Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0054-15T4
04-29-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. V.R., Defendant-Appellant. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.R., a minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Adrienne Kalosieh, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christie Pazdzierski, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (James J. Gross, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Lihotz and Nugent. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FG-12-57-15. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Adrienne Kalosieh, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christie Pazdzierski, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (James J. Gross, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant V.R. appeals from an August 14, 2015 judgment terminating her parental rights to her five-year-old child, J.R., and awarding guardianship to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) to secure the child's adoption. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing the Division failed to satisfy by clear and convincing evidence the four-part best interests of the child test. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1)-(4). In order to terminate parental rights, the State must demonstrate:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;The "prongs are not discreet and separate," but overlap with each other. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 167 (2010) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 606-07 (2007)).
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N. J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1)-(4).]
"The considerations involved in determinations of parental fitness are 'extremely fact sensitive' and require particularized evidence that address the specific circumstances in the given case." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 139 (1993)). Therefore, a trial judge must relate specific factual findings correlated to each prong of the best interests test. Such findings are essential to underpin any conclusion that parental rights be terminated.
During the three-day guardianship trial, the Division presented testimony from three caseworkers, a psychological expert and introduced numerous documents. Defendant challenged the Division's position by presenting expert psychological testimony. The trial judge reserved decision and later issued an oral opinion stating her findings and conclusions. Addressing the first prong of the best interests test, the judge stated:
There's been a harm to this child at the outset in the sense that the [c]ourt had to remove [the child] because of the risk of harm. Mom had not completed services and
lost her support. So already the children come into the Division's care with that risk of harm or endangerment. And as the case progresses, because mom is not consistent or becomes consistent, and then falls back to being non-consistent, the child becomes more and more difficult to deal with[; h]as to be placed in different locations[; h]as a psychological [examination] to tell [sic] that she's a danger to herself and others. So this harm from a lack of . . . a permanent location and going from house to house becomes more apparent as the case goes on.The judge also found the second prong was satisfied because defendant was "unable to eliminate the harm facing the child, and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm." In coming to this conclusion, the judge emphasized defendant failed to "cure or overcome even the initial harm that endangered the health, safety and welfare of [the child]" as her own expert suggested she needed "additional parenting and support" to care for the child. The Division did present evidence of services extended to defendant and the child aimed toward achieving reunification. The judge found defendant was not progressing enough to avoid further delay of the child's right to a permanent placement. As to whether termination would do more harm than good, the judge relied on the Division's expert, who the judge found more credible than defendant's.
So we start off with the . . . endangering and risk of harm. We . . . see because of mom's slow movement in services, then the new DV where she herself admits to her inability to put her children's needs ahead of herself. . . .
And there's no question at this point that she cannot parent the child. And there's no question at this point that that is . . . harming the child. . . . So I believe that prong one has been met by clear and convincing evidence.
Following our initial review, we note the judge's opinion recites various testimony; however, we are unable to determine the specific findings linked to prongs one and two of the statutory test. The judge's comments are elusive as to the harm to the child, defendant's acts or omissions requiring removal, and whether defendant was unable or unwilling to mitigate that harm. The judge mentions defendant's diagnosed mental health issues but fails to explain how or why defendant's illness impacted the conclusion to terminate parental rights. Further, the judge's opinion does not identify the nature and extent of services offered by providers or discuss how defendant's failure to consistently attend such services bears on the child's present or future safety, security and stability.
"Rule 1:7-4 requires a judge to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law on every [decision] decided by a written order that is appealable by right." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 443 (App. Div. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Fodero v. Fodero, 355 N.J. Super. 168, 170 (App. Div. 2002)). This obligation mandates a trial judge describe, by oral opinion or memorandum decision, all facts, supported by competent evidence in the record, which led to the legal conclusions drawn and also to substantiate the relief awarded to the prevailing party. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980); see R. 1:7-4 (requiring a trial judge to accompany all opinions with findings of fact and conclusions of law).
Because the trial judge's opinion omits critical factual findings to support the conclusions reached, it falls short of the requirements of Rule 1:7-4(a). This gap impedes appellate review, requiring a remand for this specific purpose.
Accordingly, we issue a limited remand in this matter, requiring the trial judge to provide a detailed written statement of reasons addressing each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and to identify the factual support relied upon to order termination of parental rights and judgment of guardianship. The additional statement of findings shall be provided within thirty days. Thereafter, all parties, if desired, may simultaneously submit a supplemental letter brief, not to exceed ten pages, within twenty days of receipt of the judge's findings. We retain jurisdiction.
Remanded.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION