Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2363-11T4
03-22-2013
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. J.W., Defendant-Appellant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF Z.W., a minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Christine B. Mowry, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Patricia J. O'Dowd, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Elahna Strom Weinflash, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Ashrafi and Guadagno.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FG-14-0071-11.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Christine B. Mowry, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Patricia J. O'Dowd, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Elahna Strom Weinflash, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant-mother, J.W., appeals from the judgment of the Family Part terminating her parental rights to a daughter, Z.W., now five years old. We affirm.
The Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) presented evidence initially in a Title Nine case alleging abuse and neglect, and subsequently at a Title Thirty trial seeking to terminate J.W.'s parental rights so that the child can be adopted. At the three-day guardianship trial in October and November 2011, the Family Part reviewed documentary evidence and heard testimony from two DYFS caseworkers, the child's foster father, three expert witnesses, defendant, and her boyfriend. A summary of the relevant facts follows.
At the age of eleven, defendant was diagnosed with severe bipolar disorder. She has been hospitalized several times, including an eighteen-month stay at a residential facility. She is a high school graduate but has not worked since 2003 and subsists on social welfare benefits.
Defendant gave birth to her daughter in 2007, when defendant was twenty-five years old. The pregnancy was the result of a casual relationship, and the child's biological father has had no involvement in her life. After the alleged father was located in another state, he denied knowing defendant and declined to undergo a paternity test. The case proceeded against J.W. alone.
From 2007 to 2009, DYFS investigated defendant several times because family members and others reported that she was neglecting the child and because the police were called for several domestic violence incidents between defendant and her boyfriend, B.H., including in the presence of the child. In November 2007, when the child was about six months old, DYFS received a referral alleging that the child was at risk of harm because of defendant's drug use, untreated mental illness, and domestic violence. DYFS investigated and found that the child was safe, but it also concluded that ongoing supervision was warranted. Defendant agreed to a case plan that required her to comply with mental health services.
In February 2009, the police were called to the residence defendant shared with her boyfriend because of a domestic altercation. Defendant had wielded a kitchen knife and threatened to kill herself. Later, she claimed that the child was asleep in her playpen throughout the incident. The police took her to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation. Defendant admitted she was not taking her psychiatric medications, stating that they interfered with her parenting ability. Although DYFS found no evidence of neglect, it concluded that there was a "substantial risk" of harm to the child because of defendant's mental illness and her pattern of maintaining violent relationships. Defendant agreed not to live with B.H. and moved in with a family member. But within a month, she was forced to leave the relative's home. She refused placement at a shelter and instead moved back in with the boyfriend.
Seven months later, in September 2009, DYFS learned that defendant and her boyfriend were involved in another domestic violence incident. The boyfriend was arrested and charged with harassment. DYFS's follow-up report indicates that defendant remained committed to her relationship with the boyfriend. DYFS learned from the police that four incidents of domestic violence involving defendant and her boyfriend had been reported in the preceding eight months.
A month later, in October 2009, DYFS received a referral that defendant did not consistently feed or bathe the child and left soiled diapers on the floor. A neighbor found the two-year-old child walking on the street alone. When a DYFS caseworker visited defendant's apartment, she saw soiled diapers, old food and garbage littering the kitchen, and jugs of urine and a box of pornographic DVD's in the bedroom. Defendant was still not taking her psychiatric medications, was using marijuana, and remained committed to living with the boyfriend. DYFS concluded that charges of neglect were "substantiated" in that defendant did not protect her daughter from the risks posed by her mental illness, unstable lifestyle, and volatile relationship with the boyfriend. Defendant agreed to a DYFS case plan that required her to undergo psychological and substance abuse evaluations, to comply with mental health services, to refrain from domestic violence, and to establish a stable home.
A short time later, in November 2009, DYFS received another referral and returned to defendant's apartment with a police escort. DYFS offered to refer defendant to a shelter or to drive her to a relative's home. Defendant agreed to leave the apartment. While defendant and the child were being transported to her grandmother's home, defendant became erratic and threatened the DYFS caseworkers. In fear for their safety, the caseworkers drove to a police station. DYFS then carried out an emergency removal of the child from defendant's custody. On November 16, 2009, the Family Part granted DYFS custody and supervision of the child.
Shortly after removal, the child underwent a comprehensive medical evaluation and was found to have no developmental or health problems, except that she had missed some immunizations and needed dental work. Medical examinations in June 2010 and August 2011, while the child has been in the custody of DYFS, indicate that she has reached all developmental milestones.
The child has been in four different foster homes since her removal in November 2009. Since December 2010, she has been in the care of a foster father who is a relative of the child, and he and his wife are committed to adopting her. Because the foster parents are part of the child's extended family, she will be able to maintain existing relationships with other relatives. The foster parents will consider allowing defendant contact with the child after adoption, but only if defendant establishes more stability in her own life.
Since the child was removed, at least five additional domestic violence incidents have been reported between defendant and her boyfriend, defendant being the alleged aggressor in some of them. Defendant also admitted in March 2010 that she continues not to take her psychiatric medications.
DYFS has referred defendant for four psychiatric evaluations. In May 2009, board certified psychiatrist Alexander Iofin, M.D., examined defendant and diagnosed bipolar disorder, type I, severe. He recommended ongoing care by a mental health clinic located near her home. In December 2009, psychiatrist Paul Kennedy, M.D., examined defendant and diagnosed bipolar disorder with an "acute and chronic long-term history of mood swings." He recommended outpatient psychotherapy and mood stabilizing medication. By compliance orders entered between January 2010 and July 2011, the Family Part ordered that defendant be provided psychiatric and substance abuse evaluations, medication monitoring, counseling, parenting and anger management classes, and supervised visitation with the child.
In February 2010, DYFS referred defendant to the Center for Evaluation and Counseling for a forensic assessment of her parenting ability. Clinician Stephanie Kurilla, M.A., administered the Child Abuse Potential Inventory, which indicated defendant is not a risk for child abuse or neglect. However, the clinician believed the results were unreliable. After a three-hour interview, Kurilla concluded that defendant is "an emotionally unstable, behaviorally erratic, explosive adult with a history of anger management difficulties and violence" and "a high-risk parent for child abuse and neglect and is deficient in parenting skills." She recommended supervised visitation, psychotherapy, parenting and anger management classes.
In September 2011, Dr. Iofin conducted a follow-up psychiatric evaluation. He diagnosed defendant with post-traumatic stress, bipolar, and provisional schizoaffective disorders. He described her condition as severe and chronic. He concluded that defendant "currently cannot be considered as a minimally adequate parent for the child . . . [nor] in the foreseeable future as well." He recommended lifelong psychotherapy counseling, psychotropic medications, and medication monitoring.
In January 2010, a drug test of defendant was negative for drug use. In March 2010, substance abuse counseling services were cancelled by the provider because defendant did not come to her appointment or return calls. Also, in January 2010, DYFS referred defendant for couples counseling and medication monitoring. The therapist terminated the couples counseling after one session because of the behavior of defendant and her boyfriend. In the spring of 2010, defendant withdrew from another counseling program. In April and May 2010, DYFS referred defendant for anger management classes and counseling by a battered women's program. In June 2010, defendant resumed her counseling and medication monitoring but her case was closed by October for non-attendance. In March 2011, DYFS again referred defendant for parenting classes, and in May 2011, DYFS referred her for psychotherapy. She attended only sporadically.
Ultimately, DYFS concluded that defendant was not making adequate progress to justify the continuation of services and filed a plan to terminate parental rights. The Family Part entered a permanency order on October 29, 2010, approving DYFS's plan for termination of parental rights and adoption of the child because defendant did not show adequate progress in addressing her mental illness and unstable housing situation.
In April 2011, DYFS referred her to Family Intervention Services (FIS) for supervised visitation with the child. FIS staff initially reported that defendant was attentive, gentle, and positive during visits with her daughter, and that she was open to coaching by staff to improve her parenting skills. Within three months, however, defendant was no longer amenable to coaching, and she often engaged in phone calls during visitation. On a subsequent visit, defendant threatened and pushed FIS staff, and she was terminated from the program.
In May 2011, licensed psychologist Mark Singer, Ed.D., conducted a bonding evaluation of defendant and her boyfriend with the child to determine if reunification was in the child's best interest. Dr. Singer concluded that defendant and her boyfriend "are experiencing significant[] chronic disorders which they are not likely to address appropriately over time. . . . The data suggests that, within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, neither adult . . . is capable of parenting [the child] at this time."
With respect to parental attachment, Dr. Singer observed that the child was equally comfortable with defendant and her boyfriend and her foster parents. He concluded the child views each adult as a "significant parental figure." Dr. Singer concluded that the harm caused by the loss of one parental figure could be mitigated by a remaining parental figure if that parent had the emotional resources to provide a stable and nurturing home. Because defendant "will not likely become a viable parenting option[] . . . in the foreseeable future[,]" Dr. Singer's report recommended termination of her parental rights.
In June 2011, licensed psychologist Elizabeth Smith, Psy.D., conducted a second bonding evaluation. Dr. Smith administered the Adult Adolescent Parenting Inventory, which is intended to predict propensity for child abuse. The scores of defendant and her boyfriend indicated a "medium risk" for abuse. Dr. Smith found defendant was knowledgeable about parenting and child development, but had difficulty separating her feelings and identity from the child's. She concluded that if defendant and her boyfriend "remain together there is a high probability of continued conflict and domestic violence."
At the attachment evaluation, all four parental figures interacted well with the child, and she appeared happy and comfortable with all of them. The child referred to both couples as "daddy" and "mommy." Dr. Smith concluded that the child had a "high degree of familiarity" but not a "secure attachment" to defendant, and that the child was "in the process of developing a growing attachment to her foster parents." Dr. Smith also opined that if the child was reunited with defendant, "it is very likely that she would be placed in foster care again, causing significant and lasting emotional harm." The doctor recommend termination of defendant's parental rights.
Based on the evidence we have summarized, the Family Part entered judgment on December 6, 2011, terminating defendant's parental rights. The judge issued a thirty-four-page statement of reasons for the judgment. This appeal followed.
As an appellate court, we defer to the Family Part's findings of fact and the conclusions of law that are based on those findings. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R., 405 N.J. Super. 418, 433 (App. Div. 2009). We also defer to the trial court's assessment of expert evaluations. In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 382 (1999).
We accord deference to the trial judge because she had the opportunity to "make first-hand credibility judgments" and to gain a "feel of the case" over time, thus supporting a level of factual familiarity that cannot be duplicated by an appellate court reviewing a written record. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 293 (2007)). "We will not disturb the family court's decision to terminate parental rights when there is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the court's findings." Ibid.; accord In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002). "Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an appellate court intervene and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a denial of justice." E.P., supra, 196 N.J. at 104 (quoting G.L., supra, 191 N.J. at 605). Here, the Family Part's conclusions are not clearly mistaken or wide of the mark. They are supported by the evidence.
Defendant contends the judgment should be reversed because the evidence did not satisfy all four criteria required by N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) for termination of her parental rights. Under the statute, parental rights may be terminated when:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;DYFS bears the burden of proving the statutory criteria by clear and convincing evidence. G.L., supra, 191 N.J. at 606. The four subsections of the statute are "not discrete and separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999).
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide for a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) [DYFS] has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
The first prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires proof of harm to the child by the parent. The "standard does not concentrate on a single or isolated harm or past harm as such. . . . [T]he focus is on the effect of harms arising from the parent-child relationship over time on the child's health and development." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348. In this case, the Family Part concluded that the first prong was satisfied by defendant's mental illness preventing her from meeting the child's needs. The court referred to "a two-year period where [the child] experienced instability, neglect of her medical needs, and several instances of domestic violence . . . ."
We acknowledge that no evidence was presented showing that the child was actually harmed physically or psychologically by the domestic violence. The child's merely witnessing domestic violence between adults, without evidence of physical or emotional harm to the child, is not sufficient by itself to find that the child has been abused or neglected. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 372 N.J. Super. 13, 25-26 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 426 (2005); cf. M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 289 (harm is proven where parent does not protect child from danger presented by partner's domestic violence to the child).
We also acknowledge that "[m]ental illness, alone, does not disqualify a parent from raising a child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 450 (2012). The first prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), however, can be proven by expert evidence showing that a parent's mental illness prevents her from meeting a child's daily needs. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 436 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 44 (2002). One such need is that of a stable and safe home, the lack of which causes a child psychological harm. See K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 353; D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 379; N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 591-92 (App. Div. 1996); In re Guardianship of R., 155 N.J. Super. 186, 194 (App. Div. 1977). When a mental illness causes risk of harm, such as impermanence of the child's home and living conditions, and the parent is unwilling or incapable of obtaining appropriate treatment, the first prong has been proven. See F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 450-51. Repeated incidents of domestic violence add to the instability of the child's home.
Here, the expert evidence supports the Family Part's finding that defendant's mental illness has prevented and will continue to prevent her from providing the child a safe and permanent home and from the nurturing that the child needs. Dr. Iofin concluded "that [defendant] currently cannot be considered as a minimally adequate parent for the child . . . . [nor] in the foreseeable future," and he recommended lifelong mental health treatment. Dr. Singer also concluded that neither defendant nor the boyfriend "is capable of parenting [the child] at this time." Dr. Smith predicted that future foster care was "very likely" if the child were to reunited with defendant, "causing significant and lasting emotional harm" to the child. Defendant proffered no evidence to rebut these expert conclusions. She testified she still had not established a permanent home, and she admitted she had not regularly attended psychotherapy.
DYFS is not required to "wait 'until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect.'" F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 449 (quoting D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 383). We find no error in the Family Part's finding that defendant's mental illness prevented and will continue to prevent her from providing the child with a stable and safe home, one that is also free of domestic violence.
With respect to the second prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), defendant applies the outdated parental-fitness standard, which has been superseded by the best-interest-of-the-child standard in termination of parental rights cases. The Court in K.H.O. set forth the correct analysis:
[The] inquiry is aimed at determining whether the parent has cured and overcome the initial harm that endangered the health, safety, or welfare of the child, and is able to continue a parental relationship without recurrent harm to the child. Alternatively, under this second criterion, it may be shown that the parent is unable to provide a safe and stable home for the child and that the delay in securing permanency continues or adds to the child's harm.The Court recently reiterated the correct analytical approach:
[K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348-49 (citations omitted).]
[T]he cornerstone of the inquiry is not whether the biological parents are fit but whether they can cease causing their child harm. . . . The burden falls on the State to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent has not cured the initial cause of harm and will continue to cause serious and lasting harm to the child.
[N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 167-68 (2010) (quoting J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 10).]
In this case, the Family Part did not err in concluding that defendant failed to eliminate the harm she caused her daughter because she did not stay in treatment for her mental illness and did not establish a stable home. Cf. In re A., 277 N.J. Super. 454, 469 (App. Div. 1994) (parent's mental illness was overcome through parent's dedicated participation in mental health services). The harm to the child has not been eliminated. See A.G., supra, 344 N.J. Super. at 436-37.
Defendant emphasizes DYFS's findings that the first two neglect referrals were not substantiated, but the Family Part appropriately weighed the evidence as a whole with an eye to whether defendant would be able to provide a safe and stable home in the future. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2); F.M., 211 N.J. at 450-51; K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 348-49.
"Keeping the child in limbo, hoping for some long term unification plan, would be a misapplication of the law." A.G., supra, 344 N.J. Super. at 438. When DYFS's efforts to rehabilitate a biological parent repeatedly fail, "permanent plans must be made for children, justifying the termination of parental rights." J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 7-8. "The object [of termination] is to allow the child the opportunity for a permanent placement with a new family, where the child can grow and thrive with the end goal of adoption." E.P., supra, 196 N.J. at 92.
Next, defendant contends the trial court erred in finding prong three of the statute to have been proven. She argues that DYFS did not provide adequate visitation and did not offer anger management and parenting classes. The record contradicts defendant's contentions. DYFS referred defendant for anger management classes in April and May 2010, and it referred her for parenting classes in May 2010 and March 2011.
Defendant does not challenge the court's finding that there were no alternatives to termination, such as kinship legal guardianship. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 513 (2004).
To satisfy the third prong, DYFS must "undertake diligent efforts to reunite the family . . . [focusing on] assistance to the parent to correct and overcome those circumstances that necessitated the placement of the child into foster care." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 354. "'The diligence of DYFS's efforts . . . is not measured by' whether those efforts were successful." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 452 (quoting D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 393).
Here, DYFS provided reasonable services to defendant in the form of psychological and psychiatric evaluations, substance abuse evaluations, individual therapy, parenting classes, housing assistance, supervised visitation, and transportation assistance. The failure of the reunification plan was primarily due to defendant's inability or refusal to complete the programs to which she was referred. Defendant admitted during an evaluation that she did not attend parenting classes regularly and did not go to the anger management classes.
Defendant has not disputed the adequacy of the mental health and housing services provided by DYFS. She contends visitation was inadequate because it was too short and not offered at her home. Defendant did not take full advantage of the visitation opportunities provided. She argued with staff and caseworkers and regularly took phone calls during her visitation time. The record supports the Family Part's conclusion that DYFS made reasonable efforts to help defendant overcome the circumstances that caused her child's removal.
The fourth requirement of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) "'serves as a fail-safe against termination even where the remaining standards have been met.'" A.R., supra, 405 N.J. Super. at 442 (quoting E.P., supra, 196 N.J. at 108); accord F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 453. It requires a determination of "whether . . . the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with [his] natural parent[] than from the permanent disruption of [his] relationship with [his] foster parent[]." K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 355. DYFS must offer "testimony of a well qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive, objective, and informed evaluation of the child's relationship with [both] the foster parent" and the natural parent. J.C., supra, 129 N.J. at 19.
In this case, the experts found the child is equally attached to defendant and the foster parents, and she will feel the harm of termination of either relationship. Balancing the relative harm of severing either relationship, the Family Part stated:
[The child] has been in placement since November 2009 . . . . The foster parents have provided [her] with a stable home and are committed to adopting her. . . . Expert testimony has also evinced that [the child] has a healthy attachment to her resource family and that any loss that she may suffer does not rise to the level of irreparable harm. . . . The risk of a failed reunification [of defendant and the child] presents a greater harm to ameliorate than the loss [the child] would endure if she were to stay where she currently resides and lose her relationship with her mother.
Defendant primarily relies on J.C. and argues the experts did not conclude that separation from the foster parents would result in "serious and enduring" harm. Ibid. J.C, however, involved circumstances where severing the child's attachment to the foster parents would be the primary source of harm. Id. at 18. Here, the grounds for termination were the shortcomings of the biological parent, not attachment to the foster parents. Moreover, the experts concluded that only the foster parents had the emotional and psychological capacity to remediate the harm, and reunification with the defendant would likely result in the child eventually returning to foster care.
Under the fourth prong, "an important consideration is [a] child's need for permanency. Ultimately, a child has a right to live in a stable, nurturing environment and to have the psychological security that his most deeply formed attachments will not be shattered." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 453 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As with the other three prongs, the Family Part did not err in concluding that DYFS had proven the requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence.
In Point II of her brief, defendant argues that DYFS unlawfully removed the child from her custody when it initially instituted Title Nine proceedings. She contends the emergency removal of the child without court order was unlawful because the child was not in "imminent danger," as required by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29(a).
We reject this argument for three reasons. First, she did not timely appeal from the Title Nine proceedings, which were dismissed on January 31, 2011, after DYFS filed its complaint for guardianship and termination of parental rights under Title Thirty. Second, she presumes incorrectly that a valid Title Nine removal is a predicate to a valid judgment under Title Thirty. The Supreme Court has emphasized that Title Thirty focuses on the child's best interest as opposed to safety, and that a valid Title Nine judgment is only one of five grounds by which the State may seek termination of parental rights. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88, 108-14 (2011); accord N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.P., 408 N.J. Super. 252, 259 (App. Div. 2009), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 153 (2010). The facts of this case support other statutory grounds by which DYFS could have sought termination without a Title Nine judgment.
Finally, the Court recently held that the doctrine of laches forecloses the argument defendant makes. In F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 444-46, the defendant-mother argued that termination of her parental rights was a nullity because DYFS did not first obtain custody of the child by a Title Nine proceeding. The Court applied the doctrine of laches, id. at 444-45, and held "[i]f there is to be a challenge to DYFS's very right to proceed with a termination-of-parental-rights hearing, it must come before the hearing," id. at 445.
We need not address the merits of defendant's argument as to the manner of removal of the child because it does not affect the validity of the Title Thirty judgment.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION