Summary
affirming district court's dismissal of a civil rights suit brought by a father dissatisfied with state court's termination of telephonic visitation
Summary of this case from Dreibelbis v. YoungOpinion
No. 07-2866.
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 September 20, 2007.
Filed: October 4, 2007.
Appeal From the United States District Court For the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-00142) District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell.
Before: McKEE, FUENTES AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
OPINION
James E. Nixon appeals from the dismissal of his complaint by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Nixon is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Rockview State Correctional Institution at Bellefonte, Pennsylvania. He filed his complaint in District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, referencing his unsuccessful proceedings in the state courts concerning visitation with his two children who are under the care of the Tioga County Department of Human Services. During his incarceration, Nixon had telephone contact with his children, but in March 2003, after a hearing, the Tioga County Court of Common Pleas suspended his telephone visitation. Nixon later filed a petition for visitation, which was denied after a hearing in February 2004. Nixon appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. In his brief, he argued, among other things, that he was denied due process because he was not notified of the February 2004 hearing, and thus he could not present evidence and rebut the testimony of the Tioga County Department of Human Services witnesses. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision in September 2004. Nixon unsuccessfully filed with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for allowance of appeal. On January 24, 2005, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Nixon's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Nixon referred to the appellate proceedings docketed in the Pennsylvania Superior Court at 345 MDA 2004, and in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at 211 MM 2004. The background information is supplied by the state court materials filed in those proceedings.
Nixon then filed his civil rights complaint, dated January 20, 2007, asserting that the defendants lied, covered up mistakes or negligent acts, falsified documents related to his children, or made slanderous comments about him in connection with the state court proceedings. He sought reinstatement of visitation privileges with his youngest child and punitive damages. The District Court granted Nixon's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based upon theRooker-Feldman doctrine. Nixon filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. Nixon appeals and proceeds in forma pauperis on appeal.
The doctrine is named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review of the District Court's application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Nixon asserted in his motion for reconsideration that the defendants' lies, perjury, and defamatory statements violated his civil rights as a father and a citizen of the United States. However, despite Nixon's apparent attempt in his motion for reconsideration to raise claims not barred byRooker-Feldman by asserting that he filed suit seeking redress for the wrongs committed by the defendants, we are hard-pressed to agree. This is especially true given that Nixon's motion for reconsideration invited the District Court to review the state court record and transcripts and that his complaint specifically sought reinstatement of the suspended visitation rights. Though Nixon's allegations are phrased in terms of the defendants' actions during the state court proceedings, the injury for which he seeks redress was caused by the state court judgment. Thus, we conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over these claims. See Holt v. Lake County Bd. of Comm'rs, 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2005) (a litigant may not circumvent the effect of Rooker-Feldman by styling the complaint as a civil rights action) (per curiam).
Moreover, we note that several of the defendants appear to be private individuals, including the children's natural mother. To the extent that Nixon attempted to raise independent civil rights claims not barred by Rooker-Feldman, it does not appear that any such claims could be stated under section 1983, because there were was no suggestion in the complaint that those individuals acted under color of state law.
Because we conclude that his appeal presents us with no substantial question, see Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we will summarily affirm the District Court's order.