Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4563-14T4
04-13-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. L.M.M., Defendant-Appellant, and L.F., D.D. and E.C., Defendants. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.L.F., J.A.F. and E.M.F., Minors.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Janet A. Allegro, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton-Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Laura A. Dwyer, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor J.L.F. (David Valentin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fasciale, Nugent and Higbee. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FG-04-137-15. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Janet A. Allegro, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton-Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Laura A. Dwyer, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor J.L.F. (David Valentin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant L.M.M. appeals from a May 21, 2015 judgment of guardianship terminating his parental rights to his son J.L.F., and placing him in the custody of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division). Defendant contends the Division failed to prove each prong of the best interests of the child standard, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), by clear and convincing evidence, and that he was deprived of a fair psychological evaluation because it was not conducted by a Spanish-speaking psychologist. After reviewing the arguments presented in light of the evidence presented to the trial court and the prevailing legal standards, we affirm.
We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's involvement with defendant. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in Judge Francine I. Axelrad's comprehensive oral opinion set forth on the record. We add the following brief comments.
The record demonstrates defendant was aware of J.L.F.'s birth, and as the judge noted, "took a laissez-faire attitude and left everything to the natural mother." He did not promote himself as an option to the Division. It was not until after he became aware that the mother was not complying with the Division that he introduced himself as an option; however, that was after he had substantially failed to participate in services or appear in court, and failed to undertake a substance abuse evaluation. In short, defendant was aware of the Division's involvement with the child at the time the child was born, and did not introduce himself as an option or seek to comply with the Division until very late in the process.
In addition to failing to present himself as an option earlier in the process, defendant also had significant issues with unstable housing. The judge credited the Division's expert, Dr. Linda Jeffrey, who found that defendant "was not attuned to the reality of [J.L.F.]." The expert opined further that defendant considered J.L.F. "essentially a chattel for him to get gratification[,]" and that defendant "exhibited poor judgment [and] lack of personal insight[,]" which prevented defendant from providing "a safe, stable parenting environment." The judge noted "Dr. Jeffrey concluded, [based] on a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that [defendant] displays adjustment disorder and personality disorder problems that are likely to adversely affect and decrease his parenting capacity."
As a result, the judge credited Dr. Jeffrey's conclusion that defendant cannot provide a minimal level of safe parenting for the child and the child faces a risk of harm in defendant's care. The expert also noted that separating the child from the foster parents could result in harm to the child if not skillfully handled, and that defendant did not have the skill to achieve such a transition.
The judge carefully reviewed the evidence presented, and thereafter concluded that the Division had met, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the legal requirements for a judgment of guardianship. Her opinion tracks the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), accords with In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999), and New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986), and is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). We therefore affirm for the reasons the judge expressed in her well-reasoned opinion.
In light of the substantial credible evidence in the record amply supporting the judge's thorough oral opinion, we conclude defendant's argument the judge erred by failing to expressly consider New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 150 (2010), lacks sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A), (E). --------
We reject defendant's argument the he was deprived of a fair psychological evaluation because it was not performed by a Spanish-speaking psychologist. It is undisputed that defendant had the benefit of an interpreter throughout the pendency of the evaluation. Defendant "confirmed that the information and answers provided on the written information form were accurate, true, and complete and indicated he understood that this information may be included in the report of this psychological evaluation and may be reviewed by the [c]ourt."
Defendant speculates it is possible that because the interpreter was not a psychologist, there was a risk that "such specific psychological information" could have been wrongly interpreted. However, defendant offers no credible, specific examples of what was misinterpreted, leaving only a conclusory and amorphous allegation. Defendant argues that he "may have not felt comfortable asking questions of the interpreter and not the psychologist." Again, defendant points to no evidence that he expressed such concern at any point during the evaluation. As defendant was provided with an interpreter and cannot point to any specific prejudice, we reject his argument that he was denied a fair evaluation.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION