Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3747-14T4 DOCKET NO. A-4748-14T4
04-20-2016
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. A.J. and R.J., Defendants-Appellants. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF R.L.J., a Minor.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant R.J. in A-3747-14 (Richard Sparaco, Designated counsel, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant A.J. in A-4748-14 (Richard Foster, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Arielle E. Katz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for the minor (Joseph H. Ruiz, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Alvarez and Haas. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FG-13-55-14. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant R.J. in A-3747-14 (Richard Sparaco, Designated counsel, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant A.J. in A-4748-14 (Richard Foster, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Arielle E. Katz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for the minor (Joseph H. Ruiz, Designated Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendants A.J. and R.J. appeal from an April 1, 2015 decision terminating their parental rights to their son, R.L.J., who was three and a half years old at the time of the guardianship trial. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Terence P. Flynn, J.S.C., in his detailed and cogent decision rendered from the bench.
The evidence is outlined in detail in the judge's opinion. We summarize the salient facts. When the child was born in 2011, A.J. claimed she had been able to abstain from drug use for three months before his birth. She has wrestled with drug addiction and mental health issues years prior to and in the time following the child's birth. Plaintiff New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) had an action pending against A.J. for the removal of her older child when R.L.J. was born. A.J. had no stable home at the time. R.L.J. was removed at birth. He was initially placed with the same foster family as the older sibling. For a brief time thereafter, he was placed with a family member of his father, but on July 22, 2013, he was placed with his current resource family. They are committed to adoption.
Although more thoroughly documented as to A.J., R.J. also has long-standing problems with drug addiction. A.J. has been charged and jailed intermittently for minor offenses, such as shoplifting, but R.J., then forty-one years old, reported to a Division therapist a lengthy history of incarceration, including for drug distribution. He was actually imprisoned at the time of the final hearing, with a likely parole date in 2017.
Since the inception of these proceedings, both parents have been referred to many drug evaluations, screens, and programs. Neither party has completed the inpatient substance abuse programs that were recommended. R.J. never began one. They have been terminated from various outpatient programs, been found to have used a variety of illegal substances, including heroin, have not worked, have moved from motel to friend's apartment to motel, and visited the child only intermittently.
The Division presented evidence that the child appears to be thriving in the current placement. Karen Wells, Psy.D., conducted bonding evaluations during which she concluded that although she could not "unequivocally . . . [state] that R.L.J. would suffer enduring and irreparable harm if he were removed from [his resource parents] . . . the emotional and psychological difficulties, including a sense of bewilderment, confusion, and grief, [sic] [R.L.J.] would experience . . . should not be underestimated." Although R.L.J. showed an attachment to his mother, any loss he would experience from the termination of that relationship would be minimal as compared to the potential trauma of the loss of the secure attachment he enjoys with his foster parents. Because of his incarceration, no bonding evaluation of R.J. was completed.
Dr. Wells also expressed substantial concern regarding the limited ability the parents demonstrated to care for themselves, much less for a child. She expressed concern about R.J.'s mental state, and inability, as the judge described it, "to provide even minimal parental care and responsibility for [the child]"; she was also concerned that because of his perception of his future as "dark and bleak," there was a strong likelihood of recidivism. As to A.J., the doctor said that it was likely her "depression, loneliness and isolation are getting worse." Her emotional condition, and intention to cohabit with the child's father upon his release from prison, raised the likelihood of continuing drug use.
In his comprehensive opinion, the trial judge found the Division had proven by clear and convincing evidence all four prongs of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). He concluded that termination of defendants' parental rights was in the child's best interests.
On this appeal, our review of the trial judge's decision is limited. We defer to his expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998), and we are bound by his factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)).
After our review, we consider the trial judge's factual findings to be fully supported by the record. His legal conclusions are unassailable. The Division carried its burden as to every prong of the statutory test.
We briefly address A.J.'s separate contention that the trial judge erred in questioning Division witnesses regarding her health problems, and that by doing so, violated A.J.'s procedural due process rights. The questioning was not objected to at trial. She also contends that the court erred by stating that she suffered from deep-seated depression, asserting that the characterization was not supported by the expert's report. A.J. concedes the report and the testimony generally reflected she suffered from depression, and feelings of melancholy.
In this case, however, the expert did note that A.J.'s substance abuse, unresolved emotional health issues, and continuing relationship with R.J. left her unable to parent. Whether A.J. suffered from an unresolved mental health issue that merits the label of clinical depression is of no moment. The important point on which the judge properly relied is that A.J.'s mental health issues kept her from being able to safely parent her child. That the trial judge referred to those mental health issues as deep-seated depression does not rise to the level of error. His conclusion that her emotional health issues, as described by the expert, warranted termination of her parental rights was clearly supported by the record.
Additionally, nothing prohibits a trial judge from, during a bench trial and within reason, questioning a witness. State v. O'Brien, 200 N.J. 520, 534 (2009). No boundaries were breached here. The judge's conduct was not error, much less plain error. See R. 2:10-2 ("Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is . . . clearly capable of producing an unjust result.").
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION