Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1365-13T3 DOCKET NO. A-1660-13T3 DOCKET NO. A-1661-13T3 DOCKET NO. A-1909-13T3
02-19-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. N.L., Defendant-Appellant, and D.W., Defendant. IN THE MATTER OF J.R.D., A Minor. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. N.L. and S.B., Defendants-Appellants. IN THE MATTER OF H.A.B., A Minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant N.L. (Jack L. Weinberg, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for intervenor-appellant and appellant S.B. (Catherine Reid, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jaime Millard-Tindall, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors J.R.D. and H.A.B. (Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Submitted October 6, 2015 - Decided January 7, 2016
Motion for reconsideration granted.
Resubmitted February 9, 2016 - Decided February 19, 2016 Before Judges Hoffman, Leone and Whipple. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, Docket Nos. FN-08-25—11 and FN-08-66-12. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant N.L. (Jack L. Weinberg, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for intervenor-appellant and appellant S.B. (Catherine Reid, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jaime Millard-Tindall, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors J.R.D. and H.A.B. (Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In these four appeals, consolidated for purposes of this opinion by our order dated May 2, 2014, defendant N.L. appeals from Title 9 fact finding orders dated December 20, 2010, and November 5, 2012, determining that she abused or neglected her daughters, J.R.D. (Jennifer) and H.A.B (Holly). Defendant S.B. likewise challenges the Family Part's finding that he abused and neglected his daughter, Holly, and also intervenes in the appeal involving Jennifer to contest the finding that he sexually abused her.
For ease of reference, we utilize pseudonyms for defendants' children. We note here that each child has a different father.
In addition, S.B also appeals from a dispositional order dated December 20, 2010, compliance review orders dated February 10, 2011, and May 6, 2011, a September 9, 2011 protective order, and a May 8, 2013 order amending the September 9, 2011 protective order.
On January 7, 2016, we issued our initial opinion affirming the decisions of the trial court. On January 21, 2016, both defendants filed motions for reconsideration based on the fact that our opinion referenced a previous substantiation of abuse and neglect against S.B. that was later changed to "unfounded." We note that the record documenting this change was presented to this panel, for the first time, as an attachment to the briefs submitted in support of defendants' motions for reconsideration.
On February 8, 2016, we granted defendants' motions for reconsideration, and sua sponte amended the record on appeal to include the record that was the basis for defendants' motions. Having again reviewed the record, as supplemented, we continue to conclude that the Family Part judges' decisions were supported by sufficient credible evidence and are consistent with applicable law. Therefore, we affirm.
I.
We summarize the most pertinent evidence introduced at the fact finding hearings. In March 2007, N.L. gave birth to Jennifer. As an infant, Jennifer was diagnosed with laryngomalacia (a condition in which the soft cartilage of the upper larynx collapses causing airway obstruction), among other health conditions, and consequently required in-home nursing care for sixteen hours per day. In June 2007, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("the Division") received a referral stating that N.L. suffered from bipolar disorder, had no money, was not adequately maintaining her home, and had a history of domestic violence with a former paramour. Although the allegations were deemed unfounded, in July 2007, N.L. voluntarily transferred physical custody of four-month-old Jennifer to N.L.'s grandmother, J.D. (Grandmom). This arrangement continued until mid-to-late 2009, when N.L. regained custody of Jennifer.
In 2010, Jennifer was living with N.L. and S.B., N.L.'s boyfriend, and staying with Grandmom most weekends. Jennifer referred to S.B. as "Daddy," although he was not her biological father. On May 23, 2010, Grandmom reported to the Division that Jennifer told her that S.B. had hit her with a belt. Jennifer also told Grandmom that she needed to use the bathroom because her "flower" (the name she used for her vagina) hurt. Division caseworkers responded based upon the allegation of physical abuse and observed that there were bruises and scratches on Jennifer's back. However, Jennifer was evasive in answering questions, and N.L. stated that the injuries to Jennifer were from her dog. The Division deemed the allegation of physical abuse unfounded.
On August 1, 2010, Jennifer disclosed sexual abuse by S.B. to Grandmom, stating that "daddy put his finger in my flower and my butt." In response, Grandmom asked, "[Y]our daddy put his fingers in your flower?" Jennifer replied, "No, G-G, one finger," and asked, "Why did daddy hurt me?" Grandmom subsequently told N.L., who took Jennifer to the emergency room at Kennedy Hospital. There, Dr. Rachel Burke examined Jennifer and determined that she did not have a urinary or vaginal infection, and that her vaginal mucosa was normal and her hymen intact. Dr. Burke spoke privately with Jennifer, who told her that "daddy put his finger in my flower and my butt" and that this occurred "today . . . in mommy's room."
Dr. Burke informed the Division of the disclosures made by Jennifer and the results of her examination. Division caseworkers responded to N.L.'s home; however, N.L. continued to minimize and deny the abuse. N.L. suggested, rather, that Grandmom had coached Jennifer into fabricating this allegation because she did not like S.B. At Grandmom's home, Jennifer told a caseworker about the sexual abuse, and the Division referred the matter to the Gloucester County Prosecutor's Office. During an interview with an investigator, Jennifer again said that she had been touched on her "flower" and on her butt by S.B. The Division substantiated S.B. for sexual abuse. It also substantiated N.L. for putting Jennifer at risk of further sexual injury, and sought to remove Jennifer. N.L. told Jennifer, "They're taking you away because you're saying bad things about your daddy." On August 4, 2010, the Division filed a verified complaint and order to show cause against N.L., but did not name S.B. as a party because he was not Jennifer's father.
In their motions for reconsideration, defendants indicate that the Division changed this finding to "unfounded" on March 29, 2011, but never notified them of this change until May 2015. At that time, it appears that defendants may have attempted to supplement the record to reflect this change, but their motions were denied. As a result, the record documenting the change to unfounded was not before this panel until defendants filed their reconsideration motions.
At a December 20, 2010 fact finding hearing, Division caseworker Dawn Carruolo described the events that occurred after the Division received the referral from Dr. Burke on August 1, 2010. Although Dr. Burke's physical examination did not show any injury to Jennifer, the Division nonetheless decided to remove Jennifer because she was at risk due to S.B.'s continued presence in the home and N.L.'s attitude towards the allegations. Specifically, N.L.'s statements to Jennifer raised concerns that she would not properly protect Jennifer, and that she would inhibit any further disclosure by Jennifer. Carruolo emphasized that it was rare to find any physical evidence of sexual abuse, and that the lack of injury did not necessarily mean that molestation did not occur.
In addition, Grandmom testified that she grew concerned about Jennifer in April 2010 when she noticed Jennifer "constantly" touching her vagina, using both her fingers and toys. Grandmom believed that this was "in excess" of anything normal. She had also discovered Jennifer with barrettes "clamped" on her breasts. According to Grandmom, this touching behavior continued through July 2010. N.L. did not testify at the hearing or present any witnesses.
Although she was not being asked to make a Title 9 ruling as to S.B., the judge found that S.B. had touched Jennifer in the manner she had described to multiple individuals. In the judge's view, N.L. had demonstrated reckless disregard for Jennifer's safety by failing to engage in appropriate safety planning, and by interfering with the investigation through her statements to Jennifer at the time of her removal. The problem was not just that N.L. did not believe her child, but also that she refused to err on the side of caution and separate Jennifer from S.B., even after receiving information that sexual abuse usually does not leave physical evidence. The judge noted that N.L could have left Jennifer with Grandmom, but was unwilling to take any precautionary measures. The judge entered an order finding that N.L. committed abuse and neglect because Jennifer "was unable to return home because of [S.B.] [being] allowed to stay in the home by [N.L.]," and because "[N.L.] told [Jennifer] you are being taken away because you are saying bad things about your daddy."
Following the hearing, a December 20, 2010 order directed that Jennifer was to remain in the custody of the Division, and that N.L. was to comply with services. No services were ordered for S.B. because he was not Jennifer's biological father or a party to the litigation, and because services would be of no use to him and would not assist in protecting Jennifer. At a February 10, 2011 compliance review hearing, the judge again directed that N.L. was to have only supervised contact — and S.B., no contact — with Jennifer. The judge stated that she would not consider N.L.'s request for S.B. to be joined as a defendant and provided with services at that time. Subsequently at a May 5, 2011 compliance review hearing, the judge denied N.L.'s renewed motion to add S.B. as a defendant, and instructed N.L. to stop referring to S.B. as "Daddy" when she spoke to Jennifer, and to stop passing messages from S.B. to Jennifer.
At a September 9, 2011 permanency hearing, N.L. informed the court that S.B. had moved out of her home earlier that summer, and that she did not know his whereabouts. The judge signed an order authorizing overnight visitation provided N.L. completed an in-home parenting program and consented to an order of protection. The judge also signed a protective order that stated, "Under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.55, [S.B.] is prohibited from the home of [N.L.] and prohibited from any contact with the minor child [Jennifer]. [N.L.] must report any attempt to violate or violation of this order to the police and the Division."
The court improperly imposed restraints on S.B. as a non-party in its September 9, 2011 order. However, as discussed below, that portion of the order was later vacated.
On September 15, 2011, N.L. gave birth to Holly and identified S.B. as the father. The Division intervened and — in addition to serving S.B. with the September 9, 2011 order of protection — created a safety plan which involved S.B. not having any contact with Holly, including at N.L.'s home, apart from supervised visits at a Division office. N.L. signed the plan, but S.B. refused.
On October 24, 2011, the Division received a call that S.B. had been inside N.L.'s home in violation of the safety plan; however, the Division was unable to confirm the report. On October 26, 2011, the Division filed a complaint for care and supervision of H.A.B. with restraints under a separate docket number.
On October 27, 2011, N.L. informed the Division that S.B. had been arrested at her home. A detective explained that S.B. had been arrested and charged with burglary, criminal mischief, theft, and possession of stolen property. The burglary had occurred a few houses down the street from where N.L. resided; S.B. was found and arrested hiding in N.L.'s attic. N.L. admitted to police that she assisted S.B. in the commission of the burglary by loaning her car to him and by allowing him to hide in her home. Additionally, N.L. revealed that there was stolen property hidden in her home.
The Division substantiated both N.L. and S.B. for abuse and neglect and removed Holly on an emergency basis on October 27, 2011. On October 31, 2011, the Division filed an order to show cause and an amended complaint. That same day, the judge awarded custody of Holly to the Division after finding that S.B. was in N.L's home contrary to the September 9, 2011 order and safety plan, and that N.L. did not take steps to protect her children. Following a November 11, 2011 compliance review, the judge entered orders granting N.L. only supervised visitation with both of her children, and S.B. supervised visitation with Holly.
From this point on, the court heard both Jennifer's case (Docket No. FN-08-25-11) and Holly's case (Docket No. FN-08-66-12) together.
On March 6, 2012, the judge entered an order in Holly's case denying the Division's request to proceed with a fact finding hearing against S.B. regarding the sexual abuse allegations against S.B. The judge explained that Jennifer had been interviewed too often and too much time had passed; thus, she would not consider Jennifer's allegations that S.B. abused her.
The judge subsequently held a fact finding hearing on June 20, 2012, regarding the allegation that Holly had been abused and neglected on October 27, 2011. At the hearing, the court learned that S.B. would receive a three-year prison sentence for his burglary-related charges. Division caseworker Jean O'Donnell explained that the safety plan had been predicated upon the September 9, 2011 order entered in Jennifer's case, and also the two sexual abuse substantiations against S.B. She testified that S.B. had admitted to sexually abusing a four-year-old cousin when S.B. was a child. The judge did not immediately make any findings during or after this hearing. On November 5, 2012, the judge issued an order and an accompanying fact finding decision determining that both defendants had abused and neglected Holly, who had been added to the safety plan in Jennifer's case as a protected child. In her findings, the judge found defendants' violations of the September 9, 2011 court order and safety plan had placed both Jennifer and Holly at risk. On June 21, 2012, the judge entered dispositional orders indicating that, because S.B. was out of the home and N.L. was cooperating, Jennifer and Holly would return to N.L.'s custody on June 29, 2012, with the Division retaining care and supervision.
O'Donnell also testified that S.B. was substantiated for this abuse. In his reconsideration motion, S.B. argues that because he was only ten or eleven years old when he abused his cousin, he could not have been substantiated. Whether or not the Division substantiated S.B. is immaterial, given that he admitted abusing his cousin.
The judge found that the October 27, 2011 incident also placed Jennifer at risk even though she was not present in the home at the time. However, the fact finding hearing was only intended to address whether Holly had been abused or neglected on October 27, 2011, so no finding could be or was made that Jennifer was abused or neglected on October 27, 2011. While the judge's finding thus exceeded the proper scope of the hearing, reversal is not required because the fact finding order did not mention Jennifer. --------
On August 17, 2012, the Division substantiated N.L. for environmental neglect because between July 31 and August 1, 2012, workers had found her home to be uninhabitable, with dog urine and feces on the floor, almost no food in the kitchen, dirty dishes piled high in the kitchen sink, and an unusable bedroom for one of the children. Moreover, Jennifer indicated that N.L. was not preparing the children's meals.
At a September 5, 2012 compliance review hearing, the court heard testimony that N.L. was not compliant with services, and that an unknown man was presently living in the home with her. The judge entered orders continuing custody of Jennifer and Holly with N.L., and ordering N.L. to comply with services and to provide a clean and safe home environment.
On November 15, 2012, N.L. gave birth to twins from another father. On November 27, 2012, the Division took custody of all four children on an emergency basis after Division caseworkers discovered that N.L. was regularly sleeping through the day, not complying with services, failing to care for the children, and not maintaining her home. The caseworkers also found a fetus, which N.L. had miscarried, in a bag in her refrigerator. Jennifer — now five-years-old — had not gained any weight since returning to N.L.'s custody, and had missed school and medical appointments. Further, Jennifer was being forced to care for Holly, including washing her clothes and preparing dinners for themselves. On November 29, 2012, the court entered an order granting the Division custody of the children. By March 5, 2012, S.B. had been released to a halfway house. On that date, the court signed an order which directed that "the [o]rder of [p]rotection under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.55, prohibiting [S.B.] to be at or around [N.L.'s] residence [was] to continue and no contact with [Holly] unless at the Division Office."
On May 6, 2013, S.B. moved to vacate the September 9, 2011 order against him in the case involving Jennifer since he was not a party in that case. S.B. also sought to vacate the restraints against him set forth in the March 5, 2012 order in Holly's case. The motion was heard by another judge, who permitted S.B. to intervene in Jennifer's case but only as to the validity of the restraints entered against him, a non-party. The judge concluded that S.B. should have had the opportunity to be heard before the September 9, 2011 order was entered against him. On May 8, 2013, the judge filed an order striking that portion of the September 9, 2011 order which restricted S.B.'s activities. In its place, the judge entered modified language clearly imposing the responsibility upon N.L. to exclude S.B. from her residence and to prohibit her from allowing S.B. to have any contact with Jennifer.
Following an emergency July 11, 2013 hearing, the court suspended N.L.'s visitation with all four children after Jennifer revealed that she had been sexually abused by both S.B. and other men, and that N.L. had threatened to kill her if she spoke of this. At a September 18, 2013 hearing, N.L. voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to her twins. Meanwhile, S.B. remained in a halfway house.
On October 21, 2013, the court entered orders terminating both abuse and neglect cases after the Division filed a complaint for guardianship of Jennifer and Holly. These appeals followed.
II.
As the reviewing court, we are bound to accept the trial court's factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). Although we review legal conclusions by the trial judge de novo, we owe a particular deference to fact finding by family court judges because of their special expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Consequently, we only disturb a family court's findings if they are "so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice." In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms Resorts, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)). In light of these standards, we find no basis to disturb the trial judges' findings of fact, and those findings support their legal conclusions.
A.
N.L. first contends that the trial judge erred in finding that she abused and neglected Jennifer when she refused to believe Jennifer's disclosure of inappropriate touching and require that S.B. leave her home. We disagree.
Under Title 9, after a child has been temporarily removed from his or her parent's custody, a fact finding hearing must be held to determine whether the Division has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the child was abused or neglected. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.44; N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 32 (2011). When "there is no evidence of actual harm, . . . the statute requires a showing of 'imminent danger' or a 'substantial risk' of harm before a parent or guardian can be found to have abused or neglected a child." N.J. Dep't of Children & Families v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 8 (2013) (citation omitted). Specifically, Title 9 provides that an "abused or neglected" child is also one "whose physical, mental, or emotional condition . . . is in imminent danger of becoming impaired" as the result of the failure of his or her parent to exercise a minimum degree of care in, among other things, "providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship," or by "unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).
In determining whether action or inaction constitutes abuse or neglect, the court must base its decision on the totality of the circumstances. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320, 329 (App. Div. 2011). An inquiry under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 must focus on the harm to the child, rather than on the intent of the caregiver. G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 181-82 (1999).
N.L. contends that the evidence presented by the Division was inadequate to prove there was any imminent danger to Jennifer. She insists there was no evidence to justify a finding that S.B. abused Jennifer, and that Jennifer's out-of-court statements were not properly corroborated. We disagree with these contentions, and conclude that the record clearly supports the trial court's findings.
"[P]revious statements made by the child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence; provided, however, that no such statement, if uncorroborated, shall be sufficient to make a fact finding of abuse or neglect." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). Because there is no direct physical or testimonial evidence in most child sexual abuse cases, evidence of age-inappropriate sexual behavior by the alleged victim can provide the necessary corroboration required by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2002). Age-inappropriate behavior such as precocious sexual knowledge and abnormal and sexualized behavior is one of the behavioral signs associated with child sexual abuse. Id. at 436; State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 563-64 (1993).
Jennifer's abnormal, sexualized behavior, as described by Grandmom, was sufficient to corroborate the many disclosures that Jennifer made throughout the weekend of July 31 to August 1, 2010. Grandmom confirmed that three-year-old Jennifer's obsessive touching of her vagina, even in the presence of strangers, was a new behavior as of April 2010 and continued through July 2010. Furthermore, Dr. Burke counseled N.L. at length that the lack of physical evidence did not necessarily mean that the abuse had not occurred, and it was only N.L. who definitively stated that her dog had bruised Jennifer. As such, any inference premised on Jennifer lacking physical signs of abuse is without merit.
As noted by the trial court, N.L. needed only to ask S.B. to leave or ask Grandmom to care for Jennifer in order to provide Jennifer with a safe living environment. However, N.L. repeatedly refused to put her daughter first. Rather, she attempted to silence Jennifer by: 1) scaring her at Grandmom's apartment; 2) angrily blaming her for the removal; and 3) telling her that nothing had happened to her. As such, the record contains sufficient credible evidence supporting the conclusion that N.L. abused and neglected Jennifer by failing to provide her with a safe home and placing her in imminent risk of harm.
B.
N.L. further contends that she was denied her due process rights when the trial court refused to join S.B. in the initial action regarding Jennifer. We disagree.
N.L. argues that "[w]ithout . . . S.B. present in the court room and participating in a defense of the allegations of sexual abuse," she was denied the ability to adequately defend against the allegations that she was not willing to provide a safe home for Jennifer. To the contrary, the fact that S.B. was not a party to the initial abuse or neglect proceeding about Jennifer did not violate N.L.'s due process rights. S.B. was not a party in the Title 9 proceedings because he was not Jennifer's parent or caretaker. Moreover, N.L. could have called S.B. as a witness to testify on her behalf. Accordingly, N.L.'s contentions are without merit.
C.
N.L. next argues that the trial court erred in finding that she neglected Holly on October 27, 2011. She insists that there was only a "minor infraction" of the September 9, 2011 order and subsequent safety plan, and that Holly was never in any imminent risk of harm. We disagree.
Rather, the record supports the trial court's finding that N.L. failed to protect Holly from risk of harm from S.B. by ignoring the safety plan and letting S.B. reside in her home. Based upon the repeated sightings of S.B. at N.L.'s home, S.B.'s statement to police that he resided with N.L., N.L.'s admission to police that S.B. had been in her home the night of the burglary, and the presence of S.B.'s stolen goods in N.L.'s home, the trial court properly rejected N.L.'s contention that S.B.'s presence in her home on October 27, 2011, was merely a one-time occurrence reflecting a minor lapse in judgment.
N.L. was not credible, she violated a safety plan, and she demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to protect her children from a known sexual predator. As such, we reject N.L.'s contentions and affirm the trial court's finding that she neglected Holly on October 27, 2011.
D.
S.B. contends that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court's factual finding that he sexually abused Jennifer. Like N.L., he maintains that Jennifer's allegations were not properly corroborated. He also argues that his due process rights were violated when he was not made a party to the Title 9 action, and then again when the trial court restricted his movements as part of its September 9, 2011 order. S.B. insists that, absent the trial court's improper imposition of this invalid order, he never would have been later found to have abused and neglected Holly.
As noted, we agree with the trial court that Jennifer's statements were properly corroborated and admissible at the Title 9 hearing, and that the trial court properly relied upon them in finding that S.B. posed a threat to Jennifer's safety. S.B.'s due process rights were not violated because he was not sanctioned in the Title 9 proceedings. Thus, S.B.'s challenges to that proceeding lack merit.
While the court did improperly impose restraints on S.B., a non-party, in its September 9, 2011 order, that portion of the order was later vacated. Essentially, S.B. now argues that the safety plan to protect Holly, which he subsequently violated, was only put in place because of this flawed order. However, the safety plan was put into place not only because the Division substantiated S.B. for abusing Jennifer, but also because S.B. had admitted to sexually abusing another child, a young cousin. Accordingly, the safety plan was not put into place in error, but to address the Division's very legitimate concerns. Regardless, S.B. had no right to violate an in-place safety plan, even if it was predicated on a later vacated substantiation. See State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 159 n.3 (2004) ("It goes without saying that although failure to meet the technical and substantive requirements for a restraining order results in an invalid order, the order nonetheless has legal effect until vacated."); see also State v. Roberts, 212 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that defendant must obey court order even if order is later vacated for lack of jurisdiction); State v. Masculin, 355 N.J. Super. 250, 258 (Ch. Div. 2002) (holding that defendant may not ignore procedurally defective temporary restraining order). We see no basis here to grant relief.
E.
Additionally, S.B. contends that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court's Title 9 finding that he abused and neglected Holly. S.B. insists that there was no evidence that his mere entry into N.L.'s home on one occasion in order to evade the police placed Holly in imminent danger. We disagree.
The record reflects that S.B. had repeatedly violated the safety plan by his presence in N.L.'s home throughout October 2011. Simply put, S.B. was not permitted in N.L.'s home, yet he was found and arrested there, and had contraband hidden there, despite knowing there was a safety plan. His actions consequently created the opportunity to have unsupervised contact with Holly.
Defendants' remaining appellate arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed on all appeals. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION