Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4742-14T4 DOCKET NO. A-4743-14T4
11-01-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. M.D. and J.S., Defendants-Appellants. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.S., a minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant M.D. in A-4743-14 (Carol A. Weil, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.S. in A-4742-14 (Jeanne Screen, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Martin B. Gandelman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for the minor (Sean Lardner, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Reisner, Rothstadt and Sumners. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Cape May County, Docket No. FG-5-23-14. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant M.D. in A-4743-14 (Carol A. Weil, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.S. in A-4742-14 (Jeanne Screen, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Martin B. Gandelman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for the minor (Sean Lardner, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendants M.D. (mother) and J.S. (father) appeal from a June 8, 2015 order terminating their parental rights to their daughter A.S. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) and the Law Guardian contend that the order should be affirmed. After reviewing the record in light of the applicable legal standards, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge John R. Rauh in his oral opinion issued on June 8, 2015, and his supplemental written opinion filed on July 8, 2015.
The pertinent evidence was set forth in Judge Rauh's opinion and need not be repeated here in detail. The child, who was born on December 17, 2012, has never lived with defendants, due to their longstanding substance abuse problems and their repeated periods of incarceration. The child was born with opiates in her system. The Division took custody of the child after the mother refused to allow the hospital to treat the baby's withdrawal symptoms. The child was released from the hospital on January 29, 2013, and the Division placed her with a capable foster family, with whom she has lived ever since. The child has bonded with the foster parents, who wish to adopt her, and she would experience severe emotional harm if removed from their care.
On the other hand, the child has no parent-child bond with defendants. In fact, their visitation rights were suspended in May 2014, due to their repeated failure to attend scheduled visits with the child. Although the court held a series of status hearings thereafter, neither parent asked the court to reinstate visitation prior to the guardianship trial. Neither parent completed the many services the Division offered to them. Both parents were incarcerated at the time of the trial. According to the Division's expert psychologist, defendants were unlikely to overcome their addictions and other life challenges in the foreseeable future, and certainly not in time to meet the child's need for a permanent home. Defendants did not present any witnesses at the trial.
Judge Rauh concluded that the Division had satisfied all four prongs of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). He found that termination of defendants' parental rights "is the only safe alternative and is certainly in the child's best interest."
On this appeal, M.D. presents the following points of argument:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY TERMINATING THE MOTHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS BECAUSE ALTERNATIVES TO TERMINATION AND ADOPTION WERE NOT TIMELY CONSIDERED, AND BECAUSE VISITATION WAS WRONGLY DENIED WHILE SHE WAS INCARCERATED
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL FINDING THAT DCPP HAD SATISFIED THE SECOND AND THIRD PRONGS OF THE BEST INTERESTS TEST WAS ERROR IN LIGHT OF DCPP'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE [M.D.'s] CONTINUING PURSUIT OF SERVICES WHILE INCARCERATED
POINT III
THE ORDER TERMINATING THE MOTHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE DIVISION FAILED TO PROVE THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD NOT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD
J.S. presents these points of argument in his brief:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING THE FATHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS TO HIS DAUGHTER IN THIS CASE WHERE THE DIVISION FAILED TO MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO THE FATHER TO FACILITATE VISITATION AND FAILED TO EXPLORE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE CAREGIVERS
A. The Trial Court's Finding that the State Had Met Its Burden of Establishing Prong Three of the Best-Interest Standard Is Not Supported By Sufficient Credible Evidence In the Record
B. The Trial Court's Finding that the State Had Met Its Burden of Establishing Prong Four of the Best-Interest Standard Is Not Supported By Sufficient Credible Evidence in the Record
We find no merit in any of defendants' arguments. Defendants concede that their visitation rights were suspended due to their failure to attend visits with the child, but they both argue that once they became incarcerated the Division should nonetheless have brought the child to visit them in prison. Defendants also contend that the agency should have considered placing the child with family friends whose names the mother provided shortly before the trial. The Division declined to consider the friends, because by that time the child had bonded with the foster parents.
Based on our review of the record, we find that Judge Rauh's decision is supported by substantial credible evidence. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). We also conclude that defendant's appellate arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION