the reunification period, even if it had been inclined to do so. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
When, as here, a dependent child is not returned to a parent at the 12-month review, and "there is no substantial probability of return to the parent within 18 months of the original removal order, the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan." (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249, italics added.) Accordingly, mother's request that we reverse the order setting this matter for a section 366.26 hearing necessarily fails.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary relief is denied on the merits. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
/s/_________
TUCHER, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
POLLAK, P. J. /s/_________
BROWN, J.